责任对后悔强度的影响：来自ERP的证据

采用事件相关电位技术,研究责任对后悔的影响。实验采用赌博范式,主要因素是被试对于负性结果所负责任的大小,分为三个水平：1（只有被试一人犯错）、1/2（被试和另外一个人犯错）以及1/3（三人同时犯错）。研究结果发现,被试主观评定的情绪强度和责任感上,1条件下的显著大于1/2和1/3条件下的,而1/2和1/3条件无显著差异;被试的反事实思维则在三个水平上差异显著,责任越大,反事实思维越强。fERN（feedback error-related negativity,反馈错误相关负波,也称FRN,反馈负波）的波幅在1条件下的显著大于1/2和1/3条件下的,而1/2和1/3条件下的无显著差异;而P300的波幅则在三种水平上差异显著,责任越大,波幅越小。结果支持责任对后悔强度有所影响,且后悔强度在一定程度上随责任大小呈线性变化。     

The role of emotion in decision-making: evidence from neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage

Most theories of choice assume that decisions derive from an assessment of the future outcomes of various options and alternatives through some type of cost-benefit analyses. The influence of emotions on decision-making is largely ignored. The studies of decision-making in neurological patients who can no longer process emotional information normally suggest that people make judgments not only by evaluating the consequences and their probability of occurring, but also and even sometimes primarily at a gut or emotional level. Lesions of the ventromedial (which includes the orbitofrontal) sector of the prefrontal cortex interfere with the normal processing of "somatic" or emotional signals, while sparing most basic cognitive functions. Such damage leads to impairments in the decision-making process, which seriously compromise the quality of decisions in daily life. The aim of this paper is to review evidence in support of "The Somatic Marker Hypothesis," which provides a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and suggests that the process of decision-making depends in many important ways on neural substrates that regulate homeostasis, emotion, and feeling. The implications of this theoretical framework for the normal and abnormal development of the orbitofrontal cortex are also discussed.     

后悔的认知机制和神经基础

后悔是基于对不利或相对不利行为结果的反事实思维诱发的一种复杂的负性社会情绪,对我们日常生活的决策和身心健康具有重大的影响。与失望情绪相比,后悔在现象学、产生条件以及评价方式等方面具有明显的差异。后悔不仅会受到个体的行为方式、人格特征、归因等因素的影响,而且还会受到结果信息属性的影响。后悔的预期和体验涉及的功能性脑区主要包括：眶额皮层、扣带前回、海马、杏仁核。研究后悔的实验方法和技术手段有待于进一步拓展,后悔的认知机制和神经基础还有待于进一步探讨和完善     

Impairment in judgement of the moral emotion guilt following orbitofrontal cortex damage

Although neuroimaging studies have provided evidence for an association between moral emotions and the orbitofrontal cortex, studies on patients with focal lesions using experimental probes of moral emotions are scarce. Here, we addressed this topic by presenting a moral emotion judgement task to patients with focal brain damage. Four judgement tasks in a simple pairwise choice paradigm were given to 72 patients with cerebrovascular disease. These tasks consisted of a perceptual line judgement task as a control task; the objects’ preference task as a basic preference judgement task; and two types of moral emotion judgement task, an anger task and a guilt task. A multiple linear regression analysis was performed on each set of task performance scores to take into account potential confounders. Performance on the guilt emotion judgement task negatively correlated with the orbitofrontal cortex damage, but not with the other variables. Results for the other judgement tasks did not reach statistical significance. The close association between orbitofrontal cortex damage and a decrease in guilt emotion judgement consistency might suggest that the orbitofrontal cortex plays a key role in the sense of guilt, a hallmark of morality.     

The contribution of distinct subregions of the ventromedial frontal cortex to emotion,social behavior,and decision making

Damage to the ventromedial frontal cortex (VMFC) in humans is associated with deficits in decision making. Decision making, however, often happens while people are interacting with others, where it is important to take the social consequences of a course of action into account. It is well known that VMFC lesions also lead to marked alterations in patients’ emotions and ability to interact socially; however, it has not been clear which parts of the VMFC are critical for these changes. Recently, there has been considerable interest in the role of the VMFC in choice behavior during interpersonal exchanges. Here, we highlight recent research that suggests that two areas within or adjacent to the VMFC, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), may play distinct but complementary roles in mediating normal patterns of emotion and social behavior. Converging lines of evidence from human, macaque, and rat studies now suggest that the OFC may be more specialized for simple emotional responses, such as fear and aggression, through its role in representing primary reinforcement or punishment. By contrast, the ACC may play a distinct role in more complex aspects of emotion, such as social interaction, by virtue of its connections with the discrete parts of the temporal lobe and subcortical structures that control autonomic responses.     

