Religiosity and Economic Development in Singapore

This paper examines religiosity in modern and industrialized Singapore. Several theories argue that economic development brings about secularization and the general decline of personal religiosity in modern and industrialized societies. Using data gathered from the World Values Survey-Singapore (2002) as well as data from other sources, this article finds that Singaporeans are not very secularized; they are religious (religion is important in people's lives); they have a high level of belief in (metaphysical) religious aspects; and they fulfill their religious obligations and activities. The main reasons for this apparent lack of secularization are, firstly, that religion is deeply embedded in Singapore society; secondly, that the state has both directly and indirectly promoted religion; and thirdly, that a process of religious rationalization has taken place.     

In-Between Spaces. Pluralism and Hybridity as Elements of a New Paradigm for Religion in the Modern Age

We are living in an age of pluralization in which religiosity and secularity are not mutually exclusive. With subversive intent, Peter L. Berger relativizes with this thesis his criticism of secularization theory. In the light of the persistence and widespread nature of religion and religiosity, Berger still considers secularization theory’s assumption that modernization and secularization go hand in hand to be empirically untenable. At the same time, however, he acknowledges that a “secular discourse” has asserted itself globally and has achieved a dominant position in society. This secular discourse also spreads throughout the mind of each individual, without (necessarily) driving out religiosity. The present article traces the lines of argumentation in Peter L. Berger’s works that lead to the thesis of two pluralisms: the coexistence of different religions and the coexistence of religious and secular discourse. Moreover, it establishes a connection between the question of the simultaneity of religiosity and secularity and the debate on hybridity that is currently being conducted within German-speaking sociology. The author postulates that this focus on “in-between” spaces—that is, on plurality and hybridity—rather than on dichotomies has the potential to trigger a new paradigm for religion in the modern age.     

Religion and Political Economy in an International Panel

Two important theories of religiosity are the secularization hypothesis and the religion-market model. According to the former, sometimes called a demand-side theory, economic development reduces religious participation and beliefs. According to the latter, described as a supply-side theory, religiosity depends on the presence of a state religion, regulation of the religion market, suppression of organized religion under Communism, and the degree of religious pluralism. We assess the theories by using survey information for 68 countries over the last 20 years, measuring attendance at formal religious services, religious beliefs, and self-identification as religious. In accordance with the secularization view, overall economic development—represented by per capita GDP—tends to reduce religiosity. Moreover, instrumental estimates suggest that this link reflects causation from economic development to religiosity, rather than the reverse. The presence of an official state religion tends to increase religiosity, probably because of the subsidies that flow to organized religion. However, in accordance with the religion-market model, religiosity falls with government regulation of the religion market and Communist suppression. Greater religious pluralism raises attendance at formal services but has no significant effects on religious beliefs or self-identification as religious. Although religiosity declines overall with economic development, the nature of the interaction varies with the dimension of development. For example, religiosity is positively related to education and the presence of children and negatively related to urbanization.     

“Secularization of Consciousness” or Alternative Opportunities? The Impact of Economic Growth on Religious Belief and Practice in 13 European Countries

This research note contributes to an evaluation of the validity of secularization theory by studying the relationship between economic modernization and patterns of religious change. Both the disenchantment narrative of Berger and Weber and the existential security perspective of Inglehart hypothesize that economic development should be accompanied by a weakening of religious values. Using macro‐level panel regressions, my analysis reveals that while economic growth is directly associated with diminishing church attendance rates, it is not directly associated with a decline in belief. The relation between economic growth and religious decline is therefore not primarily mediated by a “secularization of consciousness.” Findings instead indicate that economic prosperity leads to a change in consumption patterns on the part of individuals due to increased income and availability of alternative, secular opportunities to meet needs previously fulfilled by traditional religion. A decline in religious belief may occur as a secondary consequence of this behavioral change, since diminishing worship attendance rates reduce the influence of religion on value socialization.     

