Wisselende grense: visuele kuns en alledaagse aktiwiteit

Kontemporêre visuele kuns sluit toenemend aktiwiteite in wat die terrein van alledaagse aktiwiteit betree. Insgelyks penetreer estetiese begrippe wat voorheen tot die kunsdissipline beperk was die sfeer van bestaansroetine en selfs beroepsterreine soos besigheidsbestuur wat voorheen as onversoenbaar met die kunste beskou was. Die gevolg is dat die konvensionele grense tussen kunsaktiwiteit, en enige ander aktiwiteit, ook die skryf van tekste oor die visuele kuns, onder druk verkeer en ernstige vrae oor die wesenlike inhoud van kuns en selfs die behoud van die kategorie ‘kuns’ ontstaan. Met, as vertrekpunt, die uitsprake en kunsaktiwiteite van die Duitse ‘beeldhouer’, Joseph Beuys, word 'n oorsig aangebied van die wisselwerking tussen visuele kunsvorme en ander alledaagse aktiwiteite. Die implikasies van hierdie transgressie van grense vir oproepe om 'n her-mitologisering van kuns en die aansluitende rekonstruksie van die waardestelsels van die gemeenskap word uit 'n aantal perspektiewe belig, en enkele aansluitende filosofiese interpretasies van die funksie en doel van kunsaktiwiteit word gebruik om die begrip 'artistieke deelname' in reliëf te plaas.     

Erotiek,religie en geweld: die eksessiewe in Peter Shaffer se Equus

Abstract

Die artikel voer aan dat die eroties-oordadige wat vir George Bataille 'n religieuse aangeleentheid was maar ook setel in die domein van geweld, 'n gepaste teoretiese agtergrond verskaf waarteen Peter Shaffer se Equus (1977) gelees kan word, 'n drama wat onmiddellik opval vanweë die vermenging van die erotiese, passievolle aanbidding en geweldadige vernietiging. Daar sal aangetoon word dat die oordadige, die nuttelose en die oortollige eienskappe is van Bataille se religio-erotiese aangeleentheid waarmee hy deurentyd poog om die dubbele negatief van Hegel te ontkom deur die grense van sinteses te verbreek. Of die grense van sinteses wel suksesvol verbreek word, is dit noodsaaklik om Bataille se begrip van die diskontinue en die kontinue, die profane en die heilige, die orgie en offering te ondersoek. Deur hierdie konsepte toe te pas op Equus kom die karakters Dysart, Frank, en Dora voor as diskontinue wesens van die profane wêreld en Alan as die kontinue wese wat eksessief en geweldadig leef. Mikhail Bakhtin se analise van François Rabelais se wêreld van die populêre Middeleeuse karnaval waar oordaad, feesviering, gelag en omkering van orde prominent figureer, word ter aansluiting gebruik met Bataille se teorie en dien as ondersteuning met die lees van Equus.     

Anti-Christelike ‘ateïsme’ en anti-Semitisme by Friedrich Nietzsche

Die werke van Renan, Stöcker en Dühring het 'n belangrike rol in die vestiging van anti-Semitisme in Duitsland gespeel. Nietzsche neem aan die politieke debat van sy tyd deel deur swaarde met hierdie drie te kruis. Teen die agtergrond hiervan word in hierdie artikel die standpunt verdedig dat Nietzsche se ateïsme 'n totale afwysing van die anti-Semitisme behels—of daardie anti-Semitisme nou in 'n ‘Christelike’ of 'nie-Christelike' gewaad geklee was. In sy Genealogy of morals en Anti-Christ, maak hy gebruik van 'n genealogiese strategie waarmee hy die standpunt dat die anti-Semitisme, die Christendom en die Judaïsme van die priesters 'n familie-verwantskap het, verdedig. Hulle word gekenmerk deur ressentiment, oftewel 'n gemeenskaplike morele verwysingsraamwerk. Sy ateïsme is 'n poging om verby (anderkant) hierdie verwysingsraamwerk te beweeg.     

Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning1

Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semantics. Although I am largely convinced by Stanley’s objections to epistemic contextualism, I will try in what follows to formulate a version that might have some prospect of escaping his powerful critique.     

