Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously

This paper offers a qualified defense of a historically popular view that I call sentimental perceptualism. At a first pass, sentimental perceptualism says that emotions play a role in grounding evaluative knowledge analogous to the role perceptions play in grounding empirical knowledge. Recently, András Szigeti and Michael Brady have independently developed an important set of objections to this theory. The objections have a common structure: they begin by conceding that emotions have some important epistemic role to play, but then go on to argue that understanding how emotions play that role means that there must be some alternative, emotion-independent route to obtaining knowledge of value. If there has to be such an emotion-independent route, then the perceptual analogy breaks down in a significant way. In this paper, I argue that the right ways for sentimental perceptualists to respond to each of these objections are revealed by thinking through how analogous objections applied to perception and the empirical domain would be answered. Although Szigeti's and Brady's objections should not persuade sentimental perceptualists to give up their view, the objections do put important constraints on what a form of the view has to be like in order to do exciting metaethical work.     

On Hatzimoysis on Sentimental Value

Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value. I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.

Why are some people more susceptible to ingroup threat than others? The importance of a relative extrinsic to intrinsic value orientation

Whereas an individual differences perspective recently pointed to the importance of a relative extrinsic to intrinsic value orientation in the prediction of outgroup attitudes, the intergroup relations perspective stresses the importance of threat. This study investigates the interplay of both perspectives. A scenario study among high-school students showed that only people who attach greater relative importance to extrinsic values react with a negative attitude towards an outgroup that is portrayed as threatening. A longitudinal study among university students then showed that people with a relatively greater extrinsic value orientation are not only more likely to react to threat but also to perceive threat. Specifically, cross-lagged analyses showed that a relatively greater extrinsic value orientation predicted over-time increases in threat perceptions.     

Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases

According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access to normative properties. We argue that underlying this objection are several specific problems, rooted in the different types of mental states to which emotions may respond, that the sentimental perceptualist must tackle for her view to be successful. We argue, moreover, that the problems can be answered by filling out the theory with several independently motivated yet highly controversial commitments, which we carefully catalogue. The plausibility of sentimental perceptualism, as a result, hinges on further claims sentimental perceptualists should not ignore.

     

Materialistic Values and Well‐Being Among Business Students: Further Evidence of Their Detrimental Effect1

According to an environmental‐match perspective regarding the content of values ( Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000 ), extrinsic or materialistic values should positively predict well‐being in populations in which extrinsic values match the environmentally promoted values (e.g., among business students). However, other value researchers ( Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002 ) disagree with these claims. Although the present study shows that business students ascribe higher importance to extrinsic values than do education students, the negative relation of extrinsic values with well‐being and the positive relation with internal distress and substance use was not moderated by the department to which students belonged. Finally, mediational analyses revealed that value orientations could account for the fact that business students report lower well‐being and higher substance use in comparison to education students.     

Philosophy for Children and the Extrinsic Value of Academic Philosophy

External pressure on Higher Education Institutes in the United Kingdom has brought the question of the extrinsic value of academic philosophy into focus. One line of research into questions about the extrinsic value of philosophy comes from the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement. There is a large body of literature about the benefits of P4C. This paper argues that the distinctive nature of the P4C pedagogy limits the claims made by the P4C literature about the extrinsic value of philosophy to claims about the value of P4C. While this is not a problem within the P4C literature that recognises these limitations, the paper makes three claims about why it is sometimes inappropriate to extend claims from research into the value of P4C to claims about the value of non-P4C philosophy. It argues that more research is needed to investigate the value of non-P4C philosophy.     

Extrinsic value orientation and "the tragedy of the commons"

Two studies examined the effect of Extrinsic Value Orientation (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996) upon harvesting strategies and personal profit within commons dilemmas, in which individual and group interests can be at odds. At an individual or within-group level of analysis, extrinsically oriented persons (who value money, fame, and popularity) harvested more than intrinsically oriented persons (who value self-acceptance, intimacy, and community). However, a counteracting group-level effect was found such that groups with a greater number of extrinsic members harvested less on average than did groups with more intrinsic members, because their commons did not last as long. As a result, even excessive harvesters within extrinsic groups did no better than did self-restrained harvesters within intrinsic groups. Supplementary analyses indicate that extrinsic values are associated with acquisitiveness regarding resources, more so than apprehension regarding others' acquisitiveness.     

