《哲学通论》与黑格尔哲学

孙正聿教授的《哲学通论》是"一部专著性的教材",其专著性和教材性全都有赖于它在西方哲学史中有其根基;具体来说,《哲学通论》的哲学史底蕴主要来自德国古典哲学,特别是黑格尔哲学,体现在:整本《哲学通论》在其最主要的几个问题节点上都借助于黑格尔哲学来建构自身的思路和结构,从而使这本专著性教材与黑格尔哲学形成了深刻的内在理论关联。《哲学通论》最具创意也最有特色的三个思路是:作为哲学思维方式的"反思思想"维度,作为哲学核心问题的"思想客观性"问题,以及作为哲学历史演进的"本体论中介化"进程。这三个思路都是以黑格尔哲学为基础,并在与黑格尔的深度对话中建构发展起来的。     

从黑格尔的康德批判看黑格尔哲学

黑格尔对康德哲学的批判是理解黑格尔哲学的极好的入手处。黑格尔通过对康德哲学广泛而深入的批判,彰显了他自己哲学最主要的特征和贡献。黑格尔对康德哲学的批判涉及多个方面,其中最根本的目标是批判康德哲学的主观主义二元论,因为这种二元论反映了现代世界和人的种种严重分裂。黑格尔把康德哲学称为"主观观念论",把自己的哲学称为"绝对观念论";"绝对观念论"的目的就是要从根本上克服现代性造成的种种二元分裂。另外,对康德哲学的批判构成了黑格尔哲学的积极动力;他一直为人诟病的形而上学及其各个核心概念,只有在此背景下才能得到正确的理解。     

贺麟教授在纪念康德、黑格尔学术讨论会开幕式上的讲话(摘要)

我们今天在北京举行纪念康德《纯粹理性批判》出版200周年、黑格尔逝世150周年学术讨论会,这是我国外国哲学史界一次具有重要意义的学术会议。我们中华民族是一个富有哲学素养的民族,在古代就有过不少高水平的哲学家。同时我们也很敬仰对世界精神文明和理性的光明有卓越贡献的外国思想家,特别象康德、黑格尔这样伟大的哲学家。康德和黑格尔的著作丰富了人类的哲学思想宝库,研究他们的著作,可以促进我们对马克思主义三大来源之一的德国古典哲学的深入理解,并推动     

康德黑格尔的著作

今年是康德名著《纯粹理性批判》出版两百周年和黑格尔逝世一百五十周年。为了纪念哲学史上这两件大事,今年秋天我国有关方面将举行纪念活动。中国社科院哲学研究所西方哲学史研究室编的《论康德黑格尔哲学》,就是这个纪念活动的内容之一。该书收论文十七篇,从不同角度对康德黑格尔哲学作     

论理性和知性的辩证法

黑格尔十分赞赏康德把人的认识能力区分为以下三个环节:一、感性(Sinnlichkeit);二、知性(Verstand);三、理性(Vernunft)。黑格尔认为康德对知性和理性的区分是特别重要的。黑格尔甚至断言,这种区分正是由康德首次引进哲学中来的,因为“我们未发现以前的哲学家作过这种区分”。但这不完全正确,因为柏拉图曾作过类似的区分。关于这一点,黑格尔自己在《哲学史讲演录》一书中就曾提到过。在康德所作的知性和理性的区分中,黑格尔认为什么是重要的呢?这首先是,按照黑格     

辽宁省外国哲学学会召开会员大会

1981年12月25日至26日,辽宁省外国哲学学会在沈阳召开了会员大会。会上有关同志分别介绍了全国首次日本哲学和哲学史学术讨论会、全国中外比较哲学讨论会、纪念康德、黑格尔学术讨论会和第二次全国外国当代哲学学术讨论会的情况。与会同志讨论了当前外国哲学史研究和教学工作中的一些问题,讨论集中在异化与人道主义以及如何对待欧洲哲学史这两个问题上面。     

柏拉图“理念论”辨正──再论哲学的价值课题

这里所谓“再论”,是相应于已发表的拙文《康德哲学辨正》（载《哲学研究》1994年第4期）而言的。同是借着西方哲学史的话题对过分逻辑化或认识论化了的哲学思维作一种反省,本文更多地把意趣寓托于对“理念”的某种真际的抉发,而无意一一驳法关于柏拉图哲学的其他种种理解。一、“理念论”的初衷在柏拉图的“理念”被我们的哲学教科书和不少学者的著述一次又一次作为“共相”的绝对化作了批判后,这里试图对被批判的对象作另一种分辨。问题当然不在于对哲学史上这一著名范畴更多地赞誉还是更多地责备,而在于这一范畴的品评者们是否真正…     

