道德耻感的基本样态分析

道德耻感的内容丰富多彩,并通过多种多样的羞耻心理体验形式表现出来.其基本样态包括:自然耻感和道德耻感、自律性耻感和他律性耻感、先耻感和后耻感、个体耻感和群体耻感、德耻感和才耻感,等等.     

论孔子耻感的道德品性

孔子道德哲学体系中的耻感具有他律与自律相统一的道德品性.当耻感与"礼"相联系时,它注重的是社会的道德评价,以个人与他人的关系为条件,具体表现为道德他律;当耻感与"仁"相关照时,它注重的是主体的道德自觉,以自我行为与道德要求的关系为条件,具体表现为道德自律.在进行社会主义荣辱观教育的过程中,解读孔子自律与他律相统一的耻感品性,对于人们按照社会主导价值观自觉地趋荣避耻具有重要的启迪意义.     

Moral Psychology of Shame in Early Confucian Philosophy

In Western philosophy and psychology, shame is characterized as a self-critical emotion that is often contrasted with the similarly self-critical but morally active emotion of guilt. If shame is negative concern over endangered or threatened self-image (usually in front of others), guilt is autonomous moral awareness of one’s wrongdoings and reparative motivation to correct one’s moral misconduct. Recently, many psychologists have begun to discuss the moral significance of shame in their comparative studies of non-Western cultures. In this new approach, shame is characterized as a positive moral emotion and active motivation for self-reflection and self-cultivation. If shame is a positive and active moral emotion, what is its moral psychological nature? In this paper, I will analyze shame from the perspective of cultural psychology and early Confucian philosophy. Unlike many Western philosophers, Confucius and Mencius discuss shame as a form of moral excellence. In early Confucian texts, shame is not a reactive emotion of an endangered self but a moral disposition that supports a self-critical and self-transformative process of moral development.     

儒家"耻"德与公民道德文明的教养

中国是一个长期受到儒家道德人文理念浸润的国度 ,儒家的道德人文理念对于我们今天的公民道德建设无疑仍然具有重要的启示和借鉴意义 ,本文即旨在阐发儒家“耻”德对于我们今天的公民道德教养的积极借鉴意义。     

Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.     

Measuring Moral Progress

The study provides an in-depth analysis of two young adult subjects from a longitudinal study who underwent successive and significant developmental changes. Their developmental patterns, however, are only revealed by a new conception of moral stages, which is both more comprehensive and more detailed than Kohlberg’s original approach. In particular, the suggested alternative taxonomy neatly accommodates what appears as developmental anomalies in the Kohlbergian frame of reference. What is more, apart from merely matching with the observed data, the new theory also explains why the subjects developed the way they did, since it reveals the inherent cognitive conflicts at each stage and how these are resolved at the following one. Although the theory stands against the Kohlberg theory as it is, it may be understood as an extension and further development of the latter, in the sense that Kohlbergian stages are differentiated, supplemented, and theoretically substantiated within the new framework.

Moral Progress and Human Agency

The idea of moral progress is a necessary presupposition of action for beings like us. We must believe that moral progress is possible and that it might have been realized in human experience, if we are to be confident that continued human action can have any morally constructive point. I discuss the implications of this truth for moral psychology. I also show that once we understand the complex nature and the complicated social sources of moral progress, we will appreciate why we cannot construct a plausible comprehensive action-guiding theory of moral progress. Yet while the nature and sources of moral progress consistently thwart many theoretical hopes, the idea of moral progress is a plausible, critically important and morally constructive principle of historical interpretation.     

Moral Dilemmas,Collective Responsibility,and Moral Progress

Ruth Marcus has offered an account of moral dilemmas in which the presence of dilemmas acts as a motivating force, pushing us to try to minimize predicaments of moral conflict. In this paper, I defend a Marcus-style account of dilemmas against two objections: first, that if dilemmas are real, we are forced to blame those who have done their best, and second, that in some cases, even a stripped down version of blame seems inappropriate. My account highlights the importance of collective responsibility in understanding dilemmas, and I suggest that it sheds light on understanding moral progress.     

Reappraising the Moral Nature of Emotions in Decision Making: The Case of Shame and Guilt

Emotions play a crucial role in moral behavior. The present paper does not contest this point but argues that qualifications of certain feelings such as shame and guilt as moral emotions should not exclusively be based on a proximal analysis of their function. A proximal analysis details how moral emotions produce moral behavior. Emotions are qualified as moral when they are elicited by concerns for others rather than the self and produce prosocial action tendencies. Although researchers have acknowledged that moral emotions may also have an ultimate function that details why it is in the individual interest that these moral effects occur, they have neglected to translate such ideas into testable hypotheses. Using guilt and shame as an example, we show how an analysis of ultimate functions accommodates recent findings, which contest the view that guilt is more moral than shame and provides new insights as to when and why moral emotions will produce moral effects.     

