Solving the problem of creeping minimalism

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.     

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post-hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre-establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre-establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone metaethical arguments.     

Motivation to hide emotion and children's understanding of the distinction between real and apparent emotions

The authors investigated the extent to which children's understanding of the distinction between real and apparent emotions varied according to the motivation to hide emotions. Children, aged 6-7 and 10-11 years, were read stories designed to elicit either prosocial or self-protective motivated display rules and were asked to predict the facial expressions the protagonists would make to hide felt emotions. Children were found to understand the distinction between real and apparent emotions very well, independently of the type of motivation. Contrary to predictions, boys understood this distinction better than did girls when the motivation to hide positive emotions was prosocial. Children perceived neutralization as the most appropriate strategy to hide felt emotions, followed by masking.     

The operant-respondent distinction: Future directions

The operant-respondent distinction has provided a major organizing framework for the data generated through the experimental analysis of behavior. Problems have been encountered, however, in using it as an explanatory concept for such phenomena as avoidance and conditioned suppression. Data now exist that do not fit neatly into the framework. Moreover, the discovery of autoshaping has highlighted difficulties in isolating the two types of behavior and conditioning. Despite these problems, the operant-respondent framework remains the most successful paradigm currently available for organizing behavioral data. Research and theoretical efforts should therefore probably be directed to modifying the framework to account for disparate data.     

Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged

Richard Hare argues that the fundamental assumptions of Kant's ethical system should have led Kant to utilitarianism, had Kant not confused a norm's generality with its universality, and hence adopted rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra Hare that the gap between Kantian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. This article shows that Timmermann's claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and metaethical aspects of each view, and that Hare's attempt to bridge the gap between Kantian and consequentialist ethics is immune to Timmermann's criticisms. Furthermore, the term “Kantian ethics” is often misleading, and should typically be qualified as either “Kantian rationalism” or “Kantian deontology” in order to avoid confusions of the sort Timmermann falls into.     

Osteoporosis and risk of fracture: reference class problems are real

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - Elselijn Kingma argues that Christopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory does not show how the reference classes it uses—namely, age groups of a sex...     

Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism

This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that Horwich's anti-primitivist version of minimalism must be rejected because, already for formal reasons, the truth-schema does not achieve a positive explication of any property of propositions. The second goal is to develop a more moderate primitivist version of minimalism according to which the truth-schema is admittedly powerless to underpin truth with something more basic but it still succeeds in giving a complete account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a proposition to be true. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Error Theory and the Concept of Morality

Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality requires one to act against one's self‐interest while insisting on the categorical, inescapable, or overriding status of moral considerations: they argue that morality requires magic, then (rightly) claim that there is no such thing as magic. An alternate eudaimonist conception of morality is introduced which itself has an older provenance than the social point of view, dating to the ancient Greeks. Eudaimonism answers to the normative requirements of morality, yet does not require magic. Thus, the initial motivation for error theory is removed.     

AGAINST METAETHICAL IMPERIALISM: Several Arguments for Equal Partnerships between the Deontic and Aretaic

Virtue and deontological ethics are now commonly contrasted as rival approaches to moral inquiry. However, I argue that neither metaethical party should seek complete, solitary domination of the ethical domain. Reductive treatments of the right or the virtuous, as well as projects that abandon the former or latter, are bound to leave us with a sadly diminished map of the moral territories crucial to our lives. Thus, it is better for the two parties to seek a more cordial and equal relationship, one that permits metaethical pluralism, and acknowledges mutual dependence. I do not seek to prescribe how that relationship should look: this essay offers less a positive metaethical position than a prolegomenon to such a position, one that attempts to head off harmful attempts to reduce the territory of the aretaic to that of the deontic, or that of the deontic to the aretaic.     

Examples of real world engineering ethics problems

Nine examples are presented illustrating the kinds of problems encountered in actual practice by conscientious engineers. These cases are drawn fom the records of the IEEE Ethics Committee, and from the experience of the ethics help-line initiated recently by the Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Science. They range from situations in which companies try to cheat one another to those in which human health and safety are jeopardized. In one case, an engineer learned that even a quiet resignation can prove very costly in a personal sense. Some ways in which professional societies might make ethical practice of engineering somewhat easier are mentioned. An carlier, shorter version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Ethics in Engineering and Computer Science, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, March 21–24, 1999, and can be accessed on line at http://onlineethics.org/cases/unger.html. In all cases described in this paper, the names of individuals and organizations have been suppressed or fictionalized. Professor Unger was Chairman of the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) Ethics Committee (1997–1998).     

The infant's concept of agency: the distinction between social and nonsocial objects

The primary purpose of this study was to examine young infants' discrimination between the abilities of social and nonsocial objects to serve as agents. Thirty-one infants between 8 months and 8 days old and 14 months and 19 days old were studied. The children's communicative skills were evaluated through frustration episodes in which a toy was taken away in order to elicit communicative behaviors toward the mother. Visual fixation time was compared for events in which an inanimate object moved independently and events in which a human being was the agent. Analysis of the magnitude of decrease of attending responses revealed that the older infants took longer to process anomalous events, whereas the younger infants manifested more interest for events in which an animate being played the role of agent. The findings suggest that infants can distinguish between the causal powers of social and nonsocial objects by the end of the first year.     

The distinction between desires and intentions

Within attitude theory the concepts of desires and intentions are not differentiated but are often treated as synonyms. However, we argue that there are theoretical reasons for distinguishing between desires and intentions, and we articulate three main criteria, perceived performability, action‐connectedness, and temporal framing, that differentiate between the two constructs. Two studies are reported to test the distinction. Study 1 (n = 188) revealed that desires, compared to intentions, are less performable, are less connected to actions, and are enacted over longer time frames. Study 2 (n = 249) showed, among other things, that the perceived feasibility for actions that are desired and intended is higher than for those that are only desired, but only when the action refers to relatively short time frames (i.e. 1 week or 4 weeks vs. 4 months). The findings are discussed in the light of the distinction between intentions and desires and the role that they play in individual decision making. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.