Depression versus anxiety: Processing of self- and other-referent information

Abstract

Depression and anxiety are psychopathological states that have been closely related in clinical. empirical. and theoretical investigations. Cognitive approaches to the emotional disorders suggest that depressed and anxious individuals can be differentiated on the basis of the specific content of their self-referent judgements and information processing. The present investigation provided a stringent test of the content-specificity hypothesis by iomparing depressed. anxious. and nondepressed-nonanxious subjects' processing of positive and negative depression-relevant, anxiety-relevant. and control content adjectives for themselves and a well-known other (their best friends). Based on judgement and reaction time measures. the content-specificity hypothesis was supported. Depressed subjects were unique in exhibiting balanced endorsements and processing of positive and negative traits. suggesting that they possessed self-schematil with mixed positive and negative content. In contrast. anxious subjects were unique in ascribing more negative than positive anxiety-relevant traits to themselves and in processing negative anxiety-relevant traits fitstcr than depression-relevant traits. In addition. depressed and anxious subjects' self-referent processing was specific to the self: both groups' judgements were more negative for themselves than for their best friends. The findings are discussed with regard to their implications for cognitive differences between depression and anxiety and the specificity of the “depressive evenhandedness” effect.     

自尊的记忆效应的实验研究

本实验研究证实了自尊的记忆效应的存在,即自尊水平与词性的交互作用对特质形容诃的回忆量有显著影响。具体而言,对于正向词的回忆量,高自尊组显著高于低自尊组。对于负向诃的回忆量,高自尊组与低自尊组无显著差异;而在高自尊组,正向词的回忆量显著高于负向诃的回忆量。在低自尊组,正向词的回忆量与负向诃的回忆量无显著差异。实验结果支持自尊对记忆影响的忽视——不一致模型。     

Autobiographical memory and clinical anxiety

Abstract

Previous experiments on the recall of threatening and neutral information in clinically anxious subjects have yielded mixed results. The present study assessed autobiographical memory in patients with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), and normal controls. Subjects were first presented with neutral cue words and asked to respond with any personal memory. GAD subjects judged the content of their own memories as more consistent with anxious mood, and less consistent with pleasant mood, than that reported by controls. Subjects were then again presented with neutral cue words, but with instructions to provide either “anxious” or “nonanxious” personal memories, on specified trials. Significant interactions between group and instruction condition indicated that anxious subjects recalled more anxiety-evoking memories, and recalled them more rapidly, relative to controls. Ratings by blind judges did not support the hypothesis that this apparent difference in the content of autobiographical recall was an artefact due to anxious subjects labelling memories as being more anxiety evoking than would controls. Possible explanations of the findings, and reasons for the apparent discrepancy between these and earlier results, are discussed.     

Influence of the spacing of trait information on impressions of likability

Five experiments were conducted in which subjects were shown lists of trait adjectives that supposedly described particular individuals. Each list included both positive and negative traits, with all such traits occurring twice. The second occurrence of a trait followed the first either immediately (massed presentation) or after four other traits intervened (distributed presentation). For a given list, all positive traits received massed presentation and all negative traits were distributed, or vice versa. After list presentation, subjects judged how likable the person described would be. In Experiments 1–3 only, there was also a free recall test for the traits. The free recall test revealed both a spacing effect (distributed items being recalled better than massed) and a bias toward recalling negative traits better than positive. Likability judgments paralleled the recall pattern, with the judgments being more positive when positive traits were distributed (and negative massed), than in the opposite arrangement. Correlations calculated between recall and impressions were mostly nonsignificant, however, suggesting that judgments were not based on the recall of specific traits and that inferences formed at encoding were of primary importance.     

Repression and the inaccessibility of affective memories

The fundamental assumption that repression involves an inaccessibility to affective memories has not been directly addressed in empirical research. In the present study we examined three groups of subjects (repressors, low anxious, and high anxious) under six conditions of recall (general, happy, sad, anger, fear, and wonder). Subjects were asked to recall personal experiences from childhood and to rate their current mood and the affective intensity of the memories. The results indicated that repressors recalled significantly fewer negative memories than did low-anxious and high-anxious subjects and, furthermore, that they were substantially older at the time of the earliest negative memory recalled. Compared with low-anxious subjects, repressors also recalled fewer positive affective memories as well. This pattern of findings is consistent with the hypothesis that repression involves an inaccessibility to negative emotional memories and indicates further that repression is associated in some way with the suppression or inhibition of emotional experiences in general. The concept of repression as a process involving limited access to negative affective memories appears to be valid.     