Hume on the Distinction of Reason

This paper concerns Hume’s treatment of the distinction of reason in the Treatise, I.i.7. Many scholars have claimed that there is a tension between his account of the distinction of reason and his commitment to his so-called separability principle. I explain why Hume’s account of the distinction of reason is fully consistent with the principle, and show how other discussions, both critical of and sympathetic to Hume, fail to appreciate the radicalness of his position. I evaluate Hume’s bold position and compare it to earlier positions (Aquinas) and current positions (Donald Davidson).     

Does Conversation Need Shared Language? Davidson and Gadamer on Communicative Understanding

In a rare discussion of Gadamer's work, Davidson takes issue with Gadamer's claim that successful communication requires that interlocutors share a common language. While he is right to see a difference between his own views and Gadamer's on this point, Davidson appears to have misunderstood what motivates Gadamer's position, conflating it with that of his more familiar conventionalist interlocutors. This paper articulates Gadamer's view of the role of language in communicative understanding as an alternative to both Davidson's and that of the conventionalist writers Davidson critiques. It is argued, first, that Gadamer employs a conception of what individuates a language, and thus of what it means for two speakers to “share” a language, that Davidson never considers. By emphasizing the role of “application” in the historical development of languages, Gadamer develops a view in which languages are distinguished not by their particular semantic or syntactic rules, but by subtle differences between the concepts they express. Second, it is argued that the instances of “asymmetrical” communication—communication between interlocutors who have different sets of concepts at their disposal—that motivate Gadamer's position pose a challenge to Davidson's account of interpretative charity.     

Can There be Thought Without Words?—Donald Davidson on Language and Animal Minds

In a couple of short papers, Donald Davidson holds that a creature cannot think unless it is the interpreter of the speech of another. At first blush, speaking a language is, therefore, a necessary condition for thought. His controversial claims has led many to regard him as a follower of the Cartesian tradition wherein languageless creatures are nothing but mindless machines. Against this widely shared interpretation, in this paper we put forward a more charitable interpretation of Davidson’s claims. According to our reading, Davidson never meant to argue that languageless creatures do not think. Instead, the only thing his arguments purport to show is that one will never be in a position to confirm that they do. This paper consists of a defense of the idea that Davidson is better seen as endorsing radical skepticism as to whether languageless creatures think.

     

Kuhn as Perspectival Realist

In this essay I argue that T. S. Kuhn, at least in his later works, can be regarded as a perspectival realist. This is a retrospective interpretation based mainly on the essays published posthumously under the title The Road Since Structure (Kuhn 2000). Among the strongest grounds for this interpretation is that Kuhn explicitly states that one must have a “lexicon” in place before raising questions about the truth or falsity of claims made using elements of the lexicon. This, in a linguistic framework, can be understood as an affirmation of perspectival realism. The essay concludes with an examination of Donald Davidson’s famous paper, “On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” arguing, along lines Kuhn himself suggested, that Davidson’s presentation is no threat to his notion of a conceptual scheme, or, I would add, a theoretical perspective.     

Davidson and Sellars on “Two Images”

Davidson’s anomalous monism is based on the assumption that a human being can be described or accounted for in two very different ways, using two very different and indeed incommensurable conceptual frameworks, namely the physicalistic vocabulary of science and the mentalistic vocabulary employed by the ‘theories’ we make about each other when we interact and communicate. Also Sellars maintains that we have two alternative pictures of the world and especially of us humans as its parts, namely the scientific image and the manifest image. At first sight, the views of the two philosophers may seem quite similar; however, the true extent of this apparent similarity is worth exploring. To that end, in this paper we tackle the following questions: Are Sellars’ reasons for claiming the irreducibility of his manifest image to the scientific image the same or similar to those that Davidson has for asserting the irreducibility of his mentalistic idiom to the scientific one? Is the normativity informing Sellars’ manifest image of the same kind as that informing Davidson’s mentalistic idiom? Do the notions of rationality considered by Sellars and Davidson coincide?     

More than belief,but not more than belief and desire

Manuel A. Vásquez’ More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion paints a rich picture of what a ‘non-reductive materialist framework for the study of religion’ would look like. Although it receives strong motivation from the inability of the predominant meta-approaches of theorizing religion to take seriously a range of materially grounded religious phenomena, it suffers somewhat from a lack of independent and autonomous argumentation. This article explores a convergence between Vásquez’ main points and the basic elements of one of the most influential positions within philosophical semantics – namely the semantic holism of Donald Davidson. Because Davidson's holism (assuming its correctness) provides constraints on all forms of theorizing, the fact that Vásquez’ position, unlike the ones he critiques, conforms to those constraints lends it a degree of rational presumption.     

