公共理性及其道德意义:康德与罗尔斯的诠释

公共理性是康德和罗尔斯都关注的论题之一.康德把公共理性与包括道德启蒙在内的人类启蒙相勾连,以实践理性为根据,揭示了公共理性与人格、道德律令、正义等的可能性联系.罗尔斯力图在人的一种深度自我道德启蒙的意义上,进一步阐明公共理性与自我、正义、道德感等的关系.康德和罗尔斯对公共理性及其道德意义的诠释,本质上是对现代公民道德的存在根据与根本特征的阐明.     

罗尔斯的理性重叠共识

重叠共识被认为是理解罗尔斯思想"政治的转向"的枢纽性概念。人们一般认为,这一概念的提出意味着他的正义理论是建立在社会公众的意见或者常识之上。然而,重叠共识虽然把公众的信念当作正义理论的基石,但并不是对公众观念的简单收集,相反,它试图找出那些蕴含在政治文化中的更一般观念。因为只有这些基础性的观念可以成为理性推演的出发点。重叠共识的稳定性要求还意味着公民理性的自我谦抑,意味着辩护和信念的分离。     

论信用的道德限度

社会诚信的研究和建设是当前伦理学研究和道德建设的重点,且很多学者都把信用制度的建设作为主要途径和突破口,但这是否抓出了问题的要害,却是需要慎思的。我们通过对这两个概念的反思和比较,发现诚信比信用有更高的立意和更丰富的内涵,而信用有其内在的道德限度,表现为:信用主体是抽象的人,诚信主体是现实的人;信用要实现的是外在利益,诚信则立足于人的内在价值;信用体现的是工具理性,诚信体现一种实践智慧。通过两者的比较,我们就能合理地确定信用制度起作用的性质、范围和程度,认识到它的必要性和局限性,从而摆正它在社会诚信建设中的地位。     

论正义的形态和功能

<正>义是在人类的现实处境下,处理现实利益关系的政治智慧,其实质是人类运用认知理性、实践理性和自由意志的主体能力,以自由和平等为价值目标,在现实的利益协调和分配关系中所把握的一个"度"。由此可见,"正义"形式的背后是我们的社会生活和现实的利益关系,抽象的正义理念需要通过把握其在社会生活中的现实形态来予以揭示。我们把正义的现实形态区分为普遍正义、具体正义和程序正义。普遍正义是社会合作的伦理基础,具体正义通过"求同存异"维护公共利益,保护个体利益,程序正义则是追求社会治理工程中的价值。     

伦理理性的张力及其限度

近代以来人类理性发展的一个基本趋势是:社会越向前发展、文明越向前推进,伦理理性便越是受到人们的关注和尊崇。然而,这并不意味着伦理理性可以无边界地肆意驰骋,相反,伦理理性的张力是有限度的。这既体现于人类理性内在机制中工具理性对它的约束和牵制,也体现于近代以来人类社会发展实践的内在逻辑建构。研究和探讨伦理理性的张力及其限度,不仅有助于矫正工具理性的偏执以弥补单纯经济增长主义的缺憾,尤其有助于防止价值理性的过度张扬以避免唯价值论和纯道德批判的悬空设置。     

论社会正义的情感基础——同情

同情是社会正义的情感基础,社会正义是同情的现实指向.同情既是一种趋乐避苦的人性本能,也是个人和社会交往的情感过程.同情不仅和理性不悖,而且促进了理性.社会制度只有确立、保护并激发一般意义上的同情行为,社会的整体收益才能最大化,形式上的社会和谐才会应运而生.     

传统施与德行的利益非对等性及其时代限度

从分配正义的角度来讲,施与显然不同于交换,交换的原则是对等,施与只是付出而没有获取,它是不对等的.在中国传统社会,施与其实一定程度上产生了平衡社会财富的作用.但在以正义、自由、平等为行为价值中心的现代社会,社会公平是通过社会基本分配制度来保证的,而施与,在它因利益非对等而成为一种美德的同时,由于与正义的对等原则相冲突,表现出了其社会功用限度.现代社会,一些与正义相左的德行,也许要受到重新审视.     

