J. L. Austin and Literal Meaning

Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context‐invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning.     

The Psychology of the Child at Geneva and the J. J. Rousseau Institute

In the present study, the authors investigated what prosocial-assertive, passive, and coercive strategies 6-year-olds (N = 257) would propose in response to stories about 2 socially challenging situations: displacing another child in a game and obtaining a toy from another child. The scenarios also varied the gender composition of the characters. Participants' verbalizations while acting out their responses using toy props fell into 13 categories of strategies. Teachers reported antisocial behavior and social competence of the participants. Girls and boys responded similarly in their general suggestions of prosocial or assertive strategies, but girls were more likely to offer prosocial strategies with other girls than with boys. Teacher-rated competence and antisocial behavior interacted in predicting coercive responses by girls but not by boys. The results demonstrate that prosocial and antisocial behaviors need to be considered in interaction to fully understand the nature of social competence.