On questioning being: Foucault’s Heideggerian turn

Attempts to resolve the question of Foucault’s relationship to Heidegger usually look for points of substantive correlation between them: the coincidence of being and power, the meaning of truth, technology, ethics, and so on. Taking seriously Foucault’s claim in his final interview that he uses Heidegger as an ‘instrument of thought’, this paper looks for a correlation in practice. The argument focuses on a structural isomorphism between Heidegger’s concept of the fourfold event (Ereignis) of being and later Foucault’s critique of ‘problematization’ (problématique). This isomorphism, I argue, indicates a covert philosophical confrontation between Foucault and Heidegger, which was determinative for Foucault in the period of the turn to ethics (1976–84). This is a confrontation over the meaning of the ‘event of thought’. Such an interpretation not only permits a literal reading of Foucault’s comments regarding Heidegger in his final interview, but also casts the developments in Foucault’s later work in a fascinating new light. Foucault’s critique of problematization, on this view, is founded in an historicized version of Heideggerian ‘other’ thinking, and pivots on a ontologically tempered enactment of the Heideggerian turn (Kehre).     

Shattering the subject: Georges Bataille and the limits of therapy

This article is an analysis of the work of the French intellectual Georges Bataille (1897–1962) and its implications for interrogating the limits of therapy. One of the central concepts of Bataille's thought is transgression and the destabilizing effects of transgression on any concept of the limit. I explore this thinking through an analysis of Bataille's personal and theoretical relationship to psychoanalysis. Bataille's radicalization of psychoanalysis is then pursued through his use of mythic representations of the ‘shattered subject’. These models of the shattered subject offer an interrogation of some of the theoretical and practical limits of therapy, particularly when it is centred on the individual. Drawing on these models it is then argued that Bataille offers a new ethics of abjection, which proposes that we must interrogate the subject in terms of what our culture regards as ‘waste’. Comparison is made between Bataille's thought and that of Jacques Lacan, and it is argued that Bataille offers a potential radicalization of Lacan's concept of the Real and his ‘ethics of psychoanalysis’. The limits of Bataille's own writing are critically interrogated, drawing on the readings of his work by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault.     

Does Global Democracy Require a World State?

Abstract

The question of whether global democracy requires a world state has with few exceptions been answered with an unequivocal ‘No’. A world state, it is typically argued, is neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, different forms of global governance arrangements have been suggested, involving non-hierarchical and multilayered models with dispersed authority. The overall aim of this paper is to addresses the question of whether global democracy requires a world state, adopting a so-called ‘function-sensitive’ approach. It is shown that such an approach is equipped to resist the predominant binary view of a world state (either accepting it or rejecting it) and offer a more differentiated and nuanced answer to this question. In brief, a basic presumption of a function-sensitive approach is that the content, justification and status of principles of democracy are dependent on the aim they are set out to achieve, what functions they are intended to regulate (e.g., decision-making, implementation, enforcement and evaluation), and the relationship between those functions. More specifically, within a function-sensitive framework, the paper sketches the contours of an account of global democracy consisting of five regulative principles and argues—utilizing the notion of ‘sufficient stateness’—that it would require supranational legislative entities and perhaps supranational judicial entities but not necessarily supranational executive entities.     

Discourse,agency and the question of evil

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of evil from an ethical and discourse-analytical perspective, taking Joan Copjec’s commentary on Kant’s notion of ‘radical evil’ and its relation to human freedom as its point of departure. Specifically, Copjec’s argument, that for Kant (and, one may add, for Lacan) the subject is always “in excess of itself”, provides an important foil for, or corrective to what may seem to be the upshot of Foucault’s notion of discourse (its heuristic value notwithstanding). The latter entails that, insofar as the subject is ineluctably discursively constructed, its actions could be understood as being ‘determined’ by the discursive structure of (its) subjectivity. That is, the subject as agent may seem to lack volitional freedom in the sense that it is merely an instrument of a certain discourse by which it is ’spoken‘. However, Kant’s idea of ’radical evil‘, it is further argued, presupposes that the subject is free, in other words, that it always exceeds itself. In Foucault’ s terms, this would mean that the subject of discourse is able to adopt a counter-discursive position - something Foucault sometimes seems to make room for. What Kant calls ‘radical evil’ may be understood as something that occurs in the world through human agency, in the face of the possibility of an alternative course of action; that is, it is chosen - even if we only know this in retrospect through the phenomenon of guilt. i, in contrast, it is understood as being ‘diabolical’ in the sense of being unavoidably and irresistibly part and parcel of human ‘nature’, no one could condemn it in moral terms. This line of thinking is fleshed out, or given concrete significance by means of a discourse-analysis of documents pertaining to the so-called ‘ripper-rapist’ (criminal) case in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, in the mid-1990s.     

