Extended cognition and the priority of cognitive systems

This essay begins by addressing the role of the so-called Parity Principle in arguments for extended cognition. It is concluded that the Parity Principle does not, by itself, demarcate cognition and that another mark of the cognitive must be sought. The second section of the paper advances two arguments against the extended view of cognition, one of which – the conservatism-or-simplicity argument – appeals to principles of theory selection, and the other of which – the argument from demarcation – draws on a systems-based theory of cognition. The final section contests the claim, made by Andy Clark, that empirical work done by Wayne Gray and colleagues supports the extended view.     

Identifying and individuating cognitive systems: a task-based distributed cognition alternative to agent-based extended cognition

This article argues for a task-based approach to identifying and individuating cognitive systems. The agent-based extended cognition approach faces a problem of cognitive bloat and has difficulty accommodating both sub-individual cognitive systems (“scaling down”) and some supra-individual cognitive systems (“scaling up”). The standard distributed cognition approach can accommodate a wider variety of supra-individual systems but likewise has difficulties with sub-individual systems and faces the problem of cognitive bloat. We develop a task-based variant of distributed cognition designed to scale up and down smoothly while providing a principled means of avoiding cognitive bloat. The advantages of the task-based approach are illustrated by means of two parallel case studies: re-representation in the human visual system and in a biomedical engineering laboratory.     

The extended cognition thesis: Its significance for the philosophy of (cognitive) science

While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which versions of the EC thesis appear, and with which arguments to support them? (II) The potentials and limits of the EC thesis for topics in general philosophy of science, such as: Can naturalism perhaps be further advanced by means of the more recent EC thesis? Can we understand “big science” or laboratory research better by invoking some version of EC? And can the EC thesis help in overcoming the notorious cognitive/social divide in science studies?     

Search behaviour of cats (Felis catus) in an invisible displacement test: cognition and experience

An invisible displacement test was administered to cats in order to test the hypothesis that search behaviour in this species is influenced by their limited capacity for object permanence as well as by their previous experience with the environment. Experiment 1 compared three groups of cats in a five-choice hiding task in which the hiding places could be discriminated by their spatial positions. Two groups received a visible displacement training before the invisible displacement test and one group did not. Experiment 2 compared two groups of trained subjects in the same task, but the hiding places could be discriminated by spatial and visual cues. The results confirmed that cats are unable to solve problems with invisible displacements. The visible displacement training improved their performance, but was not sufficient to make them succeed. Experience with the hiding potential of the covers also gives more persistence to search behaviour. Finally, the distribution of search attempts is not determined by the proximity to the target and is influenced only partially by the subjects' previous experience. Like Stage 5 infants, cats rely mainly on their immediate perception. They search for an object in the last location they have seen it disappear or under the nearest cover from this location.     

Social cognition and the development of rule-guided behaviour

The weak to modest relationship between cognitive measures of judgement and reasoning and children's behaviour has led to a search for more satisfactory predictors of behaviour. One proposal is to integrate cognitive-developmental theory with children's perceptions of the self and others. In this regard, cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence indicates that children's “identification” as expressed by self-reports of parents' attractiveness and similarity to the self is correlated with their rule-guided behaviour. These relationships reflect the effects of sex-typing. In a study of behaviour in a naturalistic setting, Grade 1 girls' identification with the mother was correlated with a resistance to others' ruleviolations in Grade 2. Boys' self-initiated violations in Grade 2 were correlated with father identification in Grade 3. Given that behaviour can be mediated by perceptions of parents in relation to the self, and that effective socialization may reflect perceptions of control and a willingness to obey, a study of children's evaluations of maternal discipline techniques is reported. Findings were that children of all ages prefer an authoritative parent who displays firmness and flexibility in dealing with the situation at hand. The implications for theories of social development are discussed. Bidirectional influences in parent-child relations are considered as well as age-related changes in the connection between behaviour and sources of perceived control. Processes by which perceptions of control form a basis for autonomy and responsibility are examined.     

Superdupersizing the mind: extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat

The hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) contends that parts of the world outside of the head partly comprise the vehicles of representation and mind. I consider and reject recent efforts to defend EC from the problem of “cognitive bloat.”     

