Intuitive physics and cognitive algebra: A review

IntroductionIntuitive physics explores how people without a formal instruction in physics intuitively understand physical phenomena. After a general overview of the topics of current research in intuitive physics and a discussion of current debates, this paper provides an introduction to Information Integration Theory (IIT).ObjectiveBy means of examples, it is shown how IIT can be used to directly compare the algebraic structure of physical laws and the algebraic structure of cognitive representations of these laws.MethodThe review considers about 40 years of research on the application of IIT in the field of intuitive physics. Occasionally, reference is also made to intuitive physics studies outside this theoretical framework.ResultsThe reviewed studies highlight four main factors that affect the degree of consistency between physical laws and cognitive algebraic laws: the participants’ age, their familiarity with the event under study, the type of task, and possible learning processes.ConclusionThe last part of the article discusses the implications of the results of the reviewed studies for the two main current hypotheses on the nature of intuitive physics, namely, that intuitive physics may be based on sub-optimal heuristics or may be based on the internalization of physical laws.     

Support for distracted driving laws: An analysis of adolescent drivers from the Traffic Safety Culture Index from 2011 to 2017

IntroductionAdolescent drivers are often the focus of traffic safety legislation as they are at increased risk for crash-related injury and death. However, the degree to which adolescents support distracted driving laws and factors contributing to their support are relatively unknown. Using a large, nationally weighted sample of adolescent drivers in the United States, we assessed if perceived threat from other road users’ engagement in distracted driving, personal engagement in distracted driving behaviors, and the presence of state distracted driving laws was associated with support for distracted driving laws.MethodsThe sample included 3565 adolescents (aged 16–18) who participated in the Traffic Safety Culture Index survey from 2011 to 2017. A modified Poisson regression model with robust errors was fit to the weighted data to examine support for distracted driving laws. Models included age, gender, year, state distracted driving laws, personal engagement in distracted driving behavior, and perceived threat from other road users’ engaging in distracted driving.ResultsApproximately 87% of adolescents supported a law against texting and emailing compared to 66% who supported a universal handheld cellphone law. Support for distracted driving legislation was associated with greater perceived threat of other road users engaging in distracted driving while accounting for personal engagement in distracted driving, state distracted driving laws, and developmental covariates.DiscussionGreater understanding of the factors behind legislative support is needed. Public health interventions focused on effectively translating the risks of cellphone use while driving and effective policy will further improve the traffic safety culture.     

The Gift of Law: Liberty,Legitimacy and Autonomy in The Social Contract

Abstract

I examine Rousseau’s claim that any given will can be either itself or another, and cannot be commuted (to representatives, for example), through an investigation of liberty and legitimacy in The Social Contract, with respect to which Rousseau elaborates his notion that we prescribe laws to ourselves. Through an examination of the logic of the general will, I attempt to show that, while the theory of legitimacy is radical, it is faced with serious problems that concern the identification of the we (or the I) that is supposed to be prescribing laws to itself, and that when we are (I am) supposedly doing so, the identity of the will is far from clear.     

Truth,Predication and a Family of Contingent Paradoxes

In truth theory one aims at general formal laws governing the attribution of truth to statements. Gupta’s and Belnap’s revision-theoretic approach provides various well-motivated theories of truth, in particular T* and T#, which tame the Liar and related paradoxes without a Tarskian hierarchy of languages. In property theory, one similarly aims at general formal laws governing the predication of properties. To avoid Russell’s paradox in this area a recourse to type theory is still popular, as testified by recent work in formal metaphysics by Williamson and Hale. There is a contingent Liar that has been taken to be a problem for type theory. But this is because this Liar has been presented without an explicit recourse to a truth predicate. Thus, type theory could avoid this paradox by incorporating such a predicate and accepting an appropriate theory of truth. There is however a contingent paradox of predication that more clearly undermines the viability of type theory. It is then suggested that a type-free property theory is a better option. One can pursue it, by generalizing the revision-theoretic approach to predication, as it has been done by Orilia with his system P*, based on T*. Although Gupta and Belnap do not explicitly declare a preference for T# over T*, they show that the latter has some advantages, such as the recovery of intuitively acceptable principles concerning truth and a better reconstruction of informal arguments involving this notion. A type-free system based on T# rather than T* extends these advantages to predication and thus fares better than P* in the intended applications of property theory.

