Fragmentation in the Field—and the Movement Toward Integration in Communication Science

Two aspects of disciplinary identity are addressed in this essay: (1) Who are we, members of one discipline or a loose confederation of scholars who each have some claim to the word communication; and (2) are we (whoever we are) becoming respectable members of the academic community? The first of these issues is examined in terms of the institutional history of communication. The various forces that contributed to a fragmentation of the discipline are discussed. Evidence that a clear disciplinary identity or “self-concept” is emerging in terms of a social science of communication is presented. This identity differentiates the emerging discipline from its various predecessors, including speech and journalism. While there is less evidence to be brought to bear on the second issue, what evidence there is indicates that respectability (and disciplinary maturity) is increasing, but that there is still much progress to be made.     

The grand reversal: On the corso and ricorso of human way of life

The rapidly emerging pattern of globally interconnected society is characterized by the transition from labor to knowledge as a major new form of capital. The underlying cause of this momentous transformation is the powerful process of reintegration of all previously deintegrated, atomized or specialized ways. After an outswing (corso) of progressive specialization we are encountering (first time in human history) the beginning of a rebound (ricorso) towards the final integration.

We study three basic historical divisions which have now exhausted their progressive potential: (1) Division of task is being replaced by the reintegration of task; this is manifested by rapidly declining number of separate parts in our products. (2) Division of labor is being replaced by the reintegration of labor; this is manifested by the narrowing of the gap between producer and consumer, ultimately leading towards widespread self‐production and self‐service of products. (3) Division of knowledge is being replaced by the reintegration of knowledge; this is manifested by declining hierarchies, multifunctionality and self‐management and narrowing of the gap between employees and owners of enterprises.

The implications of these reintegrative processes affect not only the economic, social and political dimensions of the emerging society, but the very way of life of humans on this planet.     

Parenting,corpus callosum,and executive function in preschool children

In this longitudinal population-based study (N?=?544), we investigated whether early parenting and corpus callosum length predict child executive function abilities at 4 years of age. The length of the corpus callosum in infancy was measured using postnatal cranial ultrasounds at 6 weeks of age. At 3 years, two aspects of parenting were observed: maternal sensitivity during a teaching task and maternal discipline style during a discipline task. Parents rated executive function problems at 4 years of age in five domains of inhibition, shifting, emotional control, working memory, and planning/organizing, using the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function-Preschool Version. Maternal sensitivity predicted less executive function problems at preschool age. A significant interaction was found between corpus callosum length in infancy and maternal use of positive discipline to determine child inhibition problems: The association between a relatively shorter corpus callosum in infancy and child inhibition problems was reduced in children who experienced more positive discipline. Our results point to the buffering potential of positive parenting for children with biological vulnerability.     

The Five “A”s of Meaning Maintenance: Finding Meaning in the Theories of Sense-Making

Across eras and literatures, multiple theories have converged on a broad psychological phenomenon: the common compensation behaviors that follow from violations of our committed understandings. The meaning maintenance model (MMM) offers an integrated account of these behaviors, as well as the overlapping perspectives that address specific aspects of this inconsistency compensation process. According to the MMM, all meaning violations may bottleneck at neurocognitive and psychophysiological systems that detect and react to the experience of inconsistency, which in turn motivates compensatory behaviors. From this perspective, compensation behaviors are understood as palliative efforts to relieve the aversive arousal that follows from any experience that is inconsistent with expected relationships—whether the meaning violation involves a perceptual anomaly or an awareness of a finite human existence. In what follows, we summarize these efforts, the assimilation, accommodation, affirmation, abstraction and assembly behaviors that variously manifest in every corner of our discipline, and academics, more generally.     

Morality,reasoning and upbringing

This paper examines the relationship between morality and reasoning in a general sense. Following a broadly Aristotelian framework, it is shown that reasoning well about morality requires good character and a grounding in virtue and experience. Topic neutral ‘critical thinking’ on its own is not enough and may even be detrimental to morality. This has important consequences both for philosophy and for education. While morality is objective and universal, it should not be seen purely in terms of the intellectual grasp of true propositions. As Simone Weil shows, it emerges from very basic aspects of our nature. As well as reasoning in an abstract sense we need what Pascal calls esprit de finesse based in our humanity as a whole, in sens, raison et coeur. The paper concludes with some reflections on our propensity to fail morally and on the relationship between virtue and happiness.     

