Christ, Spirit and Atonement

The Christian doctrine of the atonement is complex, not least in part because it must hold together the integrity of both divine and human being. Too often attempts to expound theologies of atonement have foundered because they have pitted divine and human action in competition one with the other. This article addresses itself to this problematic by suggesting three minimum conditions which must be met if this doctrine is to a give a theologically plausible account of salvation: first, that divine and human activity not be identified; second, that divine and human activity not be co-ordinated so as to complete or complement each other; and third, that neither divine nor human activity be rendered superfluous. The article elaborates upon these conditions by taking as its test case the Christian claim: God was in Christ.     

Voluntarism,Atonement, and Duns Scotus

The two most important concepts in Duns Scotus's (1265/6‐1308) theology of the Atonement are satisfaction and merit. Just what these amount to and how they function in his theory are heavily conditioned by two more general commitments: Scotus's voluntarism, which includes the claim that nearly all of God's relations with the created order are contingent; and his formulation of the Franciscan Thesis, which holds that fixing the sin problem is not the primary purpose of God's Incarnation in Christ and that if Adam hadn't sinned God would have become incarnate anyway. In this essay I will discuss the theoretical background of Scotus's atonement theology—his voluntarism and his version of the Franciscan Thesis—before moving on to discuss his understanding of merit and satisfaction, how these are related, and how they relate to the theoretical background. I will engage some important recent scholarly attempts to position Scotus's Atonement theology as not quite as anti‐Anselmian as history has characterized it, arguing that one of these attributes to Scotus an understanding of merit which cannot be Scotus's in fact, since it entails a restriction on divine freedom that Scotus certainly would reject.     

Evolution, Sociobiology, and the Atonement

This essay views Christian doctrines of the atonement in the light of evolution and sociobiology. It argues that most of the doctrines are false because they use a false premise, the historicity of Adam and the Fall. However, two doctrines are not false on those grounds: Abelard's idea that Jesus' life is an example and Athanasius' concept that the atonement changes human nature. Employing evolution's and sociobiology's concepts of the egocentric and ethnocentric nature of humanity and the synergy between genes and environments to produce a "nature," this essay shows that these two doctrines can be amalgamated to make sense of the atonement in the late twentieth century.     

Repentance Rituals and Restorative Justice

For most of this century, debate over how criminal justice should be transacted has alternated between an emphasis on retribution versus rehabilitation. Restoration has emerged in the 1990s as a credible third alternative. The most influential definition of restorative justice is by Tony Marshall in the context of a Delphi process conducted by Paul McCold: 'Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future'. Restorative justice means restoring victims, restoring offenders and restoring communities. Among the losses victims, offenders or communities might want restored are property loss, injury, a sense of security, dignity, a sense of empowerment, voice, harmony based on a feeling that justice has been done, and social support.     

Atonement Retributivism

In this article I will illustrate how concepts such as wrongdoing, guilt, remorse, penance, atonement, reconciliation, forgiveness and punishment are interlinked in a pattern which is reminiscent of the way pieces in a jigsaw puzzle are interlinked with each other. I would like to label this conceptual “puzzle” atonement retributivism. Atonement retributivism should not be regarded as a theory, justifying punishment. Rather, it is an illustration of a vocabulary which illuminates how deeply rooted punishment is in our moral lives. This illustration shows that classical and modern theories on punishment have redefined punishment in a way which tears it apart from its conceptual roots. One practical consequence of this philosophical mistake is that the moral aspects of punishment are not recognized by our modern legal system. Hence, punishment no longer serves as penance and thus has lost its moral content.     

Anthropology,Ontology, and the Possibility of Post-Mortem Repentance

Abstract: This essay considers the question of conversion unto repentance, as an act of cognition and volition, by the separated soul in the post-mortem state. It primarily explicates and interrogates Thomas Aquinas's various attempts to rule out this possibility for the damned. Since Thomas's arguments for such impossibility feature his commitment to the radical immateriality of the human soul—and, like it, the angelic spirit—the essay highlights the ontological and moral tensions within that account. The case is thus made for the ontological, logical, and moral inconsistencies of his position, in pursuit of a more holistic anthropology across the soul's various states and a more rationally and coherent eschatology—namely, an affirmation of the irreducible mutability of the created soul on its way towards likeness to God, perhaps, if not certainly, towards universal salvation.     

