From Destruktion to Deconstruction: A Response to Moran

Abstract

As a response to Moran’s (1994) recommendation that Heidegger’s Destruktion be extensively elaborated and critiqued, this paper suggests a way in which Heidegger’s thinking can be more clearly understood as a search for how better to ‘say’ the destruction. By briefly tracing how Heidegger’s thinking on the Destruktion repeatedly turns against itself throughout his writings, it is demonstrated that Heidegger does indeed revise the notion by abandoning the term in his later writing; to replace it first with the concept of ‘overcoming’, and subsequently with the notion of Verwindung. This self-critical reworking of the Destruktion is evident in his turning towards these concepts; which is taken up by Derrida’s deconstruction in its simultaneous turning towards and away from Heidegger’s Destruktion.     

Machenschaft and Seynsgeschichte in the Black Notebooks: Heidegger on Nietzsche’s “Rediscovery” of the Greeks

ABSTRACT

One of the outcomes of the publication of the Black Notebooks has been to invite scholars to rethink their understanding of Heidegger’s thinking, including his “world-historical anti-Semitism,” his relation to war and politics, via Schmitt and Jünger, as well as machination/calculation but not less his Seynsgeschichte. Other questions include education and academic life in addition to Heidegger’s anxieties regarding the reception of Being and Time in the framework of his history of Beyng/Seyn. Refusing Nietzsche on the Greeks, especially Anaximander, Heidegger “plays out” typically bellicose interpretations of Will to Power, consummating the “abandonment of beings by being, the abandonment that gained sovereignty in the history of metaphysics.” If Heidegger’s Nietzsche thus suspiciously resembles the Nazi Nietzsche, reading the proliferation of editions bears out Heidegger’s claims for the backwards-working force of the Nachlaß.     

Heidegger’s Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

Heidegger maintained that Nietzsche was a metaphysical thinker. What did he mean by that? Not that Nietzsche advanced purely theoretical doctrines that might be perfected or refuted by rational argument. Instead, he meant that Nietzsche’s thinking is a ‘representational thinking’ (vorstellendes Denken) that preserves a commitment to a conception of truth as correctness (Richtigkeit). Nietzsche’s apparent denials of the intelligibility of truth, Heidegger argues, are in fact expressions of our growing insensitivity to truth understood as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). Nietzsche’s thinking is thus deeply attuned to metaphysics as Heidegger came to understand it in the late 1930s, namely as a forgetting of being (Seinsvergessnheit), beginning with Plato. His interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought, particularly the idea of eternal recurrence, changed less because he changed his mind about Nietzsche than because he reconceived the philosophical tradition since Plato as metaphysical, and so reframed his own project as an attempt to think beyond metaphysics.     

Democratic pluralism and majority rule

Abstract

I argue that Metz’s undertaking, in seeking a ‘comprehensive basic norm’ to underpin African ethics, is similar to Hans Kelsen’s postulation of the Grundnorm in his Pure Theory of Law. But African ethics does not need to be underpinned by an approach such as Kelsen’s. In my view, Metz’s preference for seeking to develop a Grundnorm rests upon a failure to attend carefully to the distinctness of African ethical thinking from Western ethical thinking. This failure is manifest in a spurious distinction (on which Metz relies) between ‘moral anthropology’ / ‘cultural studies’ and ‘normative theory’. It is also manifest in Metz’s failure to attend carefully to the work of Wiredu and Bujo, both of whom present systematic, critical analyses of African ethical thinking while implicitly rejecting the quest for a Grund norm as being unAfrican.     

Killing the father,Parmenides: On Lacan’s anti-philosophy

This paper examines the historical claims about philosophy, dating back to Parmenides, that we argue underlie Jacques Lacan’s polemical provocations in the mid-1970s that his position was an “anti-philosophie”. Following an introduction surveying the existing literature on the subject, in part ii, we systematically present the account of classical philosophy Lacan has in mind when he declares psychoanalysis to be an antiphilosophy after 1975, assembling his claims about the history of ideas in Seminars XVII and XX in ways earlier contributions of this subject have not systematically done. In part iii, focusing upon Lacan’s remarkable reading of Descartes’ break with premodern philosophy—but touching on Lacan’s readings of Hegel and (in a remarkable confirmation of Lacan’s “Parmenidean” conception of philosophy) the early Wittgenstein—we examine Lacan’s positioning of psychoanalysis as a legatee of the Cartesian moment in the history of western ideas, nearly-contemporary with Galileo’s mathematization of physics and carried forwards by Kant’s critical philosophy and account of the substanceless subject of apperception. In different terms than Slavoj ?i?ek, we propose that it is Lacan’s famous avowal that the subject of the psychoanalysis is the subject first essayed by Descartes in The Meditations on First Philosophy as confronting an other capable of deceit (as against mere illusion or falsity) that decisively measures the distance between Lacan’s unique “antiphilosophy” and the forms of later modern linguistic and cultural relativism whose hegemony Alain Badiou has decried, at the same time as it sets Lacan’s antiphilosophy apart from the Parmenidean legacy for which thinking and being could be the same.

