Debriefing and accountability in deceptive research

Debriefing is a standard ethical requirement for human research involving the use of deception. Little systematic attention, however, has been devoted to explaining the ethical significance of debriefing and the specific ethical functions that it serves. In this article, we develop an account of debriefing as a tool of moral accountability for the prima facie wrong of deception. Specifically, we contend that debriefing should include a responsibility to promote transparency by explaining the deception and its rationale, to provide an apology to subjects for infringing the principle of respect for persons, and to offer subjects an opportunity to withdraw their data. We also present recommendations concerning the discussion of deception in scientific articles reporting the results of research using deception.     

Forgoing Debriefing in Deceptive Research: Is It Ever Ethical?

The use of deception in research is generally permitted so long as participants are debriefed at the conclusion of their participation. Several authoritative research ethics guidelines allow investigators to omit debriefing under certain circumstances, however. Here we examine various justifications for forgoing debriefing in deceptive research, including concerns about subject pool contamination, the risk that revealing the deception will be harmful or distressing to participants, and issues of practicability. We conclude that, contrary to current practice, omitting debriefing is ethically acceptable only when debriefing is impracticable, the deception is innocuous, and no reasonable person would object to involvement in the research.     

Deception methods in psychology: have they changed in 23 years?

To learn whether criticism and regulation of research practices have been followed by a reduction of deception or use of more acceptable approaches to deception, the contents of all 1969, 1978, 1986, and 1992 issues of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology were examined. Deception research was coded according to type of (non)informing (e.g., false informing, consent to deception, no informing), possible harmfulness of deception employed (e.g., powerfulness of induction, morality of the behavior induced, privacy of behavior), method of deception (e.g., bogus device or role, false purpose of study, false feedback), and debriefing employed. Use of confederates has been partly replaced by uses of computers. "Consent" with false informing declined after 1969, then rose in 1992. Changes in the topics studied (e.g., attribution, socialization, personality) largely accounted for the decline in deception in 1978 and 1986. More attention needs to be given to ways of respecting subjects' autonomy, to appropriate debriefing and desensitizing, and to selecting the most valid and least objectionable deception methods.     

Beyond Abu Ghraib: The 2010 APA Ethics Code Standard 1.02 and Competency for Execution Evaluations

To learn whether criticism and regulation of research practices have been followed by a reduction of deception or use of more acceptable approaches to deception, the contents of all 1969, 1978, 1986, and 1992 issues of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology were examined. Deception research was coded according to type of (non)informing (e.g., false informing, consent to deception, no informing), possible harmfulness of deception employed (e.g., powerfulness of induction, morality of the behavior induced, privacy of behavior), method of deception (e.g., bogus device or role, false purpose of study, false feedback), and debriefing employed. Use of confederates has been partly replaced by uses of computers. "Consent" with false informing declined after 1969, then rose in 1992. Changes in the topics studied (e.g., attribution, socialization, personality) largely accounted for the decline in deception in 1978 and 1986. More attention needs to be given to ways of respecting subjects' autonomy, to appropriate debriefing and desensitizing, and to selecting the most valid and least objectionable deception methods.     

Eliciting cues to deception and truth: What matters are the questions asked

In this paper we argue that there is little need for more of the traditional deception detection research in which observers assess short video clips in which there are few (if any) cues to deception and truth. We argue that a change in direction is needed and that researchers should focus on the questions the interviewer needs to ask in order to elicit and enhance cues to deception. We discuss three strands of research into this new ‘interviewing to detect deception’ approach. We encourage practitioners to use the proposed techniques and encourage other researchers to join us in conducting more research in this area. We offer some guidelines for what researchers need to keep in mind when carrying out research in this new paradigm.     

Deception in research: distinctions and solutions from the perspective of utilitarianism

The use of deception in psychological research continues to be a controversial topic. Using Rawls's explication of utilitarianism, I attempt to demonstrate how professional organizations, such as the American Psychological Association, can provide more specific standards that determine the permissibility of deception in research. Specifically, I argue that researchers should examine the costs and benefits of creating and applying specific rules governing deception. To that end, I offer 3 recommendations. First, that researchers who use deception provide detailed accounts of the procedures they used to minimize the harm created by deception in their research reports. Second, that the American Psychological Association offer a definition of deception that describes techniques commonly used in research. Finally, I recommend that the informed consent procedure be revised to indicate that the researcher may use deception as part of the study.     