Basic human values: The ethos for methodology

This paper draws on the personal experiences of part of a research project where the original methodology was flawed and needed to change to properly encompass the lives and experiences of the people who the research was for, namely users of mental health services living in supported housing. The change in methodology involved a recognition that the research could not be termed ‘value-free’; that researchers are not objective. It is argued that it was important to demonstrate that the information obtained in the research was ‘valid’, and that despite the subjective nature of the research, there are steps that can be taken to convince others that the information received is ‘real’. It is further argued that the traditional approach to research of separating theory (or knowledge) from practice was not only inappropriate in this sort of research, but is a false notion in any sort of action research that aims to promote change. The importance of the influence and power of service providers in action research is recognised, as well as the constraints placed on short-term funded projects. It was important for the methodology to be non-oppressive so that researchers adopted an open and honest approach and for researchers to become involved with the research participants. The implications of this ‘involvement’ are discussed. There is a concluding discussion about whether non-users of mental health services can be considered as allies in research. It is argued that all oppressed groups need their allies and if the research is led by basic human values, then working alongside people who depend on services can lead to emancipatory outcomes.     

The new enhancement technologies and the place of vulnerability in our lives

What is the place of vulnerability in our lives? The current debate about the ethics of enhancement technologies provides a context in which to think about this question. In my view, the current debate is likely to be fruitless, largely because we bring the wrong ethical resources to bear on its questions. In this article, I recall an important, but currently neglected, role that moral concepts play in our thinking, a role they should especially play in relation to the introduction of new technologies. I call this the ‘contemplative role of moral concepts’. I then contrast two approaches to the contemplative role of moral concepts which are found in the current literature, and show why it is important to keep in mind both of these approaches when thinking about human vulnerability.     

Exploring the spiritual in the pedagogy of Friedrich Froebel

Friedrich Froebel (1782–1852) was the inventor of the kindergarten, and his emphasis on childcentredness and play influenced the progressive movement throughout the world. The concepts of unity and wholeness are highly visible in his writings. Religion is addressed in his work and that of his followers, but little attention has been paid to spirituality per se in Froebel’s thought. This paper explores the place of the spiritual in Froebel’s scheme and in some of what has been written about him. It notes his use of the concepts of the spirit and spirituality, and considers the relationship between his faith and the Christian religion. It discusses the ‘laws’ which Froebel enunciated: of Divine Unity, opposites and the connection of opposites; the principle of self-activity; and the process of ‘unfoldment’. These principles are observed in his teaching methods and resources, specifically in the Gifts and The Mother-Song Book of 1844. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for such concepts as the spirit of the child and spiritual education. The picture that emerges is of a child-centred education which honours the integrity of childhood. It is argued that such an education, fully embraced, is a spiritual education.     

Irony,Embodiment, and the ‘critical Attitude’: Engaging Saba Mahmood's Critique of Secular Morality

At the intersection of feminism, postcolonial studies, and religious studies, this essay engages Saba Mahmood's critique of universalistic ethics and post-structural feminism. It contrasts Mahmood's ‘ethical embodiment’ with a concept of ‘ethical irony’, offering examples of the latter from literature (Brecht, Baudelaire) and cultural theory (Carolyn Steedman, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault). Its thesis is that ethical irony signifies modes of critical engagement that are not premised on notions of metaphysical subjectivity or abstract rules, but may nonetheless be cross-culturally translatable. One specific formulation of ethical irony considered concerns the figure of injurable bodies. At once material (bodily) and transcendental (unknown injuries from unknown sources, or the possibility of injury), injurable bodies the irreducibility of ethics to the purely abstract and the purely empirical. Finally, the defence of ethical irony speaks to the viability of upholding what Foucault called the ‘critical attitude’ as a cross-cultural norm.     

Subjectivity,Reflection and Freedom in Later Foucault

Abstract

This paper proposes a new reading of the interaction between subjectivity, reflection and freedom within Foucault’s later work. I begin by introducing three approaches to subjectivity, locating these in relation both to Foucault’s texts and to the recent literature. I suggest that Foucault himself operates within what I call the ‘entanglement approach’, and, as such, he faces a potentially serious challenge, a challenge forcefully articulated by Han. Using Kant’s treatment of reflection as a point of comparison, I argue that Foucault possesses the resources to meet this challenge. The key, I contend, is to distinguish two related theses about reflection and freedom: Foucault’s position is distinctive precisely because he accepts one of these theses whilst rejecting the other. I conclude by indicating how this reading might connect to the longstanding question of Foucault’s own right to appeal to normative standards.     

