Further Distinctions between Coping and Defense Mechanisms?

In the current literature there is a great confusion between coping and defense mechanisms. As Cramer (1998) points out, a distinction between them is both possible and worthwhile in that they possess different cognitive features. Cramer proposes two basic criteria: the conscious/unconscious and the intentional/unintentional nature of the processes. We focus on a further criterion, the manipulation versus revision of one's mental attitudes, which so far has been neglected in the relevant literature. We suggest that responses to adversity implying manipulation are typical of defense mechanisms, while those implying the revision of one's mental attitudes characterize coping strategies. Finally, we address emotion-focused coping as the area where coping and defense meet, and we suggest that responses displaying defensive features should be excluded from the category of coping in accordance with the distinctions identified.     

Coping and Personality: Third Time's the Charm?

ABSTRACT In this special issue, a third generation of research is represented which recognizes and demonstrates that individual differences in personality play an important role in the coping process. Although progress is apparent, there are several unresolved issues, including the best way to measure coping and whether "type of coping" matters in naturalistic settings. Three potentially important parameters of coping—range, patterning, and competence—are described, but only the first has received systematic empirical attention. The study of coping might also be advanced by researchers giving more attention to the differences between problem situations in which traits are more easily expressed ("weak" situations) versus those where normative criteria and constraints are explicit ("strong" situations).     

What's the Story?: Spirituality and Writing

What is spirituality? As in other papers (Gearon, 1995, cf Wright, 1996; Gearon, 1996, 1997), I maintain here that spirituality may be defined as our relationship with ultimate reality. Spirituality is thus inevitably, by this definition, always metaphysical (Gearon, 1995, again, cf. Wright, 1996, but also Wright, 1997). I want to develop this theme here by contending that such notions of ultimate reality are determined, themselves defined, by texts, that spirituality today, in literate societies, is defined by writing.

Developing this intentionally provocative idea of spirituality's ultimate definition and determination by writing, particularly through notions of narrative and text, this paper provides a critical examination of the place of the literary form in contemporary debate on spirituality in education. Marking out the contentious territory of various interdisciplinary boundaries – some more disputed than others – an attempt is made to parallel the problems centring on our understanding of spirituality with problems associated with the interpretation of texts. By way of an open conclusion, designed as with the main body of the paper to stimulate debate, these albeit brief considerations will be set within the more specific concerns of ‘Engaging the Curriculum – A Theological Programme’, (Thatcher, 1995; Markham, 1996, 1997, 1997a; Gearon, 1997a, 1997b, and, forthcoming, 1998, 1998a), a major project to promote an interdisciplinary awareness of spiritual and theological issues in the curriculum in a genuinely international context. (The bulletin and now journal of the project is, beyond the UK, circulated in Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Philippines, the United States, amongst other countries.)     

Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?

The first part of this paper discusses Quine’s views on underdetermination of theory by evidence, and the indeterminacy of translation, or meaning, in relation to certain physical theories. The underdetermination thesis says different theories can be supported by the same evidence, and the indeterminacy thesis says the same component of a theory that is underdetermined by evidence is also meaning indeterminate. A few examples of underdetermination and meaning indeterminacy are given in the text. In the second part of the paper, Quine’s scientific realism is discussed briefly, along with some of the difficulties encountered when considering the ‘truth’ of different empirically equivalent theories. It is concluded that the difference between underdetermination and indeterminacy, while significant, is not as great as Quine claims. It just means that after we have chosen a framework theory, from a number of empirically equivalent ones, we still have further choices along two different dimensions.     

Why Should We Lower Our Defenses About Defense Mechanisms?

