What is Ubuntu,? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African Descent

Abstract

In this article, I describe and systematize the different answers to the question ‘What is ubuntu,?’ that I have been able to identify among South Africans of African descent (SAADs). I show that it is possible to distinguish between two clusters of answers. The answers of the first cluster all define ubuntu, as a moral quality of a person, while the answers of the second cluster all define ubuntu, as a phenomenon (for instance a philosophy, an ethic, African humanism, or, a worldview) according to which persons are interconnected. The concept of a person is of central importance to all the answers of both clusters, which means that to understand these answers, it is decisive to raise the question of who counts, as a person according to SAADs. I show that some SAADs define all Homo sapiens, as persons, whereas others hold the view that only some Homo sapiens, count as persons: only those who are black, only those who have been incorporated into personhood, or only those who behave in a morally acceptable manner.     

Interpreting Ecofeminist Environmentalism in African Communitarian Philosophy and Ubuntu: An Alternative to Anthropocentrism

Abstract

The question of what an African ecofeminist environmental ethical view ought to look like remains unanswered in much of philosophical writing on African environmental ethics. I consider what an African ecofeminist environmental ethics ought to look like if values salient in African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu are seriously considered. After considering how African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu foster communitarian living, relational living, harmonious living, interrelatedness and interdependence between human beings and various aspects of nature, I reveal how African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu could be interpreted from an ecofeminist environmental perspective. I suggest that this underexplored ecofeminist environmental ethical view in African philosophical thinking might be reasonably taken as an alternative to anthropocentric environmentalism. I urge other ethical theorists on African environmentalism not to neglect this non-anthropocentric African environmentalism that is salient in African ecofeminist environmentalism.     

The Bewaji,Van Binsbergen and Ramose debate on Ubuntu

Abstract

What follows is a discussion, in three parts, of the African concept of ubuntu and related issues. In the first part of the discussion J.A.I. Bewaji assesses an essay by W.M.J. van Binsbergen on Ubuntu and the Globalisation of Southern African Thought and Society (2001). In the second part Bewaji reviews M.B. Ramose’s African Philosophy through Ubuntu (2002). And in the third part Ramose responds to both Bewaji and Van Binsbergen. Although Ramose disagrees with some of Bewaji’s comments and interpretations - especially with regard to the thesis on which ubuntu is, according to the former, founded (i.e. “that ontology proper is a rheology”) - both Bewaji and Ramose agree that Van Binsbergen’s critique of ubuntu philosophy, and specifically of Ramose’s explication thereof; is untenable.     

Addressing fragmented human–nonhuman interactions through an ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics

In this paper, I address human-induced environmental ills we face using an ubuntu-inspired ethical lens. I follow ubuntu scholars to stress the significance for moral agents to embody virtues. Virtue development is essential to carry out obligations and address human impacts on the environment. Thaddeus Metz, in particular, has drawn attention to how embodying ubuntu virtues of humility and friendliness can prompt moral agents to be other-regarding. The view I developed in this paper differs from his ubuntu-inspired account in at least two significant ways. First, humans cannot be in harmonious relationships with some species such as Black Mambas, Hyenas and sea urchins even if they can interact. Second, we must acknowledge the consequentialist dimension of ubuntu ethics and prioritise the different aspects of ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics, ranking them to offer possibilities for a more realistic recommendation to change our moral life. This paper demonstrates that the three dimensions of ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics are fundamental because we need to think about moral consequences, right action and our virtue in accounting for our actions.     

The Ideal of African Scholarship and its Implications for Introductory Philosophy: the Example of Placide Tempels

Abstract

Thinking of an academic discipline in terms of a ‘social practice’ (MacIntyre) helps in formulating what the ideal captured in the slogan ‘African scholarship’ can contribute to the discipline. For every practice is threatened by the attractiveness of goods external to the practice–in particular, competitiveness for its own sake–and to counter this virtues of character are needed. African traditional culture prioritizes a normative picture of the human person which could very well contribute here to upholding the values internal to scholarship. I argue, contrary to Matolino, that for these purposes Tempels’ notion of the transactional process of becoming more of what you are by virtue of the human insertion in nature, is a useful starting point. But the dominant way philosophy is framed today, the human person outside of ‘nature’, omitting the key notion of presence-to-self, disallows this dialogue between the dominant tradition and African thought culture. I show, by interrogating what I take to be an impoverished understanding of objectivity in the dominant philosophical approach, how the idea of personal, subjective, growth is crucial to introductory philosophy if the project of African scholarship is to find purchase. As an example I look at rival ways of understanding the value of justice, procedurally or, alternatively, substantively and hence foregrounding participation.¹     