Affective valence and the self‐reference effect: Influence of retrieval conditions

Positive trait information is typically better recalled than negative trait information when encoded in reference to the self, but not when encoded in reference to someone else or when processed for general meaning. This study examined whether this influence of affective meaning is modulated by retrieval conditions. Participants encoded positive and negative trait adjectives in reference to themselves or to a celebrity. They were then presented with either a free‐recall task (Experiment 1) or a recognition memory task (Experiment 2). Positive adjectives were better recalled than negative adjectives, but only when they were encoded in reference to the self. In contrast, encoding condition and valence did not interact in the recognition memory task. Taken together, these findings suggest that the difference in memory between positive and negative self‐referent information is due, at least in part, to a control exerted on memory retrieval.     

Depressed and nondepressed content self-reference in mild depressives

The present research investigated the extent to which mild depressives and normals differed in their self-referent processing of personal information. In Experiment 1, these subjects made two types of ratings on depressed (e.g., bleak, dismal) and nondepressed (e.g., loyal, organized) content personal adjectives. Half of the adjectives in each content category were rated for a semantic attribute (Does this word have a specific meaning or relate to a specific situation?), whereas half were rated for degree of self-reference (Does this word describe you?). These ratings were followed immediately by an incidental recall task, in which subjects recalled as many of the adjectives as possible. Consistent with predictions generated from a content-specific self-schema model, normals displayed superior recall for self-referenced nondepressed content adjectives, when compared to recall for self-referenced depressed content adjectives and recall for semantic ratings (both depressed and nondepressed content). In contrast, mild depressives exhibited enhanced self-referent recall for both types of content, when compared to their recall for semantic adjectives. This finding suggested that mild depressives utilize a self-schema which incorporates both depressed and nondepressed content. Experiment 2 explored this suggestion further by substituting an other-referent rating task (Does this word describe Pierre Trudeau?) for the semantic judgment used in Experiment 1. Again, consistent with a content-specific self-schema model, normals displayed superior recall only for self-referenced nondepressed adjectives. Mild depressives, however, showed enhanced self-referent recall, relative to other-referent recall, only for depressed content adjectives. For nondepressed content, mild depressives did not distinguish between the self- and other-referent conditions. This finding hinted that the nondepressed component of the mild depressives self-schema may operate at a somewhat reduced effectiveness, but only when required to differentiate between self and others.     

State and trait differences in depressive self-perceptions.

A number of investigators have interpreted a tendency for depressed people to recall more negative than positive self-referent adjectives as evidence for a depressive self-schema made up of predominantly negative characterological information. We sought to confirm this account by eliciting the subjective self-perceptions of the depressed. Depressed patients and controls were required to rate whether or not a series of positive and negative adjectives applied to them during the previous week, at any time, and generally. The depressed distinguished clearly between these questions and, although describing themselves currently in largely negative terms, described their general state as equally composed of positive and negative elements.     

The symptom perception hypothesis revised: depression and anxiety play different roles in concurrent and retrospective physical symptom reporting

According to the classic symptom perception hypothesis (Costa & McCrae, 1987; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989), the global predisposition to frequently experience a variety of negative emotions-that is, neuroticism (N) or trait negative affectivity (NA)-is associated with inflated physical symptom reporting. We tested a revision of this hypothesis, which posits distinctive roles for depression and anxiety in the physical symptom experience. Three studies tested predictions from the revised symptom perception hypothesis: (a) that depressive affect should be related to inflated retrospective physical symptom reports and (b) that anxious affect should be related to inflated concurrent, or momentary, physical symptom reports. Study 1 assessed the relations among N/NA, depressive affect, and recall of physical symptoms experienced in the previous 3 weeks. Depressive affect was uniquely and positively associated with recalling more symptoms. When entered with depressive affect in multiple regression analyses, neuroticism was not associated with level of symptoms recalled. In Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to anxious, depressed, angry, happy, or neutral mood inductions and then reported about concurrent symptom experience. Participants in the anxious mood condition reported significantly more concurrent physical symptoms than did those in the other 4 conditions. In Study 3, anxious, depressed, or neutral mood was induced, followed by assessment of both concurrent and retrospective physical symptoms. Those assigned to the anxious mood induction reported more concurrent symptoms, while those in the depressed mood condition reported having experienced more symptoms in the past. These findings are consistent with the idea that encoding and retrieval processes, which are differentially associated with anxious versus depressed affect, influence different aspects of physical symptom reporting. The results have implications for self-diagnosis, medical treatment-seeking, and care, and potential insights about other complex social and interpersonal behaviors are discussed.     