Extrinsic Value Orientation and Affective Forecasting: Overestimating the Rewards, Underestimating the Costs

ABSTRACT We examined affective forecasting errors as a possible explanation of the perennial appeal of extrinsic values and goals. Study 1 found that although people relatively higher in extrinsic (money, fame, image) compared to intrinsic (growth, intimacy, community) value orientation (REVO) are less happy, they nevertheless believe that attaining extrinsic goals offers a strong potential route to happiness. Study 2's longitudinal experimental design randomly assigned participants to pursue either 3 extrinsic or 3 intrinsic goals over 4 weeks, and REVO again predicted stronger forecasts regarding extrinsic goals. However, not even extrinsically oriented participants gained well-being benefits from attaining extrinsic goals, whereas all participants tended to gain in happiness from attaining intrinsic goals. Study 3 showed that the effect of REVO on forecasts is mediated by extrinsic individuals' belief that extrinsic goals will satisfy autonomy and competence needs. It appears that some people overestimate the emotional benefits of achieving extrinsic goals, to their potential detriment.     

内外动机对青少年记忆的影响及其神经机制

动机是一切行为的核心, 动机可分为外在和内在动机。青少年时期既是记忆的关键期, 也是动机发展的特殊时期。然而, 目前关于内外动机影响青少年记忆的研究才刚刚起步, 尚不清楚外在和内在动机影响青少年记忆的规律和机制是否一致, 也不清楚二者如何交互影响记忆。本研究将结合认知范式和脑成像技术, 考察外在和内在动机如何分别影响以及交互影响青少年记忆。这将有助于更加全面、深刻理解内外动机影响青少年记忆的独特规律和机制, 为科学提升青少年动机和记忆效果提供研究证据。     

To Have or To Be? A Comparison of Materialism‐Based Theories and Self‐Determination Theory as Explanatory Frameworks of Prejudice

ABSTRACT The present study aimed to delineate the psychological structure of materialism and intrinsic and extrinsic value pursuit. Moreover, we compared models based on self‐determination theory (SDT), Fromm's marketing character, and Inglehart's theory of social change to account for racial prejudice. In a sample of undergraduate students (n=131) and adults (n=176) it was revealed that the extrinsic value pursuit Financial Success/Materialism could be distinguished from the extrinsic value scales Physical Appeal and Social Recognition, and Community Concern could be distinguished from the intrinsic value pursuit scales Self‐acceptance and Affiliation. Moreover, Financial Success/Materialism and Community Concern were consistently and significantly related to prejudice, whereas the other SDT facet scales yielded weaker relationships with prejudice. Structural models based on SDT and Inglehart were not corroborated, but instead the present data supported a mediation model based on Fromm's work in which the effect of Community Concern was mediated by Financial Success/Materialism. Broader implications for SDT are critically assessed.     

双模态情感分析的弹幕网络视频平台营销策略

随着互联网飞跃发展, 弹幕视频应运而生。这种新型的用户与视频交互方式具有新特性, 如用户情感表达实时动态性、情感分布多峰性。同时, 新特性也给实际研究工作带来挑战, 如用户画像刻画难度增大, 视频推荐和广告推送所需精度提高。现有研究尚未对弹幕视频的新特性进行深入分析, 也没有充分挖掘其本身所蕴含的学术研究价值。本文利用深度学习、自然语言处理技术、系统动力学方法, 结合心理学、市场营销学等多学科交叉前沿知识, 从数据驱动角度对弹幕视频数据进行分析和建模, 深度挖掘视频大数据潜在的商业价值。重点研究弹幕与视频双模态融合的情感识别方法; 构建带有用户情感特征的动态用户画像, 并建立基于用户画像的网络视频粘性营销机制; 分析用户情感与视频广告插播方式的相关性, 提出视频广告动态插播策略。丰富现有研究的同时, 为网络视频企业准确定位与分析用户需求, 创建高品质的智能营销平台供理论与决策支持。     