The Notion of Ubuntu and Communalism in African Educational Discourse

The notion of ubuntu and communalism is of great importance in anAfrican educational discourse, as well as inAfrican Philosophy of Education and in Africanphilosophical discourse. Ubuntu is aphilosophy that promotes the common good ofsociety and includes humanness as an essentialelement of human growth. In African culture the community always comesfirst. The individual is born out of and intothe community, therefore will always be part ofthe community. Interdependence, communalism, sensitivity towards others and caring for others are all aspects of ubuntu as a philosophy of life (Le Roux, 2000, p. 43). The community and belonging to acommunity is part of the essence of traditionalAfrican life. Philosophy of life and Philosophyof Education, thus, go together, because aphilosophy of life helps to identify the goalsand purposes that a particular society holdsdear. Humanness is very important in Africanphilosophy in the sense of seeing human needs,interests and dignity as fundamental to humanexistence and therefore it will also beimportant in African Philosophy of Education(Letseka, 2000, p. 182). According to Letseka(2000, p. 186) nobody is born with botho orubuntu– these are communally acceptedand desirable ethical standards that a personacquires throughout his/her life and thereforeeducation also plays a very important role intransferring the African philosophy of life.     

Grote’s analysis of Ancient Greek political thought: its significance to J. S. Mill’s idea about ‘active character’ in a liberal democracy

ABSTRACT

George Grote (1794–1871) published the History of Greece between 1846 and 1856, thereby providing the first positive evaluation of democratic Athens in the early modern period and a novel interpretation of the roles of the sophists and of Socrates, premised on his understanding of democratic Athens. Grote’s account offered a sociological explanation of the moral psychology cultivated by the constitution of the Athenian polis through the citizens’ active political participation. This participation cultivated civic virtues, emotional and ethical attachment to the polis, and a sense of obligation towards the polis, even at the expense of self-interest. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was familiar with Grote’s historical works and emphasized the parallels between the ancient direct democracy and the modern, representative democracy, which he himself promoted in his Considerations on Representative Government (1861). In this article it is argued that J. S. Mill’s concept of the ‘active character’ of the citizen in a modern representative democracy was inspired by Grote’s understanding and positive evaluation of ancient democratic Athens and its moral psychology. This is one example of the phenomenon mentioned in the editorial to this special issue, namely that accounts of past philosophy may influence philosophy proper.     

Effects of Worldview and Mortality Salience in Persuasion Processes

Individual differences in media effects research have yielded a trove of insights into how media content can have varying effects. One such variable is worldview—a philosophy of life that enables a person to make sense of one's experience—but the notion has largely been unexamined in media effects research. A person's worldview can moderate the way a persuasive message is processed—sometimes in the opposite direction of that intended by communicators. Building on the construct of worldview and terror management theory, two experiments (N = 149 and N = 151) examined the question with worldview as a measured variable and mortality salience as a two-level factor. Worldview had a main effect on global evaluations of ads, as participants who tended toward a relativist worldview had lower evaluations of the ads and lower behavioral intentions, while participants who tended toward a positivist worldview had higher evaluations of the ads and higher behavioral intentions. Also, mortality salience was found to moderate participants' worldview, presumably making their worldview more accessible to exert a greater influence. The importance of worldview as a construct in media effects research, as well as theoretical implications for persuasion and terror management theory, are discussed.     

Post,Oblique, Human

Abstract

Taking its cue from the oblique of Elaine L. Graham's ‘post/human’, this essay examines the difficult relationship between humanism and its ‘post’. If, as Graham points out, the present moment is one in which anthropocentrism is both in crisis and deferred to as ‘common sense’, what is to be done? Perhaps the answer lies in strategies for ‘obliquing’ humanist discourse, working through its contradictions in order to establish the ‘post/human’ as a figure that forever disrupts humanism.     