The Idea of Moral Progress

This paper shows that moral progress is a substantive and plausible idea. Moral progress in belief involves deepening our grasp of existing moral concepts, while moral progress in practices involves realizing deepened moral understandings in behavior or social institutions. Moral insights could not be assimilated or widely disseminated if they involved devising and applying totally new moral concepts. Thus, it is argued, moral failures of past societies cannot be explained by appeal to ignorance of new moral ideas, but must be understood as resulting from refusals to subject social practices to critical scrutiny. Moral philosophy is not the main vehicle for disseminating morally progressive insights, though it has an important role in processes that lead to moral progress. Yet we have grounds for cautious optimism, since progressive moral insights can be disseminated and can, sometimes, have constructive social effects.     

Macho and Shame

Abstract

Bilmes M. Machismo and Shame. Int Forum Psychoanal 1992;1:163-168. Stockholm. ISSN 0803-706X

“Machismo” is usually used in a pejorative way to describe an attitude of male domination and display of power. While this portrayal is clearly recognizable, it does not tell the full story. The Spanish word “macho” simply means male or masculine, and can be used positively to designate one gender's successful struggle for pride, honor and identity. Machismo is a caricature of these qualities, a brutishness stemming from defensive mechanisms. The thesis of this paper is that the experience of maleness is especially linked to the psychic emotion of shame. Specifically, exaggerated machismo, as the term is usually understood, is the result of frustrated, shameful dependency experiences.     

Shame On You,Shame On Me? Nussbaum on Shame Punishment

abstract Shame punishments have become an increasingly popular alternative to traditional punishments, often taking the form of convicted criminals holding signs or sweeping streets with a toothbrush. In her Hiding from Humanity, Martha Nussbaum argues against the use of shame punishments because they contribute to an offender's loss of dignity. However, these concerns are shared already by the courts which also have concerns about the possibility that shaming might damage an offender's dignity. This situation has not led the courts to reject all uses of shaming, but only to accept shaming within certain safeguards. Thus, despite Nussbaum's important reservations against shame punishments, it may still be possible for her to accept shaming within specific parameters such as those set out by the courts that protect the dignity of an offender. As a result, she need not be opposed to the use of legitimate shame punishment.     

Shame and Shamelessness

What is the relation between shame and shamelessness? It may seem obvious: shamelessness is simply the absence of shame. But on reflection, it becomes clear that the story is considerably more complicated. Michelle Mason's intriguing "On Shamelessness" prompts such reflection (albeit unintentionally). Mason argues that we should be mindful of the "moral importance of shame" and "unapologetic in its defense" (403), and she does so via an examination of shamelessness and an argument to the effect that shamelessness is (with some exceptions) a moral fault. The tacit assumption is that insofar as shamelessness is a moral fault, the value of shame is vindicated. I challenge that assumption.     

Shame and Silence

Abstract

Samantha Vice’s proposal on how to live in ‘this strange place’ of contemporary South Africa, includes an appeal to the concepts of shame and silence. In this paper, I use Emmanuel Levinas and Giorgio Agamben to move the discussion of shame from a moral to an existential question. The issue is not about how one should feel, but about the kind of self that whiteness in South Africa makes possible today. Shame desubjectifies. Vice’s recommendation of silence is then taken as witnessing/listening, which I argue grounds the possibility of a recovery of the self.     

Shame and psychopathology

The origins of the word "shame" recall the concept of the infraction of integrity both as scandal and as individualization. The human experience of shame stretches along a continuum from modesty to disabling interpersonal terror. Unlike other basic affects, its emergence is a fundamental moment in the process of self-awareness and self-object differentiation. Neglected by psychiatry because it was regarded as a moral concept, today it is possible to hypothesize that it has a biologic basis that one can attempt to describe in terms of corticothalamic pathways. In this respect, like other affects, it could be considered as a cognitive shortcut to activate specific and evolutionally useful behavioral patterns, such as concealment or a request for affiliation. It is fairly ubiquitous in psychopathology, but is clinically much more structured in its abnormal expressions in anxiety disorders, particularly social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, eating disorders, body dysmorphic disorder, and even in bipolar mood disorder. In schizophrenia it has been described as being one stage in the construction of delusion. Its presence is connected to interpersonal relationship (altruism) though it seems absent in autism. The assessment of shame experiences in psychiatric patients could be useful for both pharmacological and psychotherapeutic strategies, and could provide a categorization of a new psychopathology based on abnormal affects.