Death,Deprivation and the Afterlife

Philosophia - Most people believe that death is bad for the one who dies. Much attention has been paid to the Epicurean puzzle about death that the rests on a tension between that belief and...     

McMahan on Speciesism and Deprivation

Jeff McMahan has long shown himself to be a vigorous and incisive critic of speciesism, and in his essay “Our Fellow Creatures” he has been particularly critical of speciesist arguments that draw inspiration from Wittgenstein. In this essay I consider his arguments against speciesism generally and the species‐norm account of deprivation in particular. I argue that McMahan's ethical framework (as outlined in The Ethics of Killing) is more nuanced and more open to the incorporation of speciesist intuitions regarding deprivation than he himself suggests. Specifically, I argue that, given his willingness to include a comparative dimension in his “Intrinsic Potential Account” he ought to recognize species as a legitimate comparison class. I also argue that a sensible speciesism can be pluralist and flexible enough to accommodate many of McMahan's arguments in defense of “moral individualist” intuitions. In this way, I hope to make the case for at least a partial reconciliation between McMahan and the “Wittgensteinian speciesists”, e.g. Cora Diamond, Stephen Mulhall, and Raimond Gaita.     

Deprivation 2 3

The author describes her experience of setting up a therapeutic service for 'looked-after children' in a social services department, and the change of approach from a focus on individual therapy 8 to consultation and liaison with the network. The idea that children in the 'care system' suffer a triple deprivation when the 'double deprivation', as described by Henry (1974), is compounded by organizational difficulties, is explored. Material is presented of work with foster-parents which helped to prevent placement breakdown. The ways in which disturbing emotional states of clients are re-enacted within the organization are discussed. The author suggests that the paralysis in a social services system, which can lead to 'drift', resembles the 'collapse of strategy' of babies displaying a 'disorganized/disoriented' attachment response to a frightened or frightening mother. The need for a 'secure base' for social workers and their managers is stressed if they are to provide the same for their clients.     

Death and the Self

It is an old philosophical idea that if the future self is literally different from the current self, one should be less concerned with the death of the future self (Parfit, 1984 ). This paper examines the relation between attitudes about death and the self among Hindus, Westerners, and three Buddhist populations (Lay Tibetan, Lay Bhutanese, and monastic Tibetans). Compared with other groups, monastic Tibetans gave particularly strong denials of the continuity of self, across several measures. We predicted that the denial of self would be associated with a lower fear of death and greater generosity toward others. To our surprise, we found the opposite. Monastic Tibetan Buddhists showed significantly greater fear of death than any other group. The monastics were also less generous than any other group about the prospect of giving up a slightly longer life in order to extend the life of another.     

Life,Death, and Life After Death: Meanings of the Relationship Between Death Anxiety and Religion

ABSTRACT

A sample of 389 individuals completed a death anxiety scale and a series of items that measured self-reported religious practices and beliefs. Those lowest in religious practices and beliefs were significantly higher in death anxiety. Contrary to some prior research, depth of belief had a stronger negative association with death anxiety than did religious activities. Strongest relationships had to do with concepts of life after death. The oldest respondents reported the least death anxiety.     

Deprivation and reward stimuli as compound stimuli

In Experiment 1 the experimental group was tested with a deprivation level and a reward magnitude which it had experienced previously but which it had not experienced in combination. This group was inferior in test performance to a group which had experienced the test deprivation-reward combination prior to test. These results were interpreted as indicating that deprivation stimuli and reward stimuli form a compound stimulus and training on the elements of the compound produces performance inferior to training directly on the compound. In Experiment 2, the decrement associated with two different shifts in deprivation and reward did not differ despite the different size change of total incentive involved in the two shifts. The results were interpreted as indicating that the deprivation-reward stimulus is not produced by a single underlying incentive mechanism.     

Personality and Reaction Time after Sleep Deprivation

The relationship between reaction time and both state and trait personality variables was investigated in 37 participants after 30 h of sleep deprivation. Regression analyses suggested that endorsement of greater Novelty Seeking, anger/hostility, and depression/dejection, and less confusion, was associated with greater reaction time declines on one Multi-Attribute Task Battery index after sleep deprivation. Further, greater Novelty Seeking and depression/dejection, and less vigor/activity, was associated with greater reaction time declines after sleep deprivation on another Multi-Attribute Task Battery index. Additional correlational analyses indicated that better reaction times were associated with greater Novelty Seeking and lower anger/hostility prior to sleep deprivation, and less confusion/bewilderment following sleep deprivation. Findings suggest that both state and trait personality variables are associated with reaction time performance following sleep deprivation.     

Death and the Meaning of Life

Abstract

Thoughts of mortality sometimes bring on a crisis in confidence in the meaning in one's life. One expression of this collapse is the midlife crisis. In a recent article, Kieran Setiya argues that if one can value activities as opposed to accomplishments as the primary goods in one's life then one might avoid the midlife crisis. I argue that Setiya's advice, rather than safeguarding the meaning in one's life, substitutes for it something else, a kind of happiness. I use Susan Wolf's concept of meaning in order to make this case. Wolf has not written much about the importance of death, but I argue that her account of meaning shares essential features with the theories developed by Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger. Sartre argues that death is an unqualified harm, while Heidegger argues that there is meaning in life only because we are mortal. I conclude by showing how Heidegger's theory of mortality underwrites accounts of meaning like those found in Wolf.     

Death and the Evolution of Language

My hypothesis is that the cognitive challenge posed by death might have had a co-evolutionary role in the development of linguistic faculties. First, I claim that mirror neurons, which enable us to understand others’ actions and emotions, not only activate when we directly observe someone, but can also be triggered by language: words make us feel bodily sensations. Second, I argue that the death of another individual cannot be understood by virtue of the mirror neuron mechanism, since the dead provide no neural pattern for mirroring: this cognitive task requires symbolic thought, which in turn involves emotions. Third, I describe the symbolic leap of the human species as a cognitive detachment from the here and now, allowing displaced reference: through symbols the human mind can refer to what is absent, possible, or even impossible (like the presence of a dead person). Such a detachment has had a huge adaptive impact: adopting a coevolutionary standpoint can help explain why language is as effective as environmental inputs in order to stimulate our bodily experience. In the end I suggest a further coevolutionary “reversal”: if language is necessary to understand the death of the other, it might also be true that the peculiar cognitive problem posed by the death of the other (the corpse is present, but the other is absent) has contributed to the crucial transition from an indexical sign system to the symbolic level, i.e., the “cognitive detachment”. Death and language, as Heidegger claimed, have an essential relation for humans, both from an evolutionary and a phenomenological perspective: they have shaped the symbolic consciousness that make us conceive of them.