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1.
We provide a semantics for relevant logics with addition of Aristotle's Thesis, ∼( A→∼A) and also Boethius, (A→B)→∼(A→∼B). We adopt the Routley-Meyer affixing style of semantics but include in the model structures a regulatory structure for all
interpretations of formulae, with a view to obtaining a less ad hoc semantics than those previously given for such logics. Soundness and completeness are proved, and in the completeness proof,
a new corollary to the Priming Lemma is introduced (c.f. Relevant Logics and their Rivals I, Ridgeview, 1982). 相似文献
4.
This article presents an extension of Lewis’ analysis of counterfactuals to a graded framework. Unlike standard graded approaches, which use the probabilistic framework, we employ that of many-valued logics. Our principal goal is to provide an adequate analysis of the main background notion of Lewis’ approach—the one of the similarity of possible worlds. We discuss the requirements imposed on the analysis of counterfactuals by the imprecise character of similarity and concentrate in particular on robustness, i.e., the requirement that small changes in the similarity relation should not significantly change the truth value of the counterfactual in question. Our second motivation is related to the logical analysis of natural language: analyzing counterfactuals in the framework of many-valued logics allows us to extend the analysis to counterfactuals that include vague statements. Unlike previous proposals of this kind in the literature, our approach makes it possible to apply gradedness at various levels of the analysis and hence provide a more detailed account of the phenomenon of vagueness in the context of counterfactuals. Finally, our framework admits a novel way of avoiding the Limit Assumption, keeping the core of Lewis’ truth condition for counterfactuals unchanged. 相似文献
5.
Epistemic two-dimensional semantics is a theory in the philosophy of language that provides an account of meaning which is sensitive to the distinction between necessity and apriority. While this theory is usually presented in an informal manner, I take some steps in formalizing it in this paper. To do so, I define a semantics for a propositional modal logic with operators for the modalities of necessity, actuality, and apriority that captures the relevant ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics. I also describe some properties of the logic that are interesting from a philosophical perspective, and apply it to the so-called nesting problem. 相似文献
6.
Information theoretic semantics proposes to construe predicate reference in terms of nomological relations between distal properties and properties of representational mental events. Research on the model has largely concentrated on the problem of choosing the nomological relation in terms of which distal properties are to be singled out. I argue that, in addition to this, an information theoretic account has to provide a specification of which properties of representational mental events will play a role in determining reference, qua bearers of nomological relations. I contend that this task poses a serious additional challenge to the viability of the model.I am indebted to Paul Boghossian, Allan Gibbard, Eric Lormand, Peter Railton, Gideon Rosen, Crispin Wright, and Steve Yablo for their comments on drafts of this paper. 相似文献
7.
I am idebted to members of the Wellington Logic Seminar for useful discussions of work of which this essay forms part, in particular to M. J. Cresswell for comments in the earlier stages of the investigation and to R. I. Goldblatt who suggested the definition of B infD supu and made numerous other suggestions. 相似文献
10.
The main part of the proof of Kripke's completeness theorem for intuitionistic logic is Henkin's construction. We introduce a new Kripke-type semantics with semilattice structures for intuitionistic logic. The completeness theorem for this semantics can he proved without Henkin's construction. 相似文献
11.
Conclusion Even those generally skeptical of propensity interpretations of probability must now grant the following two points. First, the above single-case propensity interpretation meets recognized formal conditions for being a genuine interpretation of probability. Second, this interpretation is not logically reducible to a hypothetical relative frequency interpretation, nor is it only vacuously different from such an interpretation.The main objection to this propensity interpretation must be not that it is too vague or vacuous, but that it is metaphysically too extravagant. It asserts not only that there are physical possibilities in nature, but further that nature itself contains innate tendencies toward these possibilities, tendencies which have the logical structure of probabilities. Thus the basic dispute between advocates of an actualist relative frequency interpretation and a single-case propensity interpretation is not a matter of epistemology, but metaphysics. The frequency theorist wishes to maintain that claims about physical probabilities are nothing more than claims about relative frequencies that will occur in the actual history of the world, be it infinite or no. It is a substantial, though hardly conclusive, argument for the propensity view that the mathematical structures commonly employed in studies of stochastic processes and statistical inference are richer than can be accommodated by a relative frequency interpretation. Whether it is possible to bridge this gap without going beyond an actualist metaphysics remains to be seen. 38 相似文献
12.
Concluding remarks Our program is ambitious, as is any attempt to match life (in our case real science) with virtue (e.g., exactness). We want our semantics to be not only simia mathematicae but also ancilla scientiae: built more geometrico and at the same time relevant, nay useful, to live science. The goal of exactness may sound arrogant but is actually modest, for the more we rigorize the more we are forced to leave out of consideration, at least for the time being. As to the service intention: we should try to be of some help to science because the latter faces semantic problems but has no tools of its own for solving them. If it had such tools scientists would not engage in spirited polemics over matters of sense and reference, as they often do. Witness the debates on whether the relativistic and quantum theories are concerned with sentient observers, whether population genetics refers to populations taken as wholes, whether psychology is actually concerned with the brain, and whether the sense of a theory is excreted by its mathematical formalism or is determined by the way the theory is tested.A semantics of science should help settle these and similar issues. Moreover it should give sound advice as to how to formulate scientific theories so as to avoid such imprecisions and ambiguities as may give rise to debates of the kind. Constructing such a semantics, both exact and relevant to science, should be more rewarding than either manufacturing neat but irrelevant theories or pursuing erratic polemics on meaning and meaning changes.
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15.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - 相似文献
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