How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had

Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher‐level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no‐defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from the foregoing to compare Norman's belief, formed by clairvoyance, with Sally's theistic belief, formed by a sensus divinitatis.     

Choice Blindness and Preference Change: You Will Like This Paper Better If You (Believe You) Chose to Read It!

Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post‐choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

迷信,迷信,一"迷"就信

何谓迷信?词书上开列的含义有两条:①信仰神仙鬼怪等;②盲目的信仰和崇拜.这在中国恐怕早已是家喻户晓的了.可是,如果再问一句为什么要信迷信,也许就不是三言两语就能解释清楚的,要不,为什么词书上也没有加以说明呢?然而,在一次与神汉、巫婆的偶然相遇中,他们对迷信一词的解释,却不禁使我莫名惊诧起来.     

论“信则有，不信则无”的真谛——关于净土存在的揭示

净土的有与无(存在与不存在)是与人们对它的信与不信相联系的。因为人们以信乐为基，而行愿到一定程度之后才能感受到净土的存在。否则，人们自始至终都没有相信过，更没有修行过，人们当然就领略不到净土的庄严和净土的存在。因为，即使它存在，那也只是诸佛的存在，同人们自己是没有必然联系的，因为那毕竟不是人们自己的净土。     

不投入哪有产出

我是山西人，我是带着感情来的，但这次我到五台山觉得非常伤心，问题主要有以下三点：     

If You Can Replicate the Handedness-Immune Disorder Effect, the More Power to You

Bryden, McManus, and Bulman-Fleming′s (1994) meta-analysis of studies examining the Geschwind-Behan-Galaburda hypothesis indicates that the original data set supports the hypothesis significantly more than the body of replication attempts. We present data on 2256 subjects that clearly fail to support the hypothesis and describe practical and statistical reasons suggesting why the original data cannot be easily replicated. A power analysis suggests that to find the effect in a general sample, one should plan to have 17,000 to 40,000 subjects.     

“Before You Formed in the Womb I Knew You”: Sex Selection and Spaces of Ambiguity

The spaces provided by biotechnologies of sex selection are rich with epistemological, ontological, and ethical considerations that speak to broadly held social values and epistemic frameworks. In much of the discourse about sex selection that is not medically indicated, the figure of the “naturally” conceived (future) child is treated as a problem for parents who want to select the sex of their child. As unknown, that child is ambiguous in terms of sex—“it” is both and neither, and might be the “wrong” sex. Drawing on Beauvoirean thinking about ambiguity and desire, I cast part of the desire to select the sex of a child as bound to an ethic and epistemology of disambiguation, and urge that the space of being‐unknown is one to which each person is entitled.     

I Knew It All Along,Unless I Had to Work to Learn What I Know

After receiving knowledge regarding some topic, people usually overestimate their prior topic knowledge. Two experiments investigated whether people would claim less prior knowledge if they worked to earn their present knowledge. In Study 1, students finishing a psychology course claimed less precourse psychology knowledge if they reported devoting more effort toward the course. In Study 2, the knew-it-all-along effect was stronger for participants who were simply given the answers to questions than for participants who studied for 20 minutes to learn the answers. Both cognitive and motivational factors can account for the observed effects of effort investment on retrospective knowledge judgments.     

If You Meet a Ghost From the Past,Eat It

No abstract available for this article.     

What I Wish I Knew Then...Reflections from Personal Experiences in Counseling about Down Syndrome

Sharing the news about a newborn baby’s diagnosis of Down syndrome with families is a scenario genetic counselors frequently face. Yet often we may feel uncomfortable or unsure how to best support families in this setting in a way that will foster competence and resilience. This commentary is a reflection of one genetic counselor’s experiences in counseling about Down syndrome over the course of her career and how her thinking has transitioned from a medical based model of disability to a more individual and family-focused model. Ideas and suggestions are offered that genetic counselors can incorporate into their practice.     

下一站再爱你

<正>他和她曾在上帝面前许下诺言,无论贫穷富足、健康疾病,彼此相爱、终生相伴。当厄运临到,病魔缠身,她不但要面对化疗、放疗的痛苦,更要面对与自己最爱的丈夫别离的伤痛。这是一个简单而不平凡的真实爱情故事,守望一次相约不见的再见。根据澳洲华人陈淑贤姊妹(Tracy)生前真实经历改编的电影《下一站再爱你》,2014年8月22日在全国4900间电影院同步上映,影片让我更真切地感受到上帝永恒的爱、眷顾及保守     

"If I Don''t Get Simple, I Cry"

Poor families have taught us special lessons that are applicable to all families. They have instructed us about the problems, within families, of developing relationships adequate to the tasks of family life. One consequence is that therapists are attending more to the evolution of the structure of family relationships, particularly, the phenomenon of underorganization. Poor families have also provided insight into the dynamic relationship between families and their social context. As a result, a therapeutic perspective is emerging that focuses on the influence of the community on the individual and the family, a perspective that may be called an eco-structural approach to therapy.