“康德哲学的批判分析”简介

苏联亚美尼亚共和国国家出版社在1958年年底用俄文出版了哲学博士卡别江教授的一部长达三十余万言的新著“康德哲学的批制分析”。本书共分“导论”和九个专题。“导论”部分对康德哲学的时代背景和对康德哲学的各种评价怍了扼要的介绍,作者不但批判了康德哲学的反动方面,同时也对康德作了全面的估价,指出了康德反地旧形而上学的重要意义。其他九个专题是:康德哲学的社会根源和认识论根源;     

罗尔斯和康德思想渊源重探

从思想传记的角度看,对康德哲学的反思塑造了罗尔斯政治哲学的形成、转向和终局。学界对罗尔斯和康德思想渊源论题主要有“貌合神离说”和“近而远之说”两种观点,前者认为罗尔斯前期对其正义理论的康德式阐释是基于对康德的误读,后者认为罗尔斯后期政治理论致力于疏离康德学说。借鉴学界对康德实践哲学的新近研究会发现,“貌合神离说”误解了康德的道德心理学,而“近而远之说”则误解了康德法权论与其伦理学的关系。澄清这些误解之后会发现,罗尔斯和康德的思想实际上是一种渐近关系,即“行合趋同”。     

评“哲学史”第一卷

这里评介的这部著作是以—篇内容丰富的引论开始的,在这篇引论中探讨了几个根本性的方法论问题:哲学史的对象,哲学史的分期,马克思主义哲学史与各种唯心主义的哲学史概念的关系,马克思主义哲学史中的党性原则,哲学史这门科学的意义。确定科学的对象乃是一个极为重要的研究任务。确定一门科学的对象就意味着表明它的特性、范围和特点,使它与其他各门科学有所区别。“社会     

Comment on John Yolton's ‘Is There a History of Philosophy? Some difficulties and suggestions’

In this comment on John Yolton's ‘Is There a History of Philosophy?’ (Yolton, 1985) I review his account of the development during the 17th to 19th centuries of a common sense of the range of philosophical problems and of the canon of philosophical works. I suggest that his account may be read in light of Rorty's four genres of historiography (Rorty, 1984). I criticize his view of the place of the history of philosophy in philosophy as too timid, though correct as far as it goes. I then suggest, but do not attempt to establish, a bolder thesis. Finally, I raise some doubts about the adequacy of Yolton's reading of Descartes and Berkeley set out in two of his ‘Puzzlements.’ The ‘Puzzlements’ themselves are supposed to illustrate typical misreading of major figures in the history of philosophy.     

Inferentialist Philosophy of Language and the Historiography of Philosophy

This article considers the implications of inferentialist philosophy of language for debates in the historiography of philosophy. My intention is to mediate and refine the polemics between contextualist historians and ‘analytic’ or presentist historians. I claim that much of Robert Brandom's nuanced defence of presentism can be accepted and even adopted by contextualists, so that inferentialism turns out to provide an important justification for orthodox history of philosophy. In the concluding sections I argue that the application of Brandom's theory has important limits, and that some polemics by contextualists against presentists are therefore justified.     

The Establishment Of The Standard History Ofphilosophy of Education and Suppressed Traditions of Education

History of education emerges during the course of the nineteenth century in Germany and is marked by four features. It is educational, and not scientific in nature, because it was written primarily for teacher education and training; it is national, or even nationalistic; it is oriented almost exclusively towards German philosophy; and it is indebted to Lutheran Protestantism. This model of pedagogical historiography leaves its mark on the historiographies that emerged later in England, France, and the United States. Taking the example of Rousseau, this contribution makes it clear that these Lutheran and idealist premises lead to a one-sided historiography, so that the republican tradition in which Rousseau stood could be suppressed. On this basis, the paper points up the methodological necessity in historical research to examine contexts, giving up the idea of one history of education in favor of reconstruction of various traditions. The gain lies in making visible suppressed transnational languages that educational reflection made use of for centuries. In particular, a connection is revealed between the republican education of the eighteenth century in Europe and the concern with the issue of the “good citizen” that has preoccupied the American discussion from Jefferson to the Pragmatists to Diane Ravitch.     

Lakatosian Rational Reconstruction Updated

I argue in this article that an aspect of Imre Lakatos’s philosophy has been largely ignored in previous literature. The key feature of Lakatos’s philosophy of the historiography of science is its non-representationalism, which enables comparisons of alternative ‘historiographic research programmes’ without implying that the interpretations of history re-present or mirror the past. I discuss some problems of this interpretation and show specifically that Lakatos’s philosophy does not distort the history of science despite its normative ambitions. The last section is devoted to updating Lakatos’s programme to answer the needs of contemporary history and philosophy of science. The standard of rationality used in comparative assessments should be understood as a tool for measuring the coherence of an account of history with regard to the ‘actual history’. This standard takes two forms: framework-dependent and framework-independent rationality. The latter is decisive in comparative assessments.     

