Local probability effects of repeating irrelevant attributes

We present two experiments in which participants classify stimuli having two potentially conflicting attributes, one of which is response-relevant whereas the other (“irrelevant”) attribute is logically and statistically independent of the response. We introduce a novel design not used with filtering tasks before in which the main factor is the local (i.e., one-step) transition probability π (= 0.25, 0.50, 0.75) that the irrelevant attribute is repeated from one trial to the next. Experiment 1 involved a visual Simon task in which the color of the stimulus is relevant and its location is irrelevant. Experiment 2 used a semantic classification task in which the parity of a digit presented is relevant and its numerical magnitude is irrelevant. The results of both experiments demonstrate that participants in the π = 0.75 group responded faster when the irrelevant attribute is in fact repeated rather than alternated; in contrast, participants in the π = 0.25 group responded faster (Experiment 1) or equally fast (Experiment 2) when the irrelevant attribute is alternated rather than repeated. These expectancy-related effects cannot be attributed to spurious design contingencies as the irrelevant attribute was independent of the relevant attribute (and thus of the response), of the congruency status, and also of their alternation/repetition. One interpretation of our findings is that information about the irrelevant attribute in the previous trial is used much as an informative central precue, so that participants can prepare early processing stages in the current trial, with the corresponding benefits and costs typical of standard cueing studies.     

Decomposing the emotional Stroop effect

The emotional Stroop effect refers to the phenomenon that participants are faster in responding to the ink colour of neutral than of negative word stimuli, possibly reflecting fast and automatic allocation of attention towards negative stimuli. However, this interpretation was challenged by McKenna and Sharma (2004) McKenna, F. P. and Sharma, D. 2004. Reversing the emotional Stroop effect reveals that it is not what it seems: The role of fast and slow components. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30: 382–392. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] who found that the emotional Stroop effect reflected a generic slowdown after negative stimuli. In fact, they even found reversed effects in a design in which neutral stimuli more often followed negative stimuli and vice versa. Yet, besides reversing the emotional Stroop effect this contingency might in fact have counteracted the fast effect, which was usually interpreted as the emotional Stroop effect. To decompose the emotional Stroop effect we used a design in which the foregoing and the current valence were uncorrelated and in which the fast and slow effects could be computed independently from each other. We found evidence for both fast and slow effects and discuss the practical implications for researchers using the emotional Stroop task as a measurement and the theoretical implications for researchers interested in the underlying cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the emotional Stroop effect.     

Sustained suppression in congruency tasks

In a list version of the Stroop task, Thomas (1977 Thomas, JK. 1977. Stroop interference with word or hue pre-exposure. Dissertation Abstracts International, 38: 1450 [Google Scholar]) observed that Stroop interference was smaller when the irrelevant word was repeated through parts of the list. MacLeod (1991 MacLeod, CM. 1991. Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: An integrative review. Psychological Bulletin, 109: 163–203. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) formulated the sustained-suppression hypothesis for this effect. It is assumed that the automatic response activation on the basis of the irrelevant word is selectively suppressed. In this paper this hypothesis is further investigated. In a serial Stroop task with short response–stimulus interval (RSI) we demonstrate that the Stroop effect disappears when the irrelevant word is repeated, whereas the Stroop effect is evident when the word changes. With a long RSI, there is no influence of the sequence of the irrelevant word. The same pattern of results is observed in a flanker task. The results are discussed in terms of the activation-suppression model (Ridderinkhof, 2002 Ridderinkhof, KR. 2002. Micro- and macro-adjustments of task set: Activation and suppression in conflict tasks. Psychological Research, 66: 312–323. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and the sustained-suppression hypothesis.     

