‘You Do You’ Feminism: Lesbian,Bisexual, and Queer Women’s Perspectives on the Dildo

Historically, feminists have engaged in a contentious debate about the dildo. Some assert that it is an oppressive tool of the patriarchy whereas others proclaim that it is a practical means of expressing lesbian, bisexual, and queer women’s sexuality. To gain some perspective into the current status of this debate, seven non-heterosexual women were interviewed about their attitudes toward dildos. Interviews were examined using inductive thematic analysis, and viewed through the lens of social constructionism. Rather than taking sides in the dildo debates, participants embraced a you do you ideology (i.e., there is no “right” or “wrong” answer when it comes to choosing whether to use or not use dildos). Three themes clustered around this overarching ideology: dildos are optional (à la carte dildo), meanings of dildos are contextually and phenomenologically determined (contextuality of the dildo), and dildos have theoretical implications (critically conscious queers). Participants’ eschewal of the binarized debate about the dildo may be entwined with changing understandings of feminist, gender, and queer theory.     

‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Fairness

According to the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it is never the case that you ought to do something you cannot do. While many accept this principle in some form, it also has its share of critics, and thus it seems desirable if an argument can be offered in its support. The aim of this paper is to examine a particular way in which the principle has been defended, namely, by appeal to considerations of fairness. In a nutshell, the idea (due to David Copp) is that moral requirements we cannot comply with would be unfair, and there cannot be unfair moral requirements. I discuss several ways of spelling out the argument, and argue that all are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.     

‘You can’t buy love’: trivializing and the challenge for religious education

While there has been an increase in empirical research which explores the spirituality of children, few studies have explicitly named and described factors which may inhibit children’s expression of their spirituality. This paper, emanating from the author’s own research into children’s spirituality in Australian Catholic primary schools, presents and describes one such factor, which has been termed trivializing. An example of hermeneutic phenomenological writing—the text—in which trivializing was revealed is presented, followed by a reflection upon the text guided by van Manen’s lifeworld existentials (lived body, lived time, lived space, lived human relations). In the light of this reflection some initial implications for nurturing the spirituality of children within the primary religious education classroom are presented.     

“God Smites You!”: Atheists’ Experiences of Stigma,Identity Politics,and Queerness*

Existing research on Atheists is sparse. The lived experiences of Atheists have been ignored almost entirely. Triangulating from autoethnographic materials and life-history interviews, this project documents the ways that Atheist individuals understand the stigmas attributed to them and their responses to it. Some of the behaviors are framed as “techniques of information control” such as “compartmentalizing” and “passing.” Others are framed as “Identity Politics.” Techniques of information control and identity politics may serve to impede efforts toward effective activism on behalf of Atheists. Taken from an alternative perspective, Atheism is deconstructed as a form of “queerness” in relation to religion.     

‘There and then’, ‘here and now’, ‘when and if’: The relationship of present,past and future in the consulting room

This paper revolves around the question of the patient’s inhabiting of time. Where is the main focus of the patient’s indwelling in time – the past, the present or the future – and what are the qualitative aspects of such indwelling? Of equal significance, is the patient able to move freely between past, present and future events and preoccupations and make links between them, or is he or she caught in a ‘time warp’? These questions are explored within a context of both psychodynamic and existential theory, drawing on the one hand on the work of Winnicott, Bick, Bion and Turp and on the other of Heidegger, Van den Berg, Merleau-Ponty, Kemp and Scheffler. The themes addressed are illustrated with clinical examples.     

Refuting Polonius: Sincerity,Authenticity, and ‘Shtick’

Abstract

Mark Johnston argues that the identity between water and H₂O generates a puzzle: Ice is related to H₂O just as water is related to H₂O. If water is identical to H₂O, so is ice, and we end up with an absurdity: water is ice. This paper suggests a way to preserve the identity between water and H₂O without this absurd result.     

