"以生言性"的传统与孟子性善论

This article analyses the tradition of “articulating xing in terms of sheng” and related other expressions, and also examines the debate between Mencius and Gaozi concerning “xing is known by sheng.” It claims that while Mencius’ “human nature is good” discourse is influenced by the interpretive tradition of “articulating xing in terms of sheng”, Mencius also transcends and develops this tradition. Therefore it is only when Mencius’ views about the goodness of human nature are understood in the context of this interpretive tradition that his ideas can be fully understood. Utilizing this framework, the Confucian understanding of rights is then explored. Translated by Andrew Lambert from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (7): 36–42     

Human Nature and Moral Cultivation in the Guodian 郭店 Text of the Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 (Nature Derives from Mandate)

The debate over whether human nature is good or bad and how this is related to self-cultivation was central in the minds of traditional Chinese thinkers. This essay analyzes the interrelationship between the key concepts of xing 性 (human nature), qing 情 (human emotions/feelings), and xin 心 (heart-mind) in the Guodian text of the Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 (Nature Derives from Mandate) discovered in 1993 in Hubei province. The intellectual engagements evident in this Guodian text emerge as more syncretic and dynamic than those that can be found in the discourse of any single tradition, such as Gaozi, Mencius, or Xunzi. Its thesis on human nature and moral cultivation reveals the existence of a possibly more diverse intellectual discourse from which the different foci of philosophical debate represented by later thinkers developed.     

Two Senses of “Wei 偽”: A New Interpretation of Xunzi’s Theory of Human Nature

In contrast to the traditional and ordinary interpretation of Xunzi??s theory of human nature, which considers Xunzi??s theory as claiming that human nature is bad or evil, this article aims at, first, arguing that the interpretation is wrong or at least incomplete and, second, constructing a new interpretation that, according to Xunzi??s text, there are some factors in human nature that are able to promote good behaviors. I shall demonstrate that some major paragraphs in Xunzi??s text were misinterpreted and misarranged, analyze that the word wei (artifice) in the chapter of ??Zhengming?? has two different but related senses, one of which designates some of the potential capacities of human nature, and argue that the 23 words in the chapter of ??Rongru?? should not be deleted as redundant, as was done by the two famous philologists in Qing dynasdy, Wang Niansun and Wang Xianqian.     

From Desire to Civility: Is Xunzi a Hobbesian?

This article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s understandings of human nature are qualitatively different, which is responsible for the difference in their respective normative political theory of a civil polity. This article has two main theses: first, where Hobbes’s deepest concern was with human beings’ unsocial passions, Xunzi was most concerned with human beings’ appetitive desires (yu 欲), material self-interest, and resulting social strife; second, as a result, where Hobbes strove to transform the pathological (anti-)politics of resentment into the politics of recognition by creating rational egalitarian citizenship under the all-encompassing constitutional sovereign power, Xunzi attempted to nourish human beings’ basic appetitive desires (yu 欲) by instituting a li 禮 ordered civil entity. This article concludes by showing how Confucian civility that Xunzi reconstructed by means of the li 禮 can effectively deal with unsocial passions.     

Xunzi and the primitivists on natural spontaneity (xìng 性) and coercion

This article explores two opposing views from Warring States China concerning the value of human natural spontaneity (hereafter xìng 性) and large-scale government coercion. On the one hand, the Ruist (Confucian) philosopher Xunzi championed a comprehensive and coercive ethical, political, and social system or Way (dào 道) that he believed would lead to social order and moral cultivation while opposing people’s xìng. On the other hand, the authors of roughly books 8–10 of Zhuangzi, the primitivists, criticized a Way bearing a striking resemblance to Xunzi’s on the grounds that it seriously harms people by opposing their xìng. I argue that the primitivists offer compelling reasons for Xunzi to modify his own Way regarding its relationship with xìng, though their own proposed alternative Way is not very attractive. I conclude with a brief discussion of one primitivist-inspired alternative view found in the Lü Shi Chun Qiu, which plausibly suggests that one way of respecting people’s xìng is by offering them opportunities to explore their natural abilities.     

Between Good and Evil: Xunzi’s Reinterpretation of the Hegemonic Rule as Decent Governance

This essay investigates Xunzi’s political philosophy of ba dao (Hegemonic Rule). It argues that Xunzi’s practical philosophy of ba dao was developed in the course of resolving the tension between theory and practice latent in Mencius’s account of ba dao. Its central claim is that contra Mencius who remained torn between his ideal political theory of ba dao and the practical utility and moral value of ba dao, Xunzi creatively re-appropriated ba dao as a “morally decent” (if not morally ideal) statecraft, within the parameter of practical Confucian philosophy. After examining the moral and political value of ba dao in both domestic and international governance, the essay concludes by arguing that Xunzi’s defense of ba dao should be understood in the context of what I call “negative Confucianism,” without which the realization of the Confucian moral-political ideal (or positive Confucianism) is impossible.     

Zhi 志 in Mencius: a Chinese notion of moral agency

Zhi is an important Chinese notion that conveys among other things human capacity to set aims, to determine a course of action, or to persist in a resolve. The term naturally turns up in Chinese contributions to Western Free Will debate. In this paper, I explain zhi by working out a comparison that goes from East to West. I do a three-fold textual analysis of zhi focusing on the Mencius. I outline different usages found in the text, examine a nuanced, dominant meaning suggested in 2A.2, and discuss notional features based on language patterns. My analysis yields a more homegrown understanding of zhi which I shall compare with Western expressions of moral agency.     