Questioning implicit motor learning as instantiated by the pursuit-tracking task

The effect of concurrent visual feedback on the implicit learning of repeated segments in a task of pursuit tracking has been tested. Although this feedback makes it possible to regulate the positional error during the movement, it could also induce negative guidance effects. To test this hypothesis, a first set of participants (N?=?42) were assigned to two groups, which performed either the standard pursuit-tracking task based on the experimental paradigm of Pew (1974 Pew, R. W. 1974. Levels of analysis in motor control. Brain Research, 71: 393–400. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; group F-ST), or a task called “movement reproduction” in which the feedback was suppressed (group noF-ST). A second set of participants (N?=?26) performed in the same feedback condition groups but in a dual-task situation (F-DT and noF-DT; Experiment 2). The results appear to confirm our predictions since the participants in groups without feedback, contrary to those in groups with feedback, succeeded with practice in differentiating their performances as a function of the nature of the segments (repeated or nonrepeated) both in simple (Experiment 1) and in dual-task (Experiment 2) situations. These experiments indicate that the feedback in the pursuit-tracking task induces a guidance function potentially resulting in an easiness tracking that prevents the participants from learning the repetition.     

Chasing red herrings: Memory of distractors causes fixation in creative problem solving

Two experiments tested the red herring retrieval hypothesis, which states that fixation in creative problem solving is worse when memory for red herrings (i.e., inappropriate or incorrect solutions) is strengthened. In Experiment 1, when associations between Remote Associates Test (RAT) problem words (e.g., COTTAGE, SWISS, CAKE) and related red herring words (e.g., hut, chocolate, icing) were strengthened via repetition, an encoding variable, fixation was found to increase. In Experiment 2, when associations were formed between RAT problem contexts and red herrings, then subsequent reinstatement of problem contexts during RAT problem solving trials (as compared with showing new contexts) also worsened fixation effects. Our results add to the increasing body of research that connects memory with creative problem solving, and they suggest possible ways for overcoming fixation effects.     

Disentangling perceptual and psycholinguistic factors in syntactic processing: Tone monitoring via ERPs

Franco, Gaillard, Cleeremans, and Destrebecqz (Behavior Research Methods, 47, 1393–1403, 2015), in a study on statistical learning employing the click-detection paradigm, conclude that more needs to be known about how this paradigm interacts with statistical learning and speech perception. Past results with this monitoring technique have pointed to an end-of-clause effect in parsing—a structural effect—but we here show that the issues are a bit more nuanced. Firstly, we report two Experiments (1a and 1b), which show that reaction times (RTs) are affected by two factors: (a) processing load, resulting in a tendency for RTs to decrease across a sentence, and (b) a perceptual effect which adds to this tendency and moreover helps neutralize differences between sentences with slightly different structures. These two factors are then successfully discriminated by registering event-related brain potentials (ERPs) during a monitoring task, with Experiment 2 establishing that the amplitudes of the N1 and P3 components—the first associated with temporal uncertainty, the second with processing load in dual tasks—correlate with RTs. Finally, Experiment 3 behaviorally segregates the two factors by placing the last tone at the end of sentences, activating a wrap-up operation and thereby both disrupting the decreasing tendency and highlighting structural effects. Our overall results suggest that much care needs to be employed in designing click-detection tasks if structural effects are sought, and some of the now-classic data need to be reconsidered.     

“It Was Too Much for Him”—Hermeneutics: Levels and Thresholds

Hermeneutics can be reduced to a pure academic discipline. If one prefers a more existential art form for interpreting works of art, texts, or daily life situations, one needs to be initiated into the secrets of life. I find an allegory of this kind of hermeneutics by interpreting Ingmar Bergman's (1958/2007 Bergman, I. (2007). Nära livet. Nordisk Tonefilm DVD (KS8FHP127). (Original work published 1958) [Google Scholar]) film The Brink of Life. This exegesis learns that understanding what really matters implies a cautious exploration and crossing respectfully several thresholds, to read between the lines, to see with an inner eye and to hear with an inner ear, so that one can develop a depth of empathy.     