Knowledge,context, and social standards

This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc.A shorter version of this paper, entitled Knowledge and Context, was presented as a symposium at the 1986 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association and appeared in the Journal of Philosophy 83 (October 1986) 574-83. Because of space limitations, much of the material in sections 1 and 2 of this longer version was compressed into footnotes. Section 3 and many of the footnotes were deleted entirely and the argument of section 5 was presented in a condensed form. I am grateful to Frederick Schmitt and the editors of Synthese for the opportunity to present the paper in its original form.     

Tradition and Reason: Two Uses of Reason, Critical and Contemplative

Abstract: Reason, as it is proper to the task of theology, has two uses: critical and contemplative. This twofold appropriation of reason sets the stage for this article, a stage occupied in turn by Newman and by Aquinas. The critical function of theological work is expressed via the 1877 preface which Newman wrote for his Lectures on the Prophetic Office of the Church. The critical office of theology is vital not only to the practice of theology itself but to the liturgical and spiritual life of the church, and to the exercise of church leadership if that leadership is not to descend into tyranny. For the theologian, reason is not antithetical to contemplation; rather, contemplation includes a form of reasoning. Theology is ‘a schooling in the discipline of contemplating the self‐revealing God’, a discipline of ‘metaphysical ascesis’ which compels both intellectual conversion and moral practice. Such an ascesis was practised well by Aquinas, and Kerr reflects on the Summa Theologiae as ‘a training in a form of metaphysical reasoning’, being schooled in the knowledge of God which strips away our ‘idolatorous inclinations’.     

American psychology,and the needs for transcendence and community

In this its centennial year the American Psychological Association has reason to take satisfaction from its past accomplishments. However, as psychologists we know that our view of our history has some self-serving aspects. There have been some errors of commission and omission. In this paper one of those errors of omission is discussed: the significance of religion, especially of the fundamentalist variety, for understanding the modern psyche. This omission is viewed from a historical perspective in which the relationship between the needs for transcendence and community underwent a fracturing that has had troublesome consequences both for religious and nonreligious people. The nature of those needs are illustrated in the ideas and writings of two people separated by 2500 years: Socrates and B. F. Skinner. This paper was delivered by Professor Sarason as an invited address to the American Psychological Association in celebration of it centennial in Washington DC, August 1992. The editor is particularly pleased that Dr. Sarason chose to publish his address in this journal.     

Social laws in alternating time: effectiveness,feasibility, and synthesis

Since it was first proposed by Moses, Shoham, and Tennenholtz, the social laws paradigm has proved to be one of the most compelling approaches to the offline coordination of multiagent systems. In this paper, we make four key contributions to the theory and practice of social laws in multiagent systems. First, we show that the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (atl) of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman provides an elegant and powerful framework within which to express and understand social laws for multiagent systems. Second, we show that the effectiveness, feasibility, and synthesis problems for social laws may naturally be framed as atl model checking problems, and that as a consequence, existing atl model checkers may be applied to these problems. Third, we show that the complexity of the feasibility problem in our framework is no more complex in the general case than that of the corresponding problem in the Shoham–Tennenholtz framework (it is np-complete). Finally, we show how our basic framework can easily be extended to permit social laws in which constraints on the legality or otherwise of some action may be explicitly required. We illustrate the concepts and techniques developed by means of a running example. This paper was presented at the Social Software conference in May 2004, Copenhagen, organised by PHILOG. We thank the organisers for providing the opportunity, and the participants for their useful feedback.     