Regret and the negative evaluation of decision outcomes in major depression

Disruption of normal emotional experience is central to the phenomenology of depression. Twenty-three depressed outpatients and 23 control subjects performed a computerized decision-making task, during which affective ratings were assessed online to identify various dimensions of emotional experience. We sought to contrast regret (the comparison of the outcomes of selected and nonselected options) with the general negative appraisal of task events. The experience of regret was reduced in depressed patients, an effect that was particularly related to self-reported apathy scores. In an exploratory analysis, we observed that females had a general downward shift in their ratings, as compared with males, but disappointment and regret effects were of similar magnitude. The possible contribution of the orbitofrontal cortex to the phenomenology of regret is discussed. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/ supplemental.     

跨期选择和风险决策的认知神经机制

经济决策包含两个传统问题：跨期选择和风险决策。跨期选择分为冲动决策和自我控制,当冲动决策时,优先激活了与中脑多巴胺神经元相联系的旁边缘区域,包括伏隔核、眶额皮层中部和前额叶中部;自我控制即选择延迟决策时大脑双侧前额叶和后顶叶皮层神经活动增强。在风险和不确定性条件下,大脑皮层和杏仁核与风险决策联系密切。     

Regret and Behavior: Comment on Zeelenberg and Pieters

Zeelenberg and Pieter's (2007) regret regulation theory 1.0 offers a synthesis that brings together concepts spanning numerous literatures. We have no substantive disagreement with their theory, but instead offer 3 observations to further aid regret researchers studying consumer decision making. First, the overall arch of any regret theory must be situated within an understanding of behavior regulation. Second, the distinction between regrets of action versus inaction is best understood in terms of motivational implications, particularly with regard to Higgin's (1998) distinction between promotion and prevention focus. Third, the opportunity principle offers a particularly clear means of summarizing the regulatory consequences of the regret experience. Regret is an emotion pivotal for decision making, and its cognitive underpinning has and continues to be elucidated in research focusing on counterfactual thinking.     

The functions of the orbitofrontal cortex

The orbitofrontal cortex contains the secondary taste cortex, in which the reward value of taste is represented. It also contains the secondary and tertiary olfactory cortical areas, in which information about the identity and also about the reward value of odours is represented. The orbitofrontal cortex also receives information about the sight of objects from the temporal lobe cortical visual areas, and neurons in it learn and reverse the visual stimulus to which they respond when the association of the visual stimulus with a primary reinforcing stimulus (such as taste) is reversed. This is an example of stimulus-reinforcement association learning, and is a type of stimulus-stimulus association learning. More generally, the stimulus might be a visual or olfactory stimulus, and the primary (unlearned) positive or negative reinforcer a taste or touch. A somatosensory input is revealed by neurons that respond to the texture of food in the mouth, including a population that responds to the mouth feel of fat. In complementary neuroimaging studies in humans, it is being found that areas of the orbitofrontal cortex are activated by pleasant touch, by painful touch, by taste, by smell, and by more abstract reinforcers such as winning or losing money. Damage to the orbitofrontal cortex can impair the learning and reversal of stimulus-reinforcement associations, and thus the correction of behavioural responses when there are no longer appropriate because previous reinforcement contingencies change. The information which reaches the orbitofrontal cortex for these functions includes information about faces, and damage to the orbitofrontal cortex can impair face (and voice) expression identification. This evidence thus shows that the orbitofrontal cortex is involved in decoding and representing some primary reinforcers such as taste and touch; in learning and reversing associations of visual and other stimuli to these primary reinforcers; and in controlling and correcting reward-related and punishment-related behavior, and thus in emotion. The approach described here is aimed at providing a fundamental understanding of how the orbitofrontal cortex actually functions, and thus in how it is involved in motivational behavior such as feeding and drinking, in emotional behavior, and in social behavior.     