Reconstructing Recent Work on Macrosocial Stress as a Research Program

We reconstruct recent work on macrosocial stress (Chou, Parmar, &; Galinsky, 2016 Chou, E. Y., Parmar, B. L., &; Galinsky, A. D. (2016). Economic insecurity increases physical pain. Psychological Science, 27, 434–454. doi:10.1177/0956797615625640[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) as if it were an instance of a research strategy that tests point-alternative hypotheses within a full-fledged research program. Because this strategy is free of various deficits that beset dominant strategies (e.g., meta-analysis, Bayes factor analysis), our article demonstrates one way in which the confidence crisis may be overcome.     

The effects of environmental support and secondary tasks on visuospatial working memory

In the present experiments, we examined the effects of environmental support on participants’ ability to rehearse locations and the role of such support in the effects of secondary tasks on memory span. In Experiment 1, the duration of interitem intervals and the presence of environmental support for visuospatial rehearsal (i.e., the array of possible memory locations) during the interitem intervals were both manipulated across four tasks. When support was provided, memory spans increased as the interitem interval durations increased, consistent with the hypothesis that environmental support facilitates rehearsal. In contrast, when environmental support was not provided, spans decreased as the duration of the interitem intervals increased, consistent with the hypothesis that visuospatial memory representations decay when rehearsal is impeded. In Experiment 2, the ratio of interitem interval duration to intertrial interval duration was kept the same on all four tasks, in order to hold temporal distinctiveness constant, yet forgetting was still observed in the absence of environmental support, consistent with the decay hypothesis. In Experiment 3, the effects of impeding rehearsal were compared to the effects of verbal and visuospatial secondary processing tasks. Forgetting of locations was greater when presentation of to-be-remembered locations alternated with the performance of a secondary task than when rehearsal was impeded by the absence of environmental support. The greatest forgetting occurred when a secondary task required the processing visuospatial information, suggesting that in addition to decay, both domain-specific and domain-general effects contribute to forgetting on visuospatial working memory tasks.     

Multidimensional representation of objects—The influence of task demands

In our daily life, we often encounter situations in which different features of several multidimensional objects must be perceived simultaneously. There are two types of environments of this kind: environments with multidimensional objects that have unique feature associations, and environments with multidimensional objects that have mixed feature associations. Recently, we (Goldfarb & Treisman, 2013) described the association effect, suggesting that the latter type causes behavioral perception difficulties. In the present study, we investigated this effect further by examining whether the effect is determined via a feedforward visual path or via a high-order task demand component. In order to test this question, in Experiment 1 a set of multidimensional objects were presented while we manipulated the letter case of a target feature, thus creating a visually different but semantically equivalent object, in terms of its identity. Similarly, in Experiment 2 artificial groups with different physical properties were created according to the task demands. The results indicated that the association effect is determined by the task demands, which create the group of reference. The importance of high-order task demand components in the association effect is further discussed, as well as the possible role of the neural synchrony of object files in explaining this effect.     

Why Bayesian Psychologists Should Change the Way They Use the Bayes Factor

The discussion following Bem’s (2011 Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 407–425. doi: 10.1037/a0021524[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) psi research highlights that applications of the Bayes factor in psychological research are not without problems. The first problem is the omission to translate subjective prior knowledge into subjective prior distributions. In the words of Savage (1961 Savage, L. J. (1961). The foundations of statistical inference reconsidered. In J. Neyman, (Ed.), Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Volume 1: Contributions to the Theory of Statistics, pp. 575–586. BerkeleyCA: University of California. [Google Scholar]): “they make the Bayesian omelet without breaking the Bayesian egg.” The second problem occurs if the Bayesian egg is not broken: the omission to choose default prior distributions such that the ensuing inferences are well calibrated. The third problem is the adherence to inadequate rules for the interpretation of the size of the Bayes factor. The current paper will elaborate these problems and show how to avoid them using the basic hypotheses and statistical model used in the first experiment described in Bem (2011 Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 407–425. doi: 10.1037/a0021524[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). It will be argued that a thorough investigation of these problems in the context of more encompassing hypotheses and statistical models is called for if Bayesian psychologists want to add a well-founded Bayes factor to the tool kit of psychological researchers.     

