The end of ubuntu or its beginning in Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate: An exercise in conversational philosophy

Matolino and Kwindingwi in an essay “The end of ubuntu” published in this journal in 2013 argue that ubuntu has stalled both as a way of life and as an ethical theory which led them to draw the far-reaching conclusion that ubuntu has reached its end. In 2014 Metz published a rejoinder in this journal with the title “Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi” in which he gestures that the justifications on which Matolino and Kwindingwi rested their conclusion were unfounded. Reacting to Metz in an essay published in this journal in 2015 with the title “A response to Metz’s reply on the end of ubuntu”, Matolino claims that Metz’s rejoinder poses no serious threat to their original position and insists that Metz’s counter-position is not only weak but grossly indefensible. In fact, he characterises Metz’s arguments as dogmatic rather than philosophical. In this paper, I wade into this encounter, which I now tag the “Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate”, not for the sake of argument but to show the philosophical significance of the “Matolino-Kwindingwi conundrum”. That ubuntu has reached its end is not a mere declaration or position or conclusion, it is a problem, one whose significance would redefine not only the sphere of ubuntu philosophy but the historicity of African philosophy as a whole. I shall argue also that though the conundrum remains decisive, I agree with Metz that the arguments marshalled in its support are not decisive. Metz on the other hand may have offered systematisation of ubuntu but I agree with Matolino that his new system may not be as impregnable as he envisages. In showing the philosophical significance of the conundrum and in showing the weaknesses in the arguments of these actors, I shall argue not for the restoration but for the re-invention of ubuntu using the tool of conversational thinking.     

Is it the end or just the beginning of ubuntu? Response to Matolino and Kwindingwi in view of Metz’s rebuttal

In this article we offer a critical review of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s article “The end of ubuntu” in which they put forward their view, based on conditions in contemporary South Africa, that the philosophy of ubuntu is dead. In the main, we intend to uphold what we believe is the more plausible argument, as suggested by the title of Metz’s paper, “Just the beginning of ubuntu”. We argue that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s arrival at the conclusion that ubuntu is over is influenced by their point of departure, which appears to be established on the dubious pre-philosophic assumption that ubuntu, as a normative ethical theory, is a “narrative of return”. We further question their assertion that contemporary conditions in South Africa are the basis on which ubuntu moral theory should be dismantled. Matolino and Kwindingwi argue for the demise of ubuntu without supporting their position with convincing, logical reasons. We argue that ubuntu, insofar as it is a moral theory, is competitive and will ultimately prove to be a desirable ethic which could contribute positively towards developing moral character in the contemporary sociopolitical environment in parts of Africa. This article intends to explore the methodology and logic of the debate. However, in the pursuit of pure academic critique, we reject Metz’s allegation that the criticism by Matolino and Kwindingwi is ad hominem.     

Ubuntu and the modern society

The incompatibility school of thought maintains that ubuntu is incompatible with modern society’s politico-juridical order and neoliberal economic system that promotes individualism and unequal distribution of wealth in the context of economic marginalisation and severe impoverishment of the black African majority. Furthermore, the postcolonial state tends to undermine the common good of society. The pro-ubuntu camp maintains that ubuntu is relevant as a normative ethical concept and as the underlying moral framework of reconciliatory politics of South Africa’s rainbow nation. I will show that the limitation of ubuntu due to its application in the framework of liberal constitutional democracy and neoliberal “global institutional order” that serve the interests of global capital and at the same time undermine the economic interests of impoverished black Africans requires ubuntu normative ethical theory to establish an understanding of a rearrangement of the “global institutional order” in a way which fits ubuntu. This work is novel as I appropriate Metz’s understanding of ubuntu as a normative ethical theory to show the importance and the nature of the realignment of the “global institutional order” to ubuntu in a way which promotes the common good of the global community of human beings.     

Essential building blocks of the Ubuntu debate; or: I write what I must

This article is in part a response to Matolino and Kwindingwi’s “The end of Ubuntu” and Metz’s response “Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi”, both of which appeared in the South African Journal of Philosophy. My contribution also stands alone as an outline of the basic minimum of conceptual moves any Ubuntu theorist has to make in order for their text to avoid the twin seductions of being either a contemporary variant of an outdated ethnophilosophy, or an ahistorical analysis of Ubuntu that remains oblivious to the historicity of the concept. The obvious fact that Ubuntu has had a complicated history, first as pre-colonial praxis and then as abstract postcolonial philosophical construct, demands of the postcolonial theorist to pay attention to the epistemic shifts that have historically determined how Ubuntu interacted with various hegemonic, that is, Western-dominated, theoretical discourses.     