     

Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought

ABSTRACT

While much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, and that only our conscious thinking ‘takes place in words,’ I draw out the distinct strands that underpin such remarks. The opening half of the paper focuses upon Nietzsche’s understanding of unconscious thinking, and the role of affects therein. In what remains, I consider the difference (for Nietzsche) between conscious and unconscious thought, with a particular focus on two important readings. The first, put forward by Paul Katsafanas, claims that conscious states alone have conceptually-articulated content. The second, defended most prominently by Mattia Riccardi, argues that Nietzsche’s various claims evince a form of HOT (higher-order thought) theory. I argue that neither reading is quite right, and instead propose an alternative interpretation of conscious thinking ‘in words’, which draws on work on inner speech.     

The Restitution of Primary Identification Psychoanalysis

The paper discusses different well-known imagined monsters. Starting with the fairy tale and the films on The Beauty and the Beast (La Belle et la Bête), hidden meanings from several psychodynamically valid perspectives are proposed with the aim of finding out what makes this story so popular and everlasting. Projected demons or impulses in Maurice Sendak's Where the Wild Things Are are discussed as well as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and his monster who are presented and connected to facts in this author’s life. In the summary links to psychoanalytic thinking are proposed.     

Nietzsche and the Empirical: through the eyes of the term ‘Empfindung’

Abstract

This paper examines Nietzsche’s attitude to the empirical by concentrating on his concept of Empfindung (sensation, perception, feeling). In Section 1, five distinctive features of his use of ‘Empfmdung’ are described in relation to the philosophical tradition and some of his sources in 19^th Century physiology. All five features, I argue, point to Nietzsche’s philosophical concern to stake out the limits of ‘Empfmdung’ as an aspect of human finitude. In Section 2, my attention turns from the term ‘Empfmdung’ to Nietzsche’s actual argumentation. The bewildering variety of perspectives and arguments concerning ‘Empfmdung’ in his writings are broken down into three basic types of argument or discourse with radically different, incompatible presuppositions: a critical, epistemological discourse serving anti-metaphysical ends; a quasi-scientific discourse serving critical-epistemological ends; and a quasi-ontological discourse of life that looks to explain the results of Nietzsche’s critical epistemology. The value of this ‘contradictory’ practice, I contend, is twofold: Nietzsche makes epistemology fruitful for the philosophical problem of life; at the same time he offers a performative critique of epistemology by the manner in which he exceeds it.     

On questioning being: Foucault’s Heideggerian turn

Attempts to resolve the question of Foucault’s relationship to Heidegger usually look for points of substantive correlation between them: the coincidence of being and power, the meaning of truth, technology, ethics, and so on. Taking seriously Foucault’s claim in his final interview that he uses Heidegger as an ‘instrument of thought’, this paper looks for a correlation in practice. The argument focuses on a structural isomorphism between Heidegger’s concept of the fourfold event (Ereignis) of being and later Foucault’s critique of ‘problematization’ (problématique). This isomorphism, I argue, indicates a covert philosophical confrontation between Foucault and Heidegger, which was determinative for Foucault in the period of the turn to ethics (1976–84). This is a confrontation over the meaning of the ‘event of thought’. Such an interpretation not only permits a literal reading of Foucault’s comments regarding Heidegger in his final interview, but also casts the developments in Foucault’s later work in a fascinating new light. Foucault’s critique of problematization, on this view, is founded in an historicized version of Heideggerian ‘other’ thinking, and pivots on a ontologically tempered enactment of the Heideggerian turn (Kehre).     

Simone Weil: The Ethics of Affliction and the Aesthetics of Attention

ABSTRACT

For Simone Weil the invocation of ‘rights’ to address extreme human suffering–what she calls ‘affliction’–is ‘ludicrously inadequate’. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the ‘cry’ of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil’s concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil’s ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention.     