Intelligence research at the interface between differential and cognitive psychology: Prospects and proposals

There seems to be widespread agreement among theoreticians and methodologists alike that new approaches to studying intelligence should somehow combine the differential and cognitive (information-processing) approaches that have been used in the past, and that the combination should somehow enable the investigator to isolate components of intelligence that are elementary (at some level of analysis). Researchers disagree, however, as to how the differential and cognitive approaches should be combined, and consequently, in how elementary components of intelligence should be isolated and in what they are. How does an investigator choose from among the multiple paths available for theory and research? In this article, I propose some guidelines that may help investigators make informed choices. The article is divided into three major parts. In the first, I propose guidelines for choosing from among various methodologies for studying intelligence, and then describe briefly at least some of the methods that meet (or come close to meeting) these guidelines. In the second part, I propose guidelines for the specification of subtheories (and eventually, full-fledged theories) of intelligence, and illustrate how these guidelines can be met. Finally, I describe the direction in which I believe our subtheories and methods should lead us.     

At the root of embodied cognition: cognitive science meets neurophysiology

Recent experimental research in the field of neurophysiology has led to the discovery of two classes of visuomotor neurons: canonical neurons and mirror neurons. In light of these studies, we propose here an overview of two classical themes in the cognitive science panorama: James Gibson's theory of affordances and Eleanor Rosch's principles of categorization. We discuss how theoretical perspectives and neuroscientific evidence are converging towards the current paradigm of embodied cognition. From this perspective, we discuss the role of action and simulation in cognitive processes, which lead to the perceptual recognition of objects, and actions and to their conceptual categorization.     

Arctic cognition: a study of cognitive performance in summer and winter at 69°N

Evidence has accumulated over the past 15 years that affect in humans is cyclical. In winter there is a tendency to depression, with remission in summer, and this effect is stronger at higher latitudes. In order to determine whether human cognition is similarly rhythmical, this study investigated the cognitive processes of 100 participants living at 69°N. Participants were tested in summer and winter on a range of cognitive tasks, including verbal memory, attention and simple reaction time tasks. The seasonally counterbalanced design and the very northerly latitude of this study provide optimal conditions for detecting impaired cognitive performance in winter, and the conclusion is negative: of five tasks with seasonal effects, four had disadvantages in summer. Like the menstrual cycle, the circannual cycle appears to influence mood but not cognition. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Purposive behaviour in cognition and perception: Considerations of awareness in memory

The responses to the original article by Rönnberg (1990a) provoked interesting and thoughtful points of view that are covered by Gärling (1990), Hjelmquist (1990), Montgomery (1991), and Runeson (1990). These articles do not merely present a different outlook but also provide concepts that are certainly worthy of consideration and add more substance to the general topic under discussion. The purpose of this commentary is to seek an understanding of the ideas presented by the above authors within a synthesis of our views of current conceptualizations in cognition and perception. Each of the original criteria (Rönnberg, 1990a) will be treated in turn.     

Culture and systems of thought: holistic versus analytic cognition

The authors find East Asians to be holistic, attending to the entire field and assigning causality to it, making relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and relying on "dialectical" reasoning, whereas Westerners are more analytic, paying attention primarily to the object and the categories to which it belongs and using rules, including formal logic, to understand its behavior. The 2 types of cognitive processes are embedded in different naive metaphysical systems and tacit epistemologies. The authors speculate that the origin of these differences is traceable to markedly different social systems. The theory and the evidence presented call into question long-held assumptions about basic cognitive processes and even about the appropriateness of the process-content distinction.     

Participatory action research: towards (non-ideal) epistemic justice in a university in South Africa

ABSTRACT

The paper explores the possibilities for promoting epistemic justice in a South African university setting through a participatory action-based photovoice research project in which university researchers worked alongside undergraduate students with no prior experience of doing research. The student voices are employed to understand how learning as capability development and agency expansion can advance epistemic justice in a university setting of hierarchical relationships that make participatory action research challenging. The paper considers how, in this project, spaces of epistemic democracy intersected with the expansion of multidimensional functionings, resulting in more epistemic justice for the student-researchers. The paper considers the possibilities for change through a participatory project toward promoting epistemic justice at the individual level. It also explores some criticisms of the limits of such individual development in the face of structural challenges.