正义论的主要观念和两个正义原则

一、正义论的主要观念我的目的是要提出一种正义观,这种正义观进一步概括人们所熟悉的社会契约理论(比方说:在洛克、卢梭和康德著作中的契约论),使之上升到一个更高的抽象水平。为做到这一点,我们并不想把原初契约作为一种要进入一种特殊社会或建立一种特殊政体的契约,确切地说,我们的指导思想是:适用于社会基本结构的各种正义原则是原初契约的目标。这些原则是那些想促进他们自己的利益的自由和有理性的人们,将在一种最初的平等状态中接受的,以此来确定他们联合的基本条件。这些原则将调节所有进一步的协商,详细说明各种可     

康德实践论中的人学思想及其对马克思主义的影响

康德终生关注人,尤其关注实践意义的人。在实践论范围内,他把人放置到人与自身、人与他人、人与上帝诸多关系中去加以审视。人与自身的关系其实就是理性与感性、自由与自然的关系。理性独立于并超越感性之自然从而争得自由,才有道德,才成其为人。于此,康德强调此种独立与超越之自由,强调理性自律的道德价值。人与他人的关系就是理性与理性、自由与自由的关系。理性与理性、自由与自由乃是基于道德之上的人格平等的关系,是诸多立法意志的平等关系。于此,康德强调人格之间的平等,强调理性立法的人格尊严。人与上帝的关系就是意志个别与意志一般、理性个别与理性一般的关系。康德引出上帝旨在解决道德与幸福的关系问题,即至善问题。在康德看来,上帝乃是理性自身的一种主观设定,人对上帝的信仰不过是理性对自身设定理想的信仰,即对正义的信仰。于此,康德强调正义,强调理性战胜人类自我、调整社会的理想。综上所述,可以看出,康德实践意义之人的真正内涵就是理性自由、理性平等、理性正义。康德大讲理性乃其一大贡献,但只讲理性又为其不足。马克思主义不满足于此,才有人是现实的社会关系的总和之说。     

胡塞尔对伦理人格的思考

胡塞尔认为,伦理学的根本问题是"我应当如何把我整个生命塑造成一种具有伦理人格的生命"。伦理人格的核心在于人格自我的自身塑造、自身培养和自我实现。其本质地要求人格自我在正确理性的明察下,对人格自我进行总体性的反思、批判和革新,从而对生活的最高目的和最善的生命目标做出绝对应当的抉择。对胡塞尔来说,只有人才有人格,只有伦理人才是真正意义上的人。对于伦理人格的思考,胡塞尔前期持有一种理性主义的立场,在中后期他对这种理性人格进行了深刻的批判,认为人格的最深层存在及其自身统一性的根源,不是仅仅在理性中,更根本的是在爱中。一个只有理性的人格是不完满的人格,一个真正的人格是在对绝对人格价值的爱中实现的。     

Challenges of Honesty

The analytic method builds on honesty, specifically in the moment-to-moment events of the micro-process. Ferenczi was a researcher who experimented with the limits (including the limits of honesty) of the method to its extremes. Honesty is a moral virtue, and from that perspective all events and phenomena of the moment have an ethical aspect. Self-analysis—a prerequisite and an important component of the analytic stance—puts on trial the analyst’s capacity and willingness to be honest. This paper examines these ethical aspects in the micro-process and the unavoidable dilemmas connected with it. The important settings where self-analysis is used are: being in analysis, conducting analysis and in supervision. The limits of honesty in these settings are also discussed. Recently, case discussion groups have been playing an increasingly important role in analytic conferences and also in training. The risks and limits of honesty in case discussion groups deserve to be studied.     

Source Characteristics in Denying Rumors of Organizational Closure: Honesty Is the Best Policy

Effect of source honesty and appropriateness on effectiveness of rumor denial was tested. When the source was perceived as high on honesty, the denial was more successful in reducing belief and anxiety associated with the rumor. Source appropriateness (operationalized as a combination of source knowledgeability and status) did not have a main effect on belief or anxiety reduction. Honesty and appropriateness had an additive effect, such that the denial was most successful in reducing belief when the source was perceived as high on both honesty and appropriateness.     

中国人诚实-谦虚人格的特点及其内隐外显关系

诚实-谦虚是重要的人格维度。研究一基于词汇假设法提出诚实包括坦诚、不欺骗、不狡猾、不虚伪等因子,谦虚包括自谦、不浮夸、不自傲、不虚荣等因子,证实中国人的诚实、谦虚相互独立且高相关。研究二通过问卷调查法发现：(1)诚实在性别、户籍上存在显著差异,谦虚在性别、是否独生子女上存在显著差异;(2)诚实对情绪智力、积极应对方式、追求成功动机有显著的正向预测作用,诚实对消极应对方式有显著的负向预测作用;(3)谦虚对追求成功动机有显著的负向预测作用。研究三采用内隐联想测验证实了内隐诚实、内隐谦虚的存在并且内隐外显相互分离。研究表明：中国人的诚实-谦虚人格为一阶8因子、二阶2因子的结构,诚实可以有效预测个体的情绪智力、应对方式和追求成功动机,谦虚可以有效预测个体追求成功动机,诚实、谦虚存在内隐效应且内隐外显之间相互分离。     

Gain–loss-frame in outcome-interdependence: does it influence equality or equity considerations?