Eucharistic priority in Hilary of Poitiers' trinitarian theology: a critique of contemporary approaches to divine–human communio

The notion of koinonia or communio is at the heart of contemporary ecclesiology, and trinitarian theology has become its necessary presupposition. This article argues that the way many contemporary theologians have envisaged this link between divine and human communion is deeply problematic. Hilary of Poitiers was the first theologian of communio, and he offers a bold critique of contemporary discussions. Hilary gives eucharistic priority to trinitarian theology, that is, there is a movement from Eucharist to Trinity in his thinking on the relation between divine and human communion. A retrieval of Hilary's eucharistic priority in trinitarian discourse can provide constructive avenues in trinitarian theology which avoid the anthropocentric tendencies of contemporary social doctrines of the Trinity and reject the misdiagnosed problem of trinitarian ‘relevance’ in current discussions. Such a retrieval recovers trinitarian doctrine as a practised, performed reality, lived out in human communio itself through the eucharistic life of the Church.     

On Traumatically Skewed Intersubjectivity

ABSTRACT

Beginning with his Interpersonal World of the Infant (1985), Daniel Stern suggested that the infant is driven from birth to connect intersubjectively with his caregivers. By the final three months of the first year of life, as the infant begins to use protodeclarative pointing and jointly attends to the outer world, he also begins to jointly attend with his caregiver to their respective intrapsychic worlds, the mental states of his caregiver and himself. Clinically, analysts observe at this crucial point of development of secondary intersubjectivity mothers who, more often than not, respond only selectively and often unpredictably to their infants. In many instances, this may be motivated out of a mother’s own need for regulation of emotion and arousal as we have shown in our empirical research. This article elaborates on clinical observations that, for the infant or young child to feel his traumatized mother’s affective presence, he must try to enter mother’s state of mind, while simultaneously, mother is seeking to self-regulate in the wake or the revival of trauma-associated memory traces, this at the expense of mutual regulation of emotion and arousal. We call this phenomenon traumatically skewed intersubjectivity. We find that children coconstruct with their traumatized mothers a new, shared traumatic experience by virtue of the toddler’s efforts to share an intersubjective experience with a mother who is acting in response to posttraumatic reexperiencing. The problem is that the infant or young child has no point of reference to decipher the traumatized mother’s social communication. And so, what is enacted leads to a new, shared traumatic event. Both the child’s anxiety and aggression can, in this setting, easily become dysregulated, further triggering mother’s anxiety and avoidance, leading thus to a vicious cycle that contributes to intergenerational transmission of trauma. Clinical examples and implications for psychoanalytically-oriented parent-infant psychotherapy will be discussed.     

Oedipus goes to the opera: Psychoanalytic inquiry in Enescu’s Œdipe and Stravinsky’s Oedipus Rex

Abstract

Psychoanalytic inquiry into operas based on the life of Oedipus may provide further knowledge on the Oedipus complex. Therefore, we chose to analyze Enescu’s ?dipe and Stravinsky’s Oedipus Rex. Two distinct methodologies were used in our study. The first explored the concept of free association through musical themes in the operas. The second involved the comparative study of the Oedipus myth in order to provide a deeper understanding of Oedipus’s character. We observed that Oedipus displayed symptoms of his complex through the traits of aggressiveness and arrogance. Moreover, we noticed that Oedipus was compelled by the necessity of finding out who his real parents were and by unconsciously accomplishing the prophecy. Oedipus assumed the responsibility to free the Thebans from plague. Yet, it was too late, for the feared part of the prophecy was already accomplished. He provided a wrong answer to the Sphinx and then received the most severe punishment, one that would have ostracism as its outcome. It was, however, not too late for Oedipus to finally discover who his real parents were. Nevertheless, afraid of losing his place as King of Thebes, he investigated the plague’s causes. This resulted in his aggression as he resisted discovering “where babies come from.”     

The doubled movement of infinity in Kierkegaard and in Sūfism

S?ren Kierkegaard was a very rigorous critic of traditional philosophical thinking and speculative systems. According to his theory it is possible that there is a logic system, but not a system of life. If such a system exists, it can be known only to God. Man can attain the meaning of life only by his own relationship to God. However, this relationship cannot be explained by philosophy because it has to do with a transcendent ‘double movement of infinity’ which takes place between God and the individual. Like philosophy, mysticism cannot explain one's relationship to God. The difference is that philosophy neglects God as the absolute starting point, while mysticism forgets that an individual—after he has experienced divinity—may return to the real world. The self need not disappear in divinity. The dialectic of the relationship between God and man implies that both poles (God and man) are present, thus ‘the infinite difference between God and man’ does not disappear. Since Sūfism is a type of Islamic mysticism, it may be said that a Sūfi cannot witness God's truth if he remains in his union with God. It is therefore relevant to draw some parallels between Kierkegaard's view and a comparable Sūfi view about the human relationship to God.     

