The psychology of social dilemmas: A review

Broadly defined, social dilemmas involve a conflict between immediate self-interest and longer-term collective interests. These are challenging situations because acting in one’s immediate self-interest is tempting to everyone involved, even though everybody benefits from acting in the longer-term collective interest. As such, greater knowledge of social dilemmas should help us understand not only the theoretical puzzles of why people cooperate (or not) but also the ways in which cooperation in groups and organizations can be maintained or promoted. This article reviews different types of social dilemmas, highlights recent developments in the field (especially within psychology), and suggests some new avenues for future research. We illustrate that the field of social dilemma is growing and flourishing in terms of theory, interdisciplinary collaboration, and applicability, producing insights that are novel, replicable, and applicable to many social situations where short-term self-interest is at odds with the long-term interests of teams, organizations, or nations.     

Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis

How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas or situations when immediate self-interest and longer term collective interest conflict? What variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives for cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that rewards and punishments should both promote cooperation, and we identify 2 variables—cost of incentives and source of incentives—that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperation.A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes revealed that rewards and punishments exhibited a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d =0.51 and 0.70, respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly to administer, compared to free. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both (a) iterated dilemmas with reassignment to a new group after each trial and (b) one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators, such as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad conclusions, consider implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards and punishment in social dilemmas.     

Applying a logic of appropriateness to understand behavioral differences between common resource dilemmas and public good dilemmas

Common resource dilemmas (CRDs) and public good dilemmas (PGDs) are distinct types of social dilemmas, yet they model the same underlying conflict between the collective interest and one's self-interest. Here, we study and interpret behavioral differences between these two main types of social dilemmas by applying a logic of appropriateness. In two experiments, we argue and demonstrate that CRDs, relative to PGDs, evoke higher levels of cooperation, because taking from collective property (in CRDs) is generally considered less appropriate than not giving from personal property (in PGDs). Importantly, these differential considerations of appropriateness are reflected not only in the willingness to cooperate but also in the willingness to punish and reward others' (non)cooperative behavior. Taken together, the findings reveal that CRDs and PGDs elicit different norms of appropriateness.     

How to overcome the detrimental effects of noise in social interaction: the benefits of generosity

Interpersonal misunderstanding is often rooted in noise, or discrepancies between intended and actual outcomes for an interaction partner due to unintended errors (e.g., not being able to respond to an E-mail because of a local network breakdown). How can one effectively cope with noise in social dilemmas, situations in which self-interest and collective interests are conflicting? Consistent with hypotheses, the present research revealed that incidents of noise exert a detrimental effect on level of cooperation when a partner follows strict reciprocity (i.e., tit for tat) but that this effect can be overcome if a partner behaves somewhat more cooperatively than the actor did in the previous interaction (i.e., tit for tat plus 1). Also, when noise was present, tit for tat plus 1 elicited greater levels of cooperation than did tit for tat, thereby underscoring the benefits of adding generosity to reciprocity in coping with noise in social dilemmas. The Discussion outlines implications of the present work for theories focusing on self-presentation and attribution, communication, and trust and prorelationship behavior.     

Interest (mis)alignments in representative negotiations: Do pro-social agents fuel or reduce inter-group conflict?

In representative negotiations, interests of the representative and the represented constituency are not always aligned. We investigated how interest (mis)alignment and representative’s social value orientation influence representative negotiations. Past theory and research on the principal–agent problem, social value orientation, and cooperation in social dilemmas offer different perspectives, which we examined in two experiments. Experiment 1 revealed that both representatives with a pro-social and a pro-self value orientation were reluctant to accommodate the negotiation adversary at a cost to themselves and their constituency, while pro-social representatives were more willing to sacrifice self-interest to benefit constituency and adversary combined. Experiment 2 replicated this finding, and clarified that pro-social representatives were more willing to self-sacrifice when this served their constituency only than when it indirectly served the adversary too. Such parochial altruism demonstrates the discriminatory nature of pro-socials’ cooperation and reveals the potential dark side of a pro-social orientation in constructive intergroup negotiations.     

Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas

Sanctioning systems in social dilemmas are often meant to increase trust in others and to increase cooperation. We argue, however, that sanctioning systems may also give people the idea that others act in their own self-interest and undermine the belief that others are internally motivated to cooperate. We developed the “Removing The Sanction” paradigm and a new trust manipulation, and showed in three experiments that when there is a sanction on defection, trust in others being internally motivated to cooperate is undermined: Participants who had experienced the presence of a sanctioning system trusted fellow group members less than participants who had not. In a similar vein, the sanction undermined cooperation when trust was initially high. The implications of these paradoxical findings are discussed.     

