Xunzi’s Theory of Ritual Revisited: Reading Ritual as Corporal Technology

This essay offers a new reading of Xunzi’s ritual theory against the backdrop of excavated technical manuals from the Mawangdui and Zhangjiashan collections. While most studies tend to focus on the sociopolitical and moral aspects of Xunzi’s thought, I attempt to demonstrate that in composing his theory of ritual, Xunzi was not only concerned with defending the Confucian tradition against the criticism of his fellow philosophical masters, but was also responding to the emergence of bio-spiritual practices such as meditation, sexual cultivation, and gymnastic exercises. Alarmed by the growing popularity of these individual corporal techniques among the Warring States elite, Xunzi opted to repackage and redefine ritual as a superior technology of the body that would enable humans to transform their bodies and minds and obtain physical and spiritual bounties while at the same time enhancing sociopolitical stability and harmony by creating an organic communal body.     

Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics

Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents an empirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they argue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using an interpretation of Xunzi—a Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucian account serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematic ontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction and explanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education. Xunzi’s account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge by uncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it is not a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzi’s virtue ethic responds to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms that fully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits.     

Reading Xunzi through Nāmā: Two Ancient Inquiries into the Nature of Names

This essay is a comparison between two ancient theories of language—the 5th century BCE Indian etymologist Yāska and the 4th century BCE Chinese philosopher Xunzi 荀子. Specifically, it is a reading of the theory of “the rectification of names” in Xunzi through the lens of Yāska. Xunzi is known for his view that humanity’s innate tendencies need to be shaped through education and ritual. Similarly, ancient Indian authors like Yāska understand that a person is created, or made, through the performance of Vedic sacrifice. Both thinkers’ constructivist theories of language and meaning proceed from these ritual assumptions. However, Yāska would query Xunzi’s inherent distrust of multiple meanings of words and their negative effects on a functional state. Guided instead by a theory of the transcendence of Vedic language, Yāska would argue that the more one can proliferate possible meanings the more powerful a word becomes.     

Constraining the Ruler: On Escaping Han Fei's Criticism of Confucian Virtue Politics

One of Han Fei's most trenchant criticisms against the early Confucian political tradition is that, insofar as its decision-making process revolves around the ruler, rather than a codified set of laws, this process is the arbitrary rule of a single individual. Han Fei argues that there will be disastrous results due to ad hoc decision-making, relationship-based decision-making, and decision-making based on prior moral commitments. I lay out Han Fei's arguments while demonstrating how Xunzi can successfully counter them. In doing so, I argue that Xunzi lays out a political theory restricting the actions of the ruler through both the use of ritual and law, which allows him to develop a theory that legitimizes government while at the same time constraining itself. Xunzi's political theory makes important strides in its attempt to recognize the importance of the ruler as a moral exemplar while also restricting his control in the political process.     

Ritual in the Xunzi: A Change of the Heart/Mind

This article seeks to advance discussion of Xunzi??s view of ritual by examining the problem ritual treats and the way in which it targets the problem. I argue that the root of the problem is the natural inclination of the heart/mind to be concerned only with self-interest. The reason ritual works is that, on the one hand, it requires one to disregard concern for self-interest and observe ethical standards and, on the other, it allows one to express feelings in an ethically appropriate way. The ideal character shaped by ritual is one of respect in dealing with affairs and people; the ideal effect of ritual on the person is a sense of ease and security. Based on these conclusions, I will flesh out an implicit assumption Xunzi might have adopted about a pattern in human psychological constitution so as to further our understanding of Xunzi??s moral psychology.     

Between Good and Evil: Xunzi’s Reinterpretation of the Hegemonic Rule as Decent Governance

This essay investigates Xunzi’s political philosophy of ba dao (Hegemonic Rule). It argues that Xunzi’s practical philosophy of ba dao was developed in the course of resolving the tension between theory and practice latent in Mencius’s account of ba dao. Its central claim is that contra Mencius who remained torn between his ideal political theory of ba dao and the practical utility and moral value of ba dao, Xunzi creatively re-appropriated ba dao as a “morally decent” (if not morally ideal) statecraft, within the parameter of practical Confucian philosophy. After examining the moral and political value of ba dao in both domestic and international governance, the essay concludes by arguing that Xunzi’s defense of ba dao should be understood in the context of what I call “negative Confucianism,” without which the realization of the Confucian moral-political ideal (or positive Confucianism) is impossible.     

Xunzi on Moral Expertise

This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi??s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another??s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?     

