Rethinking war history: the evolution of representations of Stalin and his policies during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 in Soviet and Russian History Textbooks

The associative chain between the personality of Joseph Stalin and his role in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 remains stable among the historical consciousness of Russians from the end of the war until now. Traditionally, high schools devote a large amount of time to study the history of the war, including a range of the events dedicated to remembering the war. As a result, a stable and positive attitude toward the war and its significance to the Russian nation has been achieved, while the attitude toward Stalin remains ambivalent, ranging from assessing him as a perpetrator, who initiated genocide and terror against Soviet people, to national hero and great ruler, who led the country to victory. In 2017, the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation introduced three new national history textbooks based on the single goal of teaching Russian history in schools, but in practice has actually returned history back to a uniform standardized historical education across the country, similar to the Soviet education system. In this regard, the historical comparative research based on content analysis of Soviet, Russian, and newly issued textbooks is deemed topical and aimed to track the evolution of the image of Stalin and to understand how the historical representation of Stalin and his war policy has changed over the last 70 years in school education. There is also the goal of identifying the main reasons for the diverse attitudes toward Stalin currently inherent in different generations and rooted in stable ambivalent assessments of his war policy among Soviet and post-Soviet Russian society.

     

Russification as a factor in religious conversion. Making Lenin roll over in his grave

The Soviet project was as thoroughly atheist as any geopolitical system seen on the world stage. Yet in a way that V.I. Lenin could have never imagined, one of the main objectives of Soviet authorities has now become a significant factor in Central Asian Muslims converting to Christianity. Russification is the term normally used to describe the social process, whereby non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union became acculturated into Russian patterns of life, thought and worldview during the Soviet era. The result was that many Muslims inhabited both Soviet/Russian and Muslim cultural space, thus creating a new cultural identity that facilitated religious conversion away from Islam. This field research report uses the lens of personal conversion stories to examine some aspects of this phenomenon. Also, the range of personal experiences points towards the need to understand Russification as a spectrum of acculturation.     

Islamic practice and state policies towards religion in post-Soviet Russia

ABSTRACT

What has the Russian state policy towards Islam been in the first two decades after the Soviet collapse, and how has it affected Islamic practice in the country? This study explores Russian state policies towards religion from 1990 to 2017 and discusses their impact on Islamic practice in the country. In the 1990s, relations between the Russian state and Islam (state-Islam relations) were accommodationist: the state granted unrestricted access in the Russian public sphere for all Muslim communities and allowed a wide range of Islamic religious practices. State-Islam relations in the 2000s became increasingly regulatory: the state assumed a more active interventionist role in the affairs of the domestic Islamic community in order to control religious practices of certain Muslim factions and to ensure privileged access in the Russian public sphere for state-approved ‘traditional’ religious organisations. This contribution reveals the dynamics of the Russian state’s attitudes towards the largest minority religion in the country in the first two decades after the collapse of the Soviet state. It also offers analytical insights on the dynamic nature of state-religion relations in other secular states with religiously diverse populations.     

GENDER-ROLE SOCIALIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

This article represents a collaboration between Russian and Western researchers concerned with the cross-cultural study of gender. A con-temporary Russian psychoanalytic perspective on gender role development in the context of their own culture is presented, and its relationship to the Soviet and Western research literature is explored. Historical changes are noted in the transitions from prerevolutionary peasant society to Soviet socialism and to the new reforms in Russia. A long standing ambivalence toward agentic values is described throughout these phases of Russian history, and its legacy is identified in current social problems. Difficulties inherent in using Western conceptualizations of gender roles in this different context are discussed, as are points of compatibility, and their application to an investigation of Russian gender roles is illustrated.     

当前俄罗斯心理学发展的现状和趋势

苏联解体后,伴随俄罗斯社会政治的变革,俄罗斯心理学也发生了相应的变化,其现状和趋势主要表现为:继承了苏联心理学的宝贵遗产,加强了维果茨基心理学思想的研究,形成了对心理现象的统一认识,出现了轻基础研究重应用研究的倾向,产生了许多新的分支学科.     