社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下双人社会困境中合作行为的影响

为揭示双人社会困境中合作行为的影响因素,选取四种不同类型的双人社会困境,采用实验法考察社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下合作行为的影响。结果显示,亲社会个体的合作率显著高于亲自我个体的合作率,收益情境下的合作率显著高于损失情境下的合作率,在社会困境中双方冲突程度越大合作率越低;此外,高时间压力提升了亲自我个体在囚徒困境以及收益情境下信任困境中的合作率,同时降低了亲自我个体在损失情境下最大差异困境中的合作率。结果表明,社会价值取向、收益损失情境以及困境冲突程度均对合作行为的发生具有影响作用,而时间压力对合作行为的作用也同样受到三者的影响。这些发现能够为合作行为自动性的理论分歧提供新的证据。     

社会决策：自我利益与他人利益的权衡

自我利益与他人利益之间的冲突是社会决策中最重要的心理冲突之一。在自我利益与他人利益中寻求平衡是社会决策的关键。西方经济学理论在很长一段时间里认为,追求自我利益是人类行为的唯一动机。近年来越来越多的理论和实证研究表明在社会互动中,人类同时也会关心他人的利益。本文试图将自我利益和他人利益作为社会决策中利益权衡的两端,综合起来阐释诸如合作、利他、公平、利己等人类社会决策行为的重要概念,力图将纷繁的概念整合到统一、清晰的框架中。     

The effect of culture and power on cooperation in commons dilemmas: Implications for global resource management

This study adopted a contextual framework to examine whether an interaction between group culture and economic power influences self-interest in a simulated commons dilemma. Full-time managers enrolled in executive MBA programs in Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, and the United States (US) made decisions in an asymmetric commons dilemma. Relative to managers from the US and Germany, Israeli managers were more likely to follow an individually rational decision-making approach, taking more resources in a high versus low economic power condition. In contrast, managers from Hong Kong in a high economic power condition followed a collectively rational approach, voluntarily taking fewer resources. Egocentrism mediated this interaction effect of group culture and economic power for the Israeli managers who were more egocentric and believed it was fair to harvest more resources in a high power condition. However, egocentrism did not mediate the interaction effect for managers from Hong Kong. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings highlight the importance of studying the proximal effect of group culture on contextual factors, such as economic power asymmetry, that influence cooperation in social dilemmas.     

Averting the Tragedy of the Commons: Using Social Psychological Science to Protect the Environment

ABSTRACT— Many local and global environmental challenges are tragedies-of-the-commons dilemmas in which private and collective interests are frequently at odds. Recent developments in social psychological theory and research suggest that in such commons dilemmas people are not just motivated by narrow (economic) self-interest but that they also consider the broader implications of their decisions for others and for the natural environment. Based on a core-motives analysis, I identify four necessary components for designing interventions to protect the environment: (a) information, (b) identity, (c) institutions, and (d) incentives, and discuss their utility and the feasibility of incorporating them.     

Self-Construal and Cooperation: Is the Interdependent Self More Cooperative Than the Independent Self?

The present study examined whether a temporary activation of independent or interdependent self-construals by priming has an influence on cooperation in social dilemmas. It was expected that individuals primed with independence would be primarily concerned with their own outcomes, whereas individuals primed with interdependence would also be concerned with the outcomes of their interaction partner. The former should therefore exhibit lower levels of cooperation. Additionally, the influence of social value orientation on cooperation was measured. Participants played 32 rounds of a give-some dilemma with an alleged interaction partner. As predicted, participants primed with independence exhibited lower levels of cooperation than participants primed with interdependence. Results are discussed in terms of their significance for research on self-construals and social dilemmas.     

实验社会心理学中的社会困境

社会困境是指个体理性会导致集体非理性这样的情境。大量实证研究考察社会困境中合作行为的机制,然而缺乏系统的理论框架。实验室研究中所用的社会困境可以从4个方面来分类：“给-游戏”与“拿-游戏”、两人困境与多人困境、对称与非对称困境以及重复与非重复困境。综合而言,以往实验研究主要从个体差异、任务结构以及知觉与策略等3个方面考察影响社会困境的因素,这些影响因素可以整合在一个概念框架中。未来的研究尚需要联合多个学科,澄清研究变量之间的关系,并继续丰富相关概念和理论     

Accountability and cooperation in social dilemmas: The influence of others’ reputational concerns

The present study examined the assumption that non-anonymous choices in social dilemmas (i.e., choices for which one is accountable) may influence cooperation, but only to the extent that decision-makers believe that the others will evaluate non-cooperation negatively. Based on a recent review by Kerr (1999), it was expected that under conditions of accountability, decision-makers would cooperate more when they believed that the others within the group were also concerned about their social reputation and therefore were aware of the social norm of cooperation within social dilemmas. As a consequence, it could be expected that non-cooperation by oneself would be evaluated negatively by those others since they seemed to be aware of what ought to be done in a social dilemma (i.e., the norm of cooperation). Results confirmed these predictions and, in addition, also showed that greater willingness to cooperate was associated with stronger feelings of collective concern. The findings are discussed in terms of recent literature on anonymity effects in social dilemmas. This research was part of the second author's master thesis at Maastricht University. The first author was supported by a fellowship of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, no. 016.005.019).     