社会建构论心理学对维果茨基思想的继承和发展

维果茨基理论为社会建构论的产生与发展奠定了基础,社会建构论从维果茨基思想中汲取了丰富的营养,并从多方面丰富发展了维果茨基的社会建构思想。社会建构论心理学沿袭了维果茨基的反叛精神,继承并发展了维果茨基倡导的认识论和发展观,借鉴了维果茨基提出的工具论和方法论,对现代心理学的基本预设进行了根本性动摇和冲击     

Before and after Ritual: Two Accounts of Li as Virtue in Early Confucianism

In this article, I probe the nature of Confucian virtue with special focus on ritual propriety (li). I examine two classic, mutually competing accounts of li??as moral virtue and as civic virtue??in early Confucianism by investigating the thoughts of Mencius and Xunzi. My primary aim in this article is to demonstrate how their different accounts of human nature and equally different understandings of the natural state (that is, the pre-li state) led them to the development of two distinctive political theories of virtue in the Confucian tradition. More specifically, they justified the nature of the li on different terms??human/moral on the one hand and civic/political on the other. I conclude by revisiting the contemporary debate on the nature of Confucian ethics from the perspective of early Confucianism represented by Mencius and Xunzi.     

Artifice and virtue in the<Emphasis Type="Italic">Xunzi</Emphasis>

Xunzi was chronologically the third of the three great Confucian thinkers of China’s classical period, after Confucius and Mencius. Having produced the most comprehensive philosophical system of that period, he occupies a place in the development of Chinese philosophy comparable to that of Aristotle in the Western philosophical tradition. This essay reveals how Xunzi’s understanding of virtue and moral development dovetailed with his positions on ritual propriety, the attunement of names, the relation betweenli (patterns) andlei (categories), and his view ofdao (the way) in general. I have argued for a “constructivist” understanding of each of these aspects of Xunzi’s philosophy in some detail elsewhere (see Hagen 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), and so here I will just briefly review a few key points before addressing their relation to moral development.     

Mediated mutual reciprocity in the process of African children’s social ontogenesis

The paper highlights Nsamenang’s social ontogenesis theoretical stance in explaining how participatory pedagogies in socialisation impact not only development but children’s capacity to assume responsibilities for their own development. A synoptic review is presented of widely discussed challenges faced by African children, under the headings of redefining the African personhood and process of child development, poverty and malnutrition, changes in educational systems and poor access to quality education, child labour versus productive participation in the household economy, conflict and war, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and access to health care. Research evidence from Cameroon suggests that despite the challenges and adversities faced by these children, their ingenuity, resilience and cultural assets play an important role in mediating positive outcomes. Building on and expanding Nsamenang’s Africentric perspective on the sustaining power of African indigenous education processes, the paper presents a complementary theory of Mediated Mutual Reciprocity (MMR) that explains how children and learners are the main drivers of the learning process.     

Xunzi Versus Zhuangzi: Two Approaches to Death in Classical Chinese Thought

The contrasting approaches to death and bereavement in classical Confucianism and Daoism epitomize the different orientations of the two ethical traditions. Confucianism, here represented by Xunzi, interprets and manages death and bereavement through distinctive cultural practices, specifically rituals and associated norms of propriety, which are intended to bring order, harmony, and beauty to human events and conduct. Daoism, here represented by the Zhuangzi, contextualizes and copes with death and loss through an understanding of and identification with natural processes. Both approaches address death and bereavement through a systematic, naturalistic philosophy of life that makes no appeal to a conception of divinity or a personal afterlife. For Xunzi, the heart of this system is ritual propriety, through which all human affairs—including inevitable, natural events such as death—must be mediated. For the Zhuangzi, by contrast, rigid, ritualized cultural forms are an obstacle to coping efficiently with natural processes such as death. Rather than constructing a sphere of “the human” as distinct from “the natural,” the Zhuangzi urges us to situate the human within nature in a way that removes the opposition between the two. This essay contrasts and critiques the two approaches, contending that although Xunzi’s theory of ritual presents a plausible account of the relation between humanity, culture, and nature, it fails to address death appropriately as an inexorable, natural event. By contrast, the Zhuangzi presents an attractive way of relating human life and death to nature and thus perhaps offers a means of finding solace concerning death. The essay suggests, however, that the Zhuangist stance may be grounded primarily in a certain ethical or aesthetic attitude, rather than in an objectively compelling argument. Ultimately, both approaches may rest as much on contrasting ethical and aesthetic sensibilities as on rational argumentation.     

Li (Ritual/Rite) and Tian (Heaven/Nature) in the Xunzi: Does Confucian li need metaphysics?

Ritual (li) is central to Confucian ethics and political philosophy. Robert Neville believes that Chinese Philosophy has an important role to play in our times by bringing ritual theory to the analysis of global moral and political issues. In a recent work, Neville maintains that ritual ??needs a contemporary metaphysical expression if its importance is to be seen.?? This paper examines Neville's claim through a detailed study of the ??ethics of ritual?? in one of the early Confucian texts, the Xunzi. This text has sometimes been read as offering a form of naturalism in its discussions of ??heaven (tian)?? as analogous to Western, even modern, concept of ??nature,?? while other interpreters insist that tian is a normative notion. Does this concept of tian offer a metaphysical ground for ethics of ritual advocated in the text? If so, what kind of metaphysics is it? Does Confucian ritual ethics need any metaphysical grounding? There is no specific metaphysical theory in the Xunzi and passages which could be referring to or implying metaphysical assumptions are open to hermeneutical debates. Even if metaphysical assumptions are necessary or beneficial to an ethics of ritual, the paper argues that the ??metaphysical flexibility?? of the text could work to its advantage in remaining relevant in contemporary context. The conclusion explores some possible directions for further exploring the metaphysics of ritual in a modern understanding of Xunzi.     