Personality and social psychologists already use ideas that are closely related to defense mechanisms, but few of our paradigms include extensive theoretical or empirical treatment of such mechanisms. Yet defense mechanisms focus on negative affect and protection of the self, and many of the controversies, issues, and impasses contemporary researchers confront also concern negative affect and self-protection. This article discusses whether we might find systematic consideration of defense mechanisms and defensive processing to be broadly useful across several related areas of personality and social psychology in which the relationships between self and affect are implicated. Areas considered include positive illusions and adaptation, the interpretation of reports of negative affect, and related concepts from the coping, self-regulation, affect regulation, and goals literature. Thinking about defense mechanisms would seem to have both specific value for sharpening our understanding of different possible interpretations of our data, and broad heuristic value for thinking about personality integration and social behavior.     

Applying Science and Applied Science: What’s the Difference?

Prandtl’s work on the boundary layer theory is an interesting example for illustrating several important issues in philosophy of science such as the relation between theories and models and whether it is possible to distinguish, in a principled way, between pure and applied science. In what follows I discuss several proposals by the symposium participants regarding the interpretation of Prandtl’s work and whether it should be characterized as an instance of applied science. My own interpretation of this example (1999) emphasised the degree of autonomy embedded in Prandtl’s boundary layer model and the way it became integrated in the larger theoretical context of hydrodynamics. In addition to extending that discussion here I also claim that the characterization of applied science which formed the basis for the symposium does not enable us to successfully distinguish applied science from the general practice of ‘applying’ basic scientific knowledge in a variety of contexts.     

Creative Cognition and Psychosis Vulnerability: What’s the Difference?

Evidence from experimental psychology provides unequivocal support for enhanced creativity among individuals who are prone to psychotic and mood disorders. At the same time, there is strong epidemiological evidence for greater incidence of creative achievement among those diagnosed with bipolar disorder (but not schizophrenia). This review examines the evidence for common factors predisposing an individual to creativity and psychosis, as well as factors that distinguish the capacity for creative achievement from the creative potential that may be inherent in psychosis vulnerability. Factors implicated as common to creative potential and psychosis vulnerability include enhanced divergent thinking, reduced latent inhibition and preattentive filtering mechanisms; on the other hand, greater cognitive flexibility, motivation, and openness to experience tend to be associated with creative achievement, but not psychosis. This evidence is considered with respect to the utility of tailored vocational interventions to effectively harness creative potential, which may be useful for young individuals in the early stages of illness or their unaffected family members.     

Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?

In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views (most notably, Williamson’s), this result is, I think, of interest.     

Probing The Politics of Difference: What's Wrong with an All-Male Priesthood?

Though it is often taken for granted that feminists necessarily must condemn the exclusion of women from the Roman Catholic priesthood, the author demonstrates that the politics of difference, if pursued consistently, reopens this question. International feminist arguments for honoring gender differences, the teachings of John Paul II concerning women, and Catholic social justice teachings, taken jointly, suggest that the current Catholic exclusion of women from the priesthood is unjust not because the reservation of a social role to a single sex is inherently unacceptable, but because of the asymmetry in power between the roles accorded men and women in the governance of the Catholic Church. To be just, sex-specific reservation of roles must meet the criteria of balance, proportion, power, and particularity.     

What's the subject? Brexit and politics as articulation

This paper focuses on the moment of Brexit and its political aftermath in order to challenge dominant academic and popular conceptions of the political subject as singular and coherent. Instead, we suggest that there is an urgent political and analytical need for a view of the subject as multiple, contradictory, and dialogic. As interdisciplinary scholars working on the borders of policy studies and cultural studies, we think this is a critical site for transdisciplinary conversations about such conceptions of the subject. In the political field, such subjects are selectively and unevenly addressed and mobilized by political projects—such as Vote Leave—that invite them to recognize themselves as part of an imagined collective identity. In the twin disturbances of the European Union referendum and the 2017 general election, we suggest that it is possible to see that other voicings, other identifications, and other projects remain possible. Specific political mobilizations are neither singular nor stable.     

How Does the Difference Principle Make a Difference?

