On the Death of God in Lacan – A Nuanced Atheism

This article examines the death of God theme in the work of Jacques Lacan and indicates some convergences with Christian theology. It distinguishes the ‘atheism’ of Lacan from the atheism of Freud. And it demonstrates that if Lacan does not believe in the God equated with Being, the God of the philosophers, the later Lacan’s argument for what he calls the ‘eksistence’ of God beyond language, the God of the mystics, makes for a highly nuanced atheism.     

Two sorts of natural theology

Usually, natural theology is understood as the project of providing arguments for the existence of God. This project is endorsed by Moreland and Craig. McGrath, on the other hand, says that this project fails. In the first part of this article, I show how McGrath’s dismissal of arguments for the existence of God follows from his view of natural theology. In the second part, I argue that McGrath’s natural theology contains an accurate critique of Moreland and Craig’s way of doing natural theology, a critique that exposes two major problems in their treatment of the moral argument for the existence of God. In the third part, I propose a way of providing arguments for the existence of God that avoids the problems pointed out by McGrath, namely a way of arguing that seeks to show how theology may improve a certain non-theistic understanding of a natural phenomenon.     

God and the Hypothesis of No Prime Worlds

Many theists hold that for any world x that God has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y, that God had the power to actualize instead of x. Recently, however, it has been suggested that this scenario is incompatible with traditional theism: roughly, it is claimed that no being can be essentially unsurpassable on this view, since no matter what God does in actualizing a world, it is possible for God (or some other being) to do better, and hence it is possible for God (or some other being) to be better. In reply to an argument of this sort, Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder offer the surprising claim that an essentially unsurpassable being could – consistently with his goodness and rationality – select a world for actualization at random. In what follows, I respond to the most recent contributions to this discussion. I criticize William Rowe’s new reply to the Howard-Snyders (but I endorse the spirit of one of his arguments), and I claim that Edward Wierenga’s new defence of the Howard-Snyders fails. I conclude that the Howard-Snyders’ argument fails to show that an essentially unsurpassable being could randomly choose a world for actualization. Accordingly, it fails to block an important argument for atheism.     

On the Argument from Divine Arbitrariness

William Rowe in his Can God be Free? (2004) argues that God, if there is a God, necessarily chooses the best. Combined with the premise that there is no best act of creation, this provides an a priori argument for atheism. Rowe assumes that necessarily God is a ??morally unsurpassable?? being, and it is for that reason that God chooses the best. In this article I drop that assumption and I consider a successor to Rowe??s argument, the Argument from Arbitrariness, based on the premise that God does not act arbitrarily. My chief conclusion will be that this argument fails because, for all we know, there can be non-arbitrary divine choices even if there is no best act of creation.     

Theism,possible worlds,and the multiverse

God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism.     

Re-evaluating the hiddenness argument from above

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - J. L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument for atheism (2015) assumes that God’s perpetual openness to a relationship with any finite...     

Why perfect being theology?

I display the historical roots of perfect being theology in Greco-Roman philosophy, and the distinctive reasons for Christians to take up a version of this project. I also rebut a recent argument that perfect-being reasoning should lead one to atheism.     

Towards a humanistic approach to the Quran: new direction in contemporary Islamic thought

Historically, Muslim orthodoxy has regarded the Quran as God’s Word dictated to Muhammad through the mediation of the Angel Gabriel, and has thus maintained the corresponding argument that the Prophet played no role in shaping the content of the Quranic revelations. This paper discusses a project of what I shall refer to as ‘reforming theology’ within contemporary Islamic scholarship which stands in contrast to the dominant orthodox view of revelation and the nature of the Quran. In particular, the paper examines how several contemporary Muslim scholars, namely Fazlur Rahman (from Pakistan), Abdolkarim Soroush and Muhammad Mujtahed Shabestari (from Iran) and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (from Egypt), challenge the widely accepted idea about the Quran being the literal Word of God. The paper argues that the project of these scholars represents a radically new direction in Islamic theology because of its strong emphasis on the human side of the Quran. It also shows that the implications of these scholars’ re-examination of traditional theories of revelation are not only limited to theological matters, or specifically the communicative relationship between God and His Prophet, but also have a number of consequences for the practice of exegesis.     