The Boundaries of Manners: Ritual and Etiquette in Early Confucianism and Stohr’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">On Manners</Emphasis>

Early Confucian philosophy affirms and lends support to Karen Stohr’s argument that manners are a primary means by which we express moral attitudes and commitments and carry out important moral goals. Indeed, Confucian views on ritual can extend her insights even further, both by highlighting the role that manners play in cultivating good character and by helping us to probe the conceptual boundaries of manners. The various things that we call etiquette, social customs, and rituals (all of which the Confucians saw as expressions of li 禮 “ritual”) do much of the same work for us, ethically, and this work not only expresses moral attitudes and commitments, but cultivates them as well. Accordingly, Confucian thinkers can help us to recognize how Stohr’s argument can be applied more broadly than etiquette, and how good manners both express and cultivate good character.     

Spiritual development: understanding and importance in schools: an analysis based on statements made by school directors from Valparaíso,Chile

Chile’s General Law of Education states that one of the purposes of education is the spiritual development of all its schooled population. Furthermore, guidelines in Chile’s education system place school directors as key players in student’s learning. This article presents the results of a research involving school directors from Valparaíso, Chile. The aim of this research was to identify how directors of secular and religious schools understand their students’ spiritual development. We studied this aspect in particular through semi-structured interviews conducted with 20 participants. Results show that directors understand spirituality as a typically human ability that can be strengthened in schools and, thus, they believe it to be highly important in schools. In addition, they see a strong relation between spiritual development and ethical and moral development. This study also shows differences in how secular and religious schools’ directors understand this relation. This opens the way for more in-depth analysis regarding spiritual development in Chile’s education system, especially considering that directors generally believe it to be a part of a holistic and quality education.     

A Spinozistic Model of Moral Education

Spinoza’s claim that self-preservation is the foundation of virtue makes for the point of departure of this philosophical investigation into what a Spinozistic model of moral education might look like. It is argued that Spinoza’s metaphysics places constraints on moral education insofar as an educational account would be affected by Spinoza’s denial of the objectivity of moral knowledge, his denial of the existence of free will, and of moral responsibility. This article discusses these challenges in some detail, seeking to construe a credible account of moral education based on the insight that self-preservation is not at odds with benevolence, but that the self-preservation of the teacher is instead conditioned by the intellectual deliberation of the students. However, it is also concluded that while benevolence retains an important place in Spinoza’s ethics, his causal determinism poses a severe threat to a convincing account of moral education insofar as moral education is commonly understood to involve an effort to influence the actions of students relative to some desirable goal.     

Zhi and Neng belong to mind: a study of the capacity to be good in the mind of Xunzi

ABSTRACT

The mainstream of academia thinks that Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which claims that human nature is bad, is in contrast with those of Confucius and Mencius and is unable to provide a foundation for human moral subjectivity. However, there are more and more scholars bringing up different ideas, such as Lu Debin and Fung Yiuming. They think that Xunzi’s wei 偽 (artifice), which includes zhi知 (knowing) and neng 能 (capacity), is a kind of inborn capacity to think and activate that belongs to xing. This paper points out that zhi and neng belong to xin 心 (mind) rather than xing. In the text of Xunzi, xing is mainly regarded as human emotions and desires which would result in chaos if not controlled. Making zhi and neng belong to xing does not accord with Xunzi’s theory and will confuse people with the connotation of Xunzi’s xing.     

Beyond sympathy: Smith’s rejection of Hume’s moral theory

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations (as Smith thought it to be) has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory.     

Piaget and Vygotsky: Many resemblances,and a crucial difference

Piaget and Vygotsky are two influential developmental psychologists. One can even say that their contributions to developmental psychology, albeit different, are similarly remarkable and unique. This article is in four parts. In the first part, I refer briefly to a commonly noticed difference between Vygotsky’s and Piaget’s theories. In the second part, I show that there are many resemblances between Vygotsky and Piaget. In the third part, I argue that in spite of such resemblances, there exists a crucial, and generally unnoticed, difference between Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s theories, and that this difference underlies the way each author addresses the following issues: 1) the origins of development and the motor of development; 2) the relationships among equal peers vs. those based on authorities, as they are sources of development and learning; 3) the more appropriate methods for studying developmental changes; 4) the importance of the distinction between true vs. necessary knowledge; and 5) the role of transformation and personal reconstruction vs. that of transmission and social influence in the phenomena of development and learning. Finally, I summarize the main ideas and arguments which I elaborate throughout this article, and mention what can be gained when the generally ignored aforementioned difference is noticed.