The paper examines the relationship between the two parts of Rawls’ second principle of justice. More specifically, it explores the ways in which the Difference Principle (DP) may constrain the range of acceptable social arrangements in light of the stated lexical priority of the requirement of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) over the DP. The paper discusses two possibilities. First, it examines the role the DP may play within an institutional scheme that satisfies the requirement of FEO. Second, it discusses the role the principle may play in selecting among different institutional schemes that satisfy FEO. The paper argues that the DP has an important role only if there is a range of institutional arrangements that are equivalent from the point of view of FEO but non-equivalent from the point of view of the DP. Next, it explores the possible sources of the variation among the different FEO-equivalent institutional schemes, and argues that on the most satisfactory reading of the requirement of FEO, there will not be much variation that is relevant from the point of view of the DP. The paper concludes that the role of the Difference Principle is at best very limited in constraining the range of social arrangements that are acceptable from the point of view of justice.     

Coping and defence mechanisms: What are we assessing?

The present research study addresses the disparity between theoretical considerations and empirical evidence regarding the relationships between coping strategies and defence mechanisms. Self‐reported measures of coping and defences were administered to a Romanian adult sample (N = 542; 74.53% female, mean age = 31.28). Using structural equation modelling, models that assumed independence between coping and defences were compared with models that assumed the existence of relationships between the two concepts. Findings identified strong relationships between coping and defences, indicating large common variance between the two concepts. Furthermore, results suggested that coping and defences can be classified into two independent types of adaptation processes. Results of this research study suggested that coping and defences are facets of common adaptation processes.     

Behavior Genetics: What's New? What's Next?

What's new in behavior genetics? With widespread acceptance that nearly all behavioral variation reflects some genetic influence, current studies are investigating developmental changes in the nature and magnitude of genetic and environmental effects, the extent to which different behaviors are influenced by common genes, and different forms of gene-environment correlation and interaction. New designs, focused on assessment of unrelated children in the same households or neighborhood environments, and use of measured environmental variables within genetically informative designs, are yielding more incisive evidence of common environmental effects on behavior. What will be next? Behavior genetic techniques and analyses will be used to inform efforts to find genes altering susceptibility for disorder and dispositional genes affecting behavioral variation. The developing integration of behavioral and molecular genetics will identify genes influencing specific behavioral variation and enhance understanding of how they do so. Psychologists will play a pivotal role in communicating that understanding to the public and in facilitating consideration of the inevitable ethical issues then to be confronted.     

Stereotypes and stereotyping: What's the brain got to do with it?

Influential social-psychological models suggest that perceivers frequently use information-processing strategies that result in the stereotype-based construal and treatment of other people. To elucidate in greater detail when, why, and how social encounters elicit stereotyping, researchers have begun to incorporate neuroscientific tools into their repertoire of investigative methods. The current article reviews these studies and considers their significance in light of existing theories of person perception, knowledge representation, and impression formation. Finally, using the concrete example of stereotyping, benefits and pitfalls of adopting a social neuroscience approach are discussed.     

Words and Drugs: Same Mechanisms of Action?

The therapeutic effects of words, rituals and, more in general, of the whole psychosocial context around the patient, have been investigated over the past few years by using the placebo response as a model. Today we are in a good position to study all these complex psychological factors by using a physiological and neuroscientific approach that uses modern neurobiological tools to probe different brain functions. Since a placebo is represented by the whole ritual of the therapeutic act, the main concept that has emerged today is that words and rituals may modulate the same biochemical pathways that are modulated by drugs. Most of our knowledge about these mechanisms comes from the field of pain, and represents a biomedical, psychological and philosophical enterprise that is changing the way we approach and interpret medicine, psychology and human biology. If on the one hand we know some of the mechanisms of drug action in the central nervous system, on the other we can now understand how the therapist’s words may affect different physiological functions. In fact, the placebo effect and the therapist–patient relationship can be approached by using the same biochemical, cellular and physiological tools of the materia medica. Although the responses to the therapist’s words cannot be reduced merely to the action of a single drug, this represents an epochal transition, in which the distinction between psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy is progressively getting thinner, and which helps us overcome the old dichotomy between psychology and biology.