The Difference Between Being and Seeing: The Relative Contribution of Self-Perception and Priming to Behavioral Changes via Digital Self-Representation

Studies in the Proteus Effect (N. Yee & J. Bailenson, 2007 Yee, N. and Bailenson, J. 2007. The proteus effect: The effect of transformed self-representation on behavior. Human Communication Research, 33: 271–290. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) have shown that the appearance of avatars (i.e., digital representations of ourselves) can lead to behavioral changes in users. For example, participants in attractive avatars became friendlier to confederate strangers than participants in unattractive avatars. While the Proteus Effect is premised on self-perception theory (D. Bem, 1972 Bem, D. 1972. “Self-perception theory.”. In Advances in experimental social psychology Edited by: Berkowitz, L. Vol. 6, New York: Academic Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar])—the notion that we infer our own attitudes by observing ourselves as if from a third party—it is also possible that the previous findings were caused by priming (i.e., behavioral assimilation; J. Bargh, M. Chen, & L. Burrows, 1996 Bargh, J., Chen, M. and Burrows, L. 1996. The automaticity of social behaviour: Direct effects of trait concept and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71: 230–244. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). In our study, we used immersive virtual environment technology to experimentally tease apart embodiment from perception of the same visual stimulus. Our results showed that embodiment produced significantly larger behavioral changes than mere observation of the same visual stimuli. These findings support the claim that our avatars provide a unique lever to behavioral change; however, more work is needed to pin down the exact mechanism behind the effect.     

Adrian van Kaam, (1920–2007)

On the 10th anniversary of her doctoral dissertation on the psychology of fame and celebrity, Donna Rockwell shares a journal entry from that time related to working with her qualitative data. Donna was mentored by the late Clark Moustakas, Ph.D., at the Center for Humanistic Studies (now the Michigan School of Professional Psychology), in both Heuristic and Transcendental Phenomenological research methods (Moustakas, 1990 Moustakas , C. ( 1990 ). Heuristic research. Design, methodology, and applications . Newbury Park , CA : Sage .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 1994 Moustakas , C. ( 1994 ). Phenomenological research methods . Thousand Oaks , CA : Sage .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Exploring the mysteries of human experience as sacred ground, Donna describes her way of being-with the lived-world of her research participants.     

The Effect of Psychological Skills Training (PST) on Self-Regulation Behavior,Self-Efficacy,and Psychological Skill Use in Military Pilot-Trainees

Set within B. J. Zimmerman’s (1989 Zimmerman, B. J. (1989). A social cognitive view of self-regulated academic learning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 81, 329–339.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], A social cognitive view of self-regulated academic learning, Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 81, pp. 329–339; and B. J. Zimmerman, 2000 Zimmerman, B. J. (2000). Attaining self-regulation: A social–cognitive perspective. In M. Boekaerts, P. Pintrich, &; M. Seidner (Eds.), Self-regulation: Theory, research, and applications (pp. 13–39). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar], Attaining self-regulation: A social-cognitive perspective, in M. Boekaerts, P. Pintrich, &; M. Seidner, Eds., Self-Regulation: Theory, Research, and Applications, pp. 13–39, Orlando, Florida, Academic Press) cyclical model of self-regulation and social–cognitive theory, this study tested the hypothesis that multi-modal psychological skills training (PST) would increase self-regulation behavior, self-efficacy, and psychological skill use in military pilot-trainees experiencing course-related learning difficulties. From pre- to post-intervention, findings showed that specific self-regulation behavior increased linearly. Likewise, significant increases in self-efficacy and psychological skill use occurred, along with concomitant reductions in anxiety and worry. Changes were generally retained at 2-month follow-up. PST highlights potential in modifying pilot-trainee cognitive and behavioral strategies to underpin learning, improve individual/cohort responsiveness, and importantly, cost effectiveness in training provision.     

