Wishful Thinking and the Unconscious: A Reply to Gouws

Abstract

This paper argues against the view that the Freudian unconscious can be understood as an extension of ordinary belief-desire psychology. The paper argues that Freud’s picture of the mind challenges the paradigm of folk psychology, as it is understood by much contemporary philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. The dynamic unconscious postulated by psychoanalysis operates according to rules and principles that are distinct in kind from those rules that organise rational and conscious thought. Psychoanalysis offers us a radical reconception of our ordinary way of thinking about our own minds.     

Sabina Spielrein: out from the shadow of Jung and Freud

Abstract: Since the 1982 publication of Aldo Carotenuto's book, A Secret Symmetry: Sabina Spielrein Between Jung and Freud, there has been renewed interest in the life and work of Sabina Spielrein. She was Jung's first psychoanalytic case at the Burghölzli Hospital in 1904, and was referred to several times in The Freud/Jung Letters. Spielrein recovered, enrolled in medical school, and went on to become a Freudian analyst. Her most famous paper, published in 1912, ‘Destruction as a cause of coming into being’, was referred to by Freud in 1920 in relation to his Death Instinct theory. In the few Freudian publications on this controversial theory since 1920, Spielrein's contribution is consistently omitted. Jung also neglected to refer to her ‘Destruction’ paper in his early 1912 version of ‘Symbols of transformation’, even though he had edited her paper and had promised to acknowledge her contribution. He did refer extensively to Spielrein's first paper, her medical thesis, ‘On the psychological content of a case of schizophrenia’, published in 1911, as yet unpublished in English. In her paper Spielrein sought to understand the psychotic delusions of Frau M, a patient at the Burghölzli, much in the style of Jung's ‘Psychology of dementia praecox’ (1907). The purpose of this paper is to explore to what extent Spielrein's Frau M paper, and its companion ‘Destruction’ paper, make an original contribution to both Jung and Freud's emerging theories on the possible creative versus destructive outcomes of neurotic or psychotic introversion, culminating in Jung's concept of the ‘collective unconscious’ (1916) and Freud's concept of a ‘Death instinct’ (1920).     

Freudian modalities of disbelief

This article can be characterized as a ‘rediscovery’ of a notion of psychoanalysis that had disappeared or had been confused by later operations. The authors explore a Freudian notion that has been unjustly misunderstood, especially because of the multiple ways in which ‘Unglaube’ – disbelief – has been translated. We shall establish the archaeology of this term in Freud by extracting its three significant modes. Firstly, paranoiac disbelief designates an unconscious process of the rejection of belief in the subject's first encounter with a sexual reality that is always traumatic. Secondly, the obsessional neurotic's disbelief, which we shall call ‘incredulity’, is a secondary, less radical refusal of belief, one that is different from its paranoiac counterpart. Finally, we shall envision a third – dialectical – type of disbelief, which Freud called ‘act of disbelief’ and which will enable us to approach the fundamental epistemic and ethical stakes for psychoanalysis.     

THE REBIRTH OF THE IDOLS: THE FREUDIAN UNCONSCIOUS AND THE NIETZSCHEAN UNCONSCIOUS3

The author explores how psychoanalysis mutates in its passing from the privacies of the session to the public spaces of academia, shifting away from enquiry into unfolding unconscious psychic processes guided by its method, and from the clinically based notions Freud and his diverse followers constructed, here called the ‘Freudian unconscious’. In postmodern intellectual contexts Freud's work fuels a ‘Nietzschean unconscious’, issuing from public lecterns in the protagonistic, self‐creating feats of a ‘psychoanalytic discourse’. The ideology of such mutation ishere traced from Nietzsche on to Heidegger and Kojave, and then to Lacan and Laplanche. It reflects the might of the ‘death of evidences’ and the Romantic penchant for the limit‐experience and the primacy accorded to the creative imagination. Discourse as revelation rests on a ‘paradox of the enunciation’ whereby the subject (author) of the statement is taken to be identical to the subject (matter) of the statement. Banishing the boundaries of illusion and evidence, and of self‐overcoming and insight, academic ‘psychoanalytic discourse’creates a ‘return of the idols’ in ‘theoretical’ narcissistic identification.     

Freud and Piaget: The phoney war

This paper explores the relation between the Freudian and Piagetian systems, arguing that the view that they are irreconcilable “schools of thought” stems from arbitrary professional divisions rather than theoretical necessity. The laws of infantile thought according to Piaget, and of the unconscious according to Freud, overlap save in one crucial respect: Piaget's rejection of the fundamental psychoanalytic notion of “thought in the service of desire”.Though a synthesis of these two systems is practicable, and has occasionally been attempted, the paper argues that they are both trapped within a paradigm which ignores the essentially social construction of mind. The way out is suggested by recent developments in both child psychology and psychoanalysis.     