The problem of religious evil: Does belief in god cause evil?

Daniel Kodaj has recently developed a pro-atheistic argument that he calls “the problem of religious evil.” This first premise of this argument is “belief in God causes evil.” Although this idea that belief in God causes evil is widely accepted, certainly in the secular West, it is sufficiently problematic as to be unsuitable as a basis for an argument for atheism, as Kodaj seeks to use it. In this paper I shall highlight the problems inherent in it in three ways: by considering whether it is reasonable to say that “belief in God” causes evil; whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God “causes” evil; and whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God causes “evil.” In each case I will argue that it is problematic to make such claims, and accordingly I will conclude that the premise “belief in God causes evil” is unacceptable as it stands, and consequently is unable to ground Kodaj’s pro-atheistic argument.     

Why Only Perfection Is Good Enough

Abstract

I argue that the traditional problem of evil mislocates the problem which confronts the theist. The real problem arises not from the evil in the world, but from the non-perfection of the world. Given that a perfect God could create only a perfect world, and given that the world is not in fact perfect, I construct an argument for atheism. I show that the argument is not open to the objections which theists standardly bring against the traditional objection from evil.     

Punishing and atoning: a new critique of penal substitution

The doctrine of penal substitution claims that it was good (or required) for God to punish in response to human sin, and that Christ received this punishment in our stead. I argue that this doctrine’s central factual claim—that Christ was punished by God—is mistaken. In order to punish someone, one must at least believe the recipient is responsible for an offense. But God surely did not believe the innocent Christ was responsible for an offense, let alone the offense of human sin. So, the central factual claim is mistaken. In the final section, I show that this critique of penal substitution does not apply to the closely-related Anselmian satisfaction theory.     

Feminist Challenges to Conceptions of God: Exploring Divine Ideals

This paper presents a feminist intervention into debates concerning the relation between human subjects and a divine ideal. I turn to what Irigarayan feminists challenge as a masculine conception of ‘the God’s eye view’ of reality. This ideal functions not only in philosophy of religion, but in ethics, politics, epistemology and philosophy of science: it is given various names from ‘the competent judge’ to the ‘the ideal observer’ (IO) whose view is either from nowhere or everywhere. The question is whether, as Taliaferro contends, my own philosophical argument inevitably appeals to the impartiality and omni-attributes of the IO. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Incommensurability,incomparability, and God’s choice of a world

Anselmian theism holds that there necessarily exists a being, God, who is essentially unsurpassable in power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom. This being is also understood to be the creator and sustainer of all that is. In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, this role is generally understood as follows: God surveys the array of possible worlds, and in his wisdom selects exactly one for actualization, based on its axiological properties. In this paper, I discuss an under-appreciated challenge for this account of the Anselmian God’s selection of a world. In particular, I urge that there are failures of comparability between various possible worlds, and I argue that, given certain assumptions, these failures threaten the rationality of God’s choice of a world. To the extent that rationality is deemed necessary for unsurpassability, this result also challenges the core Anselmian notion that God is an unsurpassable being.     

The ecclesial dimension in the dialogue between theology and science

This article discusses the role of the science–religion dialogue in reaction to modern secularism, atheism and nihilism. It is argued that the only viable way for such a dialogue is along the lines of radical theological commitment implying the ecclesial dimension. It is carefully discussed as to how the ecclesial dimension can enter the dialogue. Ultimately it is concluded that the dialogue between science and theology explicates the para-eucharistic essence of science, thus reconciling it with theology in the sense of the commonality of their experiential origin in humanity made in the image of God.     

Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds

A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value‐bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value‐bearers he has already created. Given this, if God exists, our world—considered on the whole—is infinitely valuable. I further contend that this theistic picture makes our world's value unsurpassable. In support of this contention, I consider proposals for how infinitely valuable worlds might be improved upon, focusing on two main ways—adding value‐bearers and increasing the value in present value‐bearers. I argue that neither of these can improve our world. Depending on how each method is understood, either it would not improve our world, or our world is unsurpassable with respect to it. I conclude by considering the implications of my argument for the problem of evil more generally conceived.     

