祈使句和逻辑(英文)

本文基于更新框架定义了一种动态的祈使句语义,并在此基础之上讨论了关于祈使句的逻辑。这个语义对于祈使句的一致性问题和Ross悖论提供了一种直接的解决方案。我们的工作在祈使句和祈使力结构之间的对应之上展开。首先,根据处理祈使句相容性的不同方式,我们给出了几种不同的祈使句一致性定义。然后,祈使句的意义被处理为祈使力机构上的依赖相容性的更新函项。最后,祈使句之间的蕴涵关系被归约为祈使力结构之间的某种关系。基于不同的相容性定义,我们给出了几种不同的蕴涵关系。     

The Content and Logic of Imperatives

Axiomathes - This paper articulates an account of imperatives that sensibly supports the idea of a logic of imperative inferences. We rebuke common objections to the very possibility of such a...     

Nice Embedding in Classical Logic

It is shown that a set of semi-recursive logics, including many fragments of CL (Classical Logic), can be embedded within CL in an interesting way. A logic belongs to the set iff it has a certain type of semantics, called nice semantics. The set includes many logics presented in the literature. The embedding reveals structural properties of the embedded logic. The embedding turns finite premise sets into finite premise sets. The partial decision methods for CL that are goal directed with respect to CL are turned into partial decision methods that are goal directed with respect to the embedded logics.     

You Can't Be Serious!

Abstract

Jim Cotter frames this paper in the form of a one-sided conversation with Michael Vasey about two particular phrases that Vasey was responsible for in the current Anglican liturgy. The first comes from the baptismal rite and talks of the candidate submitting themselves to Christ as Lord. By reference to marriage and other liturgical contexts, Cotter asks whether this is an appropriate image for the twenty-first century, especially in the light of the debate about sexual abuse. The second phrase is taken from the Easter liturgy and talks of light invading the darkness. Once again Cotter challenges the military implications of this language and the negative associations that such a phrase gives to ‘darkness’ Cotter makes a call for far more careful reflection on the use of language in worship and offers a number of alternative suggestions of his own.     

Modality,Si! Modal Logic,No!

This article is oriented toward the use of modality in artificial intelligence (AI). An agent must reason about what it or other agents know, believe, want, intend or owe. Referentially opaque modalities are needed and must be formalized correctly. Unfortunately, modal logics seem too limited for many important purposes. This article contains examples of uses of modality for which modal logic seems inadequate.I have no proof that modal logic is inadequate, so I hope modal logicians will take the examples as challenges.Maybe this article will also have philosophical and mathematical logical interest.     

It Was Nice to Be There: Construct Validity Then and Now

I appear to be one of the few persons who attended both the colloquium at Princeton titled Construct Validity in Psychological Measurement held in 1979 and the conference at Newport Beach titled Construct Validity: Issues and Opportunities held in 1990. As a discussant for both meetings, I have compared construct validity as seen by participants at the 1979 meetings with construct validity as seen by participants at the 1990 meeting. Comparisons are drawn according to conceptualizations of construct validity, construct va- lidity as scientific inquiry, and construct validity in assessment technology. A most noteworthy conclusion is that these three aspects no longer apply very well to the articles herein that were originally delivered at the 1990 meeting. Instead these articles show strongly that classification according to scientific inquiry versus applications is not possible. Such a conceptual gap no longer seems to exist for construct validity. Instead, these articles as well as the one by Hogan (1991) all emphasize large scale programmatic efforts characterized by approaches driven primarily by conceptualizations derived from construct validity. A secondary theme in these articles emphasizes analysis according to taxonomies at both the predictor and criterion levels. A primary conclusion from reviewing these articles is that construct validity no longer revolves around issues, but it clearly does connote opportunities for future research and applications.     

How Mathematics Isn't Logic

If logical truth is necessitated by sheer syntax, mathematics is categorially unlike logic even if all mathematics derives from definitions and logical principles. This contrast gets obscured by the plausibility of the Synonym Substitution Principle implicit in conceptions of analyticity: synonym substitution cannot alter sentence sense. The Principle obviously fails with intercepting : nonuniform term substitution in logical sentences. 'Televisions are televisions' and 'TVs are televisions' neither sound alike nor are used interchangeably. Interception synonymy gets assumed because logical sentences and their synomic interceptions have identical factual content, which seems to exhaust semantic content. However, intercepting alters syntax by eliminating term recurrence, the sole strictly syntactic means of ensuring necessary term coextension, and thereby syntactically securing necessary truth. Interceptional necessity is lexical, a notational artifact. The denial of interception nonsynonymy and the disregard of term recurrence in logic link with many misconceptions about propositions, logical form, conventions, and metalanguages. Mathematics is distinct from logic: its truth is not syntactic; it is transmitted by synonym substitution; term recurrence has no essential role. The '=' of mathematics is an objectual relation between numbers; the '=' of logic marks a syntactic relation of coreferring terms.     

How To Be A Reliabilist

In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justified belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism, the view takes abilities to essentially involve reliable processes. In this way, the proposed view should take a leaf from process reliabilism. Finally, I will provide reason to believe that the view compares favourably with both extant versions of virtue reliabilism and process reliabilism. In particular, I will show that in taking abilities to essentially involve reliable processes, the view has an edge over extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Moreover, I will argue that the proposed view can either solve or defuse a number of classical problems of process reliabilism, including the new evil demon problem, the problem of clairvoyant cases and the generality problem.     

Analyticity Without Synonymy In Simple Comparative Logic

In this paper I provide some formal schemas for theanalysis of vague predicatesin terms of a set of semantic relations other thanclassical synonymy, includingweak synonymy (as between ``large' and ``huge'),antonymy (as between ``large'and ``small'), relativity (as between ``large'and ``large for a dog'), and a kind ofsupervenience (as between ``large' and ``wide'or ``long'). All of these relationsare representable in the simple comparativelogic CL, in accordance with the basicformula: the more something is F, the more(or less) it is G. I use Carnapianmeaning postulates to define these relationsas constraints on interpretations of theformal language of CL.     

A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision

We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed. Giacomo Bonanno: I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments. A first draft of this paper was presented at the Sixth Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT6), Leipzig, July 2004.     

How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist

Rational agents have (more or less) consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly inconsistent? In this essay I argue that Bayesianism and Dogmatism are inconsistent only with the addition of a specific hypothesis about how the appropriate responses to perceptual experience are to be incorporated into the formal models of the Bayesian. That hypothesis isn't essential either to Bayesianism or to Dogmatism, and so Bayesianism and Dogmatism are jointly consistent. That leaves the matter of how experiences and credences are related, and so in the remainder of the essay I offer an alternative account of how perceptual justification, as the Dogmatist understands it, can be incorporated into the Bayesian formalism.     

灵魂何在

存在于世界上的一切事物,包括所有生物,毫无例外都是以物质为基础的.整个宇宙也是物质的,在我们的星球之外,如果还有其他生命形式存在,也必然是物质的.     

How to Be a Humean Interventionist

This paper aims to provide Humean metaphysics for the interventionist theory of causation. This is done by appealing to the hierarchical picture of causal relations as being realized by mechanisms, which in turn are identified with lower‐level causal structures. The modal content of invariances at the lowest level of this hierarchy, at which mechanisms are reduced to strict natural laws, is then explained in terms of projectivism based on the best‐system view of laws.