The Plausibility of a Feminist Philosopher’s Take on Freudian Analysis

The analytic tradition of thought in the West started in the late nineteenth century with what is known as ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy. But as a methodological movement, it impacted other areas of knowledge as well. Feminist scholars react to the analytic tradition of thought in many various ways. Many of them critique and challenge the tradition. The present paper aims at a review of a feminist take on Sigmund Freud who imported analytical tradition in psychology at the beginning of the twentieth century. Luce Irigaray questions the legitimacy of Freudian analysis and challenges the claim of neutrality of Freudian discourse by accusing that Freud works within a patriarchal-biased ideology. About the logical basis of Freudian discourse, Irigaray alleges that a logic of indifference is at work there. But how far has Irigaray, as a feminist, been successful in showing the biases and loopholes in Freudian discourse? This paper attempts to show that the Irigarayian line of argument and critique of Freud does not offer a stronger and plausible feminist stance.

     

‘Freud's speculations in ethnology’: A reflection on anthropology's encounter with psychoanalysis

In the early 20th century, many analysts – Freud and Ernest Jones in particular – were confident that cultural anthropologists would demonstrate the universal nature of the Oedipus complex and other unconscious phenomena. Collaboration between the two disciplines, however, was undermined by a series of controversies surrounding the relationship between psychology and culture. This paper re‐examines the three episodes that framed anthropology's early encounter with psychoanalysis, emphasizing the important works and their critical reception. Freud's Totem and Taboo began the interdisciplinary dialogue, but it was Bronislaw Malinowski's embrace of psychoanalysis – a development anticipated through a close reading of his personal diaries – that marked a turning point in relations between the two disciplines. Malinowski argued that an avuncular (rather than an Oedipal) complex existed in the Trobriand Islands. Ernest Jones’ critical dismissal of this theory alienated Malinowski from psychoanalysis and ended ethnographers’ serious exploration of Freudian thought. A subsequent ethnographic movement, ‘culture and personality,’ was erroneously seen by many anthropologists as a product of Freudian theory. When ‘culture and personality’ was abandoned, anthropologists believed that psychoanalysis had been discredited as well – a narrative that still informs the historiography of the discipline and its rejection of psychoanalytical theory.     

Humour and the super-ego: A case study of Paul Muldoon’s poetry

This article focuses on the workings of ‘humour’, a phenomenon that is often neglected in Freudian readings of literature, and also (perhaps relatedly) in the analysis of work with patients. Challenging views that the details of humour are best left uninterpreted, it explores how they can provide a mode of access to what is important. In particular, it focuses on the idea of Galgenhumor (literally ‘gallows humour’) in Northern Irish verse. The Ulster poet Paul Muldoon provides a ‘case study’ of someone using considerable humour while facing political atrocities. I aim to show that Muldoon can be viewed as a useful chronicler of ‘the Troubles’ and that a Freudian view of his humour can help readers to appreciate his significance. The method of the article is to interpret some of Muldoon’s verse by applying Freudian theory, working on the basis that poetry can sometimes achieve its effects in ways that are obscured to both the reader and the poet. I have not set out to psychoanalyze Paul Muldoon through a reading of his poems, but rather to stage a discussion of ways that humour can work, making use of Freud’s theories about the unconscious, especially his writings on humour. I examine how humour can create an outlet for affect while simultaneously assisting its repression, and also how it can leave memorable traces of traumatic experience, making it easier for the experience to become available for retrospective examination and exploration.     

The frustrating problem for four-dimensionalism

I argue that four-dimensionalism and the desire satisfaction account of well-being are incompatible. For every person whose desires are satisfied, there will be many shorter-lived individuals (‘person-stages’ or ‘subpersons’) who share the person’s desires but who do not exist long enough to see those desires satisfied; not only this, but in many cases their desires are frustrated so that the desires of the beings in whom they are embedded as proper temporal parts may be fulfilledI call this the frustrating problem for four-dimensionalism. In the first half of the paper I lay the groundwork for understanding the frustrating problem, and then in the second half, I will examine six possible responses to the frustrating problem on behalf of the four-dimensionalist, (i) the Parfit (1984) inspired claim that identity is not what matters, (ii) the personal pronoun revisionism of Noonan (Analysis 70(1):93–98, 2010), (iii) the indirect concern account of Hudson (A materialist metaphysics of the human person, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001), (iv) the sensible stages account of Lewis (On the plurality of worlds, Wiley Blackwell Press, Oxford, 1986), (v) a multiple-concepts account of desire satisfaction, and (vi) a No Desire View according to which subpersons have no mental states and thus no desires to frustrate. I argue that none of these solutions will help the four-dimensionalist; she does better to reject the desire satisfaction theory, while the defender of the desire satisfaction theory does better to reject four-dimensionalism.     