AFFIRMATIONS AFTER GOD: FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE AND RICHARD DAWKINS ON ATHEISM

Abstract. In this essay, I compare the atheism of Friedrich Nietzsche with that of Richard Dawkins. My purpose is to describe certain differences in their respective atheisms with the intent of showing that Nietzsche's atheism contains a richer and fuller affirmation of human life. In Dawkins’s presentation of the value of life without God, there is a naïve optimism that purports that human beings, educated in science and purged of religion, will find lives of easy peace and comfortable wonder. Part of my argument is that this optimism regarding the power of objective science is subject to Nietzsche's criticism of Socrates and what he calls the “theoretical man.” As such, it fails in terms of providing a true affirmation of life in the godless world.     

EMERGENCE AND HUMAN UNIQUENESS: LIMITING OR DELIMITING EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION?

Abstract. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence presents a highly sophisticated argument against any kind of uncritical theology that might want to follow science into a world of overly narrow, compartmentalized disciplines that do not sufficiently communicate between themselves. Clayton argues persuasively that the basic structure of the phenomenal world is multileveled, with emergent properties and degrees of freedom that cannot be adequately described, predicted, or explained in terms of lower‐level phenomena only. Moreover, the various levels of organization are linked to one another by interfaces of mutual constraint in terms of upward and downward causation. The most valuable part of Clayton's argument, however, is that in a philosophy of emergence one must also, if not especially, account for the role of the biological sciences and especially for the influence of human thoughts and skills, human choices and actions, and—one of the most important causes of all—human purposes. Clayton's biggest challenge is that the level of human personhood offers us the only appropriate level to introduce the question of God and the possibility of divine agency. I critically evaluate this central claim and its implications not only for the extent of divine influence on the world but also for the scope and limitations of the interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and the sciences.     

Grace, Doubt, and Evil: The Constructive Task Of Reformation Theology

The Lutheran vocation is to be a friend of grace; and since the 16th century Lutheran systematic theology has built upon a foundation of grace. Two apparent barriers to grace need addressing. First, doubt in the form of agnosticism and atheism provides a metaphysical argument against God's existence. Second, evil and suffering provide a moral argument against God's existence. From a Lutheran point of view the question of God's graciousness takes precedence over God's existence.     

Hartshorne’s Dipolar Theism and the Mystery of God

Anselm said that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but he believed that it followed that God is greater than can be conceived. The second formula—essential to sound theology—points to the mystery of God. The usual way of preserving divine mystery is the via negativa, as one finds in Aquinas. I formalize Hartshorne’s central argument against negative theology in the simplest modal system T. I end with a defense of Hartshorne’s way of preserving the mystery of God, which he locates in the actuality of God rather than in the divine existence or essence. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

A MINOR MATTER? THE FRANCISCAN THESIS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY1

The Franciscan thesis maintains that the primary motive of the Incarnation is to glorify the triune God in the person of Jesus Christ: though Christ atones for human sins, his coming isn't relative to our need for redemption but rather has an absolute primacy. The Franciscan thesis is sometimes associated with the counterfactual claim that Christ would have come even if humans hadn't sinned. In recent work on the Franciscan thesis, an attempt is made to prove the counterfactual claim on the basis of a purely logical argument drawn from the writings of Bl. John Duns Scotus. After showing that this proof fails, I construct an axiological argument for the Franciscan thesis that disentangles it from unsubstantiated counterfactual claims while respecting the subtle interplay between natural and revealed theology. I then provide a metaphysical interpretation of the axiological argument that builds upon Scotist notions. Seen through this interpretive lens, Scotus's logical argument can be understood not as attempting to prove a counterfactual claim but as articulating Scotus's vision of what is required of any created order that is radically contingent on God's will yet perfectly glorifies its Creator. Thus understood, the Franciscan thesis challenges a powerful and influential picture in philosophical theology.