Old wives’ tales and philosophical delusions: on ‘the problem of women and African philosophy’

abstract

This article represents a response to ‘the problem of women and African philosophy’, which refers mainly to the absence of sRong women’s and feminist voices within the discipline of African philosophy. I investigate the possibility that African women are not so much excluded from the institutionalized discipline of philosophy, as preferring fiction as a genre for intellectual expression. This hypothesis can be supported by some feminists who read the absolute prioritisation of abstraction and generalization over the concrete and the particular as a masculine and western oppressive sRategy. Attention to the concrete and the unique which is made possible by literature more readily than by philosophy, could thus operate as a form of political resistance in certain contexts. If fiction is currently the preferred form of intellectual expression of African women, it is crucial that the community of professional philosophers in a context like South Africa should come to terms with the relevance of such a preference for philosophy’s self-conception, and it should work to make these intellectual contributions philosophically fruitful. In the process, we may entertain the hope that philosophy itself will move closer to its root or source as ‘love of wisdom’.     

Loss: the ultimate philosophical problem

This paper draws on Jan Zwicky’s claim in Lyric Philosophy that loss is the ultimate philosophical problem and Wittgenstein’s attitude to philosophy in his Culture and Value that: ‘philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition’. This paper will enter the difficult territory of loss using poetry and reflections to engage loss as a spiritual challenge and perhaps one of the major forces shaping cultural ways. Death inescapably brings loss into life for those who remain after a death but loss has many other forms and is a persistent experience in living that touches every stage of the life journey. It is a philosophical problem rooted in common human experience from childhood on that has been addressed in a multitude of forms, conceptualizations, rituals, belief systems and religions. As a method, poetry is a way of inquiry that allows one to enter experience and meet the intensity of events, particularly loss. In her essay ‘Entering the Bird Cage: Poetry and Perceptibility’, Jane Hirschfield says that poetry allows us ‘to understand the world beyond the narrow self’ and to do so ‘it is necessary to be available to the unknown’ and loss moves experience into the unknown.     

Robert Nozick,Libertarian?

Abstract

We set out a variety of material from Nozick’s work after -Anarchy, State, and Utopia- that tends to show that, despite his protestations of fidelity to libertarianism in-Invariances- and interviews before his death, his thought took directions inconsistent with the version of libertarianism in that book, in which only negative rights (or the ‘ethic of respect’ as he called it later) can be coercively enforced by the State. We explore one interpretive possibility, taking a second look at a footnote in ASU that acknowledges a moral permission to violate the ethic of respect under circumstances of ‘catastrophic moral horror.’     

The End(s) of Philosophy: Rhetoric, Therapy and Wittgenstein's Pyrrhonism

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Thoughts that are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for’. The desire for such conceptual tranquillity is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work, and especially in his later ‘grammatical‐therapeutic’ philosophy. Some commentators (notably Rush Rhees and C. G. Luckhardt) have cautioned that emphasising this facet of Wittgenstein's work ‘trivialises’ philosophy – something which is at odds with Wittgenstein's own philosophical ‘seriousness’ (in particular his insistence that philosophy demands that one ‘Go the bloody hard way’). Drawing on a number of correlations between Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and that of the Pyrrhonian Sceptics, in this paper I defend a strong ‘therapeutic’ reading of Wittgenstein, and show how this can be maintained without ‘trivialising’ philosophy.     

Mottainai: a Japanese sense of anima mundi

The Japanese expression ‘Mottainai!’ can be translated as ‘What a waste!’ or ‘Don't be wasteful!’ However, mottainai means much more than that. It expresses a sense of concern or regret for whatever is wasted because its intrinsic value is not properly utilized. Buddhism and Japan's indigenous religion, Shinto, are integral to the Japanese psyche, accordingly the other‐than‐human world is also experienced and lived in daily life. In the Japanese worldview everything in nature is endowed with spirit, every individual existence is dependent on others and all are connected in an ever‐changing world. Mottainai offers a glimpse of the anima mundi inherent in this worldview. This contrasts with our anthropocentric Zeitgeist, which manifests outwardly as environmental crisis and inwardly as fixation upon social interactions, especially through communication technologies, to the exclusion of all else. Jung's statement, ‘The decisive question for man is: Is he related to something infinite or not? That is the telling question of his life’, has never been more pertinent. Encounters beyond the human world could be understood as touching this ‘something infinite’, and the apparent benefits of such experiences in the analytical process are illustrated with clinical vignettes from the author's practice.     