SNARC (spatial–numerical association of response codes) meets SPARC (spatial–pitch association of response codes): Automaticity and interdependency in compatibility effects

Concepts, including the mental number line, or addressing pitch as high and low, suggest that the spatial–numerical and spatial–pitch association of response codes (SNARC and SPARC) effects are domain-specific and thus independent. Alternatively, there may be dependencies between these effects, because they share common automatic or controlled decision mechanisms. In two experiments, participants were presented with spoken numbers in different pitches; their numerical value, pitch, and response compatibility were varied systematically. This allowed us to study SNARC and SPARC effects in a factorial design (see also Fischer, Riello, Giordano, &; Rusconi, 2013 Fischer, M. H., Riello, M., Giordano, B. L., &; Rusconi, E. (2013). Singing numbers?…?in cognitive space--a dual-task study of the link between pitch, space, and numbers. Topics in Cognitive Science, 5(2), 354–366. Retrieved from http://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12017[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Participants judged the stimuli on numerical magnitude, pitch, or parity (odd–even). In all tasks, the SNARC and SPARC effects had superadditive interactions. These were interpreted as both effects sharing a common mechanism. The task variation probes the mechanism: In the magnitude judgement task, numerical magnitude was explicit, whereas pitch was implicit; in the pitch judgement task, it was vice versa. In the parity judgement task, both dimensions were implicit. Regardless of whether they were implicit or explicit, both SNARC and SPARC effects occurred in all tasks. We concluded that by not requiring focal attention the common mechanism operates automatically.     

Metacognition and low achievement in mathematics: The effect of training in the use of metacognitive skills to solve mathematical word problems

The central question underlying this study was whether metacognition training could enhance the two metacognition components—knowledge and skills—and the mathematical problem-solving capacities of normal children in grade 3. We also investigated whether metacognitive training had a differential effect according to the children's mathematics level. A total of 48 participants took part in this study, divided into an experimental and a control group, each subdivided into a lower and a normal achievers group. The training programme took an interactive approach in accordance with Schraw's (1998 Schraw, G. 1998. Promoting general metacognitive awareness. Instructional Science, 26: 113–125. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) recommendation and was carried out over five training sessions. Results indicated that children in the training group had significantly higher post-test metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive skills, and mathematical problem-solving scores. In addition, metacognitive training was particularly beneficial to the low achievers. Thus metacognitive training enabled the low achievers to make progress and solve the same number of problems on the post-test as the normal achievers solved on the pre-test.     

Attention,spatial integration,and the tail of response time distributions in Stroop task performance

A few studies have examined selective attention in Stroop task performance through ex-Gaussian analyses of response time (RT) distributions. It has remained unclear whether the tail of the RT distribution in vocal responding reflects spatial integration of relevant and irrelevant attributes, as suggested by Spieler, Balota, and Faust (2000 Spieler, D. H., Balota, D. A. and Faust, M. E. 2000. Levels of selective attention revealed through analyses of reaction time distributions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 26: 506–526. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Here, two colour–word Stroop experiments with vocal responding are reported in which the spatial relation between colour and word was manipulated. Participants named colours (e.g., green; say “green”) while trying to ignore distractors that were incongruent or congruent words (e.g., red or green), or neutral series of Xs. The vocal RT was measured. Colour words in colour, white words superimposed onto colour rectangles (Experiment 1), and colour rectangles combined with auditory words (Experiment 2) yielded Stroop effects in both the leading edge and the tail of the RT distributions. These results indicate that spatial integration is not necessary for effects in the tail to occur in vocal responding. It is argued that the findings are compatible with an association of the tail effects with task conflict.     

Training and education for therapeutic practitionership: “Trans-modern” perspectives

In this paper I revisit the theme of therapy training, examined in this journal a decade ago in House (1996 House, R. 1996. The professionalization of counselling: A coherent ‘case against’?. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 9(4): 343–358. [Taylor & Francis Online] [Google Scholar]. I first outline what I mean by the term “trans-modern” in the context of debates about “postmodern” and deconstructive approaches to therapy. I then explore the configuration that therapy training might plausibly take when technological rationality's positivistic certainties are dramatically undermined, and the path to becoming a therapy practitioner coheres more closely with the trans-modern, “New Paradigm” Zeitgeist–a world-view which both acknowledges the (albeit unbalanced) contributions of modernity, yet takes us well beyond modernity's constraining limitations. To illustrate my argument I focus on and problematize the role of theory in therapy training. I conclude with some speculations about plausible paths that a trans-modern approach to therapy training might profitably take in future.     

