The Contribution of Social Relationships to Children’s Happiness

The association between happiness and social relationships was examined in 9- to 12-year-old children. Participants included 432 children and their parents. Children’s happiness was assessed using self-rating scales, parent’s ratings, and the Happiness and Satisfaction Subscale from the Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale, Second Edition (Piers and Herzberg 2002). Children’s social relations were assessed with items from the Piers-Harris scale and questionnaires given to the children and their parents. These items were grouped into two positive (i.e., family and friends) and two negative categories (i.e., negative relations with peers and behaving badly toward others). Variance in children’s happiness was partially accounted for by positive social interactions involving the family (e.g., children agreeing that they are important members of their family) and friends (e.g., parents reporting that their children visit with friends more frequently). Negative social interactions also explained variance in children’s happiness including negative relations with peers (e.g., children agreeing that they feel left out of things) and behaving badly toward others (e.g., children agreeing that they are often mean to other people, and they cause trouble for their family). Demographic variables related to the family (i.e., number of siblings, age of parents, and marital status of parents) were only weakly, or not at all, associated with children’s happiness. The results parallel findings from the literature involving adults and adolescents; social relationships are significant correlates and predictors of happiness.     

Freud’s dream of the double

While the motif of the double serves a prominent role in Freud’s writings from early on, this essay is an examination of the determinative power of the double in two key texts, texts in which specific, new sets doubles emerge for the first time in Freud’s career. Totem and Taboo features a double that manifests itself primarily in the form of ambivalence. Beyond the Pleasure Principle features a double that manifests itself primarily in the form of a very peculiar conflict that also entails complicity.     

Patients’ Pregnancies During Treatment: The Influence of the Analyst’s Psychology

Psychoanalytic therapists are today far more aware of countertransference effects, intersubjectivity, and mutual influence. The area that has been explored least in this two-person appreciation of psychoanalytic process is the effect of the psychodynamics of the therapist in a wide sense—that is, how the therapist brings a whole psychology, with a wide array of potential transferences, to each treatment. Triggered by the unexpected announcement of a patient’s expecting a baby, the author reviewed his practice and found that a large portion of his women patients ages 30–45 had become pregnant during therapy or psychoanalysis. The particulars were varied: how much the patient wanted a baby, whether the treatment was psychotherapy or psychoanalysis, the patients’ personality structure. Was the analyst’s psychology a common factor? The paper presents three quite different case examples and examines whether and how the author’s developmental and inner experience of women, sexuality, pregnancy could have contributed to a dyadic process that, in turn, could lead to pregnancy. If such effects happen, then it is important to look beyond and behind “anonymity” and “neutrality,” as well as momentary countertransferences, to the real-life effects that we have in our treatments.     

Nelson Pike’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Religion

In this paper I attempt to capture the essence of Nelson Pike’s contribution to the philosophy of religion. My summary of his insights will revolve around three general topics: omniscience (and in particular its relation to human freedom), omnipotence (and in particular its relation to the existence of human suffering), and mysticism (with a focus on the question of whether and in what sense mystic visions can be sources of knowledge). Although the details vary in interesting ways, his work on these topics largely consists of recognizing an important challenge to the viability of the relevant doctrine or framework, sharpening that challenge by presenting it in a more forceful way, and then offering and assessing potential responses. Pike’s writings are characterized by exemplary rigor and relentless clarity, and together they constitute a rich (and under-appreciated) source of insight.     

Theology After the Scientific Revolution: The Significance of Nancey Murphy’s Contribution to Philosophy of Religion

This paper evaluates Nancey Murphy’s contribution to philosophy of religion paying special attention to epistemology and ethics. I argue that Murphy’s intellectual moves are motivated by a reflective and constructive engagement—around particular loci such as human knowledge, divine action, and the moral nature of the universe—with reductive materialism as a rival tradition of inquiry. At paper’s end, I suggest an amendment in Murphy’s contribution to ethics.     

From Freud’s dream-work to Bion’s work of dreaming: The changing conception of dreaming in psychoanalytic theory

Bion moved psychoanalytic theory from Freud's theory of dream-work to a concept of dreaming in which dreaming is the central aspect of all emotional functioning. In this paper, I first review historical, theoretical, and clinical aspects of dreaming as seen by Freud and Bion. I then propose two interconnected ideas that I believe reflect Bion’s split from Freud regarding the understanding of dreaming. Bion believed that all dreams are psychological works in progress and at one point suggested that all dreams contain elements that are akin to visual hallucinations. I explore and elaborate Bion’s ideas that all dreams contain aspects of emotional experience that are too disturbing to be dreamt, and that, in analysis, the patient brings a dream with the hope of receiving the analyst’s help in completing the unconscious work that was entirely or partially too disturbing for the patient to dream on his own. Freud views dreams as mental phenomena with which to understand how the mind functions, but believes that dreams are solely the ‘guardians of sleep,’ and not, in themselves, vehicles for unconscious psychological work and growth until they are interpreted by the analyst. Bion extends Freud's ideas, but also departs from Freud and re-conceives of dreaming as synonymous with unconscious emotional thinking – a process that continues both while we are awake and while we are asleep. From another somewhat puzzling perspective, he views dreams solely as manifestations of what the dreamer is unable to think.     

