社会价值取向和反馈方式对公共物品困境中决策行为的影响

本研究通过模拟投资实验和问卷来探讨重复型公共物品困境中社会价值取向（SVO）与信息反馈方式对决策行为的影响。结果表明：(1)合作型SVO的个体比非合作型个体表现出更多的合作行为;(2)SVO与信息反馈方式的交互作用岁实验轮次越来越显著,非合作型的个体会受信息反馈方式的影响,而合作型个体则不易受反馈方式的影响;(3)与无反馈的条件相比,集体反馈倾向于促进个体的合作行为,个体反馈倾向于抑制合作行为,但反馈所造成的适应性改变使情况更为复杂。     

Sequential Choice in a Step-Level Public Goods Dilemma: The Effects of Criticality and Uncertainty

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group or organization are faced with a conflict between two choices: maximize personal interests (defection) or maximize collective interests (cooperation). It is generally more profitable to defect, but if all do so, all are worse off than if all choose to cooperate. Previous research indicate that criticality and uncertainty affect the likelihood of cooperation. The more a member perceives that her choice is critical (has a significant impact on the outcome), the greater the likelihood of cooperation; conversely, the greater the uncertainty about the outcome, the lower the likelihood of cooperation. A sequential social dilemma paradigm was developed to manipulate criticality and uncertainty systematically. Using college students as subjects, two experiments were conducted. In both experiments (based on four- and six-person groups), criticality interacted with uncertainty: When criticality was high, cooperation decreased with uncertainty; but when criticality was low, there was a slight increase of cooperation rates with uncertainty. Several hypotheses are proposed to explain these results.     

Adaptive aspirations and contributions to a public good: Generic advertising as a response to decline

Generic advertising, the promotion of an entire product or service category, is a common form of inter-firm cooperation. Voluntary participation in such a campaign represents contribution to a public good. Based on the pattern of recent campaigns, we argue that this cooperation is dependent on adaptive aspirations and an increased willingness to consider alternative courses of action in light of declining sales within an industry. Three experiments are reported that tested these ideas. In each study, subjects assigned to four person groups chose how many resources to contribute to a generic advertising campaign the effectiveness of which depended on total funding levels. Each group member represented a different “store” in the same mall. The instructions framed the problem by presenting varying sales trends for the stores—Positive, Negative, or Neutral. The first two experiments were one-shot games with a dominant strategy of non-contribution and free riding. The results showed that subjects confronting the declining trend contributed significantly more than those in either of the other two conditions. A declining sales trend also positively influenced their expectations that others would contribute as well. The third experiment demonstrated that a decline-induced equilibrium persisted over trials of a finitely repeated game with a known stopping point. Contributions remained high even in the final round. Surprisingly, the specific identification of a competitor mall as the cause of the decline in sales actually resulted in lower levels of contribution. The implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma

This paper examines a model of the prisoner's dilemma in which the nature of the Nash equilibria of the game can be varied. Two equilibrium indices are derived and are compared with two cooperation indices proposed by Rapoport and Chammah (1965). Preliminary experimental results indicate that the nature of the equilibria of a game affect the amount of cooperation.     

Productive conflict in group decision making: genuine and contrived dissent as strategies to counteract biased information seeking

Decision-making groups in organizations are often expected to function as a “think tank” and to perform “reality testing” to detect the best alternative. A biased search for information supporting the group's favored alternative impairs a group's ability to fulfill these requirements. In a two-factorial experiment with 201 employees and managers from various economic and public organizations, genuine and contrived dissent were investigated as counterstrategies to biased information seeking. Genuine dissent was manipulated by forming three-person groups whose members either all favored the same alternative individually (homogeneous groups) or consisted of a minority and a majority faction with regard to their favored alternative (heterogeneous groups). Contrived dissent was varied by the use or nonuse of the “devil's advocacy” technique. The results demonstrate that heterogeneity was more effective in preventing a confirmatory information-seeking bias than devil's advocacy was. Confidence was identified as an important mediator. Implications for the design of interventions aimed at facilitating reality testing in group decision making are discussed.     