Rationality,function, and content

Conclusions To summarize, in order for rational agents to be able to engage in the sophisticated kinds of reasoning exemplified by human beings, they must be able to introspect much of their cognition. The problem of other minds and the problem of knowing the mental states of others will arise automatically for any rational agent that is able to introspect its own cognition. The most that a rational agent can reasonably believe about other rational agents is that they have rational architectures similar to its own, and that they have thoughts related to their rational architectures in certain ways. This leads to Rational Functionalism as an account of what it is to be a cognizer having mental states. That in turn entails that a computer can be a person in precisely the same sense as my next door neighbor if it can appropriately mimic my rational architecture. There is nothing I could know about my neighbor that I could not believe with equal justification about the computer. Rational Functionalism also makes it reasonable to define the narrow content of a thought to be its overall place in the agent's rational architecture, that is, its conceptual role. This is, however, avery narrow notion of content. For practical purposes, we are not interested in knowing the narrow contents of other people's thoughts. We are only interested in rather general properties of those narrow contents. This is what is expressed by the use ofthat-clauses in public language.This is a reply to the comments by Stephen Schiffer and Robert Cummins on my bookHow to Build a Person (Bradford/MIT Press, 1989). These papers were presented at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco, March, 1991. Cummins paper appears in this volume, and Schiffer's paper will appear inPhilosophy and Phenomenlogical Research.     

Modelling argumentation and modelling with argumentation

This paper discusses the epistemological and methodological bases of a scientific theory of meaning and proposes a detailed version of a formal theory of argumentation based on Anscombre and Ducrot's conception. Argumentation is shown to be a concept which is not exclusively pragmatic, as it is usually believed, but has an important semantic body. The bridge between the semantic and pragmatic aspects of argumentation consists in a set of gradual inference rules, called topoi, on which the argumentative movement is based. The content of each topos is determined at the pragmatic level, while the constraints on the forms of the topoi attached to a sentence are determined at the semantic level. Applications and possible applications toartificial intelligence and to cognitive sciences are discussed. In particular, the gradual models used to account for argumentation are shown to be extremely promising for Knowledge management, a discipline which includes knowledge acquisition, knowledge representation, transmission of knowledge (communication, interfaces, etc.), knowledge production (decision help, reasoning, etc.). A first formal model is presented and discussed: it is shown in details how it accounts for most of the argumentative features of sentences containing but, little and a little, and how it can be extended to describe sentences containing other argumentative connectives. However, this model is shown to be too simple and to violate the compositionality principle, which is shown, in the first section, to bean important methodological principle for any scientific theory. After a detailed analysis of the possible reasons for this violation, an improved model is proposed and its adequacy is discussed.     

On the Dissemination of Clinical Experiences in Using Empirically Supported Treatments

This article addresses the long-standing gap that has existed between psychotherapy research and practice and the efforts that have been made to bridge it. It also introduces one such effort, which has consisted of 3 clinical surveys on the experiences of practitioners in using empirically supported treatments for panic disorder, social anxiety, and OCD. In contrast to attempts to close the gap by disseminating research findings to the clinician, the clinical surveys are intended to allow for practitioners to disseminate their clinical experiences to the researcher—and also to other clinicians. What we view as a “two-way bridge” initiative is a collaboration between the Society of Clinical Psychology, Division 12 of the APA, and the Psychotherapy Division of the APA—Division 29. The mechanism that has been established provides a way for clinicians to be a part of the research process, which we hope will provide evidence that can help to enhance our clinical effectiveness.     

A classification scheme for discipline: type, mode of administration, context

This paper reviews research related to parental disciplinary practices and presents a classification scheme discipline that separates discipline into the type and the mode of administration used. Previous research has not kept important constructs related to discipline distinct and has ignored some types of discipline, as well as the mode of administration. The classification scheme presented is meant to try to foster conceptual clarity, to advocate for attention to important aspects of disciplinary practices in future research, and to lay the groundwork for development of additional measurement tools — particularly for survey design research.     

Scientific Progress,Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park

Dellsén (2016) has recently argued for an understanding-based account of scientific progress, the noetic account, according to which science (or a particular scientific discipline) makes cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. I contrast this account with Bird’s (2007, 2015); epistemic account, according to which such progress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park (2017) criticizes various aspects of my account and his arguments in favor of the noetic account as against Bird’s epistemic account. This paper responds to Park’s objections. An important upshot of the paper is that we should distinguish between episodes that constitute and promote scientific progress, and evaluate account of scientific progress in terms of how they classify different episodes with respect to these categories.     

