Notation to symbol: Development in children's understanding of print

Three studies used the moving word task to examine children's understanding of the symbolic nature of print. A card containing a printed word is presented with two pictures, one of which is named by the word. The child is told what the card says and then asked three times what the word is. For the second question, the card is spatially adjacent to the picture it does not name, and 4-year-olds typically respond that the word has changed to name this picture. The studies examined the impact of how the move is carried out and the role of other cognitive abilities (Study 1), the influence of the source of the print and the visibility of the cards (Study 2), and the role of the matching picture in children's solutions (Study 3). In all cases, children continued to name the picture that is closest to the card, indicating an incomplete grasp of how print carries meaning. The conclusion is that children's error in this task represents a fundamental misconception about how print signifies meanings, and that prior to reading, children do not understand the symbolic function of the constituents of print. Furthermore, executive processes of representation and inhibition are identified as significant to children's solutions.     

Children's understanding of counting

This study examines the abstractness of children's mental representation of counting, and their understanding that the last number word used in a count tells how many items there are (the cardinal word principle). In the first experiment, twenty-four 2- and 3-year-olds counted objects, actions, and sounds. Children counted objects best, but most showed some ability to generalize their counting to actions and sounds, suggesting that at a very young age, children begin to develop an abstract, generalizable mental representation of the counting routine. However, when asked "how many" following counting, only older children (mean age 3.6) gave the last number word used in the count a majority of the time, suggesting that the younger children did not understand the cardinal word principle. In the second experiment (the "give-a-number" task), the same children were asked to give a puppet one, two, three, five, and six items from a pile. The older children counted the items, showing a clear understanding of the cardinal word principle. The younger children succeeded only at giving one and sometimes two items, and never used counting to solve the task. A comparison of individual children's performance across the "how-many" and "give-a-number" tasks shows strong within-child consistency, indicating that children learn the cardinal word principle at roughly 3 1/2 years of age. In the third experiment, 18 2- and 3-year-olds were asked several times for one, two, three, five, and six items, to determine the largest numerosity at which each child could succeed consistently. Results indicate that children learn the meanings of smaller number words before larger ones within their counting range, up to the number three or four. They then learn the cardinal word principle at roughly 3 1/2 years of age, and perform a general induction over this knowledge to acquire the meanings of all the number words within their counting range.     

Early noun lexicons in English and Japanese.

Previous research suggests that children learning a variety of languages acquire similar early noun vocabularies and do so by similar and universal processes. We report here results from two studies that show differences in the early noun learning of English- and Japanese-speaking children. Experiment 1 examined the relative numbers of animal names and object names in vocabularies of English-speaking and Japanese-speaking children. English-speaking children's vocabularies were heavily lopsided with many more object than animal names whereas Japanese-speaking children's vocabularies were more evenly balanced. Experiment 2 used a novel noun extension task to examine what young children know about the different organizations of animal and artifact categories. The results suggest that early learners of English but not Japanese over-generalize what they know about object categories to animal categories. The role of culture, input and linguistic structure in early noun acquisitions is discussed.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

Learning words: children disregard some pragmatic information that conflicts with mutual exclusivity

Children tend to infer that when a speaker uses a new label, the label refers to an unlabeled object rather than one they already know the label for. Does this inference reflect a default assumption that words are mutually exclusive? Or does it instead reflect the result of a pragmatic reasoning process about what the speaker intended? In two studies, we distinguish between these possibilities. Preschoolers watched as a speaker pointed toward (Study 1) or looked at (Study 2) a familiar object while requesting the referent for a new word (e.g. ‘Can you give me the blicket?’). In both studies, despite the speaker's unambiguous behavioral cue indicating an intent to refer to a familiar object, children inferred that the novel label referred to an unfamiliar object. These results suggest that children expect words to be mutually exclusive even when a speaker provides some kinds of pragmatic evidence to the contrary.     

