Irrational action and irrational belief

Many philosophers agree with Socrates that it is not possible to perform an akratic action consciously and freely. They take this view because they assimilate the internal irrationality of such a performance to the internal irrationality of drawing a theoretical conclusion which contadicts one's premisses. This article develops some arguments against that assimilation. The extreme cost of theoretical self-contradiction is forming the belief both that something is so and that it is not so. This is impossible for anyone who understands what he is doing, and the impossibility can be explained: nothing could conceivably make such a conjunction of beliefs true. But the conjunction of a value-judgement judgment and an action that gets against it is different. Although it too is internally irrational, there is no property like truth which the value-judgement and his action ought both to possess, but cannot both possess. This article proposes a different model for akratic action, which might serve as a basis for disagreement with Socrates' view of it.     

Further validation of a measure of irrational belief

Malouff and Schutte (1986) developed a measure of irrational belief intended to be shorter and more content valid than other such measures and reported preliminary evidence of reliability and validity for the measure. The present two studies examined further the validity of the new measure. Study 1 produced evidence of construct validity in that a significant correlation was found between scores on the Malouff & Schutte measure and scores on a measure of hostility, which is a theoretically related construct. Study 2 produced evidence of construct validity in that scores on the Malouff & Schutte measure were found to be correlated with scores on two measures of theoretically related constructs: anxiety and irrational tendencies/beliefs. Study 2 also produced evidence of discriminant validity in that scores on the Malouff & Schutte measure were found to be significantly more highly correlated with scores on the more theoretically similar irrational tendencies/beliefs scale than with scores on the anxiety measure.     

Cognitive bias and irrational belief as predictors of avoidance

Cognitive bias, i.e. overestimates of subjective probability and cost of catastrophic events, and irrational belief were explored as predictors of avoidance. Three groups-anxiety disordered clients, a mixed group of clinic outpatients, and normals--were administered several self-report inventories. Multiple regression analyses were used to investigate a modified version of the Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire, the Belief Scale, and the Body Sensations Questionnaire as predictors of avoidance, as measured by the Mobility Inventory. It was hypothesized that frequency x probability x cost of catastrophic cognitions (and the occurrence of the events they represent) would be a better predictor of avoidance than frequency alone. It was also hypothesized that irrational thinking would be a significant predictor of avoidance. The results generally supported the hypotheses, with subjective probability emerging as a particularly potent predictor of avoidance. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.     

Subjective correlates and consequences of belief in free will

Four studies measured or manipulated beliefs in free will to illuminate how such beliefs are linked to other aspects of personality. Study 1 showed that stronger belief in free will was correlated with more gratitude, greater life satisfaction, lower levels of perceived life stress, a greater sense of self-efficacy, greater perceived meaning in life, higher commitment in relationships, and more willingness to forgive relationship partners. Study 2 showed that the belief in free will was a stronger predictor of life satisfaction, meaning in life, gratitude, and self-efficacy than either locus of control or implicit person theory. Study 3 showed that experimentally manipulating disbelief in free will caused a reduction in the perceived meaningfulness of life. Study 4 found that inducing a stronger belief in free will caused people to set more meaningful goals for themselves. The possible concern that believers in free will simply claim all manner of positive traits was contradicted by predicted null findings with regard to sense of humor, empathy, and self-rated attractiveness. Taken together, the present studies show that the belief in free will is a strong predictor of several positive traits and outcomes.     

Research Note Examining non-religious groups in Britain: theistic belief and social correlates

Major changes in religious belonging in Britain in recent decades have included a marked decline in levels of Christian affiliation and a growing segment of society who profess no affiliation—the ‘religious nones’. This research note uses a contemporary opinion poll to examine the groupings within the broad ‘religious nones’ category, focusing on those who identify as atheist or agnostic or who profess some other non-religion identity. This research note examines the patterning in theistic belief across these groups and assesses the socio-demographic correlates of these groups. At each stage, the non-religious groups are compared with those who profess a religious affiliation. These empirical findings are of note, given trends in the British religious landscape and wider scholarly debates about the nature and extent of secularisation, and should encourage future research in the area of non-religion.     

Differential prefrontal-temporal neural correlates of semantic processing in children

This study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine brain-behavior correlations in a group of 16 children (9- to 12-year-olds). Activation was measured during a semantic judgment task presented in either the visual or auditory modality that required the individual to determine whether a final word was related in meaning to one of two previous words (e.g., found-tank-lost). The main finding was that higher performers (i.e., accuracy) were associated with more activation in posterior representational systems including the inferior and middle temporal gyri, whereas lower performers were associated with more activation in anterior regions including the inferior and middle frontal gyri. This pattern of results was interpreted as reflecting an elaborated semantic representational system in temporal areas for the high accuracy performers that allowed them to efficiently and accurately make meaning based judgments. The low accuracy performers may have an inaccurate or weakly interconnected semantic system that results in greater use of frontal areas in a feature selection process.     

Functional belief and judgmental belief

Synthese - A division between functional (animal) belief, on the one hand, and judgmental (reflective) belief, on the other, is central to Sosa’s two-tier virtue epistemology. For Sosa, mere...     

Disputing clients' irrational beliefs

This paper describes and illustrates a conceptual framework developed to assist novice REBT therapists with enlarging their disputational repertoire. First, four disputational strategies are described and illustrated. Then four disputational styles of presenting the strategies to the client are also described and illustrated. Then the disputational strategies and the disputational styles are combined within a conceptual framework to assist the developing REBT therapist in generating a variety of disputes for a single IB. Finally, the conceptual framework is applied to the IB of the case of Karen from Dryden and Digiuseppe'sPrimer on Rational Emotive Therapy to yield thirty-two separate disputes (sixteen disputes for the premise of the IB, and sixteen disputes for the derivative) of the IB.     

Dimensions of perfectionism and irrational thinking

Several authors have suggested that perfectionism is associated with irrational thinking. The purpose of the present research was to test the hypothesis that various dimensions of perfectionism are related significantly to core irrational beliefs. In Study 1, 102 subjects completed the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS) and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). The MPS provides assessments of self-oriented, other-oriented, and socially prescribed perfectionism. Analyses revealed that self-oriented perfectionism was correlated positively with the IBT high self-expectations and perfect solutions subscales. Socially prescribed perfectionism was correlated significantly with a variety of irrational beliefs including high self-expectations, demand for social approval, dependency, blame proneness, and anxious overconcern. Other-oriented perfectionism was correlated with few irrational beliefs. In Study 2, 130 subjects completed the MPS and the Survey of Personal Beliefs, a new measure of core irrational beliefs. Analyses confirmed that all three perfectionism dimensions were associated with core irrational beliefs. It is concluded that the results constitute general support for the hypothesis that cognitive aspects are important in both personal and social components of perfectionism and that perfectionists are characterized by increased levels of irrational beliefs that may contribute to maladjustment. The findings are discussed in terms of the associations among perfectionism, irrational beliefs, and maladjustment.Gordon L. Flett, Ph.D is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at York University. Paul L. Hewitt, Ph.D is a clinical psychologist at Brockville Psychiatric Hospital. He is also an assistant professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Ottawa. Kirk R. Blankstein, Ph.D, is an associate professor in the Department of Psychology at Erindale College, University of Toronto. Spomenka Koledin is a former student at Erindale College, University of Toronto. Currently, she is a graduate student in the Master of Arts programme at York University.     

Disputation of irrational beliefs about overeating

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Disputation of irrational beliefs about overeating