Democratic pluralism and majority rule

Abstract

I argue that Metz’s undertaking, in seeking a ‘comprehensive basic norm’ to underpin African ethics, is similar to Hans Kelsen’s postulation of the Grundnorm in his Pure Theory of Law. But African ethics does not need to be underpinned by an approach such as Kelsen’s. In my view, Metz’s preference for seeking to develop a Grundnorm rests upon a failure to attend carefully to the distinctness of African ethical thinking from Western ethical thinking. This failure is manifest in a spurious distinction (on which Metz relies) between ‘moral anthropology’ / ‘cultural studies’ and ‘normative theory’. It is also manifest in Metz’s failure to attend carefully to the work of Wiredu and Bujo, both of whom present systematic, critical analyses of African ethical thinking while implicitly rejecting the quest for a Grund norm as being unAfrican.     

On historicity,context and the existence of African philosophy

Abstract

The author reviews the second edition of Philosophy from Africa by comparing it with the first edition and with other anthologies in African philosophy. Questions regarding the existence and identity of African philosophy receive special attention. It is argued that a negation of the existence of African philosophy results from monolithic, ahistorical and decontextualized thinking about Africa and about philosophy. The roots and development of African philosophy are inseparably bound up with the continent’s historical, political, cultural and economic complexities. The challenge facing African philosophers is twofold: deconstructing the notion of philosophy as constructed and conceived by the West; and reconstructing the history of African philosophy.     

Compassion and purity: the ethics and boundary-making of Christian evangelicals

The paper explores the ethical attitude of Christian evangelicals in a church in Britain and how it affects boundary-making of their community. Evangelicals in the case study seek to be accepting of the person and to refrain from being judgemental. The paper distinguishes between the person-centred ‘ethic of compassion’ and the norm-centred ‘ethic of purity’. The ethic of compassion consists in accepting another and recognising the dignity of another based on shared humanity. It is a frame of mind that combines moral intention with the emotions of empathy and sympathy. In contrast, the ethic of purity privileges adherence to the moral order of the group over considerations for the person. The ‘compassionate’ frame of mind weakens boundaries, while the ‘pure’ frame of mind reinforces them. The boundaries of a community result from the interplay of the two ethics.     

Marketing Heidegger: Entrepreneurship and corporate practices

Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus have made some valuable suggestions about the important but (in philosophy) much neglected concept of entrepreneurship. An entrepreneur, in the classical economists’ lexicon, is a person who founds, organizes, and manages a business. In more modern conversation, he or she is a business hero or heroine. Nowhere is the new emphasis on entrepreneurship more evident than in our largest corporations. The authors analyse the entrepreneur not as an eccentric or a maverick but in terms a specific way of operating within existing social practices. They reject the still prevalent caricature of the avaricious entrepreneur in the grip of greed as well as the too ‘genius'‐oriented conception of the inventor who cannot manage his own affairs, much less a corporation. An entrepreneur, on their account, is someone who knows how to notice and ‘hold on to’ an anomaly and creates a market, sometimes where there was no market at all. They argue that entrepreneurship essentially involves conversation. It is not mere inventiveness. This ‘reconfiguration’ of entrepreneurship explains a great deal about what many corporations ‐ at considerable expense ‐ are learning about their own activities and operations, and many established and successful companies are struggling to transform themselves in just the direction that Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus have outlined.     

Intellectual intuition and Kant's epistemology

In order to construct culture‐inclusive theories of psychology to establish an autonomous academic tradition of Confucian humanism, this article provides a commentary on Zongshan Mou's philosophy of intellectual intuition (智的直覺) as well as his systematic bias in translating Kant's epistemology of transcendental idealism (先驗理念論) into Chinese as ‘transcendent idealism’ (超越觀念論). I will demonstrate that his systematic bias in translating Kant's epistemology into Chinese may hinder his followers in developing a comprehensive understanding of the dialectical relationships among various paradigms of the Western philosophy of science, while his philosophy of intellectual intuition not only deviates from the original philosophical stance of pre‐Qin Confucians towards Heaven (天) and Dao (道), but also leads to his misunderstanding of Zhu Xi's philosophy and exploration of human nature (性), which may help us to understand the necessity of a psychodynamic model of cultural psychology with its emphasis on collective unconsciousness instead of the metaphor of Height Psychology.