Primary Intersubjectivity: Empathy,Affective Reversibility, ‘Self-Affection’ and the Primordial ‘We’

The arguments advanced in this paper are the following. Firstly, that just as Trevarthen’s three subjective/intersubjective levels, primary, secondary, and tertiary, mapped out different modes of access, so too response is similarly structured, from direct primordial responsiveness, to that informed by shared pragmatic concerns and narrative contexts, to that which demands the distantiation afforded by representation. Secondly, I propose that empathy is an essential mode of intentionality, integral to the primary level of subjectivity/intersubjectivity, which is crucial to our survival as individuals and as a species. Further to this last point, I argue that empathy is not derived on the basis of intersubjectivity, nor does it merely disclose intersubjectivity, rather it is constitutive of intersubjectivity at the primary level. Empathy is a direct, irreducible intentionality separable in thought from the other primary intentional modes of perception, rationality, memory and imagination, but co-arising with these. In regard to the inter-personal level, the concrete relations with others, primary empathy is both the ground for the possibility of the secondary manifestations—pity, sympathy, perspective taking, etc., and motivates them. Thirdly, it is the movement in the core of subjectivity initially generated by shifting attention between the ‘I’ and ‘we’ perspectives and later ‘solidified’ through affect to become shifting identification, which opens up the intersubjective domain. So we can affirm that we are not only born into sociality but our sociality goes to the roots of our being as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have claimed.     

‘Place’, ‘space’ and ‘dialogue’: conceptualising dialogic spaciality in English faith-based universities

This article proposes a conceptualisation of dialogic spaciality, and advances our understandings of the dynamic interplay of dialogic space (where meaningful conversations take place) and place (a geographic location) and the influence these have on academic life. The conceptualisation is developed from a qualitative study which focused on the relationship of dialogue, space and intellectual encounters in faith-based higher education settings in England. The article highlights the significance of dialogue in these institutions because of the emphasis traditionally placed on conversation in the Christian university tradition. It concludes that dialogic spaciality may counter elements of non-reflexive and performative ethos as something that is transferable to other universities.     

Intensional Specifications of Truth-Conditions: ‘Because’, ‘In Virtue of’, and ‘Made True By…’

Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their close relatives. I examine what I take to be the most promising deflationist moves in this direction and argue that they fail.     

Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology,Moral Intuitions,and Worldview Among Swedish Voters

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.     

How Are You,奥林匹克!

~~How Are You,奥林匹克!@张宝城 @王兴 @谭胜功~~     

‘I am–we are’: personal and social pathways to further study, work and family life

This project explores the apparent layers in motivation for young people’s plans in order to extend Pathways Theory. We bring together personal, relational and group motivation to explain the planned pathways to study, work and family life. Location was an Australian town, close to the national socio-economic average, to control broad social factors. Participants (N = 78) were 12 to 18 year-old girls and boys (mean age 14.5 years). Results provide little support for popular explanations based on demographic factors (age, gender, family background) and broad personal indicators of self esteem and mood. Instead, the results support proposed differential explanations for pathways to study, work and family life. In particular, personal aspects of identity and self concepts, social expectations and group identity influence young people’s pathways to further study. Group uniqueness explains pathways to paid work, yet experience of higher education tends to limit plans for family life. Findings support inclusion of personal, relational and group motivations in developing innovative theories of pathways motivation. Ongoing work considers common and distinct explanations across socio-economic contexts.     

Metaxological ‘Yes’ and Existential ‘No’: William Desmond and Atheism

This article explores and critically assesses the metaxological account of a philosophy of God professed by William Desmond. Postmodern reflection on the philosophy of God has a tendency to focus on the 'signs' of God and urges for a passive acceptance of these signs. Desmond argues, contrary to this tendency, for a mindful togetherness of philosophical activity and religious passivity. After exploring Desmond's thought on this topic, I move to assess his 'metaxological yes' to God as the agapeic origin from an existential point of view. Initially it seems that his 'yes' is somewhat strained as it burdens itself with an excessive task of having faith into something that is beyond determination. I illustrate this insight by referring to Friedrich Nietzsche’s 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra.' Nietzsche's existential 'No' toward transcendence is a consequence of a mindful confrontation with the excesses as play.     

‘Critical psychotherapy,’ ‘postpsychotherapy,’ and the cult of technicism

This paper about the terms ‘critical psychotherapy’ and ‘postpsychotherapy’ argues that the terms ‘critical psychology,’ ‘critical psychiatry,’ and ‘postpsychiatry’ are already in use, and we can see the new terms – ‘critical psychotherapy’ and ‘postpsychotherapy’ – as additions to this already existing family of terms. However, this paper also argues that what is of most importance is not the case for using these new terms, but the tendencies and features these terms might be taken to refer to. The paper begins with an experience the author had while working as a counsellor some years ago. The terms listed above are explored, as are the roots of ‘critical psychotherapy’ in psychoanalysis, before providing an example of how a philosopher’s work might be relevant to psychotherapists.     

The logic of obligation, ‘better’ and ‘worse’

Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, FT-33794. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for remarks on an earlier version of this paper.