Editorial

Abstract

Russian society has been undergoing tremendous changes in the last two decades. The renewed interest in Orthodox tradition is therefore much more than a quantitative growth in the number of believers. The quality of the discursive space in which Orthodoxy has become a subject of social debate is very different from that of a premodern society and from that of Soviet atheist society. In this context the popular image of religion – the popular idea of religious behaviour – has changed profoundly. In this essay I use the ideas of two Russian thinkers with a theological background to conceptualise these changes. Aleksandr Kyrlezhev applies the western notion of the postmodern to the Russian context to describe the transformation from the monolithic Soviet world-view to a state of ideological diversity. Aleksandr Morozov uses the metaphor ‘the end of transcendence’ to illustrate changes in religious behaviour. Both authors conclude that the renewed interest in the Orthodox tradition is primarily a desire for morality, for a set of norms and values to supplement both Soviet and imported western counterparts. I also look at Orthodox classes in the public education system in order to see how these ideas apply to the social context. Kyrlezhev's notion of a postmodern ideological diversity helps to explain how such classes are welcomed as a complementary ‘spiritual’ element alongside existing ‘materialist’ world-views. Morozov's ‘end of transcendence’ assists in understanding how such classes, although teaching about the Orthodox faith, may operate in a secular environment.     

Wilhelm Reich in Soviet Russia: Psychoanalysis,Marxism, and the Stalinist reaction

Abstract

In 1929, Wilhelm Reich lectured on “Psychoanalysis as a natural science” before the Communist Academy in Moscow; he was the only Freudian-trained Central European psychoanalyst to do so. That same year, his article “Dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis” was published in the Academy's journal, Under the Banner of Marxism, in both Moscow and Berlin. By this time, Reich's involvement with political activism aligned with the Austrian Communist Party was increasing, while simultaneously psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union was in decline. Our paper places these events in their proper historical context and includes a discussion of the various attempts to determine the compatibility of psychoanalysis and Marxism. We offer analyses of both the article, “Dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis,” and the lecture, “Psychoanalysis as a natural science,” and the reactions to both by Reich's Russian critics. We show the ways in which responses to his lecture foreshadow what becomes the standard Soviet assessment of psychoanalysis. As an appendix to this paper, we provide the first English translation of the Russian account of his lecture, as published in the Herald of the Communist Academy.     

后苏联时期俄罗斯心理学的现状

苏联解体后, 进入后苏联时期的俄罗斯心理学出现了一些新的动向, 主要表现为重新评价和审视苏联心理学的原则立场, 纠正十月革命后心理科学发展出现的偏差, 活动概念和文化历史理论仍具有生命力, 理论研究未见重大进展但工作仍继续进行, 心理科学的研究越来越贴近社会生活与实践等。当前俄罗斯心理学已成为一门深受大众青睐的科学, 它对当代各种形式的社会实践均产生了重要影响。     

Malchish‐Kibalchish: cultural factors in a clinical case

In this paper, a Jungian understanding of cultural factors influencing individual analysis is illustrated with the case of a patient suffering from panic attacks. The analysis revealed that, in addition to the patient's personal background, the collectivistic attitudes of the Soviet culture, which had a moulding effect on the patient in his childhood and obstructed his individuation, should be taken into account. The concepts of the totalitarian object and the Russian cultural complex encompassing a grandiosity pole and an inferiority pole are used to explore the patient's condition, and the crucial role of creating mutual language with the patient is outlined.     

Soviet Patriarchy: Past and Present

The myth that women had equal rights and were emancipated in the Soviet Union masks the reality that the Soviet state, like all totalitarian states, is a manifestation of patriarchal ideology. The true democratization of Russian society requires the rejection of masculinist ideology and constitutes one of the most important social and cultural challenges.     

