Anchoring Effects in Simulated Academic Promotion Decisions: How the Promotion Criterion Affects Ratings and the Decision to Support an Application

Six experiments investigated the effect of the promotion criterion in simulated academic promotion decisions. In total, 547 undergraduate students and 33 university faculty members rated a promotion application, and some also indicated their decisions to support or to reject it. Performance ratings were reliably affected by the criterion, with a high criterion resulting in higher ratings than a low criterion, and this criterion effect was found regardless of the evaluator's expertise, whether he or she took the role of an independent assessor or the line manager to the applicant, or whether the criterion was provided by the experimenter or randomly generated by the participant. The criterion also affected the level of support for a candidate when the position applied for was perceived to be extremely competitive, or when a lesser position was considered at a later time. These results provide evidence that the use of a criterion, a fairly common practice in decision‐making processes, may bias performance evaluations, which in turn may have ripple effects that affect the outcome of a chain of events. Our results also shed light on the possible mechanisms that underlie the rating biases in performance appraisal. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selective exposure and information quantity: how different information quantities moderate decision makers' preference for consistent and inconsistent information

Empirical evidence on selective exposure to information after decisions is contradictory: Whereas many studies have found a preference for information that is consistent with one's prior decision, some have found a preference for inconsistent information. The authors propose that different available information quantities moderate these contradictory findings. Four studies confirmed this expectation. When confronted with 10 pieces of information, decision makers systematically preferred decision-consistent information, whereas when confronted with only 2 pieces of information, they strongly preferred decision-inconsistent information (Study 1). This effect was not due to differences in processing complexity (Study 2) or dissonance processes (Study 3) but could be traced back to different salient selection criteria: When confronted with 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was information direction (consistent vs. inconsistent), which caused a preference for inconsistent information. In contrast, when confronted with more than 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was expected information quality, which caused a preference for consistent information (Study 4).     

Information about expert decision and post‐decision distortion of facts of own decision

Cognitive representations of decision problems are dynamic. During and after a decision, evaluations and representations of facts change to support the decision made by a decision maker her‐ or himself (Svenson, 2003). We investigated post‐decision distortion of facts (consolidation). Participants were given vignettes with facts about two terminally ill patients, only one of whom could be given lifesaving surgery. In Study 1, contrary to the prediction, the results showed that facts were distorted after a decision both by participants who were responsible for the decisions themselves and when doctors had made the decision. In Study 2 we investigated the influence of knowledge about expert decisions on a participant's own decision and post‐decisional distortion of facts. Facts were significantly more distorted when the participant's decision agreed with an expert's decision than when the participant and expert decisions disagreed. The findings imply that knowledge about experts' decisions can distort memories of facts and therefore may obstruct rational analyses of earlier decisions. This is particularly important when a decision made by a person, who is assumed to be an expert, makes a decision that is biased or wrong.     

Distortion of probability and outcome information in risky decisions

Substantial evidence indicates that information is distorted during decision making, but very few studies have assessed the distortion of probability and outcome information in risky decisions. In two studies involving six binary decisions (e.g., banning blood donations from people who have visited England, because of “mad cow disease”), student and nonstudent participants distorted their evaluations of probability and outcome information in the direction of their preferred decision alternative and used these biased evaluations to update their preferences. Participants also evaluated the utilities of possible outcomes more positively when the outcomes could follow only from the preferred alternative and more negatively when they could follow only from the competing alternative. Such circular reasoning is antithetical to the normative consequentialist principles underlying decision analysis. Presenting numerical information as precise values or as ranges of values did not significantly affect information distortion, apparently because the manipulation did not affect perceived ambiguity as intended.     

Unfairness begets unfairness: Victim derogation bias in employee ratings

This research investigated criterion contamination in human resource evaluations, specifically victim derogation in which third parties (e.g., managers, co-workers) systematically undervalue the performance and potential of individuals who have previously suffered organizational injustices. A policy capturing design (Study 1) found that managers rated job applicants who had been treated unfairly by their previous employers as less suitable than fairly treated applicants, after objective performance information was controlled. In Study 2, the effect of unfair treatment on job applicant ratings was found to be moderated by managers’ just world beliefs, with applicant ratings reflecting more derogation among managers with higher (vs. lower) Belief in a Just World. In Study 3, the pattern of results from Study 2 was replicated in a performance evaluation context using peers as raters. Moreover, in Study 3 an intervention that activated raters’ moral identity was found to attenuate victim derogation bias.     