孟子性善论新探

In Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature, fate is the original source of xing (nature). Heart is the appearance of nature. There are two aspects to nature and heart: ti (form) and yong (function). From the perspective of form, nature is liangzhi (the goodness in conscience) and liangneng (the inborn ability to be good) in human beings and heart is human’s conscience and original heart. From the perspective of function, nature is the four things of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, and heart consists in compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong. As the foundation for the theory of the original goodness in human nature, conscience and heart are a combination of human moral instinct, moral rationality and moral volition, whereas moral instinct gradually rises to moral volition and passes through moral rationality. Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature is not a theory of future goodness, but a theory of original goodness. Translated by Wang Bei from Qilu Xuekan 齐鲁学刊(Journal of Qilu), 2006, (4): 16–20     

Is Xunzi a utilitarian? Revisiting a disagreement

ABSTRACT

In Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts (e.g. Fung Yu-lan, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan). This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, and he evaluates all intellectual works and political behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies.     

Second Nature,Critical Theory and Hegel’s Phenomenology

ABSTRACT

While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase ‘second nature’ in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures ‘natural consciousness’, ‘natural notion’, and ‘inorganic nature’, in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the ‘official’ version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an ‘unofficial’ version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a ‘second nature’.     

Shu and zhong as the virtue of the Golden Rule: a Confucian contribution to contemporary virtue ethics

I aim to show how Confucian philosophy can contribute to the contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics education by arguing that it has the resource to address a lacuna in Aristotelian ethics. Aristotelian ethics, which is arguably the main resource of contemporary virtue ethics, lacks a virtue that corresponds to the notion of loving each person as one’s self or the Golden Rule. To be more precise, Aristotelian ethics has no virtue about loving all people as one’s self, although philia comes close but is precisely limited because it lacks universality. However, I believe that Dai Zhen’s interpretation of the Confucian virtues of shu and zhong does have this universal scope which philia lacks. For Dai, the ground for loving another is not any characteristic that a particular group of people have in common, such as, in the case of philia, being virtuous. Rather, the ground is universal human nature itself.     

Kant and the transparency of the mind

ABSTRACT

It has become standard to treat Kant’s characterization of pure apperception as involving the claim that questions about what I think are transparent to questions about the world. By contrast, empirical apperception is thought to be non-transparent, since it involves a kind of inner observation of my mental states. I propose a reading that reverses this: pure apperception is non-transparent, because conscious only of itself, whereas empirical apperception is transparent to the world. The reading I offer, unlike the standard one, can accommodate Kant’s claim that the I of pure apperception is the same as the I of empirical apperception.     

Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.

Simone Weil: The Ethics of Affliction and the Aesthetics of Attention

ABSTRACT

For Simone Weil the invocation of ‘rights’ to address extreme human suffering–what she calls ‘affliction’–is ‘ludicrously inadequate’. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the ‘cry’ of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil’s concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil’s ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention.     

Li,Qing, and Ethical Transformation in the Xunzi

This paper analyses the connection between knowing Dao and ethical transformation in Xunzi’s thought. While there have been many discussions concerning what Dao is and how one may come to Dao, there has not been sufficient attention on how knowing Dao leads to ethical transformation. In Section 2, I explicate Xunzi’s concept of bi 蔽 (obscurity) and suggests that one’s not knowing Dao has to do with a certain problematic state of the heart/mind. In Section 3, I analyse xu虛 (vacating), yi 一 (focusing), and jing 靜 (stilling), which are remedial practices for knowing Dao, and bring out the importance of discerning li 理 for Xunzi. In Sections 4 and 5, I propose an interpretation of the relation between li 理 and qing 情 in the process of ethical transformation. In Section 6, I highlight some remaining ambiguities that can be further investigated to deepen our understanding of Xunzi’s thought.     

WORLDLY AND UNWORLDLY FEELINGS,FABRICATION AND LETTING GO

ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a framework for understanding vedanā and emotion in relation to each other, and both of them in relation to awakening. The vedanā (or feeling tone) that arises in mental experience will be shown to be central to emotion. Western views of emotion will be examined alongside some of the Buddha’s teachings on vedanā. The paper will show mental vedanā, and human emotion in the context of the two psychological orientations of ‘fabrication’ and ‘letting go’, which are then correlated with the Buddha’s notions of ‘worldly’ and ‘unworldly’ feelings. The paper proposes that such contextualisation is useful towards the development of a clear intellectual understanding of the nature of feelings, while (more importantly) it could support practitioners in a process of meditative inquiry and transformation.     

Frank in mind: a journey to self

Abstract

This paper describes two years’ intensive psychotherapy with an 11 year old boy I shall call Lou, who as a result of traumatic experiences in his early life, struggled to integrate a robust sense of self and in particular to find accord with a sense of himself as male. The impact of maternal depression, paternal gender dysphoria and domestic violence are discussed in relation to this young boy’s capacity to resolve the ordinary Oedipal challenge and find narcissistic value in a male body image to consolidate his gender identity. Concomitant difficulties with separation from his mother and aggression towards himself and others significantly impacted his ability to manage in a mainstream school environment and he was excluded at the time the therapy began. A clinical narrative is presented which illustrates Lou’s journey in psychotherapy, where he began to engage and allow links to be made. He sought to understand his position in a world that did not make sense to him, to face a hitherto ‘unthinkable’ past and to integrate disparate aspects of himself including a male gender identity. Notably Lou’s creation of ‘Frank’ constructed from dead, lost and reanimated objects is described and the actual and symbolic functions of this therapy object are discussed in relation to his internal development and the progress of the work. Parallels are drawn with Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein, where the creature strives for psychological birth and understanding. Lou and I struggled in the paradox of the themes of his narrative; a male/female father; potency and castration; corruption and repair and how to be a boy, held and helped in part through the paternal function of a female therapist.