J. N. Mohanty: Lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,Edited by Tara Chatterjea,Sandhya Basu,and Amita Chatterjee

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research -     

The Role of Reflection in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant's account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.     

Kant and Rousseau on the Critique of Philosophical Theology: The Primacy of Practical Reason

This paper explores the Rousseauian background to Kant’s critique of metaphysics and philosophical theology. The core idea is that the rejection of metaphysics and philosophical theology is part of a turn from theoretical to practical reason influential on European philosophy of religion, a turn we associate with Kant but that is prefigured by Rousseau. Rousseau is not, however, a thinker normally associated with the notion of metaphysical criticism, nor the notion of the primacy of practical reason. The paper draws out this dimension of Rousseau’s thinking and its importance for Kantian thought. It will proceed by discussing the Kant-Rousseau connection; demonstrate the importance of practical philosophy for Kant and the critical project generally; overview Kant’s critique of metaphysics; and turn to a consideration of Rousseau, particularly from the text émile. Given the indisputable influence of Rousseau on Kant, the purpose of this paper is to explore the ways that Rousseau’s own rejection of philosophical theology might be suggestive to those interested in Kant and the way in which it throws new light on Kant’s philosophy of religion. As well as drawing out the Kant-Rousseau connection, it also, implicitly, defends the general orientation of these philosophers as one that is important, perhaps vital, to philosophy of religion.

康德关于纯粹实践理性方法论的思想

文章立足于分析康德对“客观的德性法则如何在主观上也成为实践的”这一问题的回答,梳理了康德的纯粹实践理性的方法论思想,提出了两个步骤的理论：判断力的练习与自由的意识;并分析了方法论与实践理性批判的分析论在方法上的统一。康德认为这一方法论思想对道德生活与道德培育具有重要的意义,尤其是自由的意识以及对自己的敬重是道德教育的立足点,因为它们也是人在内心防止心灵的腐败与堕落的惟一守卫者。     

《纯粹理性批判》第二版先验演绎读解

范畴的先验演绎是《纯粹理性批判》中最重要、最难懂的部分,也是在第二版中作了最大修改的部分.本文将从三个方面对第二版先验演绎给予解释性的说明,一说明了先验演绎的内涵、必要性及其困难;二阐述了先验演绎的展开,分析了先验统觉是综合的统一性与分析的统一性同一的根据,还有先验统觉如何借助于先验想象力从而使得认识成可能;三提出先验演绎带给我们的启示和留给我们困难.     

再读《纯粹理性批判》第二版序言

《纯粹理性批判》“第二版序言”写于 1 787年 ,它是康德针对该书首版后所引起的诸种批评和讨论的回应 ,与“第一版序言”相比它针对性更强 ,所讨论的问题也更加明确深入。可以说 ,“第二版序言”不仅是整本书的“序言” ,在某种程度上它甚至可以被视为是整个康德哲学的总纲。康德从理性领域中的知识如何能够踏上一条可靠的道路的问题入手 ,借鉴了逻辑学、数学和物理学的发展 ,提出在形而上学领域中进行一场思维方式的变革的重要性。从这篇序言中 ,我们不仅可以了解到康德所反对和批判的形而上学 ,以及他做出如是批判的理由 ,而且还能认识到…     

The Feminist Critique of Reason Revisited

In this essay I distinguish four different modes of feminist critique of reason. Discussing the work of authors such as Keller, Irigaray, and Butler, I point out that the issue of masculine connotations has been addressed with regard to different concepts—or at least different aspects—of reason. In view of a tendency to overdraw the objections, I suggest to reformulate the feminist critique of reason. I also argue that a rediscovery of those philosophical concepts of reason that do not restrict this term to instrumental rationality might be useful for this purpose.     

Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant

This paper argues that there is an important respect in which Rae Langton's recent interpretation of Kant is correct: Kant's claim that we cannot know things in themselves should be understood as the claim that we cannot know the intrinsic nature of things. However, I dispute Langton's account of intrinsic properties, and therefore her version of what this claim amounts to. Langton's distinction between intrinsic, causally inert properties and causal powers is problematic, both as an interpretation of Kant, and as an independent metaphysical position. I propose a different reading of the claim that we cannot know things intrinsically. I distinguish between two ways of knowing things: in terms of their effects on other things, and as they are apart from these. 1 argue that knowing things' powers is knowing things in terms of effects on other things, and therefore is not knowing them as they are in themselves, and that there are textual grounds for attributing this position to Kant.     

Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

论康德的"公共性"及其理论价值

在学术界对康德思想的讨论中,"公共性"问题却被忽略.而这恰恰是把握康德政治哲学特质的关键所在.在康德看来,任何政治判断都应该是一次"启蒙".而启蒙必须以公共性为中介.正是由于理性的公共使用,政治判断才有可能成为批判的、辩论的共识,进而才能获得深厚的民情民意基础.基于这种认识,康德颠覆了传统意义上的"公共性"并赋予其新的意涵,从而凸显了"公共性"的理论价值及其在康德思想体系中的转向意义.     

Reason and revelation: Kant and the problem of authority

This paper explores the significance of authority for Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation. Beginning with the separation of the faculties of Theology and Philosophy in Conflict, it will be shown that Kant sees a clear distinction between the authority of reason and that of revelation. However, when one turns to Religion, it is also clear that Kant sees an important, perhaps necessary, relationship between the two. Drawing on a variety of texts, in particular those concerning the public and private use of reason, this paper then explores the relationship between the authority of reason and that of revelation. From this discussion, several conclusions will be drawn regarding Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation, namely that while distinct, the two are not necessarily in conflict and that, ultimately, the proper functioning of public reason must include some reference to revelation.