The Spatiality of Pain

Abstract

My remarks on Metz’s project will focus on another angle than the one Metz uses. I am more interested in thinking about whether and how far ethical standards from different cultures really differ, how to understand those differences, and how to relate them to what is objectively good, independently of people’s opinions on the matter. Of course one widely circulating opinion on the topic is that cross-cultural differences somehow demonstrate that there is no such thing as objective good at all - that each culture has its own conception of what is good, right, permitted, forbidden, and so on, and the differences are so wide that anyone at all familiar with this, can no longer take seriously the idea that there could be any “objective” values underlying such varied systems.     

A response to Metz's reply on the end of ubuntu

Thaddeus Metz argues against our position that ubuntu has reached its end. He rejects our recommendation that ubuntu both as a way of life and as an ethical theory must be jettisoned as it is no longer applicable to modern conditions. He thinks that both our recommendations are wrong. Hence he seeks to show that ubuntu is defensible both as an ethical theory and as a way of life. Further, he thinks there is a role to be played by ubuntu in how life could be lived in modern day (South) Africa. He also seeks to offer a defence of the relevance of ubuntu theorists. For these reasons he couches his responding title with the phrase ‘Just the beginning of ubuntu [?…?]’. In this paper I continue the debate by seeking to show that Metz's response poses no threat to our original position. I then endeavour to show that my assessment of his position puts him in an unenviable position of defending the indefensible. I further suggest that Metz's current defence of ubuntu is not philosophical but dogmatic.     

Adorno,Ferenczi, and a new “categorical imperative after Auschwitz”

Abstract

Theodor W. Adorno's mature thought can be characterized by the attempt to articulate what he calls a “new categorical imperative after Auschwitz.” By this, Adorno means that theory and praxis must be organized in such a way that the Holocaust does not repeat itself. This article argues that Sándor Ferenczi’s metapsychology is key to understanding Adorno’s attempt to rethink the nature of precisely such a new categorical imperative. One of the key themes of Adorno’s entire corpus is the problem of the “identification with the aggressor” – an idea that originates with Ferenzci rather than, as is commonly thought, Anna Freud. The Ferenczian dimension of Adorno’s thinking becomes particularly clear in Adorno’s thoughts on the question of freedom. In this context, Adorno engages in a psychoanalytically informed critique of the philosophy of freedom and a speculative philosophical critique of psychoanalysis. The fashioning of a “new categorical imperative” after Auschwitz entails a form of education directed towards a new form of Mündigkeit, one oriented towards contradiction, resistance, and a steadfast refusal to “identify with the aggressor.”     

Democratic pluralism and majority rule

Abstract

I argue that Metz’s undertaking, in seeking a ‘comprehensive basic norm’ to underpin African ethics, is similar to Hans Kelsen’s postulation of the Grundnorm in his Pure Theory of Law. But African ethics does not need to be underpinned by an approach such as Kelsen’s. In my view, Metz’s preference for seeking to develop a Grundnorm rests upon a failure to attend carefully to the distinctness of African ethical thinking from Western ethical thinking. This failure is manifest in a spurious distinction (on which Metz relies) between ‘moral anthropology’ / ‘cultural studies’ and ‘normative theory’. It is also manifest in Metz’s failure to attend carefully to the work of Wiredu and Bujo, both of whom present systematic, critical analyses of African ethical thinking while implicitly rejecting the quest for a Grund norm as being unAfrican.     

Stressing the feedback: attention and cardiac vagal tone during a cognitive stress task

Objectives: The present study examined relationships among gaze behaviour and cardiac vagal tone using a novel stress-inducing task.

Methods: Participants’ (N?=?40) eye movements and heart rate variability (HRV) were measured during an unsolvable computer-based task randomly presenting feedback of “Right” and “Wrong” answers distinctly onscreen after each trial. Subgroups were created on the basis of more frequent eye movements to the right (“Correct”-Attenders; n?=?23) or wrong (“Incorrect”-Attenders; n?=?17) areas onscreen.