Belief and contextual acceptance

I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance, which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framework, I discuss how agents can rationally shift their credal probability functions so as to consciously modify some of their contextual acceptances; the present account also allows us to represent how the very set of contexts evolves. Voluntary credal shifts, in turn, might provoke changes in the agent’s beliefs, but I show that this is actually a side effect of performing multiple adjustments in the total lot of the agent’s acceptance sets. In this way we obtain a model that preserves many pre-theoretical intuitions about what counts as adequate rationality constraints on our actual practices—and hence about what counts as an adequate, normative epistemological perspective.     

Categorization behaviour in adults,adolescents, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder adolescents: A comparative investigation

Although significant progress has been made with respect to our understanding of categorization and concept learning behaviour in adults, much less is known about how this key capacity plays out with respect to more restrictive populations. This is unfortunate because much may be revealed about the nature of concept learning by examining the limits exhibited by special populations. With this tenet in mind, in what follows, we investigated key aspects of concept learning in terms of the unexplored comparative performance of three populations—adults, adolescents, and adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). To do so, we employed a novel parainformative experimental task involving categorical stimuli with four objects defined over three dimensions. The learning difficulty ordering for these types of three-dimensional stimuli has proven robust and has been replicated by several researchers. Indeed, in our experiment, we observed the same concept learning ordering in adults and adolescents, but not in ADHD adolescents: For example, the latter group showed greatly impaired categorization performance on stimuli characterized by an “exclusive-or” rule. However, categorization performance on such type of stimuli indicated good reliability in discriminating between adolescents with and without ADHD (receiver-operating characteristic, ROC?=?.82). We accurately predicted and accounted for these results using generalized invariance structure theory (GIST; Vigo, 2013. The GIST of concepts. Cognition, 129, 138–162), which posits that organisms detect invariance patterns in stimuli that are necessary precursors to concept formation.     

Lost in the great divide: Motivation in religious studies classrooms

One of the most illuminating finds in Barbara E. Walvoord's Teaching and Learning in College Introductory Religion Courses (2008) is what she calls “the great divide,” a mismatch between instructors’ goals for their courses, which are academic, and the students’ reasons for taking them, which relate to their personal interests and development. Motivation – or, rather, the lack thereof – is not explicitly considered as a potential victim of this mismatch. This article will turn its attention squarely to this issue. First, I will review data about the “great divide” and link them to the common practice of asking our students to bracket the personal when they take our courses. The article will juxtapose this practice with what research tell us about motivation, which will allow us to further explore why the divide Walvoord and others have identified is so problematic. The article will conclude with pedagogical strategies that can help instructors intentionally influence motivation in religion courses. Ultimately, I suggest that we may be doing students – as well as ourselves, as the purveyors of our discipline – a disservice, if we do not attend to (or, worse, if we actively avoid) what we know motivates students to learn.     

Kelly,bannister, and a storytelling psychology

A perspective on psychology as a story-telling discipline (Mair, 1988) is elaborated. It is suggested that both Kelly and Bannister can be seen as moving between relatively traditional psychological approaches and a more clearly narrative understanding of psychology. Ways in which work in linguistics, literary criticism, rhetoric, and related disciplines is relevant to such a view are indicated. Further important issues in a story-telling approach to psychology are sketched.     

Redefining Creativity — Analyzing Definitions,Collocations, and Consequences

How holistically is human creativity defined, investigated, and understood? Until recently, most scientific research on creativity has focused on its positive side. However, creativity might not only be a desirable resource but also be a potential threat. In order to redefine creativity we need to analyze and understand definitions, collocations, and consequences of creativity. In this paper, we reviewed 42 explicit definitions and 120 collocations. The thematic analysis of our data reveals that the vast majority of creativity definitions do not emphasize the positive/negative aspects of the concept. Neither are the negative aspects of creativity emphasized in its numerous collocations. Thus, we propose a comprehensive definition of creativity and a three‐dimensional analytical framework for investigating its consequences, positive and/or negative. Finally, we highlight the need to move to a new era of conscientious creativity, in which all humans are considered able and wise enough to create something ethical and constructive for everyone in society.