The Virtue of Dialogue,Dialogue as Virtue in Plato's Protagoras

Abstract

This article interprets Plato's Protagoras as a defense, against the claim of the sophists to possess a skill of teaching virtue, of Socrates’ claim in the Apology (38a) that the greatest good for a human being is examining oneself and others every day with regard to virtue. Attention to the often-neglected complex series of prologues as well as the dispute about method at the dialogue's center shows both the erotic and the dialogical character of Socratic virtue. Specifically, human virtue turns out to be a process of becoming as opposed to being good that can be carried out only in constant dialogue with others. In this context, the ‘science of measurement’ Socrates describes on behalf of Protagoras and the other sophists is exposed for what it is: a delusion that continues to exert its power over us today on account of the recurrent human wish to possess a skill or technique that could save us by guaranteeing the goodness and happiness of our lives.     

The Courage of Conviction: Andreia as Precondition for Philosophic Examination in Plato's Protagoras and Republic

There are at least two apparently conflicting views of courage found in Plato's dialogues: the intellectualist view exemplified by Socrates’s identification of courage with wisdom as found in the Protagoras; and the dispositional view of courage as a natural temperament to overcome fear in situations of danger, the necessary qualification for the auxiliary class in the Republic. In this paper I argue that these views are complementary, dispositional courage being a necessary precondition for the pursuit of the proper human excellence of wisdom. I demonstrate this by considering the role opinion plays in each understanding of courage, showing both that dispositional courage is necessary to ensure that proper opinions be retained in the pursuit of wisdom and that wisdom is necessary to guarantee these opinions are the proper ones. Finally, I argue that not only is this relationship of the two understandings of courage present in the Republic, but even in the Protagoras Socrates’s method of conducting the elenchus betrays awareness on his part of the importance of dispositional courage in the pursuit of wisdom     

柏拉图的神

对于柏拉图的哲学,国内学界研究颇多,但是其神学思想一直没有得到应有的重视①。实际上,作为西方哲学与宗教神学思想的重要源头,柏拉图的哲学和他的有神论是密不可分的。柏拉图的有神论从哲学和宗教神话两个方面受到前苏格拉底时期希腊思想的影响。几乎此前的所有哲人都以各自不同的方式涉及到了神的概念和问题;宗教方面主要是来自于希腊神话的崇拜奥林匹斯神的流行宗教。以及宣扬灵魂轮回和禁欲主义的俄耳甫斯教及相关的狄奥尼索斯崇拜。由于篇幅所限,柏拉图所受到的影响（以及他对后世的影响）只能另文刊出。本文将直接探讨柏拉图对话中的神学思想、本文的基本观点,是从理念论的角度,按照与理念的内在关系来探讨、理解柏拉图的有神论,即“理念有神论”（Ｉｄｅａｌ Ｔｈｅｉｓｍ）,并视之为柏拉图神学的实质。     

Early Education in Plato's Republic

In this paper, I reconsider the commonly held position that the early moral education of the Republic is arational since the youths of the Kallipolis do not yet have the capacity for reason. I argue that, because they receive an extensive mathematical education alongside their moral education, the youths not only have a capacity for reason but that capacity is being developed in their early education. If this is so, though, then we must rethink why the early moral education is arational. I argue that the reason is rooted in the nature of moral explanations. These sorts of explanations are rooted in the Forms and thus one can only understand those explanations when they have knowledge of the Forms. But this requires preparation – the very sort of preparation that is provided by both the mathematical and moral educations.     

Diotima and Demeter as Mystagogues in Plato's Symposium

Like the goddess Demeter, Diotima from Mantineia, the prophetess who teaches Socrates about eros and the “rites of love” in Plato's Symposium, was a mystagogue who initiated individuals into her mysteries, mediating to humans esoteric knowledge of the divine. The dialogue, including Diotima's speech, contains religious and mystical language, some of which specifically evokes the female‐centered yearly celebrations of Demeter at Eleusis. In this essay, I contextualize the worship of Demeter within the larger system of classical Athenian practices, and propose that Plato borrowed Eleusinian language because it criticized conventional notions of the divine, thereby allowing him to reimagine the possibilities for the philosophical process among humans.     

Plato's Hypothetical Inquiry in the Meno

This paper argues that the hypothesis proposed in the Meno is the proposition ‘virtue is good’ alone, and that its epistemic nature is essentially insecure. It has been an object of huge scholarly debate which other hypothesis Socrates posited with regard to the relationship between virtue and knowledge. This debate is, however, misleading in the sense of making us believe that the hypothesis that virtue is good is regarded as a truism in the light of the process of positing a higher hypothesis described in the Phaedo and the Republic. I argue that the hypothesis in question is presented as a result of the earlier discussion of Meno's third definition of virtue (77b2–79a2), which implies the consequence that morally correct actions are beneficial whether or not accompanied by conventional goods such as wealth and honour. The underlying role of presenting it as a hypothesis is therefore to postpone demonstrating the truth of a controversial thesis which needs a substantial justification. In conclusion, I suggest that Plato's real intention in introducing the method of hypothesis in the dialogue is not to answer the original question but to lead Meno to seek for knowledge.     

Minding the Gap in Plato's Republic

Philosophical Studies -     

Socratic Courage in Plato's Socratic Dialogues

This article considers Socrates's conception of courage in Plato's Socratic dialogues. Although the Laches, which is the only dialogue devoted in toto to a pursuit of the definition of courage, does not explicitly provide Socrates's definition of courage, I shall point out clues therein which contribute to an understanding of Socrates's conception of courage. The Protagoras is a peculiar dialogue in which Socrates himself offers a definition of courage. Attending to the dramatic structure and personalities of the dialogue, I will point out that Socrates does not commit to the definition and that the hedonism and the definition of courage are used to disclose Protagoras's confusion regarding virtue. Following one of the clues within the Laches I will turn to the Apology and indicate Socrates's conception of courage which is based on his awareness of lack of knowledge of death and his religious conviction that nothing will happen for the good in life or in death. Finally I will show that such conception of Socratic courage satisfies the criteria in the Laches.     

Plato's Theory of Aging

Plato's writings express a positive attitude toward elderly people. But do his writings also show a serious theoretical interest in issues of aging? We approach this question by comparing what Plato says about aging to major theoretical issues in gerontology. We argue that many of Plato's subtler observations of the behavior of elderly people and many of his ideas about aging anticipate specific research and theoretical advances in contemporary gerontology. We compare passages in Plato's works to the debate between activity and disengagement theories, the concepts of continuity and gerotranscendence, Robert Butler's discovery of “the life review,” and recent theories of old age wisdom. Plato's anticipation of these ideas and issues related to them suggests that his writings may contain still other major insights into aging which are not yet articulated in gerontology. We suggest three possibilities.