Results: Correct-Attenders maintained HRV from baseline to the stress task. In contrast, Incorrect-Attenders spent significantly more time viewing “Wrong” feedback, exhibited a reduction in HRV during the stress condition (p?Conclusions: Results demonstrate that pervasive attention to negative feedback (“Wrong”) elicits perseverative stress and negative self-evaluations among university students. This study highlights the potential for studying attentional biases and emotional distress through combined measures of gaze behaviour and cardiac vagal tone.     

Response to Critics

In this “Response to Critics,” Cathleen Kaveny continues the conversation in the JRE symposium centered on her recent book, Prophecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square. The book's central argument is that adequate discussion of contention in the contemporary public square requires attending to matters of rhetoric, particularly the rhetoric of prophetic indictment. Kaveny engages the comments of four interlocutors: Alda Balthrop‐Lewis, James Childress, William Hart, and Martin Kavka. The first section, “Overarching Goals,” summarizes the objectives of the book. The second section, “Methodology,” engages critics regarding methodological issues, highlighting Kaveny's commitment to a version of MacIntyre's tradition theory and her indebtedness to her legal training. The third section, “Structure,” responds to particular questions her interlocutors raise about the four parts of the book. The fourth section, “Larger Questions,” ponders the next stages of the academic and political discussion about contention in the public square.     

The Lure of Pan(en)theism

Abstract

This response to Karmen MacKendrick’s work follows the thematic trail of desire through Divine Enticement (2012), seeking to clarify the relationship in MacKendrick’s work between God and creation. While MacKendrick expresses an initial desire for an “immanent divine,” especially in relation to the work of St. Augustine, she later feels more drawn to “a world that in its beauty calls out the name of its creator” than to a world “in which the creator is simply present.” This brief engagement explores MacKendrick’s logic of seduction in relation to the panentheist and pantheist theologies of Cusa and Bruno, ultimately suggesting that “immanence” only collapses the distance of desire if creation is understood to be finite and self-identical.     

A critical commentary on follow-up studies and “desistance” theories about transgender and gender-nonconforming children

ABSTRACT

Background: It has been widely suggested that over 80% of transgender children will come to identify as cisgender (i.e., desist) as they mature, with the assumption that for this 80%, the trans identity was a temporary “phase.” This statistic is used as the scientific rationale for discouraging social transition for pre-pubertal children. This article is a critical commentary on the limitations of this research and a caution against using these studies to develop care recommendations for gender-nonconforming children.

Methods: A critical review methodology is employed to systematically interpret four frequently-cited studies that sought to document identity outcomes for gender-nonconforming children (often referred to as “desistance” research).

Results: Methodological, theoretical, ethical, and interpretive concerns regarding four “desistance” studies are presented. The authors clarify the historical and clinical contexts within which these studies were conducted to deconstruct assumptions in interpretations of the results. The discussion makes distinctions between the specific evidence provided by these studies versus the assumptions that have shaped recommendations for care. The affirmative model is presented as a way to move away from the question of, “How should children's gender identities develop over time?” toward a more useful question: “How should children best be supported as their gender identity develops?”

Conclusion: The tethering of childhood gender diversity to the framework of “desistance” or “persistence” has stifled advancements in our understanding of children's gender in all its complexity. These follow-up studies fall short in helping us understand what children need. As work begins on the 8th version of the Standards of Care by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, we call for a more inclusive conceptual framework that takes children's voices seriously. Listening to children's experiences will enable a more comprehensive understanding of the needs of gender-nonconforming children and provide guidance to scientific and lay communities.     

Waves,streams, states,and self: An outline of an integral psychology 1

Abstract

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross‐cultural literature search on the “mind” side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self‐system). A “master template” of these various phenomena, culled from over one‐hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the “mind” side of the brain‐mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the “hard problem,” or how the mind‐side can be integrated with the brain‐side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness.     