     

The Empirical Status of the Laws of Emotion

Abstract

Smedslund's view that my laws are non-empirical and tautological is based upon two arguments that I do not share. First, the content of the definition of emotion from which he starts is for me an empirically verifiable theory. Secondly, elements in that definition or theory, and in its derivations, are tautological only when these elements (like “want”) are merely understood as states of awareness, and not as constructs referring to observables outside the awareness of the subject of emotion: antecedents, conditions. processes, and overt responses. In short, I think that my laws could be proven wrong or, more plausibly, unproductive, and thus not necessarily true.

In addition, contrary to Smedslund, I hold that the laws of emotion can in part be contradictory precisely because they do not represent logical, but empirical, facts. Humans have contradictory interests and may well have provisions to Serve these interests.     

In the Name of Culture and Religion: The Political Function of Blasphemy in Islamic States

ABSTRACT

This article argues that blasphemy laws and a cultural relativist approach to human rights have a political function in authoritarian states. Islamic states use a strong cultural relativist approach to justify their dismal human rights record. The main aim of this approach, however, is survival. The article shows how Islamic countries use religion for their own political survival purposes and how blasphemy laws are often used to silence critique of political, social and religious orders that infringe on basic human rights. From this perspective, blasphemy laws are tools of oppression, not a symbol of cultural and religious difference. By highlighting how blasphemy laws and a cultural relativist approach to religion have been used as tools of oppression by authoritarian regimes, the article underscores the importance of freedom of expression for any functioning democracy.     

Bucer's Views on Ecclesiastical Property in the Light of Civil and Canon Law

Abstract

The issue of church property is a crucial one in the history of the sixteenth-century Reformation. In support of his views, Bucer could cite Holy Scripture, Roman Law and the Corpus Iuris Canonici, although Bucer felt that priority could be assigned to those laws that can be inferred from Holy Scripture. This article looks at four themes in the debate on ecclesiastical goods as they concern Martin Bucer: the differing ways in which Protestant estates dealt with the matter; the PR around such actions; resistance to the Emperor; and the issue of ecclesiastical estates ruled by prince-prelates.     

The A Priori and the Empirical in Theories of Emotion: Smedslund's “Conceptual Analysis” of Emotion

Abstract

This paper examines the suggestion made by Smedslund that the empirical laws of emotion proposed by Frijda are a priori necessities, derivable from a definition of emotion Smedslund proposes. First, a distinction is drawn between a causal and non-causal reading of Smedslund's own definition of emotion. The suggestion is made that although on the causal reading the definition might provide sufficient conditions for being in an emotional state, causal regularities are empirical, so this reading would not meet his own criteria for an a priori definition. Moreover, showing that Frijda's laws are derivable from the definition thus understood would not undermine their empirical status. The non-causal reading is then examined and questions are raised about whether it can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a state to be a state of emotion. Finally, the suggestion is made that the central issue in the question of whether or not a theory of emotion is wholly empirical turns not on whether it can be derived from a definition of emotion, but, rather, on the extent to which the explanations proposed of the regularities governing emotions must appeal to a priori rationality constraints.     

Polkinghorne and Cartwright on Pluralism and Metaphysics

Abstract

This paper reviews the natural philosophies of John Polkinghorne and Nancy Cartwright, with particular emphasis on the role of pluralism in their respective writings. While often motivated by distinct projects, their philosophies display some interesting and perhaps unexpected similarities. It is suggested that Polkinghorne's views are not far away from some of Cartwright's proposals, and further that certain debates about God's providential action could be helpfully reoriented if the insistence on natural laws as a centerpiece of scientific explanation were relinquished.     

Subject-predicate calculus free from existential import

Two subject-predicate calculi with equality,SP ₌ and its extensionUSP ₌, are presented as systems of natural deduction. Both the calculi are systems of free logic. Their presentation is preceded by an intuitive motivation.It is shown that Aristotle's syllogistics without the laws of identitySaP andSiP is definable withinSP ₌, and that the first-order predicate logic is definable withinUSP ₌.     

Did Darwin initially develop a theory of evolution in the biological sense of the word?

Abstract

Darwin’s physicalist orientation reacts to a long-standing vitalistic mode of thought of idealistic morphology and should be assessed by taking other 19th and 20th centuries biological schools of thought into account - trends that each emphasised different modes of explanation, such as mechanicism, physicalism, holism, neo-vitalism, organismic biology and pan-psychism.

