Atheism and Dialetheism; or, ‘Why I Am Not a (Paraconsistent) Christian’

In ‘Theism and Dialetheism’, Cotnoir explores the idea that dialetheism (true contradictions) can help with some puzzles about omnipotence in theology. In this note, I delineate another aspect of this project. Dialetheism cannot help with one big puzzle about another classic ‘omni’ property, omnibenevolence—the famous problem of evil. For someone (including a dialetheist) who thinks that the existence of evil is a knock-down argument against traditional theism, it is a knock-down argument against dialetheic theism, too.     

Dialetheism and the Impossibility of the World

This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction, in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then proposed which avoids these unsavoury consequences by invalidating the interdefinability rules for the modal operators with the use of two valuation relations. However, while using AV carries no significant cost for the absolutist, the same isn't true for the dialetheist. Although using AV allows her to avoid the consequence that the actual world is an impossible world, it does so only on the condition that the dialetheist admits that she cannot give a dialetheic solution to all self-referential semantic paradoxes. Thus, unless there are any further available modal logics that don't commit her to the impossibility of the actual world, the dialetheist is faced with a dilemma. Either admit that the actual world is an impossible world, or admit that her research programme cannot give a comprehensive solution to the self-referential paradoxes.     

Existential-Hayatological Theism

One of the oldest conceptions of theology is discourse of the poets about the gods and its philosophical interpretation. Judaism and Christianity borrowed this Greek understanding of theology and revised it only slightly to reflect its own monotheistic vision of God and God’s relations to and with the world of nature and human existence. The question as to which philosophy best explicates and justifies the oral and written mythopoetic discourse of the imaginative bards of Israel and the early Christian community became a fundamental issue and has remained so through the centuries. The aim of this essay is to explore this question once again in the context of post-liberal theology in general, the works of Abraham Heschel, Claude Tresmontant, and the Japanese theologian Tetsaturo Ariga on an implicit biblical philosophy and the explicit metaphysical theism of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. The outcome of this exploration will be a rational reconstruction or ideal type of neo-classical theism or what I have chosen to call existential-hayatological theism.     

Why Theists Cannot Accept Skeptical Theism

In recent years skeptical theism has gained currency amongst theists as a way to escape the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning our ability to know that instances of apparently gratuitous evil are unredeemed by morally sufficient reasons known to God alone. After explicating skeptical theism through the work of Stephen Wykstra and William Alston, I present a cumulative-case argument designed to show that skeptical theism cannot be accepted by theists insofar as it crucially undermines epistemic license to the very theism it is invoked to defend. I also argue that attempts to defend a theism-friendly moderate version of skeptical theism either fail to halt the spread of damaging skepticism, or lack philosophical validity.

Examining Problems and Assumptions: An Update on Criticisms of Open Theism

Abstract : Open theism, a form of relational theology, has generated a host of criticisms. I examine some of the recent criticisms by analyzing several that center around biblical, doctrinal and philosophical problems. I show how many criticisms miss the mark by failing to recognize and address the underlying assumptions held by open theists.     

Theism, Dualism, and the Scientific Image of Humanity

Recently, some philosophers of religion have suggested that a reduction of the classical image of humanity may jeopardize classical theism. To obstruct reductionism, some theologians have argued for dualism on the basis of the argument of consciousness. In this essay, I argue that even consciousness must be considered a brain-based phenomenon. This does not commit one to reductionism, however. Nonreductive physicalism appears to offer a promising alternative to either dualism or reductionism, without necessarily compromising more traditional views of humanity. I do suggest that a modification of the classical image of God may be inevitable.     

Open Theism: An Answer to My Critics

Abstract :  Open theism is a version of historic free will theism which posits God as granting to human beings significant freedom to cooperate with or to resist the will of God for their lives. God's goal is to make possible relationships of mutual love between God and creatures and therefore set up a dynamic give and take situation in which God can even be said to risk failure to the degree permitted by the overall plan. A debate has broken out as to whether open theism goes too far in its revision. I myself see it as a mere adjustment to standard Arminian thinking on the point of understanding the divine foreknowledge. In this article, I argue that, despite a goodly number of objections, the position deserves to be viewed as a legitimate option for Christian theology, yea even for "evangelical" theology.     

Can Deflationists be Dialetheists?

Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his Deflationary Truth and the Liar (JPL 28:455–488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. We agree with Simmons on this point; however, we disagree with his main conclusion. In a nutshell, Simmons' main conclusion is that deflationists can solve the Liar only by compromising deflationism. If Simmons is right, then deflationists cannot solve the Liar paradox. In this paper we argue that, pace Simmons, there is an approach to the Liar that is available to deflationists, namely dialetheism.     

Theism and Mathematics

The author investigates the connection between God and mathematics, and argues (1) that the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” makes much better sense from the perspective of theism than from that of naturalism, (2) that the accessibility (to us human beings) of advanced mathematics is much more likely given theism than given naturalism, (3) that the existence of sets, numbers, functions and the like fits in much better with theism than with naturalism, and (4) that the alleged epistemological obstacles to knowledge of mathematics offered by the abstract character of numbers, sets, etc., disappear from the point of view of theism.     

The Dialogue Between Religion and Science: Which God?

As exemplified by three cases, difficulties in the dialogue between religion and science not infrequently arise from differing views of God's omnipotence and omniscience. From the side of theology, reflections on the biblical and church-related sources of those views, on Auschwitz and theproblem of theodicy, on God as Creator of the universe, and on how to read and interpret the Bible show that a view of a God who self-limits almightiness and all-knowing in order to grant freedom and functional integrity to a Creation about which God cares can be multiply justified. Such a view is not dissonant with regard to a self-organized, open universe, producing "unexpected" emergent features as seen by science     

Are there True Contradictions? A Critical Discussion of Graham Priest's, Beyond the limits of thought

The present article critically examines three aspects of Graham Priest's dialetheic analysis of very important kinds of limitations (the limit of what can be expressed, described, conceived, known, or the limit of some operation or other). First, it is shown that Priest's considerations focusing on Hegel's account of the infinite cannot be sustained, mainly because Priest seems to rely on a too restrictive notion of object. Second, we discuss Priest's treatment of the paradoxes in Cantorian set-theory. It is shown that Priest does not address the issue in full generality; rather, he relies on a reading of Cantor which implicitly attributes a very strong principle concerning quantification over arbitrary domains to Cantor. Third, the main piece of Priest's work, the so-called “inclosure schema”, is investigated. This schema is supposed to formalize the core of many well-known paradoxes. We claim, however, that formally the schema is not sound. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

SCIENCE AND GOD THE CREATOR

Abstract. Variable judgments, both negative and positive, have been made by scientists (mainly physicists and astronomers) on the theological implications of their Findings. It is urged that science and theology are most appropriately related through a critical realist approach. On this basis some implications for our conceptions of God and our scientific perspectives on the created world are explored with respect to both divine Being and divine Becoming. A positive assessment of nature as created concludes the article.     

Two Systems of Self-Regulation and the Differential Application of Psychoanalytic Technique

Out of our work over the years on child development, clinical technique, and sadomasochism, we have begun to formulate a model of development that describes two possible ways of responding to feelings of helplessness in the face of the challenges of internal and external experience. Any psychoanalytic model has implications for how we think about technique and can be tested on the basis of its utility in generating technical ideas and enhancing our therapeutic repertoire. At this juncture in the history of our field, it is crucial for us to demonstrate that psychoanalytic techniques are effective in helping people enter treatment, change, and finish in a way that consolidates their gains. In this paper we explore the utility of our two-systems model for expanding the discourse about psychoanalytic technique.