Proportional reasoning,framing effects,and affirmative action: Is six of one really half a dozen of another in university admissions?

People often reason proportionally, perceiving fixed outcomes as larger or smaller depending upon the reference condition. Thus, for policies affecting individuals, presenting data as percentages rather than frequencies can alter perceived effects on high versus low base rate group members, even though identical numbers of individuals in each group are affected. Such numerical framing effects were explored through a case analysis of public debates over race-conscious selection policies and through experimental manipulations employing a race-conscious university admissions scenario. Undergraduates (N = 193) received data reporting the expected impact on black and white student enrollment resulting from a university shift to race-neutral admissions. Compared to those encountering percentages or proportions, participants receiving identical information expressed as frequencies revealed a predicted greater preference for race-neutral or “race blind” admissions. Structural equation analysis supported a model in which perceived impact and fairness mediated the relationship between format and endorsement of race-neutral admissions.     

Group discussion and first advocacy effects in computer-mediated and face-to-face decision making groups

This study examines whether the first group member to advocate a position in the group publically has disproportionate influence on the group decision, and whether group discussion by computer mail or face-to-face determines the extent of the first advocate's influence. Possible explanations of first advocacy influence were tested in an experiment that allowed simultaneous observation of three independent variables: (1) assignment of first advocate (self-selected/randomly assigned), (2) early discussion before advocacy (discussion/no discussion), and (3) mode of communication (face-to-face/electronic mail). It was assumed that a first advocate effect exists if the group choice is closer to the first advocates' stated positions than to the group's average pregroup preferences. An “influence” hypothesis predicts that first advocates who self-select will be closer to the group decision than average pregroup preferences because these are first advocates most likely to persuade other members of the group. A “listening” hypothesis predicts that first advocates who hear an early group discussion will be closer to the group decision than average pregroup preferences because these first advocates are able to anticipate the group decision as a result of listening to what is communicated in group discussion. The results indicated strong support for the “listening” hypothesis. When groups held early discussions before someone advocated a position, the first advocate effect was observed; when groups did not hold early discussions but began their task by having someone advocate a position, there was no first advocate effect. The data suggest that the content and tone of electronic group discussions was qualitatively different from face-to-face group discussions, but the process of group decision making in both conditions was about the same. The implications of these results for group discussion and computer-mediated group decision making in organizations are discussed.     

When the rich contribute more in public good dilemmas: the role of provision point level

The present research examined the effects of endowment size, provision point level and the opportunity to voice one's opinion on contributions in asymmetric public good dilemmas. Results from a first experiment showed that group members endowed with more resources contributed more when the required threshold for obtaining a public good was high rather than low. ‘Rich’ participants who reported that their personal contribution was more critical for success contributed more. However, most groups failed to surpass the high provision point threshold level. Results from a second experiment reveal that ‘rich’ participants given voice, contributed more than ‘rich’ participants not given a voice. Voice contributed to greater feelings of inclusiveness, higher contributions and increased the likelihood that the group surpassed the high provision point level. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Working Together but in Opposition: An Examination of the "Good-Cop/Bad-Cop" Negotiating Team Tactic

Unlike solo negotiators, members of negotiating teams may for strategic reasons choose to play different roles; the familiar “good cop/bad cop” distributive bargaining tactic is one example of role differentiation designed to enhance a team's success at the bargaining table. In two empirical studies about a hypothetical three-person work group, we examined the cognitive processes underlying this tactic using a social-cognitive decision model (Brodt & Duncan, 1998) that conceptualizes the negotiators' decision tasks and persuasion processes. Results generally supported the model except for an intriguing asymmetry depending on a person's initial inclination (accepting, rejecting). This research extends findings on the tactic and on contrast effects (Cialdini, 1984) and supports the model's usefulness as an approximate representation of negotiator cognition.     