Unconscious Goal Pursuit in Real-Life Organizations: Commentary on Chen,Latham, Piccolo,and Itzchakov (2020)

The research reviewed in Chen et al.’s (this issue) meta-analysis shows that a person’s goal pursuits and motivational states can be induced by external means, or ‘primes’, and then operate in much the same way as if the person made a conscious intention to pursue that goal. Previous demonstrations of this phenomena in psychology laboratories are now extended to real life organizations and settings and shown to produce even stronger effects than before. The research reviewed also further demonstrates the close similarity between unconscious and conscious goal operation, belying the Freudian idea of a separate unconscious mind. Implications for the ethicality of influencing employees without their awareness are discussed.     

From Freud’s dream-work to Bion’s work of dreaming: The changing conception of dreaming in psychoanalytic theory

Bion moved psychoanalytic theory from Freud's theory of dream-work to a concept of dreaming in which dreaming is the central aspect of all emotional functioning. In this paper, I first review historical, theoretical, and clinical aspects of dreaming as seen by Freud and Bion. I then propose two interconnected ideas that I believe reflect Bion’s split from Freud regarding the understanding of dreaming. Bion believed that all dreams are psychological works in progress and at one point suggested that all dreams contain elements that are akin to visual hallucinations. I explore and elaborate Bion’s ideas that all dreams contain aspects of emotional experience that are too disturbing to be dreamt, and that, in analysis, the patient brings a dream with the hope of receiving the analyst’s help in completing the unconscious work that was entirely or partially too disturbing for the patient to dream on his own. Freud views dreams as mental phenomena with which to understand how the mind functions, but believes that dreams are solely the ‘guardians of sleep,’ and not, in themselves, vehicles for unconscious psychological work and growth until they are interpreted by the analyst. Bion extends Freud's ideas, but also departs from Freud and re-conceives of dreaming as synonymous with unconscious emotional thinking – a process that continues both while we are awake and while we are asleep. From another somewhat puzzling perspective, he views dreams solely as manifestations of what the dreamer is unable to think.     

A challenge to ‘self’ centred ‘psycho’: Therapy as an introduction to an ‘inter-relational therapy’

This paper focuses on ‘psychotherapy’, particularly exploring the emphasis on the ‘psyche’. The term ‘psyche’ is described as potentially having different interpretations depending on the underlying ontological assumptions that influence its understanding and these, it is suggested, will have considerable implications for the therapy that identifies with the label ‘psychotherapy’. Two very different ontological perspectives are highlighted in this paper in order to illustrate the different conception of the term ‘psyche’; firstly, Freud’s interpretation of what is meant by ‘psyche’, which is then contrasted with a phenomenological perspective, with reference to the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. Both the Freudian and phenomenological approaches are then criticised for focusing on, what is described here as, an egocentric perspective and it is suggested that the term ‘psycho-therapy’ will inevitably lead to a preoccupation with putting the ‘self’ first as a basis for relating to the external world. An alternative term, ‘Inter-relational therapy’, is presented based on the ideas of Levinas and MacMurray, both of who are critical of a cultural preoccupation with focusing on the ‘self’ and suggest a need to acknowledge relationships with the external world, including the other people that populate it, prior to a ‘self’ reflective process.     

That obscure object of psychoanalysis

This essay examines how psychoanalytic conceptions of the subject and the object in the works of Freud and Lacan may contribute to a re-examination of the vexed issue of the subject–object relationship in science, philosophy and epistemology. For Freud, the ego is the essential subject, yet he regarded it as an always already objectified subject, which is objectively thinkable yet never subjectively knowable qua subject. Lacan conceptualised this Freudian principle of subjectivity with his notion of the divided (barred) subject, which he initially designated as an effect of the symbolic order of language. As to the object, both Freud and Lacan emphasized its constitutive partiality, which explains why no object is ever fully capable of providing full satisfaction and why each and every object is flawed and cracked, thus triggering desire. Extending Freud’s idea of the ‘shadow of the object,’ Lacan captured the fundamental inadequacy of the object with his concept of the object a. As such, for Freud and Lacan, the subject–object relationship is problematic, because it concerns a relationship between a divided subject and a non-object (object a). In this relationship, the subject is not purely object and the object is not merely subject (in the Kantian sense), nor is the Hegelian subject–object identity more than an idealist aspiration. For psychoanalysis, the subject is always traversed by the object, yet the object can never be fully integrated into a subjectified structure of knowledge. The only way to conceive of an adequate subject–object relationship is at the level of fantasy.     