Abstract: A Multi-Level Model of Individual Differences in Speed/Accuracy Tradeoff (SATin)

Individuals performing an experimental cognitive task have a choice whether to favor accuracy, speed, or weight them both equally. Models of speed/ accuracy tradeoff have been proposed in the assessment literature (van der Linden, 2007 van der Linden, W. J. 2007. A hierarchical framework for modeling speed and accuracy on test items. Psychometrika, 72: 287–308. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and experimental literature (Ratcliff &; Rouder, 1998 Ratcliff, R. and Rouder, J. N. 1998. Modeling response times for two-choice decisions.. Psychological Science, 9: 347–357. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). However, these models do not estimate individual differences in choice of speed/ accuracy tradeoff at between- and within-subjects levels.

The top of Figure 1 presents the equations and path diagram for the SATin model. Individual differences in speed/ accuracy tradeoff will be modeled at two levels with, 1) variability in Tradeoff (between-subject level, Level 2) and 2) variability in c (within-subject level, Level 1). An individual's Tradeoff factor score represents the individual's distributional position relative to others regarding whether they favor speed (values < 0), accuracy (values > 0), or neither (value = 0). A negative c indicates that the individual is trading off speed and accuracy for these particular trials, whereas a positive and zero c indicate the individual is not trading off.

Abstract: A Multi-Level Model of Individual Differences in Speed/Accuracy Tradeoff (SATin)

All authors

Dan R. Johnson, William H. Beasley &; David E. Bard

https://doi.org/10.1080/00273170802640475

Published online:

18 December 2008

FIGURE 1 SATin Model Diagram.     

20.

The own-age face recognition bias in children and adults     

《Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006)》2013,66(1):17-23

Children recognize children's faces more accurately than adult faces, and adults recognize adult faces more accurately than children's faces (e.g., Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005 Anastasi, J. S. and Rhodes, M. G. 2005. An own-age bias in face recognition for children and older adults. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 12: 1043–1047. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This is the own-age bias. Research has shown that this bias is at least partially based on experience since trainee teachers show less of an own-age bias than do other adults (Harrison & Hole, 2009 Harrison, V. and Hole, G. J. 2009. Evidence for a contact-based explanation of the own-age bias in face recognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16: 264–269. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). The present research tested the own-age bias in three groups of children (age 4–6, 7–9, 10–12 years) and a group of adults in the recognition of three age groups of faces (age 7–9, 20–22, and 65–90 years). Results showed an own-age bias for 7- to 9-year-old children and adults. Specifically, children could recognize faces more accurately if they were less than two years different from their own age than if they were more than two years older or younger. These results are discussed in terms of short-term experience with faces creating biases, and this rapidly changes with age.     

The own-age face recognition bias in children and adults

Children recognize children's faces more accurately than adult faces, and adults recognize adult faces more accurately than children's faces (e.g., Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005 Anastasi, J. S. and Rhodes, M. G. 2005. An own-age bias in face recognition for children and older adults. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 12: 1043–1047. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This is the own-age bias. Research has shown that this bias is at least partially based on experience since trainee teachers show less of an own-age bias than do other adults (Harrison & Hole, 2009 Harrison, V. and Hole, G. J. 2009. Evidence for a contact-based explanation of the own-age bias in face recognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16: 264–269. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). The present research tested the own-age bias in three groups of children (age 4–6, 7–9, 10–12 years) and a group of adults in the recognition of three age groups of faces (age 7–9, 20–22, and 65–90 years). Results showed an own-age bias for 7- to 9-year-old children and adults. Specifically, children could recognize faces more accurately if they were less than two years different from their own age than if they were more than two years older or younger. These results are discussed in terms of short-term experience with faces creating biases, and this rapidly changes with age.