Young children follow pointing over words in interpreting acts of reference

Adults refer young children's attention to things in two basic ways: through the use of pointing (and other deictic gestures) and words (and other linguistic conventions). In the current studies, we referred young children (2- and 4-year-olds) to things in conflicting ways, that is, by pointing to one object while indicating linguistically (in some way) a different object. In Study 1, a novel word was put into competition with a pointing gesture in a mutual exclusivity paradigm; that is, with a known and a novel object in front of the child, the adult pointed to the known object (e.g. a cup) while simultaneously requesting 'the modi'. In contrast to the findings of Jaswal and Hansen (2006) , children followed almost exclusively the pointing gesture. In Study 2, when a known word was put into competition with a pointing gesture – the adult pointed to the novel object but requested 'the car'– children still followed the pointing gesture. In Study 3, the referent of the pointing gesture was doubly contradicted by the lexical information – the adult pointed to a known object (e.g. a cup) but requested 'the car'– in which case children considered pointing and lexical information equally strong. Together, these findings suggest that in disambiguating acts of reference, young children at both 2 and 4 years of age rely most heavily on pragmatic information (e.g. in a pointing gesture), and only secondarily on lexical conventions and principles.     

Metacognitive components of visual search in children

Two studies examined children's increasing ability to analyze tasks in terms of the perceptual features that affect task difficulty. Of particular interest was any understanding that perceptual confusions occur during the search for an object surrounded by objects similar in shape or color to that object. In Study 1, 32 pre-schoolers constructed arrays intended to make the search easy or difficult. They made the search difficult simply by putting many toys into the toy box. In a forced-choice situation, they indicated that task difficulty was influenced by the number of objects and the similarity in color and shape of the targets and the surrounding objects. Study 2 more thoroughly examined knowledge of color and shape confusions, using 96 children from Grades K, 1, 3, and 4, assigned to two age groups. The older children but not the younger ones showed a significant understanding of color and shape confusions. Both age groups understood that performance is affected by a person's interest level and degree of attention to the task. The results were discussed in terms of the accessibility of the children's knowledge under different conditions.     

Monolingual and bilingual children's use of mutual exclusivity in the naming of whole objects

In two experiments, the use of mutual exclusivity in the naming of whole objects was examined in monolingual and bilingual 3- and 6-year-olds. Once an object has a known name, then via principles of mutual exclusivity it is often assumed that a new name given to the object must refer to some part, substance, or other property of the object. However, because bilingual children must suspend mutual exclusivity assumptions between languages, they may be more willing to accept two names for an object within a language. In the current research, the use of mutual exclusivity in the naming of whole objects was found across monolingual and bilingual children, although older bilingual children were significantly less inclined to use mutual exclusivity than were older monolingual children. These results are discussed in terms of differences in monolingual and bilingual children's word learning.     

Three-year-olds understand appearance and reality--just not about the same object at the same time

Young children struggle in the classic tests of appearance versus reality. In the current Study 1, 3-year-olds had to determine which of 2 objects (a deceptive or a nondeceptive one) an adult requested when asking for the "real X" versus "the one that looks like X." In Study 2, children of the same age had to indicate what a single deceptive object (e.g., a chocolate-eraser) looked like and what it really was by selecting one of two items that represented this object's appearance (a chocolate bar) or identity (a regular eraser). Children were mainly successful in Study 1 but not in Study 2. The findings are discussed with a focus on young children's difficulty with "confronting" perspectives, which may be involved in their struggles with a number of classic theory of mind tasks.     

Word comprehension and production asymmetries in children and adults

Two studies investigated differences in the comprehension and production of words in 2-year-old children and adults. Study 1 compared children’s speaking and understanding of the names of 12 novel objects presented over three weekly sessions. Study 2 tested adults’ performance under similar training and testing conditions over two sessions. The findings indicated a comprehension advantage for both age groups. A fine-grained temporal analysis of individual words revealed that acquisition does not resemble a linear stage-wise progression from comprehension to production. Rather, dimensions of lexical knowledge develop at different rates, with words acquired, lost, and maintained over the course of learning. The findings support a dynamic and graded view of lexical processing and have implications for understanding what it means to know a word.     