Darwin’s acceptance of “universal laws of nature” is consonant with Leyll’s view of invariant natural laws (uniformitarianism), but at the same time, owing to their tendency towards change, living entities are considered to be without constant structures - an outcome of Darwin’s nominalist understanding of living entities. Nominalism provides a starting point both for modem historicism (with its emphasis on change) and for Darwin’s adherence to a nominalistic view of living entities. In the light of the fossil record, the issue of constancy and change is discussed with a focus on Gould’s claim that the basic theory of natural selection offers no statement about general progress and therefore does not supply a mechanism in terms of which an overall advance might be expected.

Darwin’s physicalistic orientation in 1859 made it problematic for him to claim that he has accounted for evolution in the truly biological sense of the word.     

School-Wide Behavior Support: Legal Implications and Requirements

SUMMARY

Administrators and teachers have long been challenged by student discipline problems. In the last few years more efforts have been aimed at the prevention of both disruptive and violent behavior through school-wide discipline programs. These programs have great promise as effective ways to address disruptive behavior. In this article we examine laws and policies that support the use of school-wide discipline programs. To do this, first we present a brief overview of the primary components of these policies. Next, we examine laws and court cases that address school-wide discipline policies and procedures. Finally, we discuss the legal implications when developing school-wide discipline policies and procedures.     

WILLIAM WHEWELL,THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS,AND THE MODERN SOLAR SYSTEM

Astronomers of the first half of the nineteenth century viewed our solar system entirely differently from the way twentieth‐century astronomers viewed it. In the earlier period the dominant image was of a set of planets and moons, both of which kinds of bodies were inhabited by intelligent beings comparable to humans. By the early twentieth century, science had driven these beings from every planet in our system except the Earth, leaving our solar system (and perhaps others) as more or less desolate regions for the most part bereft of intelligent life. This essay traces this extinction and its relation to religious thought, noting the role played in it by Sir John Herschel and especially by William Whewell. The inverse square laws for gravitation, heat radiation, and light receive special attention, as does the question of the relevance of the Christian notions of a divine incarnation and redemption.     

Veiled Reality and Structural Realism

Abstract

The noted philosopher of science, Bernard d'Espagnat, tries to mediate between objective reality and empirical reality via the notion of veiled reality: namely, while the laws proper to things in themselves are unknown, their existence and interrelated activity can be inferred from observation and analysis of human experience. The author claims that Whiteheadian creativity offers a better candidate for the notion of veiled reality because it is a transcendent activity, not a transcendent actuality. Likewise, a revision of the Whiteheadian category of society as a structured field of activity for its constituent actual entities indirectly confirms Henri Poincaré's notion of structural realism.     

Supervenience Physicalism: Meeting the Demands of Determination and Explanation

Abstract

Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism—perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism—is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation.     

The Space of Motivations

Abstract

The distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law captures two familiar ways of making events intelligible, by reference to reasons or to natural laws, respectively. I describe a third way of making events intelligible, by explaining them in terms of an agent’s being motivated to do certain things. Explanations of this sort do not involve appealing to reasons for which the agent acts, nor to natural laws under which the event falls. To explain an event in this way is to place it in the space of motivations. I outline the relation between the space of motivations and the space of reasons, and suggest that the space of motivations may serve as a common ground between the positions defended by McDowell and Dreyfus in their recent debate.     

Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them

Ceteris-paribus clauses are nothing to worry about; aceteris-paribus qualifier is not poisonously indeterminate in meaning. Ceteris-paribus laws teach us that a law need not be associated straightforwardly with a regularity in the manner demanded by regularity analyses of law and analyses of laws as relations among universals. This lesson enables us to understand the sense in which the laws of nature would have been no different under various counterfactual suppositions — a feature even of those laws that involve no ceteris-paribus qualification and are actually associated with exceptionless regularities. Ceteris-paribus generalizations of an‘inexact science’ qualify as laws of that science in virtue of their distinctive relation to counterfactuals: they form a set that is stable for the purposes of that field. (Though an accident may possess tremendous resilience under counterfactual suppositions, the laws are sharply distinguished from the accidents in that the laws are collectively as resilient as they could logically possibly be.) The stability of an inexact science's laws may involve their remaining reliable even under certain counterfactual suppositions violating fundamental laws of physics. The ceteris-paribus laws of an inexact science may thus possess a kind of necessity lacking in the fundamental laws of physics. A nomological explanation supplied by an inexact science would then be irreducible to an explanation of the same phenomenon at the level of fundamental physics. Island biogeography is used to illustrate how a special science could be autonomous in this manner. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.