New Confucianism and the semantics of individuality. a Luhmannian analysis

This article discusses New Confucian views on individuality and related philosophical problems. Special emphasis is given to the position of Tu Wei‐Ming (Du Weiming), a foremost living New Confucian thinker. It is pointed out that many New Confucian philosophers share a vision of a Confucian ‘ideal’ individuality or selfhood based on social integration – as opposed to a Western type of individuality sometimes portrayed as an individuality by isolation. These patterns of individuality are further examined on the basis of Niklas Luhmann's historical analysis of the semantics of individuality and his categories of ‘individuality by inclusion’ and ‘individuality by exclusion’. Finally, some parallels and differences between Confucian and the Luhmannian viewpoints are pointed out, and a suggestion on how a Luhmannian perspective might contribute to reformulations of New Confucian thought is attempted.     

Triangulation,Untranslatability, and Reconciliation

Donald Davidson used triangulation to do everything from explicate psychological and semantic externalism, to attack relativism and skepticism, to propose conditions necessary for thought and talk. At one point Davidson tried to bring order to these remarks by identifying three kinds of triangulation, each operative in a different situation. Here I take seriously Davidson’s talk of triangular situations and extend it. I start by describing Davidson’s situations. Next I establish the surprising result that considerations from one situation entail the possibility that at any one time one language is partially untranslatable into another. Because the possibility is time-indexed, it need not conflict with Davidson’s own argument against the possibility of untranslatability. I derive the result, not to indict Davidson, but to propose a new kind of triangulation, the reconciliation of untranslatability, which I investigate. Insofar as triangulation is central to Davidson’s views, getting a handle on his various triangular situations is key to getting a handle on his contributions to philosophy. Insofar as those contributions have enriched our understanding of how language, thought, and reality interrelate, extending Davidson’s model promises to extend our understanding too.

Understanding and appreciating metaphors

We consider three theories that have dominated discussions of metaphor. One view is that metaphors make comparisons, the basis for the comparison being the features (or categories) that the terms of the metaphor share. The second view is that metaphors involve an anomaly. The third view is that metaphors are ‘interactive’, producing a new way of seeing the terms. We propose a new theory—the domains-interaction view—that draws on elements of all three earlier views, but borrows especially from the interaction view. We consider the implications of our theory for three questions: What are metaphors? How are they understood? What makes a good metaphor? We argue that metaphors correlate two systems of concepts from different domains. The best metaphors involve two diverse domains (more distance between domains making for better metaphors) and close correspondence between the terms within those domains. We call the degree of correspondence within-domain similarity. Metaphors are interpreted in several stages: the terms of the metaphor are encoded; the domains involved are inferred; the structures to be seen as parallel are found; the correspondences between these structures are ‘mapped’ or constructed; the terms of the metaphor are compared. If the terms are not seen to match or occupy analogous roles in their different domains, then the metaphor may be reinterpreted. The evidence on all this is tentative but supports our view. We review two studies (Tourangeau and Sternberg, 1981) that support the hypothesis that distance within domain relates negatively to aptness, whereas distance between domains relates positively. Several studies on comprehension tend to disconfirm the comparison theory's notion that the tenor and vehicle necessarily share features. Tenor and vehicle also appear to have asymmetrical roles in the interpretive process.     

Crossing the Finite Provinces of Meaning. Experience and Metaphor

Schutz’s references to literature and arts in his theoretical works are manifold. But literature and theory are both a certain kind of a finite province of meaning, that means they are not easily accessible from the paramount reality of everyday life. Now there is another kind of referring to literature: metaphorizing it. Using it, as may be said with Lakoff and Johnson, to understand and to experience one kind of thing in terms of another. Literally metapherein means “to carry over”. Metaphorizing in this view is then a specific kind of border-crossing between different provinces of meaning. That poses two questions: 1. What means finiteness of those provinces of meaning, what kind of border crossings are possible? What is the ground for metaphorizing meaning? 2. Could this concept used for founding a theory of the constitution of the societal and of society, that overcomes the dichotomy of structure/agency? These questions will be answered with one example in view: Schutz’ report to Kaufmann of his first visit of Husserl describing his experience as feeling like Wilhelm Meister at the Society of the Tower. In a first step this metaphor is presented together with some crumbs of metaphor theory. In a second step these crumbs will be connected to Husserl’s concept of experience. After developing a short overview over Schutz’ “finite provinces of meaning,” the relation of experience, metaphors to the intersubjectivity of these provinces in their dependence from writing and printing is discussed.     