Controlling the integration of emotion and cognition: the role of frontal cortex in distinguishing helpful from hurtful emotional information

Emotion has been both lauded and vilified for its role in decision making. How are people able to ensure that helpful emotions guide decision making and irrelevant emotions are kept out of decision making? The orbitofrontal cortex has been identified as a neural area involved in incorporating emotion into decision making. Is this area's function specific to the integration of emotion and cognition, or does it more broadly govern whether emotional information should be integrated into cognition? The present research examined the role of orbitofrontal cortex when it was appropriate to control (i.e., prevent) the influence of emotion in decision making (Experiment 1) and to incorporate the influence of emotion in decision making (Experiment 2). Together, the two studies suggest that activity in lateral orbitofrontal cortex is associated with evaluating the contextual relevance of emotional information for decision making.     

Modulating what is and what could have been: The effect of transcranial direct current stimulation on the evaluation of attained and unattained decision outcomes

The affective evaluation of decision outcomes, whether attained (e.g., disappointment) or based on the conscious realization that a decision made differently would have led to a better or worse outcome (e.g., regret), greatly influence future decisions. Prior research has demonstrated a role of the medial and orbitofrontal cortex (M/OFC) in decision valuation and the experience of regret and relief. Here we examined whether inhibitory transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) could dampen the experience of decision-induced affect, with a focus on regret and relief. Thirty-eight participants completed a previously used gambling task and were asked to rate their happiness with attained outcomes of a chosen gamble before and after being shown unattained, counterfactual outcomes (i.e., what would have happened had they selected the other gamble). The difference in happiness rating before and after revealing these unattained counterfactual outcomes was taken as a measure of regret (negative shift) or relief (positive shift). During this task, 20 participants received 2 mA cathodal tDCS over EEG coordinate Fp1 for 20 minutes, and 18 participants received sham stimulation over the same location. Linear mixed-model results showed that, compared to sham, participants who received cathodal tDCS reported less intense emotions in response to attained as well as counterfactual outcomes. These findings were not due to the groups differing in the gambles they selected or attained monetary outcomes, demonstrating that tDCS can modulate decision-induced (counterfactual) affect. This may have implications for the ability to modulate value-based decision-making using brain stimulation techniques more broadly.     

心理距离对后悔的影响*

基于解释水平理论,考察了心理距离的不同维度对后悔程度的影响。本研究从心理距离的四个维度展开,时间距离采用组内设计,空间距离、社会距离和概率维度采用单因素完全随机设计,312名被试随机分配至各个维度参与实验处理,检验不同心理距离是否调节着后悔程度,其中有效数据275份。结果表明:在时间距离、空间距离、社会距离、概率和假设性条件下,均出现决策时心理距离越近,对决策事件或客体的解释水平越低,随后在获得负性结果反馈时体验到的后悔就越强烈。由此可见,决策事件的心理距离越近,后悔程度越大。     

Regret in Decision Making

Decision research has only recently started to take seriously the role of emotions in choices and decisions. Regret is the emotion that has received the most attention. In this article, we sample a number of the initial regret studies from psychology and economics, and trace some of the complexities and contradictions to which they led. We then sketch a new theory, decision justification theory (DJT), which synthesizes several apparently conflicting findings. DJT postulates two core components of decision–related regret, one associated with the (comparative) evaluation of the outcome, the other with the feeling of self–blame for having made a poor choice. We reinterpret several existing studies in DJT terms. We then report some new studies that directly tested (and support) DJT, and propose a number of research issues that follow from this new approach to regret.     

On bad decisions and deciding badly: When intention–behavior inconsistency is regrettable

Independent of the valence of the decision outcomes, the quality of the decision process influences the experience of regret, a longitudinal study and two experiments, involving a total of close to 2000 participants, provide systematic evidence that intention–behavior inconsistency, as a prime indicator of a failed decision process, is regret inducing. Moreover, this inconsistency effect is specific to the emotion of regret, mediated by the judged quality of the decision process, independent of the valence of the decision outcomes, and, importantly, disappears when the quality of the decision process is high because inconsistency is justified. This provides new insights into regret’s role in the action sequence, and has implications for decision justification theory, and action/inaction research.     