Styles of Reasoning,Human Forms of Life,and Relativism

The question as to whether Ian Hacking’s project of scientific styles of thinking entails epistemic relativism has received considerable attention. However, scholars have never discussed it vis-à-vis Wittgenstein. This is unfortunate: not only is Wittgenstein the philosopher who, together with Foucault, has influenced Hacking the most, but he has also faced the same accusation of ‘relativism’. I shall explore the conceptual similarities and differences between Hacking’s notion of style of thinking and Wittgenstein’s conception of form of life. It is a fact that whether or not the latter entails epistemic relativism is still a controversial question. From my comparative analysis, it will emerge that there are stronger reasons to conclude that Hacking’s notion of style leads to epistemic relativism than there are to reach the same conclusion in the case of Wittgenstein’s conception of form of life. This point will be at odds with the anti-relativistic stance that Hacking has taken in his more recent writings.     

Shame and Silence

Abstract

Samantha Vice’s proposal on how to live in ‘this strange place’ of contemporary South Africa, includes an appeal to the concepts of shame and silence. In this paper, I use Emmanuel Levinas and Giorgio Agamben to move the discussion of shame from a moral to an existential question. The issue is not about how one should feel, but about the kind of self that whiteness in South Africa makes possible today. Shame desubjectifies. Vice’s recommendation of silence is then taken as witnessing/listening, which I argue grounds the possibility of a recovery of the self.     

Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction to a Filipino Virtue Ethics

This is an introduction to a Filipino virtue ethics which is a relationship-oriented virtue ethics. The concepts to be discussed are the result of the unique history of the Philippines, namely a Southeast Asian tribal and animist tradition mixed with a Spanish Catholic tradition for over 300 years. Filipino virtue ethics is based on two foundational concepts in Filipino culture. The first is loób, which can easily be misunderstood when literally translated into English as ‘inside’ but which is better translated as ‘relational will’, and the second is kapwa, which is literally translated as ‘other person’ but is better understood as ‘together with the person’. These serve as pillars for a special collection of virtues (kagandahang-loób, utang-na-loób, pakikiramdam, hiya, lakas-ng-loób/bahala na) which are not individualistic virtues in the same way as most of the cardinal virtues of the Western tradition (i.e. prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude) but are all directed towards the preservation and strengthening of human relationships. This introduction to a Filipino virtue ethics is articulated and organized through a dialogue with Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue ethics.     

Gödel And The Intuition Of Concepts

Gödel has argued that we can cultivate the intuition or ‘perception’ of abstractconcepts in mathematics and logic. Gödel's ideas about the intuition of conceptsare not incidental to his later philosophical thinking but are related to many otherthemes in his work, and especially to his reflections on the incompleteness theorems.I describe how some of Gödel's claims about the intuition of abstract concepts are related to other themes in his philosophy of mathematics. In most of this paper, however,I focus on a central question that has been raised in the literature on Gödel: what kind of account could be given of the intuition of abstract concepts? I sketch an answer to this question that uses some ideas of a philosopher to whom Gödel also turned in this connection: Edmund Husserl. The answer depends on how we understand the conscious directedness toward ‘objects’ and the meaning of the term ‘abstract’ in the context of a theory of the intentionality of cognition.     

‘Everyone’, consequences,and generalization arguments

This paper addresses issues raised by recent discussion in normative ethics which concern relations between properties of individual actions and of certain groups of actions. First, an ambiguity common to ‘everyone can’ and ‘everyone ought’ is examined. Next, a similar ambiguity in talk about consequences is studied; here several procedures for identifying and evaluating consequences are compared. Then a notation that untangles the ambiguities is presented. Next, this notation is employed in an analysis of Marcus Singer's deduction of his generalization argument. Finally, there is a study of the question as to whether or not conflicts are possible between Singer's generalization argument and the dictates of consequences of individual actions. The findings are that such conflicts are or are not possible depending upon how a certain restriction on generalization arguments is interpreted, and that in either case the proponent of generalization arguments is faced with problems.     

Die neo-inklusivistiese benadering tot religieuse pluraliteit

Abstract

Neo-pragmatists Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish have recently argued that philosophy has no consequences for legal practice (except, in the case of Fish, in so far as it carries rhetorical force). They have asserted not only that philosophy cannot provide absolute metaphysical foundations for legal practice, but also that philosophy cannot be used to criticise law. This essay examines Fish and Rorty’s reasons for denying the practical force of philosophy. Although I agree with Rorty and Fish’s non-foundationalism, I argue that in practice lawyers employ discursive categories and concepts that can be described as philosophical. I suggest also that philosophy has a critical function and that the characterisation of philosophy offered by these theorists amounts to a conservative assertion of the formal completeness and substantive justice of existing liberal legal systems. Against Fish and Rorty, I argue and selectively demonstrate that lawyers can usefully draw upon ‘public ironists’ such as Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida to criticise and improve upon extant legal practices.     

