Playing prosocial video games increases empathy and decreases schadenfreude

Past research provided abundant evidence that exposure to violent video games increases aggressive tendencies and decreases prosocial tendencies. In contrast, research on the effects of exposure to prosocial video games has been relatively sparse. The present research found support for the hypothesis that exposure to prosocial video games is positively related to prosocial affect and negatively related to antisocial affect. More specifically, two studies revealed that playing a prosocial (relative to a neutral) video game increased interpersonal empathy and decreased reported pleasure at another's misfortune (i.e., schadenfreude). These results lend further credence to the predictive validity of the General Learning Model (Buckley & Anderson, 2006) for the effects of media exposure on social tendencies.     

Belief,credence, and norms

There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a puzzle which lends support to two theses. First, that there is no formal reduction of a rational agent’s beliefs to her credences, because belief and credence are each responsive to different features of a body of evidence. Second, that if our traditional understanding of our practices of holding each other responsible is correct, then belief has a distinctive role to play, even for ideally rational agents, that cannot be played by credence. The question of which avenues remain for the credence-only theorist is considered.     

The influence of the minority on perception: A note on a possible alternative explanation

This research note raises some concerns about possible alternative explanations to studies using perceptual change as indicative of minority vs majority influence. Having failed to replicate the original study (S. Moscovici & B. Personnaz, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1980, 16, 270–282), using the same and an alternate measuring procedure, inspection of additional data introduces the role of suspiciousness in explaining this and previous findings. An informal study adds further credence to this explanation.     

面孔吸引力同化的连续性效应

以往研究表明目标面孔的吸引力评价会偏向背景面孔, 产生同化效应。但同化效应的计算常常是对不同背景下目标面孔吸引力评分进行比较, 并没有考虑目标面孔单独呈现时的吸引力评分, 可能是虚假的同化效应。本文以单独呈现的目标面孔吸引力评分作为基准值计算同化效应, 考察了呈现时间和目标与背景面孔吸引力的差异对目标面孔吸引力评价的影响。结果发现, 个体对目标面孔吸引力的评分会偏向背景面孔的吸引力, 并表现出同化的连续性效应, 即目标和背景面孔的吸引力差异越大, 同化效应越小。     

Entropy and environmental mystery: a parapsychological perspective

Findings from parapsychological field studies grounded in cognitive illusions parallel the results from Stamps' 2007 research on environmental mystery in simulated environments. However, parapsychology also implicates certain perceptual-personality characteristics in the perception of some forms of environmental mystery. Thus, it is argued that environmental mystery is produced fundamentally by an interaction of the right type of percipient (primed to detect and give credence to ambiguous stimuli) in the right type of environment (full of ambiguous stimuli).     

Do open space environments encourage children to seek immediate gratification?

This study evaluated the effects of 14 months' exposure to open space environments on preference for delayed reward. Three hundred eighty-nine pupils in open space and conventional classes in grades 4 and 5 were individually administered one of four tests for delay of gratification. These tests consisted of a choice between an immediate, smaller reward and a delayed, larger reward. Each of the four independent studies found that approximately the same percent of pupils from each educational environment selected the delayed alternative.     

Belief,Credence, and the Preface Paradox

Many discussions of the ‘preface paradox’ assume that it is more troubling for deductive closure constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All that we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a reductive view: namely, the view that outright belief is credence 1. However, I argue that this view is unsustainable. Moreover, my version of the problem turns on no particular theory of evidence or evidential probability, and so cannot be avoided by adopting some revisionary such theory. In sum, deductive closure is in more serious, and more general, trouble than some have thought.     

Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?

Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don't know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it's impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it's impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it's impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren't standard epistemological fare—at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious—but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it's possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I shall argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology.     

Divided attention: Storing and classifying briefly presented objects

Although in many studies divided attention has been examined by having people perform the same task (e.g., report or search) with a large number of objects, in few studies have people had to perform two logically independent tasks involving the same brief display. In two experiments, subjects saw 200-msec arrays of characters. In dual-task blocks, theyclassified the color of some or all of the items (making an immediate response) andstored the shape of some of the items for a later recognition test. There was not much mutual interference between classifying and storing per se. However, the tasks were by no means independent: there was substantial interference whendifferent objects from the array had to be stored for one task and classified for the other. The results confirm that wholly unrelated visual tasks depend on the same input-attention system and suggest that attending to an object for any purpose may entail storing a representation of it in visual short-term memory.     

At the threshold of knowledge

We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s (Philosophical Studies 170(2):277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins because it leads to a pervasive skepticism about knowledge of the future. We argue that the threshold view of evidence and knowledge gives independent grounds to reject fair coins.     

Response to commentaries on discussion paper Gene–environment interdependence

There is a high measure of agreement on the key issues concerning gene–environment interdependence. Contrary to arguments on the need for direct exact replication of findings, it is suggested that “robust” replication using the same constructs is needed. RCTs have an important role for testing for environmental mediation but cannot be used for environmental risks in childhood that show G×E in relation to adult outcomes. Instead, greater use needs to be made of natural experiments. Experimental methods are needed to study biological mediating mechanisms and these should include both animal models and human brain imaging studies. In addition to further research on G×E, further studies of gene–environment correlations are required. Many challenges remain but the future for gene–environment interdependence is bright.     

Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation

What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who has evaluated the same evidence? I argue that even weak general recommendations run the risk of being incompatible with a pair of real epistemic phenomena, what I call evidential attenuation and evidential amplification. I focus on a popular and intuitive view of disagreement, the equal weight view. I take it to state that in cases of peer disagreement, a subject ought to end up equally confident that her own opinion is correct as that the opinion of her peer is. I say why we should regard the equal weight view as a synchronic constraint on (prior) credence functions. I then spell out a trilemma for the view: it violates what are intuitively correct updates (also leading to violations of conditionalisation), it poses implausible restrictions on prior credence functions, or it is non‐substantive. The sorts of reasons why the equal weight view fails apply to other views as well: there is no blanket answer to the question of how a subject should adjust her opinions in cases of peer disagreement.     

Inverse duration effects in partial report.

In partial-report experiments, an array of stimuli is displayed briefly, followed by a probe indicating the items to be reported. When exposure duration of the array is increased, 2 contrasting outcomes have been found: Some experiments find that performance improves (direct-duration effect); others find that it deteriorates (inverse-duration effect). The objective here was to identify the reasons for the discrepant results. This was done by investigating the roles played by 5 factors that differed between the 2 sets of contrasting studies. An inverse-duration effect was obtained in each of 6 experiments; its magnitude was affected by retinal eccentricity and by the number of items denoted by the probe. The effect was independent of array configuration and of number of items in the array. The direct-duration effect was shown to arise from a confounding of exposure duration and brightness.     

Studying the consequences of literacy within a literate society: The cognitive correlates of print exposure

Most studies of the cognitive consequences of literacy have attempted to compare the performance of literate individuals with that of illiterate individuals. We argue that it is not absolutely necessary to examine illiterates in order to study the cognitive consequences of reading experience because there is enormous variation in exposure to print even within a generally literate society. In the present study, we tested several methods of assessing differential exposure to print and demonstrated that all have significant correlations with measures of vocabulary, cultural knowledge, spelling ability, and verbal fluency. Several indicators of print exposure predicted variance in these knowledge domains even when general ability and reading-comprehension skill were statistically controlled. Our results, although correlational, suggest that print exposure is an independent contributor to the development of certain verbal skills.     

The Longitudinal Relationship Between Media Violence and Empathy: Was It Sympathy All Along?

Previous research with adolescents has reported a negative relationship between media violence and empathy. There are, however, two important conceptual issues in this earlier literature that deserve further research attention. First, studies often treat empathy as a one-dimensional construct while it consists of both an affective and cognitive component. Second, while aiming to measure empathy, several studies have measured sympathy instead. Driven by these concerns, this study was designed to investigate the longitudinal relationship between media violence, affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and sympathy. Using data from a two-wave panel study with 943 adolescents (10–14 years old), a cross-lagged model tested whether media violence exposure negatively influences empathy and sympathy (desensitization) or whether empathy and sympathy negatively influence media violence exposure (selection). Results were in line with desensitization. However, rather than showing that media violence leads to a decrease in empathy (which previous studies have shown), results indicate a decrease in sympathy instead. These findings provide clarification to existing work as well as offer methodological and practical implications.     

Can religious and secular belief be rationally combined?

Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to groups by attempts of finding adequate ways of pooling individual degrees of belief into an overall group credence or, more abstractly speaking, into a collective mind. In this paper, we model religious people’s minds as such a collective mind. Religious people are therein identified with a set of degrees of beliefs containing religious and secular credences. E.g., within a religious context a person may be sure that some statement is true, whereas the same person lacks non-religious support for such a credence and hence may doubt the truth of that statement within a secular context. We will also present two results on the adequacy of this model.     

The Fallacy of Calibrationism

Calibrationism is an intuitively plausible thesis about the relation between rational credence and expected reliability. But calibrationism is misguided. It relies on the base-rate fallacy, a classic mistake in probabilistic epistemology. Thus while calibrationism is intuitive, it cannot be correct.     

Psychological Openness and Counselor Effectiveness: A Further Investigation

The purpose of this study was to crossvalidate previous findings which lend credence to the widely hypothesized positive relationship between a student's psychological openness and his effectiveness as a counselor. Rorschach indicators of psychological openness were compared with supervisor ratings of competence and scores obtained from the application of the Truax Scales of accurate empathy, genuineness, and nonpossessive warmth to tapes of actual counseling sessions. The data offer further support for the hypothesis that psychological openness is an important predictor of success in counselor training.     

The psychoanalytic assumption of the primary process: extrapsychoanalytic evidence and findings

No evidence for an assumption of a theory can be gained by data derived from methods dependent on that theory. Three experiments, using methods independent of psychoanalysis, test the psychoanalytic posit that primary process exists as a formal mental mode distinct from secondary process. The three experiments, using a nonpsychoanalytic index for primary process, test for a preponderance of primary process organization in three areas in which Freud observed primary process: (1) in unconscious mental states and during implicit tasks; (2) in the mental productions of preschool children; and (3) in anxiety states, as these are typically associated with unconscious conflict. All three experiments show significant results in favor of the primary process. Further, the three experiments taken together, because they account for seemingly disparate data, lend further credence to the original assumption. These positive results suggest that primary process may be more important than even Freud suspected. Perhaps it is the basic mental organization in many nonhuman mammals and some birds. Primary process organization may also underlie aspects of such basic psychological operations as generalizations in conditioning and assessments-in-action, as opposed to judgments proper, about how one would act. Finally, primary process may play a key role in drive activity. Three types of experiments are proposed to test these far-reaching applications of the primary process concept.