Keeping one's options open: The detrimental consequences of decision reversibility

People generally prefer to have the opportunity to revise their decisions. Surprisingly however, research has shown that keeping one's options open yields lower satisfaction with the decision outcome (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Two studies aimed to gain more insight into the detrimental consequences of decision reversibility and the cognitive processes underlying decision reversibility. Building upon literature on goal fulfillment we hypothesized and found in a first experiment that as long as decisions are still open to change, accessibility of decision-related constructs is increased compared to neutral constructs. A second experiment demonstrated that decision reversibility undermines working memory capacity. Moreover participants experienced higher regret after having made a reversible decision, an effect that was mediated by decreased working memory capacity. The study set implies that reversible decisions yield lower working memory capacity because people continue to think about the, still relevant, choice options. In the end this might increase dissatisfaction with the decision and regret.     

The psychology of doing nothing: forms of decision avoidance result from reason and emotion

Several independent lines of research bear on the question of why individuals avoid decisions by postponing them, failing to act, or accepting the status quo. This review relates findings across several different disciplines and uncovers 4 decision avoidance effects that offer insight into this common but troubling behavior: choice deferral, status quo bias, omission bias, and inaction inertia. These findings are related by common antecedents and consequences in a rational-emotional model of the factors that predispose humans to do nothing. Prominent components of the model include cost-benefit calculations, anticipated regret, and selection difficulty. Other factors affecting decision avoidance through these key components, such as anticipatory negative emotions, decision strategies, counterfactual thinking, and preference uncertainty, are also discussed.     

Dimensional emotions are represented by distinct topographical brain networks

The ability to recognize others’ facial emotions has become increasingly important after the COVID-19 pandemic, which causes stressful situations in emotion regulation. Considering the importance of emotion in maintaining a social life, emotion knowledge to perceive and label emotions of oneself and others requires an understanding of affective dimensions, such as emotional valence and emotional arousal. However, limited information is available about whether the behavioral representation of affective dimensions is similar to their neural representation. To explore the relationship between the brain and behavior in the representational geometries of affective dimensions, we constructed a behavioral paradigm in which emotional faces were categorized into geometric spaces along the valence, arousal, and valence and arousal dimensions. Moreover, we compared such representations to neural representations of the faces acquired by functional magnetic resonance imaging. We found that affective dimensions were similarly represented in the behavior and brain. Specifically, behavioral and neural representations of valence were less similar to those of arousal. We also found that valence was represented in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, frontal eye fields, precuneus, and early visual cortex, whereas arousal was represented in the cingulate gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, orbitofrontal cortex, fusiform gyrus, and early visual cortex. In conclusion, the current study suggests that dimensional emotions are similarly represented in the behavior and brain and are presented with differential topographical organizations in the brain.     

A Theory of Regret Regulation 1.1

We use this opportunity to respond to the issues raised by Inman (2007), and Roese, Summerville, and Fessel (2007) by addressing four broad topics that embrace the most important comments on our regret regulation theory. These topics are the feeling‐is‐for‐doing approach on which regret regulation theory rests, the importance of emotion specificity, factors that modulate the intensity of regret, and the focus on action, inaction and choice in the elicitation of regret. Together this results in a first update, version 1.1.     

The development of the experience and anticipation of regret

Although recent studies have established that children experience regret from around 6 years, we do not yet know when the ability to anticipate this emotion emerges, despite the importance of the anticipation of regret in decision-making. We examined whether children will anticipate they will feel regret if they were to find out in a box-choosing game that, had they made a different choice, they would have obtained a better prize. Experiment 1 replicated Guttentag and Ferrell's study in which children were asked what they hoped was in a non-chosen box. Even 8- to 9-year olds find this question difficult. However, when asked what might make them feel sadder, 7- to 8-year olds (but not younger children) predicted that finding the larger prize in the unchosen box would make them feel this way. In Experiments 2 and 3, children predicted how they would feel if the unchosen box contained either a larger or smaller prize, in order to examine anticipation of both regret and of relief. Although 6- to 7-year olds do experience regret when they find out they could have won a better prize, they do not correctly anticipate feeling this way. By around 8 years, the majority of children are able to anticipate both regret and relief.