Religiosity,Secular Participation,and Cultural Socialization: A Case Study of the 1933–1942 Urban English Cohort

The nature of secularization is of enduring interest in the social science of religion. Numerous recent papers have established downward cohort trends as characterizing religious change. We examine potential mechanisms by assessing cultural participation and secular engagement during the formative period of one cohort. We provide estimates of active and nominal religiosity, nonreligion and religious belief for those born between 1933 and 1942, using multiple surveys fielded between 1957 and 2018. We model the association between religiosity and secular cultural and social participation for this cohort in 1957, then examine how cultural socialization in childhood relates to religiosity in their later adulthood using surveys fielded between 2005 and 2007. Increased secular competition is found to be associated with less active religiosity. These trends were underpinned by an ethic of increasing autonomy for the young. We conclude by affirming the link between increasing secular competition, long-run modernization, and changing cultural socialization.     

Religious Heterogamy and the Intergenerational Transmission of Religion in China

In Western societies, religious heterogamy and its effects on religious socialization outcomes have been interpreted through the lens of secularization. How about China, where religion has been resurging in recent decades? Using data from the 2007 Spiritual Life Survey of Chinese Residents, this study shows that despite China's atheist education system and strict religion policies, having at least one religiously affiliated parent is associated with increased religiosity compared to having two nonreligious parents. Whereas religious heterogamy in the West has a secularizing effect on the next generation, religious heterogamy in secular nations, such as China, has a religionizing effect and contributes to religion's rise.     

Examining Social Desirability in Measures of Religion and Spirituality Using the Bogus Pipeline

A primary concern in the psychology of religion is the distinct possibility that responses to empirical assessments of individuals’ degree and type of religiosity and spirituality are exaggerated owing to social desirability bias. In spite of increased secularization in American culture and a growing distrust of organized religion, religious involvement, personal religiosity, and spirituality are still viewed as highly desirable characteristics. This study estimates the extent of social desirability biases that affect self-reports of religion and spirituality by utilizing a bogus pipeline procedure. In this procedure, participants are convinced that experimenters can detect disingenuous responses to individual items on questionnaires through the use of physiological measures, although no physiological data are actually collected. If the self-reports of participants in the bogus pipeline condition indicate greater religiosity or spirituality than those in the control condition, self-report bias is indicated. The bogus pipeline procedure has been used in other areas of study to increase veracity of self-reports when social desirability effects are present (such as reporting sexual behaviors or prejudice). The results indicate that social desirability biases influence multiple constructs including religious orientations, religious coping, and daily spiritual experiences. Implications for future research relying on self-reports of religion and spirituality are discussed.     

Gendered Religiosity

This study uses measures of cognitive and expressive aspects of gender as a social identity from the General Social Survey to examine whether and how they relate to religiosity. I find that religiosity is clearly gendered, but in different ways for women and men. Consistent with the feminine-typing of religion in the Christian-majority context of the United States, gender expression is linked with more religiousness among women but not men. Consistent with religion being a sometimes patriarchal institution, those with more pride in being men are more religious. I conclude that religiosity is gendered, that degendering and secularization processes could go hand-in-hand, and that future research on gender differences in religiosity should further examine variation among women and among men.     

A Christian Cancellation of the Secularist Truce? Waning Christian Religiosity and Waxing Religious Deprivatization in the West

Analysis of International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data collected in 18 Western countries in 1998 demonstrates that Christian desires for a public role of religion are strongest in countries where Christian religiosity is numerically most marginal. Moreover, Dutch data covering the period 1970–1996 confirm that the decline of the number of Christians in the Netherlands has been coincided by a strengthening of the call for public religion among the remaining faithful and by increased polarization about this with the nonreligious. Religious decline and religious privatization, two of the most crucial dimensions of secularization ( Casanova 1994 ), hence develop dialectically: as the number of Christians declines, the remaining faithful seem increasingly unwilling to accept the “secularist truce”—the secularist contract that guarantees religious freedom yet bans religion from the public sphere by relegating it to the private realm.     

Neither public nor private religion: the Russian Orthodox Church in the public sphere of contemporary Russia

Cross-country comparative studies of religion (e.g. the Religion Monitor) do not cover some important issues regarding the religious situation in Russia. The problem of contemporary Russian religiosity is beyond individual religiosity or religiosity as a spiritual phenomenon. In Russia—one of the countries which experienced Communism as a period of enforced secularization, there are very few people who have had any religious socialization or who have the experience of belonging to the Christian Church or to any religion. The main point of this article is that what is happening with religion in post-Soviet Russia cannot be adequately explained by the concept of ‘public religion’ and the dichotomy of public vs. private religion, due to the practices of private religion manifesting at a very low level among the Russian population, despite the fact that a large number of Russians consider themselves to be Orthodox Christians. However, the representation of the Church in the public sphere has little to do with what concerns Russians who are in some way involved in parishes. As an alternative tool we propose to describe the religiosity of Russians through the methods of network analysis. Results of a content analysis of contemporary Russian and Soviet media, survey data of the Russian population, and data obtained in a network analysis of parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church are used for substantiating this conclusion.     

