The Relationship Between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value

Recent attention to the relationship between aesthetic value and cognitive value has focused on whether the latter can affect the former. In this article, I approach the issue from the opposite direction. I investigate whether the aesthetic value of a work can influence its cognitive value. More narrowly, I consider whether a work's aesthetic value ever contributes to or detracts from its philosophical value, which I take to include the truth of its claims, the strength of its arguments, and its internal consistency. I argue that aesthetic value does have such an impact, at least sometimes and to some degree. The aesthetic merits of some works help to preserve their consistency, and the aesthetic defects of other works render them self‐contradictory.     

The Aesthetic Achievement and Cognitive Value of Empathy for Rough Heroes

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Aesthetic Experts,Guides to Value

A theory of aesthetic value should explain the performance of aesthetic experts, for aesthetic experts are agents who track aesthetic value. Aesthetic empiricism, the theory that an item's aesthetic value is its power to yield aesthetic pleasure, suggests that aesthetic experts are best at locating aesthetic pleasure, especially given aesthetic internalism, the view that aesthetic reasons always have motivating force. Problems with empiricism and internalism open the door to an alternative. Aesthetic experts perform a range of actions not aimed at pleasure. Yet their reasons for acting are aesthetic. Since aesthetic values figure in aesthetic reasons, we can read a nonempiricist theory of aesthetic value off aesthetic experts’ reasons for acting.     

Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation

Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.     

不同类型整形美容手术伦理问题分析

随着经济的发展,物质条件不断得到满足,越来越多的人开始注重自身的外表,整形美容手术也随之繁荣起来,但是随之而来的问题也越来越多,饱受社会争议.根据不同的整形美容手术所面临的伦理问题进行分类,分别进行分析及探讨,以利于整形美容学的进一步健康发展.     

审美主体与伦理主体的比较研究

本文通过对审美主体和伦理主体的比较研究揭示了个体存在的伦理层面的含义。首先考察了老庄和海德格尔的后现代宗教式的主体和儒家形而上的宗教主体,以及儒家就伦理问题对于老庄的挑战。结论是他们都缺乏把他者的生存作为自己的绝对的责任的伦理含义,因而是审美主体：其次,通过对于环境主体和伦理主体及审美主体的关系的讨论,阐释了这样一个哲学基本问题：伦理存在必须以有限性存在为前提;而后者只是一个哲学的抽象。片面地强调人的有限性(尼采),片面强调有限存在与超越者的关系(老庄和海德格尔),或否认人的有限性,这些观点都忽略了人在这个世界上的伦理责任。后现代伦理学是指我,作为一个个体(me),对于他者的一切负有不可推卸的责任。     

On Liking Aesthetic Value

According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic value. The aim of this paper is to point to a blind spot in the dialectic between these two standard positions by defending a third neglected answer to the question above, the answer of the Value-Meriting-Pleasure [VMP] advocate. According to this answer, a certain kind of (cognitive and responsive) pleasure is connected to aesthetic value non-contingently, but also non-hedonically. VMP is the view that objects of aesthetic value are non-contingently related to pleasure insofar as they merit a certain kind of pleasure. But, pace the hedonist, those objects are valuable (those that are to be engaged with etc.) neither on account of their capacity to give pleasure nor on account of the hedonic value of the attitude they merit.     

Cognitive Enhancement and the Value of Cognitive Achievement

Cognitive enhancement has an increasingly wider influence on our life. The main issue that concerns epistemologists is what its epistemological implications are. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard argue that cognitive enhancement improves cognitive achievement, but this view faces axiological objections. A worry exists that cognitive enhancement undermines achievements and erodes intellectual character. Crucially, two parties seem to talk past each other because the nature of cognitive enhancement and the value of cognitive enhancement are not clearly distinguished. To end the stand‐off between the two parties, I take insight from Gwen Bradford’s work and argue that, other things being equal, cognitive enhancement either decreases the value of cognitive achievement or undermines cognitive achievement. In the face of this threat, I further submit that we could learn to live with cognitive enhancement in an integrated way so that the lost value can be restored.     

行政问责的伦理价值

行政问责作为一种责任监督和追究机制,不仅具有政治、行政和法律等方面的价值,也具有重要的伦理价值,它们主要体现在:促进政府履行责任伦理构建责任政府,规范权力运行助推权力向善,尊重"民意"实现公共利益和弘扬道德责任塑造伦理人格等方面.     

Pragmatism, Critical Realism, and the Cognitive Value of Religion and Science

Pragmatism and critical realism are different vocabularies for talking about the cognitive value of religion and science. Each can be, and has been, used to make the case for cognitive parity between religious and scientific discourse. Critical realism presupposes a particular form of cognitive psychology that entails general skepticism about the external world and forecloses scientific inquiry in the name of a preconceived idea of what the nature of human cognition must be. Thus, of the two, pragmatism is the better vocabulary for fostering mutual understanding between religion and science.     

略论高技术的伦理价值

当代高技术发展日新月异 ,它不仅迅速地改变着世界、改变着人类的生产方式 ,而且改变着人们的生活方式和思维方式。高技术的发展与广泛应用产生了正、负两重效应。关于高技术的伦理价值的分析与思考 ,已成为科技伦理 (高技术伦理 )的重要课题。     

A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability

According to a posteriori ethical intuitionism (AEI), perceptual experiences can provide non‐inferential justification for at least some moral beliefs. Moral epistemology, for the defender of AEI, is less like the epistemology of math and more like the epistemology of tables and chairs. One serious threat to AEI comes from the phenomenon of cognitive penetration. The worry is that even if evaluative properties could figure in the contents of experience, they would only be able to do so if prior cognitive states influence perceptual experience. Such influences would undermine the non‐inferential, foundationalist credentials of AEI. In this paper, I defend AEI against this objection. Rather than deny that cognitive penetration exists, I argue that some types of cognitive penetrability are actually compatible with AEI's foundationalist structure. This involves teasing apart the question of whether some particular perceptual process has justification‐conferring features from the question of how it came to have those features in the first place. Once this distinction is made, it becomes clear that some kinds of cognitive penetration are compatible with the non‐inferential status of moral perceptual experiences as the proponent of AEI claims.