Leon Trotsky’s Contribution to the Marxist Theory of History

Trotsky’s contribution to historical materialism has been subject to two broadly defined critical assessments. Detractors have tended to dismiss his interpretation of Marxism as a form of productive force determinism, while admirers have tended to defend his Marxism as a voluntarist negation of the same. In this essay I argue that both of these opinions share an equally caricatured interpretation of Second International Marxism against which Trotsky is compared. By contrast, I argue that Trotsky’s Marxism can best be understood as a powerful application and deepening of the strongest elements of Second International methodology to a novel set of problems. Thus, against Trotsky’s admirers, I locate his Marxism as both emerging out of, in addition to breaking with, Second International Marxism; while, against his critics, I argue that it was precisely the strengths of this earlier interpretation of Marxism that informed Trotsky’s powerful contributions to historical materialism: his concept of combined and uneven development and his discussion of the role of individual agents within the Marxist interpretation of history.     

The form of the soul ― on the body in Freud’s psychoanalysis

To formulate the problem of the relation between body and soul in terms of how one should understand the relation between consciousness and the brain, or in terms of explaining how mind can arise out of matter, is a modern and far from innocent tendency that has instigated the whole spectrum of theories and answers suggested by the philosophy of mind of the so-called Analytic tradition during the 20th century. During the last 5 decades, we have seen a number of attempts at incorporating Freud into this discussion about the relation between body and soul. In this article, the author develops an argument according to which the philosophy of mind of the Analytic tradition is not really an appropriate intellectual environment for Freud´s theory of the body and its constitutive rôle. Rather, we should turn to phenomenology and transcendental philosophy where the body is thematized, not in terms of matter taken to give rise to consciousness in an empirical sense, but rather in terms of the “lived body” that is taken, in a transcendental sense, to constitute the organization of meaning in our conscious and our unconscious psychological life. On the basis of an outline of this phenomenological theory, the author argues that Freud, most of all in his theory of psychosexual development, thematizes the body as the form of the soul.     

Western Psychology and Muslim Psychology in Dialogue: Comparisons Between a Qura’nic Theory of Personality and Freud’s and Jung’s Ideas

In this paper, comparisons are made between a newly developed Qura’nic theory of personality and the Freudian and Jungian theories of the mind. Notable similarities were found between the Freudian id, ego, superego and neurosis and the Qura’nic nafs ammarah besoa’ (evil-commanding psyche), a’ql (intellect), al-nafs al-lawammah (the reproachful psyche) and al-nafs al-marid’a (the sick psyche), respectively. Noteworthy resemblances were detected also between the Jungian concepts collective unconscious, archetypes, Self and individuation and the Qura’nic constructs roh (spirit), al-asmaa’ (the names), qalb (heart), and al-nafs al-mutmainnah (the serene psyche), respectively. These parallels, as well as the departure points, between the models are thoroughly discussed and analyzed. The comparisons performed in this paper open new avenues for dialogue between western models of the psyche and their Muslim counterparts, a dialogue that can enrich both perspectives and advance the field of psychology.     

The Duty of Memory Revisited: Ricoeur’s Contribution to a Crisis in French Historiography

The relationship between memory and history, which has preoccupied historiography and the philosophy of history since the middle of the nineteenth century, took a particular course in France at the end of the millennium. The forms this relationship took in this particular context have been the subject of heated debate around whether the reconstruction of the past should bear the sign of a moral imperative or, on the contrary, it should be kept away from any moral conditioning. To address this question and underline its particular relevance to the present, I will revisit a significant debate, based around Paul Ricoeur’s interpretation of the duty of memory developed in his book Memory, History, Forgetting. I will do this by means of a three-step approach. First, a short introduction will provide several guidelines for understanding the issues at stake in the debate in which Ricoeur was caught and explanations regarding the significance of the main notions around which the discussions took place, i.e., the duty and work of memory. Second, I will identify how historical debates, political decisions and civic concerns about the past gradually coagulated into two different “camps” in France during the 1980s and 1990s, i.e., the advocates of memory against those of history, foreshadowing the emergence of a historiographical crisis, the stakes of which I will analyse in detail. Finally, I will show how Ricoeur’s solution to this debate, i.e., an incomplete dialectic between the duty and the work of memory, developed on the horizon of justice, continues to have relevance for the present, being an innovative form of “defatalizing” the past.