Why and when justice sensitivity leads to pro- and antisocial behavior

People differ in how injustice-sensitive they are either as victims or as observers. Whereas observer sensitivity is positively related to cooperative behavior, victim sensitivity promotes antisocial and egoistic behavior. The present article investigates the dynamics underlying these effects. Participants played an online-based public goods game and were informed about the number of people who violated a fairness rule in previous rounds of the game (no, some, or many violators). High victim-sensitive participants contributed less to the public good even in the “some violators” condition. High observer-sensitive participants contributed more to the public good even in the “many violators” condition. The findings correspond with the sensitivity to mean intentions model and cannot be explained by individual differences in general trust.     

The Group-Based Binding Pledge as a Solution to Public Goods Problems

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between two choices: maximizing personal interests (defection) or maximizing collective interests (cooperation). It is generally more profitable to defect, but if all do so, all are worse off than if all choose to cooperate. A public goods dilemma is a special case of a social dilemma in which people must contribute resources to provide a public good. Communication, especially face-to-face discussion, has been shown to be effective in facilitating cooperation in such situations, including asking members to make a pledge to contribute (cooperate). The purpose of this study was to evaluate some explanations for the effectiveness of a pledge in enhancing cooperation. Two hundred and fifty-six undergraduate students (in groups of four subjects) were asked to make choices in a public goods dilemma. The results suggest that a pledge is effective in enhancing cooperation because it induces group identity and the perception of criticality. It is suggested that when face-to-face discussion is not feasible, a pledge system may be effective in solving real life social dilemmas.     

Some foundations and directions for applied developmental psychology

Applied developmental psychology (ADP) is an “umbrella” discipline which includes a range of psychological sciences and professions committed to use of the data base and methods of developmental psychology to address problems in education, health, human services and public policy. ADP emerges now as a manifestation of increasing recognition of the limits of developmental psychology's traditional models and paradigms, increasing recognition of our appropriate role in social problem-solving and public policy formation and an employment market which reflects these awarenesses. Consideration of clinical psychology as an ADP provides examples of synergies and distinctions helpful in defining ADP. The “linkage” concept inherent in a “scientist-practitioner” model is emphasized as a key in this definition and as a basis for designing appropriate doctoral training programs in ADP.     

Incremental Contribution in Step-Level Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players

We consider public good games with asymmetric players in which players are assigned different endowments and must then decide privately how much to contribute to the group′s benefit. Each member receives a fixed reward-regardless of the magnitude of his/her contribution-if the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than an exogenously determined provision threshold and zero otherwise. The results show that (1) heterogeneous groups are less successful in providing public goods than homogeneous groups; (2) group members contribute the same proportion of their endowment regardless of its magnitude; (3) the distribution of endowments and the provision threshold interact; and (4) some subjects adhere to an equity principle, others maximize expected utility, and yet others do not subscribe to either of these two models.     

Formalising the informal?: Dynamic social order, bottom-up social control, and spontaneous normative relations

The right framework for studying normative issues in infosociety and MAS is that of deliberate or spontaneous social order, and intended or unintended, centralised or decentralised forms of social control. For effectively supporting human cooperation it is necessary to “incorporate” social and normative knowledge in intelligent technology; computers should deal with—and thus partially “understand”—permissions, obligations, power, roles, commitments, trust, etc. Here only one facet of this problem is considered: the spontaneous and decentralised norm creation, and normative monitoring and intervention. Cognitive aspects of spontaneous conventions, implicit commitments, tacit agreements, and the bottom-up issuing and spreading of norms are discussed. The transition from “face to face” normative relationships to some stronger constraints on agents' action, and to institutions and authority, and the possibility of a consequent increase of trust, are explored. In particular, I focus on the transition from two party trust, right, permission, and commitment, to three party relationships, where some witness or some enforcing authority is introduced. In this perspective of ‘formalising the informal’, i.e., the interpersonal unofficial normative matter, I discuss (also in order to stress dangers of computer-based formalisation and enforcement of rules) the important phenomenon of functional (collaborative) systematic violation of rules in organisation and cooperation, and the possible emergence of a “convention to violate”.     