Rational self-interest and other orientation in organizational behavior: a critical appraisal and extension of Meglino and Korsgaard (2004)

B. M. Meglino and M. A. Korsgaard (2004). argued that rational self-interest varies across individuals and negatively relates to other orientation (OO). OO moderates effects of job characteristics on attitudes, motivation, and helping. Viewing organizations as social dilemmas in which employees face a mixture of competitive and cooperative incentives, the author argues in this article that strength of self-interest links to self-concern (SC), which should be distinguished from OO. SC and OO are orthogonal and unipolar. Implications are that some propositions by Meglino and Korsgaard need to be rewritten in terms of SC or OO, and that SC is predicted to moderate effects of self-related variables (e.g., job characteristics), whereas OO might moderate effects of social variables (e.g., team climate) on satisfaction, motivation, and helping. This also implies that when both SC and OO are strong (weak), individual- and group-level constructs are both (in)valid predictors of satisfaction, motivation, and helping.     

两难中合作行为研究的回顾和展望

如何预测人们将做出合作行为,是社会两难决策研究中重要的问题。该文回顾了社会两难研究的进展情况,包括社会两难的特征、来源、类型、研究方法和理论基础;综述了两难中影响合作行为的个人因素和情景因素,重点介绍了目前存在争议的制裁系统和合作的关系研究,以及为什么它们之间会表现出一些自相矛盾之处;对合作行为研究存在的问题进行了初步探讨,未来的研究将更侧重于合作决策的理论建构、文化内涵和认知过程的揭示     

Utilitarians Are Not Always Fair and the Fair Are Not Always Utilitarian: Distinct Motives for Cooperation1

This paper investigates the effect of utilitarianism and fairness motives on cooperative behavior in a real‐life, large‐scale social dilemma while also looking at the moderating effect of various situational factors on this relationship. Perceived criticality of the situation and high‐efficacy beliefs are shown to increase cooperation of utilitarians more than they increase cooperation of those with a fairness motive. Ownership of the problem and the expected cooperation of others on the other hand are shown to increase cooperation of those with a fairness motive more so than they increase cooperation of utilitarians. Implications of these findings for increasing cooperation in social dilemmas are discussed.     

Think and act globally, think and act locally: Cooperation depends on matching construal to action levels in social dilemmas

The authors proposed and tested hypotheses that cooperation in social dilemmas depends on matching construal to action levels. Using a computerized resource dilemma that modeled fishing the oceans, when motives were framed at abstract levels, in terms of values (e.g., cooperation vs. competition), high construal levels produced more cooperativeness and competitiveness, respectively. Conversely, when motives were framed at concrete levels, in terms of actions (e.g., returning vs. taking), low construal levels produced more cooperativeness and competitiveness, respectively. Implications for integrating and extending research on construal levels in social dilemmas and increasing cooperation are discussed.     

What is smart in a social dilemma? differential effects of priming competence on cooperation

Prior theorizing of rationality in social dilemmas suggests that individuals pursuing different interaction goals may ‘perceive’ different associations between competence and behaviour in a social dilemma, arguing that competitive individuals associate competence with noncooperation (i.e. noncooperation=smart), whereas prosocial individuals associate competence with cooperation (i.e. cooperation=smart; goal‐prescribes‐rationality principle, Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The present research examines whether cooperative interaction can be affected by subtle activation (or priming) of competence, and whether the effects may differ for competitive versus prosocial participants. Consistent with hypotheses, two experiments revealed that priming competence yielded reduced levels of cooperation (and greater exploitation) among competitors, and yielded no effects (Experiment 1) or a tendency towards enhanced cooperation (Experiment 2) among prosocials. The discussion considers theoretical implications of relatively subtle influences on cooperative interaction in social dilemmas. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Palatable Punishment in Real‐World Social Dilemmas? Punishing Others to Increase Cooperation Among the Unpunished1

Social‐dilemma research has shown that imposing sanctions on defection may increase cooperation, a principle behind attempts to solve real‐world social dilemmas. Yet sanctioning systems are often difficult to implement: They are unpopular and often have large surveillance and enforcement costs. A new sanctioning system, intentionally punishing defection intermittently for some but not all group members, is shown to increase cooperation among those not punished, a finding labeled the spillover effect. This study suggests that the effect cannot be attributed simply to cooperative tendencies, as factors affecting cooperation do not affect the effect's size. The benefits of such a sanctioning system, which preserves the characteristics of social dilemmas, could include minimization of surveillance and enforcement costs, and greater public acceptability.