‘With Love from Band Aid’: Sentimental exchange,affective economies,and popular globalism

This paper discusses affective attachments to popular global imaginaries by examining the place of love in the popular humanitarianism associated with the 1984–85 music charity events Band Aid and Live Aid.The paper offers a materialist reading of the charity spectacles that situates them within a popular culture of sentimentality engaged in making and imagining forms of global community through social practices of exchange. It draws on the feminist scholarship on sentimental cultures and their imbrication with social reform movements and commodity capitalism to show how Band Aid can be understood as part of a popular culture of sentimental exchange, in which famine relief images, stories, tears, money and goods were passed along in affective exchanges that also involved sentimental stories and personalized commodities and capital such as wedding rings, household furniture and allowances. The circulation of feeling, concretized in the exchange of goods and money, confirmed the social fantasy of global community, imagined through the terms of intimate love and familial gift exchange. When combined with local, national and international commodity markets that allowed information, goods and images to travel among strangers, global gift giving appeared to replace geopolitical alliances and financial interests with an open, barrier-free, affective economy of love and cooperation.     

Commitment and satisfaction in romantic associations: A test of the investment model

Two experiments were designed to test the adequacy of the investment model of developing relationships in predicting satisfaction with and commitment to ongoing associations. According to the investment model, attraction to and satisfaction with a relationship is a function of a comparison of the relationship outcome value (both rewards and costs) to the individual's expectations, or comparison level. Commitment to a relationship is said to be a function not only of the relationship outcome value, but also the quality of the best available alternative and the magnitude of the individual's investment in the relationship. The intrinsic or extrinsic investment of resources serves to increase commitment by increasing the costs of leaving the relationship. Thus, increases in investment size, decreases in alternative value, and increases in relationship value should increase commitment to an ongoing relationship. In Experiment 1, a role-playing study, commitment to relationships increased with intrinsic and extrinsic investment size and decreased with the value of alternatives, but was not appreciably affected by relationship costs. Satisfaction/attraction significantly increased as relationship costs decreased. In Experiment 2, a survey of ongoing romantic associations, satisfaction/attraction was predicted by relationship reward value and relationship cost value. Commitment to relationships increased as relationship reward value and investment size increased and as alternative value and relationship cost value decreased, although the effects of cost value were weak.     

CAN INSTRUMENTAL VALUE BE INTRINSIC?

In this article, I critique a common claim that instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value. Instead, I offer an alternative dispositional analysis of instrumental value, which holds that instrumental value can, in certain circumstances, be an example of intrinsic value. It follows, then, that a popular account of the nature of final value – or value as an end – is false: the Moorean identification of final value with intrinsic value cannot properly distinguish between value as an end and value as a means.     

Cosmopolitan anger and shame

ABSTRACT

Sentimental cosmopolitans argue that cultivating empathy for distant others is necessary in order to motivate action to address global injustices. This paper accepts the basic premises of the sentimental cosmopolitan project but argues that it ought to be extended to include cultivating other cosmopolitan emotions, particularly anger and shame. There is a tendency to think of anger and shame as unworthy, or as base motives to be overcome; but I argue that, in fact, they constitute an important resource for motivating action to address global injustices. The argument proceeds in three parts. Section 1 outlines sentimental cosmopolitanism and explicates the relationship between empathy, and anger and shame. Section 2 examines the link between anger and shame and responsibility, arguing that anger and shame are well-suited to capturing notions of responsibility for injustice, something lacking in an empathy-based account of sentimental cosmopolitanism. Section 3 provides two further arguments in favour of anger and shame: (i) anger represents a powerful source of energy for political action, and (ii) shame can motivate cosmopolitan action where empathy is absent.     