Leader‐driven distortion of probability and payoff information affects choices between risky prospects

Research indicating that decision makers often distort new information to favor nascent preferences has focused primarily on riskless choice rather than risky choice. In addition, the critical assumption that information distortion mediates the link between the initially preferred alternative and the final choice has not been tested in a compelling manner. In an experiment designed to fill these gaps, participants made six choices involving pairs of hypothetical three‐outcome monetary gambles. We manipulated initial preferences by varying the order in which gamble features were presented. Multilevel regressions indicated that participants distorted their evaluations of precise probabilities and payoffs in the direction of their emerging preferences and that they used their biased evaluations to update those preferences. As expected, information distortion mediated the effect of initial preferences on final choices and final preference strength. In a follow‐up experiment, we compared a standard measure of information distortion (based on comparisons to mean ratings in a no‐choice control task) to a more personalized measure (based on participants' own ratings in the control task) and found the mean‐based measure to be superior for the probability and payoff information in question. Other findings in Experiment 2 corroborated the results of Experiment 1. In both studies, the distortion of quantitative inputs in a simple task highlights the non‐normative circularity of the choice process. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relinquishment of control and the type A behavior pattern: the role of performance evaluation

We investigated the role of information processing in the control relinquishment decisions of Type As and Bs. Pairs of subjects worked independently on a task and received feedback indicating that their partner had performed at a comparable or superior level. On a second task, subjects combined their efforts and made decisions concerning who would work on different parts of that task. One third of the subjects made this decision before completing an evaluation of the initial performances. Another third completed the evaluation without knowing that they would subsequently make a control decision. The final third of the subjects completed their evaluations knowing that a control decision would follow. Results indicated that when the evaluations were completed last, or when the evaluations were completed first but without knowledge of the impending decision, Type As relinquished less control to a superior partner than did Type Bs. When the evaluations were completed with knowledge of an impending control decision, Type As and Bs did not differ in their decisions. These results suggest that under certain conditions, Type As use an automatic or mindless decision style with potentially maladaptive consequences.     

SDT analysis of binary decisions and sensory intensity ratings to noxious thermal stimuli

During three sessions, each of 24 Ss responded to noxious thermal stimuli, using the following judgments: binary decision, S responded “high” or “low”; sensory intensity rating, S rated his sensory experience along a thermal intensity continuum; and concurrent report, S’s binary decision was followed by an intensity rating. The binary-decision d’ was significantly higher than the rating d′, suggesting that Ss could not maintain multiple thermal criteria in a consistent fashion. The criteria for pain obtained with single and concurrent intensity rating judgments did not differ. These results suggest that the most efficacious and valid method for the study of experimental pain is to obtain concurrent responses, and to use binary decisions to compute d’ and sensory intensity ratings to locate S’s criterion for reporting pain.     

Organizational citizenship behavior and performance evaluations: exploring the impact of task interdependence

The influence of task interdependence on the importance attributed to organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) in evaluations of employee performance was investigated in 3 studies. In Study 1,238 undergraduates were exposed to a task interdependence manipulation and a unit-level performance manipulation and provided citizenship ratings. In Study 2,148 master of business administration students were exposed to a task interdependence manipulation and then rated the importance of OCB in their evaluations of employee performance. In Study 3,130 managers rated the task interdependence in their unit of principal responsibility and the importance of OCB in their overall evaluations of employee performance. The results suggest task interdependence may affect the importance attributed to OCB by evaluators. Implications of these results are explored.     

Self-esteem and perceptions of conveyed impressions: is negative affectivity associated with greater realism?

Two studies examined the notion that negative affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984) is associated with more accurate perceptions of conveyed impressions in social interactions. In Study 1 (n = 160), low self-esteem (LSE) and high self-esteem (HSE) subjects were paired with either an LSE or an HSE partner. After a 15-min interaction, they rated themselves, their partners, and how they believed their partners would rate them on 20 adjectives related to social competence. Study 2 (n = 40) was identical except that each interaction was observed by 2 observers who rated each participant, and participants also rated how they believed an observer would rate them. LSE subjects exhibited greater accuracy only with respect to the elevation component of observers' ratings; HSE subjects overestimated the positivity of observers' evaluations, whereas LSE subjects were relatively accurate. However, LSE subjects exhibited less overall accuracy with respect to their partners' ratings. We argue that when these results are considered with earlier research, there is no support for the notion of depressive realism in assessing conveyed impressions.     