Jung,Individuation, and Moral Relativity in Qohelet 7:16–17

Qohelet’s warning in chapter 7:16 ‘not to be too righteous’ has commonly been interpreted by biblical scholars in ways that acquit the author of teaching immorality. This article approaches the text from a psychological critical perspective, bringing it into dialogue with the psychological maturation process of individuation in Jungian psychology. The confrontation with the shadow, made up of reprehensible qualities residing in the unconscious that a person wishes to deny, forms the prologue to this process. Projection or repression of these primitive instincts can lead to various problems, such as stagnation and neurosis. Raising the shadowy, primitive, and archaic content of the unconscious to consciousness and integrating it with the ego, however, leads to a mysterious union of opposites and a new personality, a ‘self’ that transcends consciousness.     

The unconscious

A discussion of the unconscious leads naturally to Freud and to a theory on subjectivity we may designate as de-centred. The unconscious reminds us that not only do we not know ourselves. In the core of our subjectivity, we have to acknowledge the notion of otherness. Re-reading Freud's text, The Unconscious, from 1915, the current author emphasises the character and function of the unconscious as radically different from what we know about conscious processes. This allows for the concept of the preconscious, which the author links to Winnicott's intermediary area and Green's tertiary processes. Taking as point of departure Freud's differentiation of word presentation and thing presentation, the author points to Freud's introduction of the term thing-cathexies of the object as designating the primal psychic representation. The Freudian perspective is broadened, encompassing the notion of otherness as discussed by Laplanche and Aulagnier. Concluding the paper, the author draws some implications for psychoanalytic technique, focusing especially on transference.     

Reciprocating Desires: The Pursuit of Desirable East Asian Femininity in China’s Commercial Sex Industry

ABSTRACT

This article examines how socioeconomic conditions impact heteronormative sexual desires between high-tier sex workers and their non-Chinese clients in urban South China. Drawing from Hoang’s interpretation of ‘dealing in desires’, Rofel’s ‘Desiring China’, and cultural capital, the article considers how desire circulates in high-end bars and its impact on how workers and clients negotiate their relationships. I move beyond Hoang’s and Rofel’s framework to include cultural capital that help sex workers perform an East Asia femininity and develop their image as cosmopolitan tempting girls to practice ‘reciprocating desires’ with their non-Chinese clients. The article unfolds as a theoretical exercise in unearthing and understanding the underpinnings of how socioeconomic context impacts our understanding of what qualifies as desirable East Asian femininity. Drawing upon ethnographic research conducted in a high-end bar in South China from the summer of 2015 to the summer of 2017, this article first examines desire and the meanings attached to sex workers’ body capital, and cultural capital that exemplify desirable East Asian femininity. Second, cultural capital explains how desire operates within high-tier heteronormative sex work spaces to construct social identity, which can help sex workers achieve professional success and become a source of personal satisfaction.     

The Evolutionary Significance of the Primary Process—The Freudian Concept and Its Revision

Freud’s Lamarckian beliefs contributed to his theory of instincts, as well as his concepts regarding the unconscious primary process. Freud’s theory of the primary and secondary process is fundamentally biological, as he placed it within an evolutionary context and hypothesized that the two systems were distinguished by free and bound psychic energy. Freud’s distinction between the primary and secondary process is one of the few psychoanalytic theories that has been confirmed by science. We believe that Freud was correct in maintaining that the primary process is of earlier evolutionary origin than the secondary process. But Freud failed to recognize the distinction between primary-process thinking that occurs in dreams and that which occurs in the waking state. In the waking state, the primary process is not wish fulfilling, as Freud believed, but functions as an inference making tool utilizing metaphor and metonymy. As such, rapid, unconscious primary process thinking is at the heart of our survival.     

Off the beaten track: Freud,sound and music.Statement of a problem and some historico‐critical notes1

The authors note that the element of sound and music has no place in the model of mental functioning bequeathed to us by Freud, which is dominated by the visual and the representational. They consider the reasons for this exclusion and its consequences, and ask whether the simple biographical explanation offered by Freud himself is acceptable. This contribution reconstructs the historical and cultural background to that exclusion, cites some relevant emblematic passages, and discusses Freud’s position on music and on the aesthetic experience in general. Particular attention is devoted to the relationship between Freud and Lipps, which is important both for the originality of Lipps’s thinking in the turn‐of‐the‐century debate and for his ideas on the musical aspects of the foundations of psychic life, at which Freud ‘stopped’, as he himself wrote. Moreover, the shade of Lipps accompanied Freud throughout his scientific career from 1898 to 1938. Like all foundations, that of psychoanalysis was shaped by a system of inclusions and exclusions. The exclusion of the element of sound and music is understandable in view of the cultural background to the development of the concepts of the representational unconscious and infantile sexuality. While the consequences have been far reaching, the knowledge accumulated since that exclusion enables us to resume, albeit on a different basis, the composition of the ‘unfinished symphony’ of the relationship between psychoanalysis and music.