Immigration, Gender, and Psychosocial Adjustment: A Study of 150 Immigrant Couples in Israel

Research on gender differences in the process of psychosocial adjustment of recent immigrants is scant. This study was designed to assess occupational, social, and personal/psychological aspects of adjustment to life in Israel among 150 heterosexual couples that immigrated together from the former Soviet Union after 1990. The mean age of participants was 46, over 60% had postsecondary education, and have lived in Israel for the average of 9 years. The study included a structured survey and in-depth interviews with 15 couples. The results suggest that overall levels of adjustment and well-being reported by men and women are rather similar, although they take somewhat different paths toward social integration. Men were doing better in the economic/occupational domain, whereas women were more active in the social domain (e.g., building their personal networks, exploring new lifestyles). Both men and women had experienced occupational downgrading in Israel, but more women worked in physically-demanding jobs such as geriatric nursing and cleaning. Women suffered a more dramatic occupational downgrading than men, as well as lower job security and under/unemployment. Yet, they showed more flexibility and tolerance of their new work roles. No tangible gender differences have been found in the general indicators of psychosocial well-being and overall satisfaction with life in Israel. Processes of social adjustment among immigrants from the former Soviet Union may be less gendered than in other immigrant communities, reflecting more egalitarian gender relations in the Russian/Soviet culture.     

The effect of Russian versus Hebrew instructions on the reaction to social pressure of Russian-born Israeli children

An experiment on the role of the language of instruction in mediating responses to social pressure was conducted with a sample of 41 Russian-born adolescents who had recently immigrated to Israel. The subjects were asked to respond to a series of conflict situations in which they were told that either the experimenters, their own parents, or their peers would see their answers. Instructions were given once in Russian and once in Hebrew. Contrary to the principal hypothesis, when subjected to pressure from adults the children gave more conventional moral responses under Hebrew than under Russian instructions. The result was interpreted as reflecting the tendency to respond more moralistically to the language of authority, which, for the emigréchildren, shifted from Russian to Hebrew. Regardless of the language of administration, the scores for the emigréchildren fell between those for Soviet and Israeli youngsters, but they were closer to the latter. Within the sample, the longer a child lived in one or the other society, the more his response to social pressure resembled the modal reaction of children in that society. Children from families who had or had not spoken Yiddish in the home showed marked differences in response, with the former resembling the Israeli and the latter the typical Soviet reaction. The results were interpreted as reflecting the capacity of children to adapt to conflicting socialization settings both within and across cultures.     

Religion and the crisis in Ukraine

This article investigates religious nationalism in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, which has appeared in political and popular rhetoric and has been expressed through violence. From the Tsarist era, Kyiv and Crimea have featured centrally in Russian national mythology as the cradle(s) of Russian Christianity. This nationalist conception of space persisted after political borders changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as has the Russian Orthodox Church's historic jurisdiction in Ukraine. As a result, Russian Orthodox believers retain a special affinity for Kyiv and Crimea, and many Ukrainian citizens have looked to Moscow for matters of faith. Subjects of inquiry include religious nationalism, the baptism of Slavic Prince Vladimir (Volodymyr), Orthodox holy places in Crimea and Ukraine, Patriarch Kirill's Russian World concept, and religious violence in Ukraine and Crimea.     

The formation of Soviet cultural theory of music (1917–1948)

This article explores the continuities and discontinuities of pre-Revolutionary intellectual traditions in 1920s Soviet culture and the Stalin-era cultural revolution. Through examination of the pre-revolutionary philosophical legacy underpinning Soviet musicological theory, I demonstrate that there are decisive features, such as Soviet Prometheanism, that characterize the musicology of the 1920s that both underline and differ from the pre-revolutionary philosophy of music and the musicology of the 1930s. I offer the basic outlines of a Soviet cultural theory of music formulated by Russian music critic, historian, composer and musicologist Boris Asafiev (1884–1949) in the 1920s. Explaining and describing what I mean by a particular cultural theory of music in the Soviet context forms the core issue of my article.