Catholic Commitment Around the Globe: A 52‐ Country Analysis

This article investigates variation in Catholic religious commitment in different macro world regions. Although sociologists have examined variation in Catholic religiosity, this research has tended to be limited to Western European and Latin American contexts and has not gone beyond employing more than one measure of religiosity. In addition, prior research has rarely examined the effect of several explanatory frameworks together. Drawing on data from the European and World Values Survey as well as national‐level data, we test for the influence of secularization/existential security, religious markets, and historical legacies on self‐rated importance of God, private prayer, and church attendance across 52 countries in five world macro‐regional contexts—Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Oceania—of the church. Our findings provide strong support for the existential security perspective and partial support for the historical legacy perspectives. We conclude with implications for the study of religion and society in general.     

Employment,Wages, and Religious Revivals in Postcommunist Countries

The fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe has profoundly changed the religious landscape in many countries. Sociologists have studied the rise and decline of religious beliefs and participation in the post‐communist region, but economic approaches have been rare. This article suggests supplementing the dominant theories—the demand‐side explanation of secularization and the supply‐side explanation of religious revivals—with a model of individual time allocation. The model presented in the article predicts both the initial growth and the subsequent decline of religious participation in postcommunist countries. The empirical portion of the article focuses on six central European countries with different levels of religiosity. Data from the three waves of the ISSP survey support the model.     

RELIGION AND SCIENCE IN GERMANY

During the last fifty years, the dialogue between science and religion in Germany has gained momentum. This essay briefly describes the academic setting in Germany with denominational theology at state universities and explains the development of secularization in reunified Germany. Twenty‐five years after reunification, East Germany is one of the most secular societies in the world, and religion is seen as a strange relic. This poses challenges to the interaction between science and religion in both parts of Germany. The essay then presents important institutions and contributors to the interaction between science and religion in Germany over the past fifty years, emphasizing the importance of private institutes at the intersection of the academy with society, churches, and ethical challenges.     

The Charm of Disenchantment: A Quest for the Intellectual Attraction of Secularization Theory

In the course of Western history, philosophy has proven to be an active participant in the process of secularization. This article seeks to examine that philosophical role more closely. The central question is how the role of philosophy must be rethought in light of the contemporary critique of classical secularization theory. The first part of the article sheds light on the current crisis of secularization theory. Drawing on recent scholarship in the social sciences, it explains why the classical tenets and assumptions of secularization theory are no longer being considered as plausible and empirically grounded hypotheses. Against that background, the second part turns to philosophy. It examines the implications for a philosophical tradition of religious criticism that has consciously operated within this once-undisputed model of secularization. The question is how this critique of religion must be rethought, if its prominent role in the history of modern philosophy can no longer be ascribed to a general secularization of the Western mind. The third and final part attempts to answer this question by focusing on one of the most frequently overlooked, yet most significant and crucial elements in the history of philosophical secularization: the intrinsic intellectual attraction of religious disenchantment.     

Observations of Muslim Physicians Regarding the Influence of Religion on Health and Their Clinical Approach

Although most patients report wanting their physicians to address the religious aspects of their lives, most physicians do not initiate questions concerning religion with their patients. Although religion plays a major role in every aspect of the life of a Muslim, most of the data on the role of religion in health have been conducted in populations that are predominantly non-Muslim. The objectives of this study were to assess Muslim physicians' beliefs and behaviours regarding religious discussions in clinical practice and to understand the factors that facilitate or impede discussion of religion in clinical settings. The study is based on a cross-sectional survey. Muslim physicians working in a tertiary care hospital in Saudi Arabia were invited to complete a questionnaire that included demographic data; intrinsic level of religiosity; beliefs about the impact of religion on health; and observations, attitudes, behaviours, and barriers to attending to patients' religious needs. Out of 225 physicians, 91% agreed that religion had a positive influence on health, but 62.2% thought that religion could lead to the refusal of medically indicated therapy. Over half of the physicians queried never asked about religious issues. Family physicians were more likely to initiate religious discussions, and physicians with high intrinsic religiosity were more likely to share their own religious views. Residents and staff physicians tended to avoid such discussions. The study results highlight the fact that many physicians do not address patients' religious issues and that there is a need to clarify ethically sound means by which to address such needs in Islamic countries. Medical institutions should work to improve the capacity of medical personnel to appropriately address religious issues. The training of clinical religious advisors is a promising solution to this dilemma.     