A confederate's perspective on deception

In this article, I outline my position regarding the use of deception in psychology experiments, based on my experience as a confederate. I describe an experiment I participated in and the problems resulting from the study: subjects' differing responses to the deception; angry reactions of some subjects to the experiment; and the general discomfort of both the subjects and the confederates, in particular, who had their doubts concerning the external validity of the study and the ethics involved in running it. Issues of informed consent and debriefing are also addressed; it is argued that the success of deception depends on the subject being misinformed as to the experiment's true nature and that debriefing itself sometimes angers subjects. I encourage a decrease in the use of deception and the reexamination of a system that attempts to balance the pain of experimental participants with anticipated benefit to scientific knowledge.     

Deception research involving children: ethical practices and paradoxes

This commentary draws on the thoughtful contemplation and innovative procedures described in the special section articles as well as current professional codes and federal regulations to highlight ethical practices and paradoxes of deception research involving children. The discussion is organized around 4 key decision points for the conduct of responsible deception research involving children: (a) evaluating the scientific validity and social value of deception research within the context of alternative methodologies, (b) avoiding and minimizing experimental risk, (c) the use of child assent procedures as questionable ethical safeguards, and (d) debriefing as both remedy and risk.     

A confederate's Perspective on Deception

In this article, I outline my position regarding the use of deception in psychology experiments, based on my experience as a confederate. I describe an experiment I participated in and the problems resulting from the study: subjects' differing responses to the deception; angry reactions of some subjects to the experiment; and the general discomfort of both subjects and confederates, in particular, who had their doubts concerning the external validity of the study and the ethics involved in running it. issues of informed consent and debriefing are also addressed; it is argued that the success of deception depends on the subject being misinformed as to the experiment's true nature and that debriefing itself sometimes angers subjects. I encourage a decrease in the use of deception and the reexamination of a system that attempts to balance the pain of experimental participants with anticipated benefit to scientific knowledge.     

When the happy victimizer says sorry: Children's understanding of apology and emotion

Previous research suggests that children gradually understand the mitigating effects of apology on damage to a transgressor's reputation. However, little is known about young children's insights into the central emotional implications of apology. In two studies, children ages 4–9 heard stories about moral transgressions in which the wrongdoers either did or did not apologize. In Study 1, children in the no‐apology condition showed the classic pattern of ‘happy victimizer’ attributions by expecting the wrongdoer to feel good about gains won via transgression. By contrast, in the apology condition, children attributed negative feelings to the transgressor and improved feelings to the victim. In Study 2, these effects were found even when the explicit emotion marker ‘sorry’ was removed from the apology exchange. Thus, young children understand some important emotional functions of apology.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, "intentionalists" argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and "motivationists" argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of "twisted" self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both "twisted" and "straight" self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

The effects of suspiciousness of deception and the perceived legitimacy of deception on task performance in an attitude change experiment1

Subjects participated in two immediately consecutive experiments In the first, they either experienced a deception and debriefing, learned about deception in the abstract, did not learn about deception In the second, they either did or did not hear a reference to the possibility of a deception in that experiment A measure of incidental learning of the message in the second experiment showed that experiencing deception and learning about it in the abstract were not functionally equivalent, that only experiencing deception tended to produce absolute bias, that this bias was probably caused by “vigilance” rather than by “negativism,” that the reference to deception before the second experiment did not itself cause bias, and that the reference eliminated the difference in performance due to experiencing a deception as opposed to only learning about it in the abstract Furthermore, suspiciousness and the reported legitimacy of deception were positively related to each other at the group mean level Separating out their contribution to experimental performance showed that they complexly interacted to determine performance. These results were discussed with reference to the fear that subjects who have heard about deception from friends might perform differently from subjects who have not, with reference to the necessity for deception in some attitude change research, with reference to one alternative to deception, and with reference to explanations of why some experiments have shown no relationship between suspiciousness and experimental performance while others have shown a negative relationship     

Persistent Effects of Information about Internal Reactions: Ineffectiveness of Debriefing

A process of self-persuasion has been advanced to account for the effects of information about internal reactions on attitudes toward emotional stimuli. To determine whether the results of this cognitive activity would be resistant to debriefing, Ss were shown slides of female nudes while hearing their alleged heart-rate reactions and were subsequently informed that these reactions were part of a deception manipulation. It was found that, although Ss accepted the debriefing, the false information continued to exert an influence on their attitudes toward the nudes. The attitudes of these Ss toward the nudes were the same as those of Ss who were not debriefed.     