Two-year-olds' sensitivity to speakers' intent: an alternative account of Samuelson and Smith

Seventy-two 2-year-olds participated in a study designed to test two competing accounts of the effect of contextual change on children's ability to learn a word for an object. The mechanistic account hypothesizes that any change in context that highlights a target object will lead to word learning; the social-pragmatic account maintains that a change in context must be perceived as relevant to the speaker's communicative intentions. Consistent with the latter account, we found that children learned the word when a change in context was intentional but not when it was accidental, and children failed to learn the word for the highlighted object when a speaker naive to the preceding context named the object.     

Early word meanings: The case of object names

It has been claimed that young children use object names overgenerally and undergenerally because they do not have notions of objects of particular kinds, but rather, complexive notions of objects and their habitual actions or locations. However, for overgeneral uses in particular, it is difficult to differentiate word meaning from word use because communicative functions are not explicitly expressed in single-word speech. In the present paper, we identify three types of overgeneral uses, and argue that two of these reflect communicative functions rather than complexive meanings. We obtained production data from 10 children in the single-word period, using a standardized method of recording utterance contexts. Most uses of object names were for appropriate instances of the adult categories. Of the overgeneral uses, most were attributable to communicative functions rather than complexive meanings, and there was no evidence of undergeneral use. The results provide strong evidence that, from the very start, children's object names, like those of adults, apply to objects of particular kinds.     

How do parents respond to children's questions about the identity of artifacts?

We investigated how parents respond to young children's questions about the identity of artifacts. Children's questions were predominantly ambiguous about whether they were inquiring about name or function, but when their questions were more specific, they were almost always about function. For unfamiliar objects, parents responded with functional information the majority of the time, alone or in addition to names. For atypical members of familiar categories, adults usually responded only with the category name. The results indicate that adults adjust their responses in a way that often provides the information about object kind, specifically functional information in the case of artifacts, that they believe their children are lacking. Such input may contribute to the development of children's concepts and word meanings.     

Précis of How children learn the meanings of words

Normal children learn tens of thousands of words, and do so quickly and efficiently, often in highly impoverished environments. In How Children Learn the Meanings of Words, I argue that word learning is the product of certain cognitive and linguistic abilities that include the ability to acquire concepts, an appreciation of syntactic cues to meaning, and a rich understanding of the mental states of other people. These capacities are powerful, early emerging, and to some extent uniquely human, but they are not special to word learning. This proposal is an alternative to the view that word learning is the result of simple associative learning mechanisms, and it rejects as well the notion that children possess constraints, either innate or learned, that are specifically earmarked for word learning. This theory is extended to account for how children learn names for objects, substances, and abstract entities, pronouns and proper names, verbs, determiners, prepositions, and number words. Several related topics are also discussed, including na?ve essentialism, children's understanding of representational art, the nature of numerical and spatial reasoning, and the role of words in the shaping of mental life.     

Testing a word is not a test of word learning

Although vocabulary acquisition requires children learn names for multiple things, many investigations of word learning mechanisms teach children the name for only one of the objects presented. This is problematic because it is unclear whether children's performance reflects recall of the correct name–object association or simply selection of the only object that was singled out by being the only object named. Children introduced to one novel name may perform at ceiling as they are not required to discriminate on the basis of the name per se, and appear to rapidly learn words following minimal exposure to a single word. We introduced children to four novel objects. For half the children, only one of the objects was named and for the other children, all four objects were named. Only children introduced to one word reliably selected the target object at test. This demonstration highlights the over-simplicity of one-word learning paradigms and the need for a shift in word learning paradigms where more than one word is taught to ensure children disambiguate objects on the basis of their names rather than their degree of salience.     