Barth and Anselm: God,Christ and the Atonement

This article considers God, Christ and the atonement in the work of Anselm and Barth. It identifies key points of agreement regarding God's self‐assigned identity and the importance of dyothelitism; it discerns a marked divergence of opinion with respect to the atonement. Anselm construes the atonement in terms of a gift that Christ offers on behalf of sinful humankind. Barth, on the other hand, presents a view of atonement that builds on his revolutionary doctrine of election. He describes the cross as an event in which sin is ‘burned up’, cancelled and overcome within the time and space of God's being.     

Jonathan Edwards on the Atonement

Evidence suggests Jonathan Edwards' adherence to a version of the penal substitution theory of atonement. Evidence also suggests that Edwards' version of the penal substitution theory requires certain metaphysical commitments about the nature of Christ's relationship to the elect, echoing those issued in his Original Sin 4.3, and elsewhere, regarding the relationship of Adam to his posterity. In what follows, I argue that such evidence points to Edwards' adherence to what has more recently been described in the literature of contemporary philosophical theology as an account of realist penal substitution.     

Repentance and forgiveness: the undoing of time

Mass death resulting from war, starvation, and disease as well as the vicissitudes of extreme poverty and enforced sexual servitude are recognizably pandemic ills of the contemporary world. In light of their magnitude, are repentance, regret for the harms inflicted upon others or oneself, and forgiveness, proferring the erasure of the guilt of those who have inflicted these harms, rendered nugatory? Jacques Derrida claims that forgiveness is intrinsically rather than circumstantially or historically impossible. Forgiveness, trapped in a paradox, is possible only if there is such a thing as the unforgivable. “Thus, forgiveness, if there is such a thing,” can only exist as exempt from the law of the possible. Does this claim not open the way for hopelessness and despair? More troubling for Derrida is his concession that forgiveness may be necessary in the realm of the political and juridical. If so, is not the purity of the impossibility of forgiveness so crucial for him, contaminated? In pointing to some of the difficulties in Derrida’s position, I shall appeal to Vladimir Jankelevitch’s distinction between the unforgivable and the inexcusable. I shall also consider the significance of repentance in the theological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas and Max Scheler. Forgiveness, I conclude, is vacuous without expiation, a position that can be helpfully understood in the context of Judaism’s analysis of purification and acquittal in the Day of Atonement liturgy. I argue that what disappears is Derrida’s assurance of the impossibility of forgiveness, a disappearance that allows for hope.     

Violence,Atonement, and Retributive Justice: Bonhoeffer as a Test Case

Recent soteriological discourse has worried that atonement theologies like satisfaction and penal substitution have potentially damaging effects like inoculating us to our violence, further buttressing retributive justice, and inducing passive acquiescence in the face of abuse. Though legitimate concerns in their own right, this essay investigates whether certain views on the atonement do in fact produce the issues of concern. By investigating the thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who believed that God had to punish sin, this article will seek to identify the complex nuances in Bonhoeffer's work that would potentially safeguard against some of the concerns being raised about atonement theologies like his.     

A Unified Theory of the Atonement

Abstract:  Following Aulén, three broad, and competing, models of the atonement are outlined in this article, and an argument is offered to suggest that the mediatorial model should be considered normative. The argument proceeds through discussion with N.T. Wright's adoption of the victory model as normative in his expositions of Pauline theology. It is here suggested that the victory model is inherently unsuitable as a paradigm for the soteriology of Romans, and argued that the assertion that it can explain the process of reconciliation lacks foundation. Further, there is indication as to how the occasional language of victory in the New Testament can often be incorporated naturally within a mediation framework.