免费师范生的教师职业认同与学习动机及学业成就的关系研究

研究以714名免费师范生为被试,采用问卷测量法,考察了其教师职业认同状况、内部和外部学习动机特点,以及教师职业认同、学习动机和学业成就之间的关系。结果发现:(1)在教师职业认同上,免费师范生对教师职业的内在价值认同显著高于外在价值认同,外在价值认同显著高于意志行为认同,职业认同的总体情况略高于中等水平,还有一定的提升空间;(2)内部学习动机比较积极,且显著高于外部学习动机;(3)教师职业认同和学习动机、学习动机和学业成就之间均存在显著的正相关,且教师职业认同对学业成就有稳定的预测力;(4)外部学习动机在教师职业认同和学业成就之间起了部分中介的作用。     

MAXIMALITY,DUPLICATION, AND INTRINSIC VALUE

In this paper, I develop an argument for the thesis that ‘maximality is extrinsic’, on which a whole physical object is not a whole of its kind in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument in defence of his Duplication Principle that, I will argue, can be extended to show that Sider's simple argument fails. However, van Inwagen's argument fails against a more complex, sophisticated argument that maximality is extrinsic. I use van Inwagen's own commitments to various forms of causation and metaphysical possibility to argue that maximality is indeed extrinsic, although not for the mundane reasons that Sider suggests. I then argue that moral properties are extrinsic properties. Two physically identical things can have different moral properties in a physical world. This argument is a counterexample to a classical ethical supervenience idea (often attributed to G.E. Moore) that if there is identity of physical properties in a physical world, then there is identity in moral properties as well. I argue moral value is ‘border sensitive’ and extrinsic for Kantians, utilitarians, and Aristotelians.     

Providing a Rationale in an Autonomy-Supportive Way as a Strategy to Motivate Others During an Uninteresting Activity

When motivating others during uninteresting activities, people typically use extrinsic contingencies that promote controlling forms of extrinsic motivation. In contrast, we investigated a motivational strategy that could support another person's capacity to personally endorse and value the effort he or she put forth during the uninteresting activity. That strategy is the provision of an externally provided rationale when communicated in an autonomy-supportive way. In two studies, we tested and found support for a motivational mediation model, based on self-determination theory, in which the presence of such a rationale (vs. its absence) adds to participants' identification with the task's personal value which, in turn, explains participants' subsequent effort. These studies suggest that extrinsically motivated behaviors can become self-determined through the process of identification and that the promotion of this identification experience depends on the presence of a rationale that is communicated in an autonomy-supportive way.     

Children prefer certain individuals over perfect duplicates

Adults value certain unique individuals--such as artwork, sentimental possessions, and memorabilia--more than perfect duplicates. Here we explore the origins of this bias in young children, by using a conjurer's illusion where we appear to produce identical copies of real-world objects. In Study 1, young children were less likely to accept an identical replacement for an attachment object than for a favorite toy. In Study 2, children often valued a personal possession of Queen Elizabeth II more than an identical copy, but showed no such bias for another sort of valuable object. These findings suggest that young children develop attachments to individuals that are independent of any perceptible properties that the individuals possess.     

Comparing Democrats and Republicans on Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values

Although claimed differences in values have played a prominent role in recent U.S. politics, the value systems of typical Republicans and Democrats have not been evaluated within a relevant dimensional framework. In 4 studies, party members were compared on extrinsic (money, popularity, image) and intrinsic (intimacy, helping, growth) values. Republicans were consistently higher on extrinsic relative to intrinsic values, a pattern suggested by past research to be personally and socially problematic. In Study 4, Republicans were also lower in a different measure of prosocial values, derived from social-dilemma research. All studies found an interaction such that only nonreligious Republicans were lower than Democrats on the intrinsic value of helping needy others. Implications for contemporary political discourse are discussed.