Trying harder may disrupt cue utilisation

Abstract

Cue depreciation refers to an inhibitory effect in fragment cueing induced by revealing a fragment gradually rather than all at once. Thus far, the effect has been observed only with test words that have been primed in some way. In Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study, even with equal priming for all words, inhibition arises with low-frequency words defined as “challenging” but not with high-frequency words defined as “easy”, and with “remember” instructions (explicit memory task) but not with “complete with any word” instructions (implicit memory task). In Experiments 3 and 4, inhibition arises with unprimed words when subjects believe discovery of such words to be correlated with intelligence or to afford more points. Cue depreciation thus appears to be influenced, rather than by priming per se, by the importance attached to the completion of fragments and “trying harder”.     

Neuropsychological sequelae following pediatric stroke: A nonlinear model of age at lesion effects

Aim: The distribution and quality of brain recovery following pediatric arterial ischemic stroke remains controversial. The literature suggests that age at stroke may be an important modulator of neuropsychological outcome, with reports inferring either greater vulnerability or plasticity in the nascent brain. Our aim was to investigate neuropsychological outcomes following pediatric stroke in a clinical sample with reference to age at lesion, lesion laterality, elapsed time from stroke to assessment, and persistent neurological sequelae.

Methods: Using comprehensive neuropsychological assessment batteries, we investigated retrospectively a large (n?=?44) and evenly distributed group of children who had ischemic stroke during “infancy” (1 month to 1 year), “early childhood” (1 to 6 years), and “late childhood” (6 to 16 years).

Results: Children who suffered a stroke performed significantly worse on a range of neuropsychological measures when compared to a normative sample. However, children who suffered a stroke between 1 and 6 years old demonstrated better preserved neuropsychological profiles than either the earlier (before age 1) or later (after age 6) age groups. In addition, those children suffering a left hemisphere lesion performed more poorly on a range of neuropsychological measures than did children with right hemisphere lesions.

Interpretation: Age at stroke is an important determinant of recovery following insult and may modulate neuropsychological and cognitive outcome.     

Depressive symptoms and use of perspective taking within a communicative context

Objective: The ability to take the perspective of one's conversational partner is essential for successful communication. We assessed whether individuals who report high levels of depressive symptoms have more difficulty with navigating this interpersonal task. Method: Undergraduate students participated in a computerised communication task that, on some trials, required perspective taking (N=125). Results: When participants were grouped according to their self-reported depressive symptoms, the “dysphoric group” (BDI ≥ 16, n=37) showed more errors than a “non-dysphoric group” (BDI ≤ 10, n=56) on trials requiring participants to use the perspective of the speaker, but not on control trials where perspective taking was not required. The dysphoric group demonstrated slower response times overall. Conclusions: Individuals with moderate to high levels of depressive symptoms are more challenged by using a speaker's perspective to interpret statements.     

1966 and All That: James Gibson and Bottom-Down Theory

ABSTRACT

The “later” James Gibson is widely misrepresented as an extreme stimulus–response theorist. In fact, Gibson's 1966 book presents a radical alternative to stimulus–response theory. “Perceptual systems” are not passive and receptive but “organs of active attention” (1966/1968, p. 58). Perceivers “reach out” into the world. This commentary examines some of the implications of Gibson's systems-cum-functionalist-cum-ecological approach, including the relations between the senses; the concept of “sensationless” perception; and most fundamentally, the nature of perceptual systems as extending beyond the body. I conclude that an adequate understanding of perception cannot be limited to the already severely limited domain of psychology. If Gibson is right, “ecological psychology” is a contradiction in terms.     

On Seeing to the Horses: Issues in Teaching and Learning in Theology and Religious Studies After Bonino and Lindbeck

This article re-examines so-called “experiential approaches” to theology and religious studies. In affirming the need of the educator to attend to both cognitive and affective aspects within teaching and learning, and in using many concrete examples from classroom practice, the article critically engages with Latin American liberation theology and post-liberalism in an attempt to clarify what “experience” is being referenced when “experiential methods” are used. The importance of the concrete worlds of individual students, the responsibility of educators to be conscious of their own power in shaping the educational experience, and the desirability of attending to issues surrounding economic disadvantage within theology and religious studies feature prominently in the study. We conclude that, though no experience is neutral, educational contexts in theology and religious studies can offer exemplary settings for profound self-discovery, exploration, and personal development through the “hermeneutical friction” created by critical examination of the narrative worlds within which we live.