The Secularization of Confessional Protests: The Role of Religious Processes of Rationalization and Differentiation

In the 1830s, a series of single-issue protests mobilized hundreds of thousands of Americans across the nation. In these protests against social problems like slavery and drinking, men and women gathered together to bear witness against what they viewed as sins, and to demand that their fellow Americans join them in confession. These confessional protests launched and linked a national wave of social movements. The origins of these movements were religious and evangelical. However, for many activists, the outcome of these protests led to a repudiation of this religious source. The development of these confessional protests reveals keys to the processes of secularization. Drawing on the letters and diaries of six white leading anti-slavery activists, we demonstrate how religious processes of rationalization and differentiation led to secularization. We present this development as a reminder to social theorists that processes immanent to religion have been fateful forces driving secularization.     

Rawls and the Problem of Honour

In this paper, I consider the difficult relationship between Rawls, religion and the values that religious believers might consider important in order to lead the good life. Contrary to many of Rawls’ defenders, I argue that at least some of the values that religious citizens are likely to hold cannot be accounted for under Rawls’ theory or under his conception of the good life. I argue that the model of goods which Rawls takes to be part of a thin theory of the good is tied to his belief that under the Original Position justice can be derived from calculations of self-interest alone. To perform my critique, I consider the paradigmatic case of honour in so-called traditional societies. I argue that the way Rawls thematizes primary goods in A Theory of Justice, including concepts like esteem, cannot account for the way honour manifests itself inside traditional communities. I conclude the paper by considering how Rawls might be able to defend his theory against my objection, by considering the relationship between Rawls’ theory, and the rationalization and secularization of society.     

Pathways of Religious Assimilation: Second‐Generation Asian Americans’ Religious Retention and Religiosity

We explore the religious assimilation of different Asian American second‐generation religious groups by examining their rates of religious retention and levels of religiosity relative to the first generation and the general American population. In general, Asian Americans exhibit a pattern of generational religious decline: the second generation tend to have lower levels of both religious retention and religiosity compared to the immigrant generation. The second generation do not necessarily conform to the religious patterns of the general population. Rather, they follow different trajectories of retention and religiosity depending on the religion. We identify four different pathways of religious change among the second generation, and discuss how racial and religious differences mediate assimilation into American religion.     

Religious Deprivatisation in Modern Greece

Comparative surveys suggest that generational replacement has negative implications for the future of religion in Europe. Using Greece as a critical case, it is argued here that focusing only on the aggregate levels of personal commitment can lead to such exaggerated pessimism. This note shifts empirical attention to show how religious authority remains relevant in society despite declining trends in individual religiosity. Preliminary findings are based on a multi-dimensional definition of religious change, which includes the scope of church authority in the public sphere. European Values Study (EVS) data from 1999 suggest that societal modernisation is not a uniformly negative influence on religion, at least when the investigation moves beyond levels of individual commitment.     

Changes in Politics and Religiosity Among Students at a Protestant University

College is a setting and time of profound change in the lives of emerging adults. This change can include shifts in identity related to politics and religion. Given widespread attention to the alignment of religious people with conservative politics and less religious people with liberal politics (i.e., the “God Gap”), we ask: do college students who become politically liberal lose their religion in the process? Using longitudinal panel data, this study examines changes in political identity and religiosity among students at a Protestant university. Findings reveal changes in students’ politics align with changes in public and private religious behaviors, certainty in belief, agreement with core tenets of the Christian faith, faith maturity, and closeness to God. Whereas students who become more politically conservative increase their religiosity, the inverse is true for those whose politics become more liberal in college.