     

Process as reality: Kierkegaard’s aesthetic approach to the ethical

This paper makes the point that Kierkegaard’s ideas concerning individuality cannot be understood clearly without placing them in the context of what I am calling ontological isolation. This means the radical deprivation by selfhood of every aspect of reality, to the point where not even the possibility or illusion of reality is available to the self. In this context the self is required to become itself, forming itself in and out of its own absolute nothingness, ontological destitution, or wrongness. With this form of isolation as our investigative key, we unlock what Kierkegaard means by his command to become a self, where becoming itself, in absence of prior possibility, constitutes the reality of self, and why Kierkegaard places crucial emphasis, contrary to the tradition, on the priority of negativity. By having the self originate itself in “absolute difficulty,” or that wherein the act itself, or pure doing without result, is primary, Kierkegaard now replaces metaphysics with ethics in order of priority, and places the self inseparably in a world that responds directly to that act. I show here a parallel between Kierkegaard’s approach to ethical action with that of artistic creation of a kind of world, the work of art. In doing so I reveal the inadequacy of interpretations that would impose traditional forms of isolation, social and cosmic, on Kierkegaard, as some of his critics do, or that would place Kierkegaard’s ethics within traditional developmental models, as many of his sympathizers do.     

Children’s judgements of the obligation to help: The role of relationships

ABSTRACT

Children at ages 7 (N = 24, M _age = 6.96, SD _age =.20), 9 (N = 29, M _age = 8.76, SD _age =.44), and 11 (N = 25, M _age = 10.76, SD _age =.66), and adults (N = 30) made judgements about the obligation to help when it conflicts with a personal desire. Across ages, the obligation to help was judged to be strongest when there were positive or neutral past interactions with the person in need of help, compared to mean past interactions. Expectation of a future friendship predicted the obligation to help, even after controlling for age and sex. However, we found no effect of children helping gender in-group members more. Evidence for altruism was not found: expected positive emotions did not predict the obligation to help. We conclude that an expectation of future relationship is the strongest predictor of helping obligation.     

Psychology is About Persons: On Brinkmann’s Expansion of Harré’s Hybrid Psychology

Brinkmann has recently put forward an integrative theory of the mind by expanding Harré’s hybrid psychology. The theory is integrative because it establishes that in order for one to gain a full understanding of the mind—which is represented as a set of dispositions—one has to take into account theories about the brain, the body, social practices, and technological artifacts. All of these are said to be ‘mediators’ upon which the mind depends. An important claim underlying the theory is that in psychology the basic ontological unit is the person. We agree with Brinkmann both on this and on the dispositional nature of the mind. Still, he does not make a strong case for the latter. Furthermore, we believe the concept of mediation is by no means helpful to produce an integrative view in psychology, not only because the theoretical job of such a concept is unclear but also because qua unifying concept it may end up undermining the ontological primacy of the person (in psychology). In this paper we refer to these issues and suggest some ideas that may help improve Brinkmann’s (and Harré’s) proposal.     

Freud’s Utopia revisited: The International Psychoanalytic University Berlin

Abstract

The International Psychoanalytic University was founded in 2009. This article provides an outline of its core tasks, study programs, research activities, and infrastructure.     

The Verbal Portrait: Erik H. Erikson’s Contribution to Psychoanalytic Discourse

This article makes the case that Erik H. Erikson developed a form of psychoanalytic discourse—the verbal portrait—which, although not unprecedented, became a focal feature of his work, and the testing ground for the cogency of his major contribution to psychoanalysis (the concept of identity). It suggests that Erikson was inspired to develop the verbal portrait because he came to psychoanalysis from art and was, in fact, a portrait artist. Drawing especially on the work of Richard Brilliant, it presents the view that a portrait is a portrayal of the subject’s identity and goes on to show how Erikson’s memorial to the cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict is representative of the verbal portrait.     

The Objective and Subjective Sides of Human Moral Consciousness and Their Relation: Author’s Reply to Reviews of Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

Confusion of Wills: Otto Rank’s Contribution to an Understanding of Childism

Drawing from Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's psychological and psychodynamic study of prejudice as a starting point, this paper explores the phenomenon of childism—namely, the prejudice again children—from a Rankian psychodynamic perspective. Young-Bruehl argues that childism is comparable to prejudices such as anti-Semitism, sexism, and racism, and serves such purposes as the elimination of an individual's personhood, sexual exploitation, and the erasure of identity. Adding to Young-Bruehl's analysis of the social and psychological causes and effects of prejudice against children, this paper will examine the nature and dangers of childism explicit and implicit in the writings of Otto Rank. We will examine the development of creative will in child maturation—a development that childist forms of prejudice may obstruct, inhibit, and compromise. We will see that Young-Bruehl's foundational writing on childism echoes many of the observations and writings of Otto Rank in regard to the prejudice against children, and how such prejudice deeply diminishes, undermines, and fractures our unfolding lives and creative will in a shared world.