Anxiety and Mood-congruent Autobiographical Memory: A Conceptual Failure to Replicate

This study further explored whether highly anxious participants exhibit a mood-congruent autobiographical memory bias, as was found in two previous studies (Burke & Mathews, 1992; Richards & Whittaker, 1990). The 74 high and low trait anxious participants retrieved personal memories to anxiety-related, neutral, and positive cue words, and were then asked to recall the original cue words. The study also explored how expression of emotional versus factual responses might affect a memory bias. On most dependent measures, no differences were found between anxiety groups. However, low anxious participants recalled more memories overall than high anxious participants. In addition, the emotions groups recalled more words at free recall than the facts groups. Findings fail to support previous studies that found an autobiographical memory bias to be associated with high anxiety, and cast more support for the mounting evidence against a mood-congruent memory bias in anxiety.     

Sex,sex roles,and response styles for negative affect: Selectivity in a free recall task

Study 1 examined how responses to negative affect may be influenced by sex differences in response styles [S. Nolen-Hoeksema (1987), “Sex Differences in Unipolar Depression: Evidence and Theory,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 101, pp. 259–282] and situational norms. Male and female experimental subjects were led to experience negative affect by reading and rating sad stories, and were then given either nonnormative or normative feedback. Nonnormative subjects were informed that their story ratings were more negative than other participants' ratings. Normative subjects were informed that their ratings were similar to others' ratings. For nonnormative subjects, men recalled less negative material than women, suggesting that response styles are most apparent when negative affect is considered inappropriate. As both sex and sex role orientation are predictive of response styles, Study 2 examined the hypothesis that both sex and sex role orientation are predictive of recall in a manner similar to sex in Study 1. Male and female subjects high and low in masculinity and femininity were assigned to negative-nonnormative and neutral affect conditions. In addition to a marginally significant sex effect consistent with Study 1, results revealed that high-masculinity individuals tended to recall more positive material in the negative-nonnormative condition than in the neutral affect condition. In contrast, low-masculinity individuals recalled less positive material in the negative-nonnormative condition than in the neutral affect condition. The implications of this research for the impact of negative affect on recall are addressed.     

Memory bias for threatening information related to anxiety: an updated meta-analytic review

The evidence for an anxiety-related memory bias is contradictory. We compiled 171 articles published until October 2016 including a group with clinical or subclinical anxiety and a control group in tasks involving implicit or explicit memory using threatening stimuli. There was an anxiety-related memory bias in free recall tasks, but it was not observed in another memory task. The between-groups differences showed that the anxious group recalled more threatening stimuli than the control group (d?=?0.321). When we compared the group differences (anxious vs. control participants) in the within-groups effect (threatening vs. neutral stimuli), a moderate effect size emerged (d_bw?=?0.714). This anxiety-related memory bias was observed with shallow processing, that is consistent with attentional biases related to anxiety. There was also evidence that high-anxious persons recall fewer positive stimuli. Future research is needed to investigate whether this result is a memory or encoding bias and explore other moderator variables.     

Memory for media: investigation of false memories for negatively and positively charged public events

Despite a large body of false memory research, little has addressed the potential influence of an event's emotional content on susceptibility to false recollections. The Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis predicts that negative emotion generally facilitates memory but also heightens susceptibility to false memories. Participants were asked whether they could recall 20 "widely publicised" public events (half fictitious) ranging in emotional valence, with or without visual cues. Participants recalled a greater number of true negative events (M=3.31/5) than true positive (M=2.61/5) events. Nearly everyone (95%) came to recall at least one false event (M=2.15 false events recalled). Further, more than twice as many participants recalled any false negative (90%) compared to false positive (41.7%) events. Negative events, in general, were associated with more detailed memories and false negative event memories were more detailed than false positive event memories. Higher dissociation scores were associated with false recollections of negative events, specifically.