Intergroup competition for the provision of step-level public goods: Effects of preplay communication

Thirty-two groups of three subjects each participated once in an intergroup public goods game (IPG) in which two groups compete for the provision of step-level public goods. Half of the groups were allowed to discuss the conflict before their members decided privately and anonymously whether to contribute their endowments to their group benefit, and half were not given this opportunity. The results show that preplay group discussion enhances the percentage of contributors and changes the players' estimates about the decisions of the other players. The theoretical implications of the results are examined within the framework of a new model which relates the individual decision to contribute or not to the reward structure, altruism, and the individual's belief structure.     

Cognitive Load and the Equality Heuristic: A Two-Stage Model of Resource Overconsumption in Small Groups

Two studies were conducted to test a two-stage model of the psychological mechanisms underlying the overconsumption of scarce resources in small groups. The model proposes that members of groups sharing resources first anchor their consumption choices on an “equal-division” heuristic and then, given sufficient cognitive capacity, adjust their choices in a self-serving direction. The results from both studies support the model. The first study found that when faced with a common resource pool almost all group members expressed thoughts regarding equality; however, individuals with sufficient cognitive capacity requested more from the pool and expressed more task-relevant thoughts than individuals lacking the necessary cognitive resources. The second study provided additional support for the two-stage model by demonstrating that group members' cognitions occur in the order predicted by the model and by demonstrating that an individual difference, social value orientation, affects thought processes only when individuals are not experiencing high cognitive loads. Implications are discussed.     

The Humpty Dumpty blues: Disaggregation bias in the evaluation of tax systems

Three experiments carried out on the World Wide Web assessed the consistency of attitudes toward various tax regimes that differed in their overall levels and degrees of tax rate graduation in the presence of framing manipulations. The regimes had two components: an income and a payroll tax. One frame involved aggregation. Subjects were asked either to design a single, global tax system or to vary one component of a tax system (payroll or income tax) with the other component held constant. The idea was to replicate the effects of income tax reform given a constant payroll tax system. Consistent with the experimental hypothesis—though not with “rational” decision making—subjects focused on the component they were asked to manipulate and did not respond fully to changes in the other component, across conditions, reflecting an under-adjustment bias as well as a framing effect. The results are akin to Thaler’s “mental account” model for personal financial behavior. A second manipulation involved a “metric” frame: whether putative tax burdens were given in dollars or percent terms. Once again consistent with the experimental hypothesis, subjects preferred higher rates of graduation when matters were stated in percent terms. The results point to the lability of public opinion about important questions of public finance, and they illustrate a specific category of biases concerning disaggregation.     

信任及其对公共财物两难博弈中合作行为影响

社会两难的行为动机研究认为,害怕和贪婪是人们选择不合作的原因。信任的心理学研究为社会两难的合作行为提供了另一种观点,即害怕被利用的背后实际上体现了博弈者对对方的信任的缺失。鉴于传统社会两难范式存在难以区分信任和合作两个因素的问题,本研究设计了“信任一合作”二阶段模拟实验,通过操作重复信托博弈中的信息反馈,研究虚拟多人信托博弈中初始信任和基于经验的信任对随后的公共财物两难博弈中合作行为的影响,结果发现：（1）初始信任对基于经验的信任的建立具有一定的积极影响,但是它对合作行为的作用远不如随后的基于经验的信任;（2）基于经验的信任水平高的被试在随后的公共财物两难博弈中也表现出较高的合作行为。     

The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma

We describe and empirically investigate a hybrid social dilemma that merges give-some and take-some dilemmas by allowing individuals to choose to either give or to take resources from a shared resource pool. Study 1 finds that (a) group size increases the inequality among group members and the likelihood of creating the public good, while reducing the amount of wasted resources; (b) larger bonuses increase provision rates; and (c) asymmetry in the wealth distribution of the group members induces higher levels of inequality of the final outcomes. Following the logic of appropriateness, players with high (low) endowments were more likely to give toward (take from) the shared resource. Study 2 finds that the tendency of the players with high (low) endowments to give (take) is amplified as the difference between endowment levels increased, and the players’ behavior is correlated with, and predictable from, independent judgments of what is perceived as appropriate.