Do children really confuse appearance and reality?

Our understanding of many mental, social and physical phenomena hinges on a general understanding that appearances can differ from reality. Yet young children sometimes seem unable to understand appearance-reality dissociations. In a standard test, children are shown a deceptive object and asked what it really is and what it looks like. Many preschool children give the same answer to both questions. This error has been attributed to children's inflexible conceptual representations or inflexibility in representing their own changing beliefs. However, evidence fails to support either hypothesis: new tests show that young children generally understand appearance-reality discrepancies as well as fantasy-reality distinctions. These tests instead implicate children's failure to understand the unfamiliar discourse format of the standard test. This misunderstanding might reveal a subtler difficulty in making logical inferences about questions.     

Children's avoidance of lexical overlap: a pragmatic account

Children tend to choose an unfamiliar object rather than a familiar one when asked to find the referent of a novel name. This response has been taken as evidence for the operation of certain lexical constraints in children's inferences of word meanings. The present studies test an alternative--pragmatic--explanation of this phenomenon among 3-year-olds. In Study 1 children responded to a request for the referent of a novel label in the same way that they responded to a request for the referent of a novel fact. Study 2 intimated that children assume that labels are common knowledge among members of the same language community. Study 3 demonstrated that shared knowledge between a speaker and listener plays a decisive role in how children interpret a speaker's request. The findings suggest that 3-year-olds' avoidance of lexical overlap is not unique to naming and may derive from children's sensitivity to speakers' communicative intentions.     

Color-object interference in young children: A Stroop effect in children 3½-6½ years old

The Stroop color–word task cannot be administered to children who are unable to read. However, our color–object Stroop task can. One hundred and sixty-eight children of 3½–6½ years (50% female; 24 children at each 6-month interval) were shown line drawings of familiar objects in a color that was congruent (e.g., an orange carrot), incongruent (e.g., a green carrot), or neutral (for objects having no canonical color [e.g., a red book]), and abstract shapes, each drawn in one of six colors. Half the children were asked to name the color in which each object was drawn, and half were to name each object. Children's predominant tendency was to say what the object was; when instructed to do otherwise they were slower and less accurate. Children were faster and more accurate at naming the color of a stimulus when the form could not be named (abstract shape) than when it could, even if in its canonical color. The heightened interference to color-naming versus object-naming was not due to lack of familiarity with color names or group differences: Children in the color condition were as fast and accurate at naming the colors of abstract shapes as were children in the form condition at naming familiar objects.     

The principles of conventionality and contrast in word learning: an empirical examination

In Study 1, 4-year-olds avoided 2 names for an object when exposed to a common or a proper noun in a puppet's presence or to a common noun in a puppet's absence, but not when exposed to a proper noun in a puppet's absence. In Study 2, 3-year-olds avoided 2 names for an object when the requester for the referent of a second label in a different language was bilingual and present during naming, but not when the speaker was bilingual but absent or monolingual. Study 3 followed up on the results of the first 2 studies. When children could assume that the puppet knew the name the experimenter used, they inferred that the puppet's use of a different name implied a different referential intent.     

Theory of Mind in Children's Naming of Drawings

Research suggests that children engage in mentalistic reasoning in their identification of drawings and other artifacts. To explore this phenomenon further, in 2 studies 4-year-olds, 7-year-olds, and adults chose names for drawings based on either the artist's intention, the drawing's resemblance to an object, or (in Study 1) a causal relation between the drawing and an object. When intention was directly pitted against resemblance or causality, participants generally chose resemblance-based or causality-based names, but when resemblance was ambiguous, participants tended to choose intention-based names. Thus, although intention was used to identify drawings when the drawings were ambiguous, participants seemed to reject a purported intention when it directly conflicted with resemblance. In addition, for older participants, the artist's knowledge of the intended referent affected the extent to which they took intention into account.