On the nature of meaning and its indeterminacy: Davidson''s view in perspective

In order to illustrate the nature of the indeterminacy of meaning, Donald Davidson sometimes compares it to the fact that we can measure length or temperature on different scales. In the following paper I try to explain first why we are supposed to expect such an analogy, given the semantics of the word meaning and of the word length or temperature. In the second part I examine how close the analogy is by distinguishing different forms of indeterminacy of meaning (viz., the indeterminacy of reference and the indeterminacy of truth) and ask whether both forms have an equivalent in a theory of measurement. I shall conclude that this is indeed the case.I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his or her detailed comments on a first version of this paper, which helped me to clarify my views considerably.     

An Inquiry into Views,Beliefs and Faith: Lessons from Buddhism,Behavioural Psychology and Constructivist Epistemology*

Abstract

 The causes of disagreements between individuals, social groups, cultural groups, political parties, and nations can be traced down to the basic human tendency to give form to – and to reify views, beliefs, and opinions. With this being the case, I would like to ask the question: what, exactly are ‘views’ (including here such overlapping categories as ‘opinions’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes’,)? How, exactly, do we give form to them? Why is it so difficult to change, or get rid of them? The Buddhist tradition since the time of its inception, has been greatly concerned with the matter of identifying ‘false views’ and replacing them with ‘correct views’. But serious and insightful research into the formation and maintenance of views and beliefs is by no means limited to Buddhism. It has been a topic of great concern in the past century to a wide range of secular researchers: social and behavioural psychologists; literary theorists and epistemologists; scientists and marketing strategists. What the specialists in these various fields have to say about beliefs is diverse – and yet there is much overlap. The ways in which they overlap are thought-provoking, and their differences are revelatory. In this paper, I investigate a few prominent approaches to the study of views and beliefs, and show how these various approaches can do much to fill in each other’s discourse. Finally, I reframe the Mahayana Buddhist notion of ‘correct faith’ within the context of this exploration of views.     

Trauma,perversion and marital bond

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to study in the clinic the incidence of so-called perverse phenomena in relationships, in order to find out when these phenomena depend on a perverse organization and when they are only a kind of erotic game between the couple, in both hetero- and homosexual aspects. The first difficulty was to find a definition of “perversion” shared by the authors who have carried out research on the subject and consequently to determine what characterizes a perverse marital bond. In contrast to neurosis, which can be defined by the use of the repression mechanism, the mechanism of disavowal is not exclusive for perversion since it can be found even in other psychical arrangements. Is it, then, a structure or a psychological organization? It is also considered to be a “truth” in psychoanalysis that the pervert cannot be analyzed. But is it the pervert who cannot be analyzed, or is it the analyst who cannot bear listening to him? Do the theoretical references of the analyst not give sufficient theoretical support to maintain his listening? This paper presents the hypothesis that perversion is an attempt – always a frustrated one, and for this reason indefinitely repeated – to elaborate a trauma in which the pervert, identified with the traumatic agent, touches a point equally traumatic for his partner, turning the partner into an object of enjoyment. This arrangement allows the pervert, at least in his imagination, to leave the suffered trauma behind, adopting towards the object a position of activity and domination. Identifying with the aggressor, he leaves his partner paralyzed in the traumatic point, a situation that he knows all too well.