William King’s Influence on Locke’s Second Edition Change of Mind about Human Action and Freedom

ABSTRACT

Locke’s influential discussion of agency in the chapter ‘Of Power’ in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding underwent important changes between the first and second edition. He reconsidered many of his central claims about the mind’s deliberation about actions. Locke’s position in the two editions is not only different but, as he himself points out, sometimes incompatible. This has suggested to some commentators that his change of mind was at least partly due to an external influence. Locke himself gestures towards this conclusion in the new ‘Epistle’ in the second edition Essay. One view is that William Molyneux was a notable influence, while another position is that Ralph Cudworth’s work on free will, either directly or indirectly through the influence of his daughter Damaris Masham, was an important influence. The position I develop in this paper is that the strongest candidate for an important external influence on Locke’s second edition revision is Molyneux’s close associate and friend, Irish philosopher and Archbishop of Dublin, William King. I argue that King’s criticism is a plausible influence on Locke’s reconceptualization of will and desire. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, King’s criticism appears to have been instrumental in Locke’s new emphasis on the agent’s capacity to determine what to value.     

The Perfection of Glory in Humility: What Karl Barth would have had to Say about Redemption

Karl Barth famously was not able to complete his magnum opus, Church Dogmatics, the final volume of which was to treat the doctrine of redemption. But the general contours of what Barth would have had to say in that volume can be discovered by following the trajectory of his thought, specifically as key developments in his later work are set next to his discussion of redemption in his first lecture cycle in dogmatics at Göttingen. This article contends that in view of revisions to his treatment of Christ's humiliation and exaltation, which reflect his handling of election in CD II/2, Barth would have had to conclude three things about redemption. First, Christ's humiliation for us is an eternal act not set aside in the eschaton. Secondly, humanity's eschatological exaltation takes the form of actualized utter dependence on God defined by corresponding life‐acts of uninterrupted self‐giving. And thirdly, that ‘redemption’ entails having a share in God's unique freedom to have his life in and with another; just this is life in the Spirit. Together, these conclusions characterize a kind of glory which is not opposed to humility but perfected in humility.     

Power and Freedom in Heidegger’s First Notebook

ABSTRACT

In the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Martin Heidegger uses a conception of power that is different to that found in his later work. Rather than power being the expression of the will to will and source of ruin for humanity, he says that humanity can only be saved from ruin if it can pave the way for an “empowerment of being” (Ermächtigung des Seins). This article will show that this early understanding of power is related to Heidegger’s conception of freedom as the essence of truth, developing his thinking on this topic from the period of 1927–1930. It will show that the terms “empowerment of being” and “letting be” (Seinlassen) are akin, and that Heidegger uses the former to distance his thinking from potential misinterpretations of the essay “On the Essence of Truth”.     

Art in support of life: Caravaggio and the plague

In the struggle with COVID-19, art offered a way to face the solitude of the lockdown. The focus of this paper is primarily on Caravaggio’s painting The Seven Works of Mercy, with references to other paintings to amplify some aspects of the artist’s approach to life and his uniqueness in the artistic landscape of his time. Darkness was part of Caravaggio’s research for spiritual truth and by entering the stories of his life and exploring the tales told through imaginative expression in his paintings, it is possible to understand his process of exploration of ancestral darkness. The author uses her imagination to reflect on how art can help to contact the profound fears buried in the unconscious which are now being awakened by the pandemic. The contemplation of this painting facilitated the emergence of emotions related to the darkness of our time, with the discovery that empathy and mercy offer a way to come to terms with the pandemic. This approach demands a different understanding of reality with Caravaggio’s dark creative world becoming a companion that permits the exploration of what is not yet thinkable in daily life. Images accompany the author’s research that relies on her imagination and amplifications.     

Absolute-Brahma: Royce and the Upanishads

While acknowledging a certain affinity between his own thought and the Vedanta concept of a world-soul or universal spirit, Josiah Royce nevertheless locates this concept primarily in what he terms the Second Conception of Being—Mysticism. In his early magnum opus, The World and the Individual (1990. New York, NY: Macmillan), Royce utilizes aspects of the Upanishads in order to flesh out his picture of the mystical understanding of and relationship to being. My primary concern in the present investigation is to introduce some nuance into Royce’s conception of Indian thought, which may then serve to suggest similar possibilities for nuance for Royce’s conception of the Absolute. I will attempt to do in two primary ways: first, I will consider Royce’s use of Indian thought via the Upanishads in explicating his second historical conception of Being. I will then turn briefly to Emerson’s poem ‘Brahma’ and the Bhagavad Gita to see if a certain reversal that occurs in both places problematizes Royce’s depiction of the universal spirit in Indian thought as well as opens up new possibilities for Royce’s own Absolute.