Eichberg’s ‘Phenomenology’ of Sport: A Phenomenal Confusion

This paper defends philosophical phenomenology against a hostile review in the previous issue of this journal. It tries to explain what philosophical phenomenology is, and the possibilities for its empirical application; whilst also showing that Eichberg’s method is idiosyncratic, problematic and not interested in philosophical phenomenology at all. It presents the phenomenological concept of phenomenon, which is neither concrete nor abstract, and contrasts it to Eichberg’s understanding of empirical concrete phenomena. Finally, the paper scrutinises Eichberg’s empirical method, which has deep problems of its own, and in any case, finds unsuitable its characterisation as ‘phenomenology’     

Bhartṛhari’s Verbal Holism: Some Hermeneutical Queries

One of the main problems regarding language which has bothered philosophers since antiquity is that it often misleads us. Linguistic understanding inevitably involves a subject who understands and the subject-matter or content of what she understands. Since the subject-matter of linguistic understanding is externally given to the subject as text or spoken word, linguistic understanding, therefore, is both subjective and objective at the same time and ineluctably involves interpretation on the part of the subject. But the moment we grant the subjective participation in understanding, the problem of universality of meaning would inevitably raise its head. This problem has been addressed in different ways by different thinkers across history and cultures. Even though some of the ancient Indian thinkers like Bhartṛhari mainly focus on understanding of the Vedic texts, they could probably have important clues for the problem of universality in understanding through language as it is posed by hermeneutic thinkers starting from St. Augustine in medieval period up to Gadamer and Habermas in more recent times. This paper attempts to explore and examine Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of verbal holism from the point of view of the problem of universality in hermeneutics.

     

Holism and Emergence: Dynamical Complexity Defeats Laplace’s Demon

Abstract

The paradigm of Laplacean determinism combines three regulative principles: determinism, predictability, and the explanatory adequacy of universal laws together with purely local conditions. Historically, it applied to celestial mechanics, but it has been expanded into an ideal for scientific theories whose cogency is often not questioned. Laplace’s demon is an idealization of mechanistic scientific method. Its principles together imply reducibility, and rule out holism and emergence. I will argue that Laplacean determinism fails even in the realm of planetary dynamics, and that it does not give suitable criteria for explanatory success except within very well defined and rather exceptional domains. Ironically, the very successes of Laplacean method in the Solar System were made possible only by processes that are not themselves tractable to Laplacean methodology. The results of some of these processes were first observed in 1964, and violate the Lapacean requirements of locality and predictability, opening the door to holism and nonreducibility, i.e., emergence. Despite the falsification of Laplacean methodology, the explanatory resources of holism and emergence remain in scientific limbo, though emergence has been used somewhat indiscriminately in recent scientific literature. I make some remarks at the end about the proper use of emergence in its traditional sense going back to C.D. Broad.     

On ‘Defending The Phenomenal Concept Strategy’

I argue that Diaz-Leon fails to defend the phenomenal concept strategy against Stoljar's criticism because she fails to give us any general reasons for thinking that conditionals that involve psychologically distinct concepts could be a priori.     

Holism: Revolution or reminder?

Conclusion Among the four propositions considered in this paper, we have found two which can contribute to a holistic environmental ethic: individuals acquire some of their value through participating in communities, including biotic communities, and wholes, including biotic communities, can have values which are not the sum of the values of the individuals composing them. However, accepting these propositions does not represent a revolutionary break distinguishing holism from traditional value theories or ethics. On the other hand, the holistic propositions we considered which would clearly differentiate holism from (at least some) traditional value theories and ethics are unacceptable. Consequently, if the propositions we have discussed fairly represent what goes under the name of holism, then rather than being a new kind of ethic, a viable ethical holism will make its contribution by emphasizing the communal elements of traditional ethics which have sometimes been neglected in glorifications of the individual. This would not be an inconsiderable contribution, philosophically, socially, or environmentally.     

McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism

In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid.     

Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality?

Axiomathes - This paper addresses the title question and provides an argument for the conclusion that so-called phenomenal intentionality, in both its relational and non-relational construals,...     

Wallace’s and Darwin’s natural selection theories

Synthese - This work takes a stand on whether Wallace should be regarded as co-author of the theory of natural selection alongside Darwin as he is usually considered on behalf of his alleged...     

How Today’s Shocks Predict Tomorrow’s Leaving

Purpose

This research explores “shocking events” as part of the unfolding model of turnover, extending our understanding of the influence of various types of shocks on future voluntary employee separations.

Design/Methodology/Approach

1536 new hires at a large financial institution reported shocks monthly during their first 8 months at work as well as their job satisfaction and perceptions of marketability. We used event history to estimate the basic distributional properties of the shocks and Cox proportional hazards models to examine the effects of shocks on job satisfaction and turnover over the subsequent year as reported by the organization.

Findings

Organizational shocks generally occur earlier than personal shocks. Further, unexpected shocks have a stronger impact than expected shocks on subsequent turnover. Finally, the effects of organizational shocks on turnover are mediated by job satisfaction, whereas personal shocks have direct effects on turnover.