Reply to Reynolds

Abstract

How should we read Foucault's claims, in his late work, for the relevance of ‘aesthetic criteria’ to politics? What is Foucault's implicit understanding of the nature of aesthetics and the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere? Would an ethics which gave a place to the aesthetic legitimize a politics of manipulation, brutality and aggression ‐ in short, a ‘fascist’ politics ‐ as some of Foucault's critics argue? In this paper, I examine key accounts of the fascist ‘aestheticization of politics’ ‐ from Walter Benjamin's classic essay, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936), to Philippe Lacoue‐Labarthe's work on the relation between Heidegger's philosophy and the fascist theme of politics as the plastic art of the state. Through a discussion of Foucault's late work, the paper demonstrates the connection between Foucault's turn to ancient Greek ethical practices and his call for a contemporary renewal of the idea of ethics as an art of living. The aim of the paper is to show in what ways the ethico‐political position which is presented in Foucault's late work, far from contributing to a fascist politics, in fact provides ways of thinking about the relationship between the aesthetic and the political which avoid both mindless radicalism and totalitarian narcissism. In doing so, the key question is, ‘What's aesthetic about Foucault's “aesthetics of existence"?’     

Fichte,Hegel, and the Life and Death Struggle

Several commentators have argued that Hegel's account of ‘self-consciousness’ in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as an ‘immanent critique’ of Fichte's idealism. If this is correct, it raises the question of whether Hegel's account of ‘recognition’ in Chapter IV can be interpreted as a critique of Fichte's conception of recognition as expounded in the Foundations of Natural Right. A satisfactory answer to this question will have to provide a plausible interpretation of the ‘life and death struggle’ as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition. This paper aims to provide such an interpretation. The first part of the paper provides a discussion of Fichte's account of recognition that emphasizes its ‘epistemic’ concerns. The second part argues that Hegel's account of the ‘life and death struggle’ can be read plausibly as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition.     

Battling for the Bible: Academy,Church and the Gay Agenda

Abstract

This paper considers the fact that the academic resources of contemporary biblical scholarship are employed by both sides in the Church debate on homosexuality. When historical and critical evidence has been marshalled, decisions continue to be made on the basis of prior commitments to deeply held theological convictions. This being the case it is important to consider the role that biblical scholars play in debate. It can no longer be considered adequate that they continue to supply supposedly objective knowledge concerning the texts while remaining silent concerning the ethics of interpretation. In the future queer theology will exercise a profound impact and queer readings that move beyond the current boundaries of ‘legitimate’ interpretations will proliferate. This will radically reshape the terrain on which debate takes place. However, at the present moment, there is an urgent need to question the ethics of interpretation within the academy itself.     

Causal Contribution in War

Revisionist approaches to the ethics of war seem to imply that civilians on the unjust side of a conflict can be legitimate targets of defensive attack. In response, some authors have argued that although civilians do often causally contribute to unjustified global threats – by voting for war, writing propaganda articles, or manufacturing munitions, for example – their contributions are usually too ‘small’, or ‘remote’, to make them liable to be intentionally killed to avert the threat. What defenders of this view lack, however, is a theory of causal contribution. This article sketches and defends a theory of causal contribution. We then apply it to the kinds of situation that defenders of the view are interested in. We argue, however, that since degrees of causal contribution turn out to be sensitive to particular features of the situation that are extrinsic to the agent's action, whether an agent makes a small or a large contribution to a threat may not only be very difficult to discern but in many cases may not line up very well with the kinds of intuition about liability that defenders of the view want to uphold.     

Beyond Existence and Non-Existence

Abstract

When Husserl speaks of the so-called ‘transcendental reduction’ or ‘phenomenological epochē’ many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence. Two reasons are given for this: First, Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction, we should no longer naively ‘accept [the world] as it presents itself to me as factually existing’ (Id I §30, p. 53) and should suspend our judgement with regard to ‘the positing of its actual being’ (Id I §88, p. 182). Second, Husserl seems to have no problem in referring to an ‘object’ of thought even when we refer to non-existent, hallucinatory or indeed impossible objects. This seems to suggest that he is not interested in the question whether or not there is a corresponding ‘ordinary’ object. The paper seeks to question this and will show that his inquiry never loses sight of the questions of truth and existence but rather brings them into the foreground.