Research suggests that framing outcomes as gains produces stronger concern for distributive justice than framing outcomes as losses. Unfortunately, however, this prior research manipulated own and other's outcomes only (and not own and other's input). Hence, it remained unclear whether framing affects concern with equality—everyone gets an equal share regardless whether one ‘deserves’ it or not—and/or equity—the share one gets is a function of the proportionality of one's own, and the other parties' inputs. The current experiment addressed this problem. Subjects (N = 94) read a scenario manipulating own and some co-workers' inputs, and subsequently rated satisfaction with pairs of outcomes providing themselves with more, equal or less outcomes than their co-worker. Outcomes to oneself exceeded expectation (gain-frame) or remained below it (loss-frame). Corroborating and expanding prior research, results showed that people are more concerned with both equality and equity when they have a gain- rather than loss-frame. In addition, results revealed evidence for a self-serving bias, in that people prefer equity or equality, depending on what serves best their own interests. It is concluded that frame affects the degree to which people are concerned about distributive justice.     

论市场经济条件下的有限诚信原则

诚信是一种美德 ,这已经是不需要讨论的。但是 ,在市场经济领域 ,无论从道德功利主义推出的诚信原则 ,还是从道德理想主义推出的诚信原则都不具有普适性。因此 ,当前市场经济条件下的诚信原则应该是一种保持必要张力和弹性的有限诚信 ,这种诚信原则既具有广泛的普适性 ,又是培育手段和目的价值相统一的理想诚信精神的逻辑起点。     

试论研究生德育的当务之急

诚信危机已渗透到了学术研究领域 ,并对研究生德育提出了严峻的挑战。标举学术责任 ,确保学术诚信 ,是研究生德育的当务之急。为此 ,研究生德育必须 :坚守学术宽容 ,营造学术诚信的学术环境 ;强化学术引导 ,建立学术诚信的学术航标 ;优化制度约束机制 ,创设学术诚信的学术平台 ;培养研究生的道德自律 ,塑造学术诚信的学术人格。     

建立诚信社会应该有制度性的奖惩安排

诚信不仅是一种美德,而且是做人、做事的基本要求。良好的社会应该是人与人之间相互信任的诚信社会。为了形成诚信文化,社会应该对不诚实行为进行惩罚,而且这种惩罚应该有一种制度性的安排,在这种安排中政府的诚信是关键的环节。     

Equality in Education – Why We Must Go All the Way

In this paper I present and defend a highly demanding principle of justice in education that has not been seriously discussed thus far. According to the suggested approach, “all the way equality”, justice in education requires nothing short of equal educational outcome between all individual students. This means not merely between equally able children, or between children from different groups and classes, but rather between all children, regardless of social background, race, sex and ability. This approach may seem implausible at first, due to the far-reaching implications it entails, primarily its requirement to deny better-off children their advantage for the sake of equality. However the paper argues that all-the-way-equality, in fact, does a better job realizing the goals of justice in education than alternative conceptions of justice. It is further argued that at least some of the principle’s most radical consequences, those that make it seem counterintuitive, can be mitigated by balancing all-the-way-equality with competing interests.     

Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in Turkey

This paper examines how some feminist and Islamist women in Turkey helped bring about change in political values during the past decade. The traditional political culture upheld statist, corporatist (as opposed to liberal, individualist) norms. The state controlled religion in the name of secularism and limited democracy within the confines of formal equality. Both feminists and Islamists contested traditional political values by insisting on their own definition of their interests, as opposed to those that were state-enforced. The feminists questioned the justice of formal equality as they sought substantive equality; Islamist women challenged the secular concept of equality as they insisted on the justice of male-female complementarity. Both groups engaged in active politics and expanded the parameters of democratic participation as they sought substantive equality beyond formal equality. Yet the patriarchal heritage of Islam defined the limits of Islamist women's search for liberation within the confines of religion.