Using confidence ratings to identify a target among foils

Sauer, Brewer, and Weber (2008) advanced a novel procedure for testing eyewitness recognition memory. Rather than providing a single decision (i.e., identifying a lineup member or rejecting the lineup as a whole), participants rated their confidence that each lineup member was the culprit. Classification algorithms determined when patterns of confidence ratings indicated suspect guilt or innocence. Across varied test stimuli, confidence-based classifications equalled or out-performed single decisions. However, Sauer et al.’s classification criteria were designed to optimize performance for the data to which they were applied. If effective classification using confidence ratings requires such idiosyncratic criteria, the applied utility of the confidence procedure is nil. We re-analysed the data from Sauer et al.’s two identification experiments and demonstrated that confidence-based classification performance exceeding that of a traditional lineup task did not depend on uniquely developed classification criteria. Confidence-rating lineups offer a potentially promising alternative to procedures requiring single decisions from witnesses.     

Self-esteem and affect as information

This research tests whether people with high self-esteem are more informed by their emotions than are people with low self-esteem. In Study 1, participants listened to a series of disturbing baby cries, rated how much distress these cries conveyed, and reported their own emotional reactions to the cries. As predicted, the relation between participants' emotional reactions and their cry ratings was strongest at higher levels of self-esteem. In Study 2, self-esteem again determined how strongly participants' own emotional reactions influenced their baby cry ratings, even though esteem was measured weeks before the experiment and even after controlling for social desirability. Study 3 manipulated self-regard and showed that the correlation between participants' emotional reactions and their cry ratings was strong for high-regard participants, moderate for control participants, and weak for low-regard participants. These results suggest that self-esteem serves to validate the informational value of feelings.     

Are observer ratings of applicants’ personality also faked? Yes,but less than self‐reports

Although self‐report personality tests are a comparatively cheap and easy‐to‐administer personnel selection tool, researchers have criticized them for not predicting enough criterion‐related variance. Researchers have suggested using observer‐ratings of personality (e.g., as part of a reference check from a supervisor) because observer‐ratings have been reported to be more predictive. However, it is theoretically and empirically unclear whether supervisors also engage in faking (the intentional distortion of responses). Study 1 explored faking among managers who were first asked to imagine that a subordinate had to leave his/her job for private reasons and then to rate the personality of the subordinate. A week later, managers rated their subordinates honestly. A repeated‐measures MANOVA indicated that managers did fake. Study 2 (among supervisors of working students) replicated the above findings but also showed that there is less faking in supervisor‐ratings than in self‐ratings. Furthermore, we found no evidence that the validity of personality scales for predicting academic performance depends on self‐ versus observer‐ratings or on an applicant versus an honest condition. These two studies thus show that practitioners should not equate personality ratings obtained from observers in a selection context with honest personality ratings.     

Attractiveness Bias in the Interview: Exploring the Boundaries of an Effect

Relationships were explored between interviewer evaluations of college applicants and the academic credentials, facial attractiveness, sex, and academic majors of applicants. Photographs of 506 randomly selected applicants were rated on attractiveness. Two criterion variables were examined: interviewer evaluations and the final admissions decision. There was a small but significant bias toward attractive applicants in interview evaluations but not in the actual admissions decisions. Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores and high-school rank were the best predictors of admissions decisions.     

Information distortion in the evaluation of a single option

Extending previous work on biased predecisional processing, we investigate the distortion of information during the evaluation of a single option. A coherence-based account of the evaluation task suggests that individuals will form an initial assessment of favorability toward the option and then bias their evaluation of subsequent information to cohere with their initial disposition. Three experiments tested this hypothesis. Initial disposition was manipulated (Studies 1 and 3) or measured (Study 2), and attribute ratings were collected as indicators of information distortion. Results from all three experiments indicate that attribute evaluations were biased to favor initial dispositions. These findings provide evidence that information distortion is one cause of primacy effects in judgment and decision-making settings involving a single option.     

Construction of preferences by constraint satisfaction

Participants were given a choice between two multiattribute alternatives (job offers). Preferences for the attributes were measured before, during, and after the choices were made. We found that over the course of decision making, the preferences shifted to cohere with the choice: The attributes of the option that was eventually chosen came to be rated more favorably than they had been rated initially, while the attributes of the rejected option received lower preference ratings than before. These coherence shifts were triggered by a single attribute that decisively favored one option (Experiment 1), and occurred spontaneously in the absence of a decisive attribute (Experiment 2). The coherence shift preceded commitment to choice. These findings favor constraint-satisfaction models of decision making.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers’ memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7–10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers' memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7-10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.