Implications

Our findings offer evidence for the utility of the shock construct in the unfolding model of turnover and speak to the importance of encouraging managers to monitor shocks on an ongoing basis in order to predict when different types of shocks will occur and their likely influence on turnover.

Originality/Value

Ours is the first study to examine shocks as they occur. This is a contrast to prior studies that relied on retrospective accounts. Thus, we are able to test new hypotheses (e.g., direct effects vs. mediation) that expand the unfolding model of turnover.

     

Il’enkov’s Hegel

This paper examines Hegel’s place in the philosophy of Eval’d Il’enkov (1924–1979). Hegel’s ideas had a huge impact on Il’enkov’s conception of the nature of philosophy and of the philosopher’s mission, and they formed the core of his distinctive account of thought and its place in nature. At the same time, Il’enkov was victimized for his “Hegelianism” throughout his career, from the time he was sacked from Moscow State University in 1955 to the ideological criticisms that preceded his death in 1979. After considering Hegel’s influence on the history of Russian thought, the paper focuses on Hegelian themes in Il’enkov’s 1974 book, Dialekti?eskaja logika and evaluates their philosophical significance. Finally, parallels are explored between Il’enkov’s situation at the end of his life and the plight of Nikolaj Bukharin, incarcerated in the Lubjanka prison in 1936 and at work on Philosophical arabesques. Both thinkers confronted the contradiction between their confidence in the rationality of history and the tragic absurdity of Soviet reality, and both responded by affirming their fidelity to Lenin and his vision of Marxism. In this way, they sought to make sense of their respective situations in the face of extreme adversity. That they so much as thought it worth trying owed much to Hegel’s influence.     

Hintikka’s Independence-Friendly Logic Meets Nelson’s Realizability

Inspired by Hintikka’s ideas on constructivism, we are going to ‘effectivize’ the game-theoretic semantics (abbreviated GTS) for independence-friendly first-order logic (IF-FOL), but in a somewhat different way than he did in the monograph ‘The Principles of Mathematics Revisited’. First we show that Nelson’s realizability interpretation—which extends the famous Kleene’s realizability interpretation by adding ‘strong negation’—restricted to the implication-free first-order formulas can be viewed as an effective version of GTS for FOL. Then we propose a realizability interpretation for IF-FOL, inspired by the so-called ‘trump semantics’ which was discovered by Hodges, and show that this trump realizability interpretation can be viewed as an effective version of GTS for IF-FOL. Finally we prove that the trump realizability interpretation for IF-FOL appropriately generalises Nelson’s restricted realizability interpretation for the implication-free first-order formulas.     

Nietzsche as ‘Europe’s Buddha’ and ‘Asia’s Superman’

Nietzsche represents in an interesting way the well-worn Western approach to Asian philosophical and religious thinking: initial excitement, then neglect by appropriation, and swift rejection when found to be incompatible with one’s own tradition, whose roots are inexorably traced back to the ‘ancient’ Greeks. Yet, Nietzsche’s philosophical critique and methods - such as ‘perspectivism’ - offer an instructive route through which to better understand another tradition even if the sole purpose of this exercise is to perceive one’s own limitations through the eyes of the other: a self-destruktion of sorts. To help correct this shortcoming and begin the long overdue task of even-handed dialogue - or contemporary comparative philosophy - we will be served well by looking at Nietzsche’s mistakes, which in turn informed the tragic critic of the West of the last century, Martin Heidegger. We may learn here not to cast others in one’s own troubled image; and not to reverse cultural icons: Europe’s Superman, and Asia’s Buddha.

Weyl’s Appropriation of Husserl’s and Poincar“s Thought

This article locates Weyl's philosophy of mathematics and its relationship to his philosophy of science within the epistemological and ontological framework of Husserl's phenomenology as expressed in the Logical Investigations and Ideas. This interpretation permits a unified reading of Weyl's scattered philosophical comments in The Continuum and Space-Time-Matter. But the article also indicates that Weyl employed Poincaré's predicativist concerns to modify Husserl's semantics and trim Husserl's ontology. Using Poincaré's razor to shave Husserl's beard leads to limitations on the least upper bound theorem in the foundations of analysis and Dirichlet's principle in the foundations of physics. Finally, the article opens the possibility of reading Weyl as a systematic thinker, that he follows Husserl's so-called transcendental turn in the Ideas. This permits an even more unified reading of Weyl's scattered philosophical comments.     

Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?

Jonathan Weisberg claims that certain probability assessments constructed by Jeffrey conditioning resist subsequent revision by a certain type of after-the-fact defeater of the reasons supporting those assessments, and that such conditioning is thus “inherently anti-holistic.” His analysis founders, however, in applying Jeffrey conditioning to a partition for which an essential rigidity condition clearly fails. Applied to an appropriate partition, Jeffrey conditioning is amenable to revision by the sort of after-the-fact defeaters considered by Weisberg in precisely the way that he demands.