Persistent effects of information about internal reactions: Ineffectiveness of debriefing

A process of self-persuasion has been advanced to account for the effects of information about internal reactions on attitudes toward emotional stimuli. To determine whether the results of this cognitive activity would be resistant to debriefing, Ss were shown slides of female nudes while hearing their alleged heart-rate reactions and were subsequently informed that these reactions were part of a deception manipulation. It was found that, although Ss accepted the debriefing, the false information continued to exert an infleunce on their attitudes toward the nudes. The attitudes of these Ss toward the nudes were the same as those of Ss who were not debriefed.     

Secondary self‐deception

According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P.     

Perseverance in self-perception and social perception: biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm.

Two experiments demonstrated that self-perceptions and social perceptions may persevere after the initial basis for such perceptions has been completely discredited. In both studies subjects first received false feedback, indicating that they had either succeeded or failed on a novel discrimination task and then were thoroughly debriefed concerning the predetermined and random nature of this outcome manipulation. In experiment 2, both the initial outcome manipulation and subsequent debriefing were watched and overheard by observers. Both actors and observers showed substantial perseverance of initial impressions concerning the actors' performance and abilities following a standard "outcome" debriefing. "Process" debriefing, in which explicit discussion of the perseverance process was provided, generally proved sufficient to eliminate erroneous self-perceptions. Biased attribution processes that might underlie perserverance phenomena and the implications of the present data for the ethical conduct of deception research are discussed.     

Liability to Deception and Manipulation: The Ethics of Undercover Policing

Does undercover police work inevitably wrong its targets? Or are undercover activities justified by a general security benefit? In this article I argue that people can make themselves liable to deception and manipulation. The debate on undercover policing will proceed more fruitfully if the tactic can be conceptualised along those lines, rather than as essentially ‘dirty hands’ activity, in which people are wronged in pursuit of a necessary good, or in instrumentalist terms, according to which the harms of undercover work are straightforwardly overcome by its benefits. This article motivates the ‘liability view’ and describes its attractions, challenges, and implications.     

Silence speaks volumes: the effectiveness of reticence in comparison to apology and denial for responding to integrity- and competence-based trust violations

Prior research on responses to trust violations has focused primarily on the effects of apology and denial. The authors extended this research by studying another type of verbal response that is often used to respond to trust violations but has not been considered in the trust literature: reticence. An accused party may use reticence in a sincere and even legitimate attempt to persuade a trustor to withhold judgment. Yet, by considering information diagnosticity and belief formation mechanisms through which verbal responses influence trust, the authors argue that reticence is a suboptimal response because it combines the least effective elements of apology and denial. Specifically, reticence is a suboptimal response to an integrity violation because, like apology, it fails to address guilt. And reticence is a suboptimal response to a competence violation because, like denial, it fails to signal redemption. Results from 2 laboratory studies, simulating different contexts and using research participants from 2 different countries, provide support for the prediction. The results offer important implications for those who might use reticence to respond to a perceived trust violation and also for those who must judge another's reticence.     

Philosophical parrhesia as aesthetics of existence

According to some interpreters, Foucault's encounter with the Greek and Roman ethics led him to reconsider his earlier work and to turn away from politics. Drawing mostly from Foucault's last and hitherto unpublished lecture course, this paper argues that Foucault's turn to ethics should not be interpreted as a turn away from his previous work, but rather as its logical continuation and an attempt to resolve some of the outstanding questions. I argue that the 1984 lectures on parrhesia should be interpreted as Foucault's philosophical apology, as an attempt to defend himself against the charges of moral and epistemological nihilism, which were raised in response to his earlier work. In his last lectures, the Nietzschean Foucault somewhat surprisingly describes his earlier work as authentic Socratic philosophy and as ethical practice of freedom. In the conclusion, I assess the plausibility of Foucault's apology and speculate in which direction his work might have developed, had it not been cut off by his death.     

影响群体道歉有效性的因素

影响群体道歉有效性的因素是多方面的。对侵犯群体而言, 有效的群体道歉需要在言语表达中包含承认错误、承担责任、表达懊悔、做出承诺等内容, 需要讲究群体道歉的行为策略, 同时还应该关注道歉的内部动机对语言表达与行为方式的影响。对受害群体来讲, 侵犯群体道歉的有效性在于道歉本身缓解了其愤怒情绪, 满足了其自尊和期望等心理需求, 同时还要受到他们对道歉真诚性知觉程度的影响。除此之外, 群体道歉还会受到群际关系质量、冲突程度、文化信念等外部因素的影响。在今后的研究中, 应该继续尝试整合群体道歉的过程机制, 丰富群体道歉有效性的考察指标, 发挥道歉在社会生活领域中的积极作用。