From Classical Studies towards Epistemology: The Work of József Balogh

In this paper, I introduce a prominent classical scholar, József Balogh, whose work can be read as a significant contribution to the historiography of ancient, and in some sense modern, philosophy. Following a summary biography, I sketch the relevance of Balogh's interpretation of Augustine. I draw some analogies between his and Eric Havelock's treatment of the problems in ancient philosophy, and argue that the obvious similarities between them have a common origin, namely the perspective of the orality/literacy chasm which both treated, in connection with their research into Augustine and Plato, as crucial. Subsequently, I show how the problem of reading aloud, which Balogh was the first to treat systematically, has acquired significance in some current debates in philosophy.     

From a ‘memorable place’ to ‘drops in the ocean’: on the marginalization of women philosophers in German historiography of philosophy

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the striking absence of women philosophers from German historiography of philosophy during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. While the general topic has been considered before, additional documents and considerations are presented that will help us better understand the omission of women philosophers in the German context. Firstly, material is presented showing that women philosophers were widely discussed in Germany prior to 1800. These discussions stand sharply in contrast with the silence about women in subsequent general histories of philosophy. Secondly, it is shown that the absence of women philosophers in German historiography of philosophy during the nineteenth century is not entirely new but has to be seen as a continuation of tendencies characteristic for the historiography of philosophy already during the eighteenth century. Thirdly, it is argued that, towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a new stimulus for thinking about women in the history of philosophy, namely women’s emancipation and, more specifically, the right to a university education. Seen in this light, the renewed and intensified effort to diminish women philosophers can be understood as a symptomatic attempt to keep women out of academia in general, and out of philosophy in particular.     

Historiographic narratives and empirical evidence: a case study

Several scholars observed that narratives about the human past are evaluated comparatively. Few attempts have been made, however, to explore how such evaluations are actually done. Here I look at a lengthy “contest” among several historiographic narratives, all constructed to make sense of another one—the biblical story of the conquest of Canaan. I conclude that the preference of such narratives can be construed as a rational choice. In particular, an easily comprehensible and emotionally evocative narrative will give way to a complex and mundane one, when the latter provides a more coherent account of the consensually accepted body of evidence. This points to a fundamental difference between historiographic narratives and fiction, contrary to some influential opinions in the philosophy of historiography. Such historiographic narratives have similarities with hypotheses and narrative explanations in natural science.

     

Heidegger's Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy

In this paper I seek to shed some light on Heidegger's conception of phenomenology, and on the relationship between Heidegger's conception and that of Husserl. In particular, I am concerned to elucidate the sense in which Heidegger's phenomenology can be seen as a species of transcendental philosophy. In the concluding section of the paper I briefly consider the significance of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology for his later philosophy, as represented by 'The Question Concerning Technology'.     

“All history is the history of thought”: competing British idealist historiographies

ABSTRACT

Along with utilitarianism, British idealism was the most important philosophical and practical movement in Britain and its Empire during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Even though the British idealists have regained some of their standing in the history of philosophy, their own historical theories still fail to receive the deserved scholarly attention. This article helps to fill that major gap in the literature. Understanding historiography as concerning the appropriate modes of enquiring into the recorded past, this article analyses the key historiographical commitments that underpin the writings of the early T.H. Green (section two), Edward Caird (section three), and F.H. Bradley (sections four and five). Section six explores the influence of Bradley's historiography. These approaches are linked by the belief that all thought can be properly understood only by critical historians who possess the appropriate tools with which to distinguish permanently valid truths from the transient imperfections with which those truths are mixed. A crucial division between them is the invocation of a neo-Hegelian Geist by the early Green and Caird, and Bradley's reliance on a progressive human nature. Moreover, the article establishes that R.G. Collingwood's highly influential theories of “absolute presuppositions” and “re-enactment” were taken largely from Bradley's historiography.     

Kuhn’s Legacy: Theoretical and Philosophical Study of History

This paper considers the legacy of Kuhn and his Structure with regard to the current history and philosophy of science. Kuhn can be seen as a myth breaker, whose contribution is the way he connected historical and philosophical studies of science, questioning the cumulativist image and demanding historical responsibility of the views of science. I build on Kuhn’s legacy and outline a suggestion for theoretical and philosophical study of history (of science), which can be subdivided into three categories. The first is the philosophical analysis of historical interpretation and its relation to the historical record. The second is ‘theoretical history’ in which one tries to infer philosophically relevant interpretations on the nature of science on the basis of historical evidence. The third is the conceptual reflection of the assumptions and implications of the contemporary historiography of science. At the end I suggest that theoretical and philosophical study of history offers a fresh way to make history and philosophy relevant to each other.