     

Pictures at an exhibition: Russian land in a global world

This article examines Russian realist landscape paintings of the Peredvi?niki. It demonstrates how in the course of the formation of a national identity during the late nineteenth century, an originally ideology-free space was politically charged and in the course of decades has been incorporated through various measures and media into the collective memory. In this way, the topos of the ‘Russian Landscape’ became lieu de mémoire for Russianness (russkost’) that transcends social order (Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation). Through identification with supposedly Russian scenery, which knows no regional or national borders, love of the motherland (‘ljubov’ k rodine) can be created and strengthened. In their various reproductions, these landscape images developed into a kind of world parallel to the world of everyday experience in the Stalin era. The ideology of Russian landscape painting is now experiencing a new level of appreciation in the West, the effect of which is a shift in focus in their evaluation, from national to universal criteria.     

Burden of the Third Rome: The threat of Russian orthodox fundamentalism and Muslim eurasia

For contemporary Muslim public opinion, anxious to comprehend the revival of Orthodoxy and nostalgia for starina (old times), the growing radical Orthodox fundamentalism seems to indicate the return of anti‐Islamic Pan‐Slavism. The Neo‐Soviet National Liberals and National Communists are both opposed to the self‐determination of Muslims in Tatarstan, Boshkirstan, Chechnya, Crimea and Daghestan. They are also hostile to the Islamic revival ( al‐sahwa al‐islamiyya) in Central Asian Turkestan and Tajikistan. Their misconception of Islam is shaped by the long tradition of Russian messianism which is rejuvenated after every cyclical decline of Russian political authority. The success of Russian messianic nationalism lies neither in its selective historiosophy nor in its dialectic politics, but in the charismatic reasoning of the old geopolitical threats to the existence of Russians, demonized as the Islamic reconquest of Idel‐Ural (Musulmanskiye dvizheny na Volgu) initiated by the restoration of Pan‐Turkic Islamistan and the Muslim Commonwealth in Central Asia. Like other Russian philosophies of the past, modern Russian nationalism draws on a host of European thinkers and their ideas, but its context is governed by the fundamental notion of ‘Holy Mother Russia’ (Sviataya Matushka Rassieya) and its Byzantine paradigm of ‘the True Holy Church of Constantinople’. Influenced by the militant anti‐Islamic and anti‐Western traditions of the Eastern Orthodox Church, modem All‐Russian nationalism has become a new and dangerous chimera of economically and politically frustrated Russians. Revitalized Russian Orthodox fundamentalism is a real threat to the newly emancipated Islamic East, because the fall of Communist atheist tyranny did not eliminate the old threat of Russian Orthodox hegemony in the Russian Federation, Central Asia and the Caucasian independent republics. Invasion, occupation and military interventions in the Chechen Republic of Itchek‐eria, Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan, as well as the prospect of armed rebellions by the Russian separatist minorities in Kazakhstan, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Crimea and Tatarstan, explicitly demonstrate the nature of All‐Russian hegemonism at the end of the post‐postmodernist age. The geopolitical and cultural continuity of the Tsarist‐Soviet empire, regardless of the political and economic regime in Moscow, still determines Russian Islamophobia and animates an obsession with ‘national security’ among the rulers of the Kremlin, who attempt to improve Russia's strategic status by a re‐annexation of the so‐called ‘near abroad’ ( blizhnee zarubezhye) countries into the Russian‐dominated confederation of Independent States.     