dos Reis Filho JT, et al Trauma, Perversion und eheliche Bande

Der Artikel untersucht klinische Fällen von sogenannter Perversion in Beziehungen, mit dem Ziel herauszufinden, wann es sich um eine perverse Organisation und wann es sich lediglich um eine spezielle Art von erotischem Spiel zwischen dem Paar handelt, dies sowohl in hetero- wie in homosexuellen Beziehungen. Die erste Schwierigkeit war, eine für alle Autoren akzeptable Definition von Perversion zu finden. Alle hatten Erfahrung in Forschung in diesem Gebiet und mussten sich auf Vorstellungen einigen, wodurch eine perverse eheliche Beziehung gekennzeichnet ist. Im Gegensatz zur Neurose, gekennzeichnet ausschliesslich von Verdrängungsmechanismen, kommt Ablehnung nicht ausschliesslich bei der Perversion vor sondern auch bei anderen psychischen Strukturen. Ist Perversion demnach eine psychische Struktur oder eine psychologische Organisation? Es wird auch als erwiesen betrachtet, dass ein Perverser nicht analysiert werden kann. Aber, ist es wirklich der Perverse, der nicht analysiert werden kann? Ist es nicht vielleicht der Analytiker, der es nicht ertragen kann, dem Perversen zuzuhören? Gibt der theoretische analytische Hintergrund des Analytikers ihm möglicherweise nicht genug Unterstützung, um das Zuhören aufrechterhalten zu können? Dieser Aufsatz vertritt die Hypothese, dass die Perversion ein unaufhörlich wiederholter, immer misslingender Versuch ist, ein Trauma aufzuarbeiten. Der Perverse ist identifiziert mit dem Täter im damaligen Trauma. Er trifft einen traumatisierten Punkt beim Partner und macht aus ihm ein Objekt seiner Lusterfüllung. Dieses Arrangement erlaubt dem Perversen-wenigstens in seiner Phantasie – das von ihm erlittene Trauma hinter sich zu lassen, indem er gegenüber dem Objekt eine Position der Aktivität und Dominanz einnimmt. Identifiziert mit dem Aggressor belässt er seinen Partner gelähmt am traumatischen Punkt-eine Situation, die er nur allzu gut an sich selbst kennt.

dos Reis Filho JT et al. Trauma, perversión y el vínculo marital

El propósito del presente trabajo es estudiar en la clínica la incidencia de los cada vez más llamados fenómenos perversos en las relaciones, para descubrir cuando este fenómeno depende de una organización perversa y cuando se trata de un tipo de juego erótico en las parejas, tanto en sus aspectos homosexuales como heterosexuales. La primera dificultad fue encontrar una definición de perversión compartida por los autores estudiosos de este tema y consecuentemente determinar las características de un vínculo marital perverso. En contraste con la neurosis que puede ser definida por el uso del mecanismo de la represión, el mecanismo de la negación no es característico de la perversión únicamente sino que se puede también encontrar en otras organizaciones psíquicas. ¿Se trata entonces de una estructura o de una organización psicológica? Se considera también que en psicoanálisis, es cierto que se trata al perverso como inanalizable. Bueno, ¿es el perverso el que no es analizable o es el psicoanalista que no puede soportar escucharlo? Acaso las referencias teóricas del analista no ofrecen suficientes soportes teóricos para mantener la escucha? Este trabajo presenta la hipótesis de que la perversión es un intento – siempre frustrado, y por lo mismo indefinidamente repetido- para elaborar un trauma en el que el perverso está identificado con el agente traumático, tocando un punto igualmente traumático en su pareja, convirtiendo a su pareja en objeto de su disfrute. Este arreglo permite al perverso, al menos en su imaginación, dejar atrás el trauma sufrido, adoptando con su objeto una posición de actividad y dominación. Identificándose con el agresor, deja a su pareja paralizada en el punto traumático, situación que el perverso sabe muy bien.     

“My graduation is my mother's funeral”: Transformation from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position in fear of success,and the role of the internal saboteur

Abstract

Freud's conflation of neurotic and existential guilt is challenged in this paper. A study of fear of success in a female analysand is presented that illustrates the resolution of this syndrome through a mourning process in which the neurotic guilt of Melanie Klein's paranoid-schizoid position is transformed into the existential guilt of Klein's depressive position. An evolution within the depressive-position existential guilt is seen as the analysand mourns and separates from an internal mother and father, who are hostile to her developmental needs. This evolution involves the transformation of an idealizing transference, symptomatically enacted through gradations of vicarious living through the analyst, being profoundly transformed into the analysand's active creation of an identity in the world. Simultaneously, the internal world becomes alive in psychic fantasy. This transformation also involves the modification of an internal sabotaging psychic structure, which had been compelled by the dissociated punitive reaction of an internalized angry mother of separation trauma, employing the unconscious re-enactment of an early infant illness. Split-off envy and split-off self-sabotage become consciously owned through the grieving of existential guilt, as visceral experience is converted into symbolization.

Susan Kavaler-Adler. “Meine Graduierung ist das Begräbnis meiner Mutter”: Transformation von der paranoidschizoiden zu der depressiven Position in der Furcht vor Erfolg – und die Rolle des innerenSaboteurs.

Freuds Verschmelzung von neurotischer und existentieller Schuld wird in dieser Arbeit in Frage gestellt. Eine Studie der Furcht vor Erfolg bei einer weiblichen Analysandin wird dargestellt und sie zeigt die Auflösung dieses Syndroms durch einen Trauer-Prozess in dem die neurotische Schuld von Melanie Klein′s paranoid-schozoider Position in die existentielle Schuld von Klein′s depressiver Position umgewandelt wird. Eine Evolution innerhalb der depressiven Position und existentieller Schuld wird gesehen als die Analysandin trauert und sich von der inneren Mutter und dem Vater trennt, die gegenüber ihren Entwicklungsbedürfnissen feindlich eingestellt sind. Bestandteil dieser Evolution ist die Umwandlung einer idealisierenden Übertragung, symptomatisch inszeniert durch Abstufungen vikariierenden Lebens durch die Analytikerin und gründlich umgewandelt in die aktive Schöpfung einer Identität in der Welt der Analysandin. Simultan wird die innere Welt in psychischer Phantasie lebendig. Diese Umwandlung involviert auch die Modifikation einer inneren seelischen Struktur, die durch die dissoziierte strafende Reaktion einer internalisierten ärgerlichen Mutter eines Trennungs Traumas aufgezwungen worden war, wobei eine unbewußte Reinszenierung eines frühen kindlichen Traumas eingesetzt wurde. Abgespaltener Neid und abgespaltene Selbst Sabotage werden dem Bewußtsein zugänglich durch ein sich Grämen in existentieller Schuld so wie viszerale Erfahrung in Symbolisierung umgesetzt wird.

Susan Kavaler-Adler. “Mi graduación es funeral de mi madre”: La transformación desde la posición esquizoparanoide a la depresiva en el miedo al éxito, y el rol del saboteador interno.

La combinación de la culpa neurótica y la culpa existencial de Freud is puesta en duda. Se presentará un estudio sobre el miedo al éxito de una analizanda mujer para ilustrar la resolución de este síndrome a través de un proceso de duelo en el cual la culpa neurótica de la posición esquizo-paranoide de Melanie Klein se transforma en la culpa existencial de la posición depresiva de Klein. Como una evolución dentro de la posición depresiva la culpa existencial es vista mientras la analizanda hace el duelo y se separa de su padre y madre internalizados, quienes son hostiles hacia sus necesidades de desarrollo. Esta evolución involucra la transformación de una transferencia idealizada actuada sintomáticamente a través de gradaciones de formas de vida sustitutivas a través de la analista, para pasar a ser una de transformación profunda en la activa creación de la identidad de la analizanda en el mundo.Simultáneamente su mundo interno toma vida en la fantasia psíquica. Esta transformación también involucra la modificación de la estructura psíquica interna saboteadora, que había sido impuesta por la reacción punitiva disociativa de una madre enojada internalizada por el trauma de separación, empleando la reactivación inconsciente de una enfermedad de la infancia temprana. La envidia y el autosabotage escindidos se vuelven conscientes a través de la aflicción de la culpa existencial, así como la experiencia viceral es convertida en simbolización.     

Coordinating perspectives: De se and taste attitudes in communication

The received picture of linguistic communication understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. This picture is in conflict with the attractive Lewisian view of belief as self-location, which is motivated by de se attitudes – first-personal attitudes about oneself – as well as attitudes about subjective matters such as personal taste. In this paper, I provide a solution to the conflict that reconciles these views. I argue for an account of mental attitudes and communication on which mental content and speech act content is understood as sets of multicentered worlds – roughly, possible worlds ‘centered’ on a sequence of individuals at a time. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on multicentered worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. The resulting picture is one on which the point of conversation is the coordination of individual perspectives.