Reading the writing on the wall: a textual analysis of Łódź graffiti

Abstract

This article traces the history of the involvement of the American Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) with Russian-language publishing from its beginnings to the end of the twentieth century. During the period between the two world wars this was the primary source of Russian Orthodox theological and philosophical literature. In addition, it served as a catalyst for ferment within Orthodoxy by providing a forum for heated debate, especially in the pages of Put’, a unique interdisciplinary journal of Christian thought. The unique role of the YMCA Press in the Russian emigration has been noted in a variety of studies. However, such evaluations usually do not pay attention to the original Protestant leadership of this remarkable Orthodox publishing house, the political impact of its avowedly non-political efforts, and the recent activities of the YMCA Press in Russia and Ukraine after the end of communism. The Press played a major role in preserving an important aspect of prerevolutionary Russian culture in Western Europe during the Soviet period until the repatriation of this culture following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this way, the Press contributed to the expansion and enrichment of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

This publishing house for all these years has been giving to Russians living in Russia the real bread of life. … I really have to testify that the hunger for books is really a much greater hunger than the hunger for food. … The greatest help that we can receive is precisely the kind of help that was given to us by Paul Anderson. (Anderson, n.d.a, preface)     

Behavioral effects of sucrose on preschool children

Despite speculation that sucrose consumption affects behavior, little empirical information is available. Accordingly, this study investigated the effect of sucrose consumption on the behavior of eight preschool children. Children were tested individually using a double-blind, crossover design. On separate mornings each child received 6 ounces of juice, sweetened on one morning with sucrose and on the other with an artificial sweetener. Children were observed for 90 minutes following the drinks, alternating between 15-minute sessions of work on structured tasks and 15-minute sessions of free play. Following the sucrose drink the children showed a decrement in performance in the structured testing situation, and they demonstrated more inappropriate behavior during free play. These differences in behavior were most pronounced approximately 45 to 60 minutes after the drinks. Thus, the study provides objective evidence in young children of a rather subtle, yet significant, time-dependent behavior effect of sucrose ingestion.This research was funded in part by grants from the General Research Grants Committee, University Hospital, Boston University Medical Center, and from the University of Connecticut Research Foundation. The project was conducted at the Clinical Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (National Institute of Health/General Clinical Research Center Grant 5M01-RR00088-20). We would like to express our appreciation to the many staff members of the Clinical Research Center for their extensive cooperation in helping us to plan and carry out this study, and to the director and staff of Technology Children's Center for their assistance in helping us to reach interested families. We also would like to thank the parents and children who participated in the study. Portions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, August 1984.     

Forced Secularization in Soviet Russia: Why an Atheistic Monopoly Failed

Under communism, the Russian religious landscape consisted mainly of two competitors—a severely repressed Russian Orthodox Church and a heavily promoted atheist alternative to religion called "scientific atheism." Under these circumstances, one might expect the rapid spread of religious disbelief, but the intensity of the atheist campaign originated from official mandate and not popular appeal. In turn, scientific atheism never inspired the Russian population and grew increasingly uninspired as Soviet officials created a monopoly "church" of scientific atheism in hopes of replacing persistent religious beliefs and practices. This article is dedicated to explaining why Communists could not successfully convert the masses to atheism. The findings provide evidence that systems of belief require more than simply the power of promotion and coercion to become accepted.     

The muscular sense in Russia: I. M. Sechenov and materialist realism

Contemporary Russian sensory physiology and psychology uses the notion of a “dark sense,” referring to the background of bodily sensation, especially of the position and movement of the body. The physiologist Ivan Sechenov introduced this language in the 1860s in the context of arguing for a physiological basis for scientific psychology. The muscular sense (the term preceding modern notions of kinaesthesia and proprioception) thereafter featured in the many talks and journal articles he presented to spread scientific enlightenment. The paper describes the history and significance of this. It does so in the light of Soviet representations of Sechenov as a scientist who substantially contributed to the Leninist materialist–realist theory of knowledge. These representations assessed Sechenov’s discussions as a breakthrough in world science to the understanding of the human organism as a self‐regulating material system. It is necessary to understand the purposes and pressures driving Soviet historiography. The paper confirms the historical importance the sense of movement has had in realist theories of knowledge of the world; and it contributes a previously unknown chapter to the history of psychology.