J. N. Mohanty: Lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,Edited by Tara Chatterjea,Sandhya Basu,and Amita Chatterjee

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research -     

The Role of Reflection in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant's account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.     

Kant and Rousseau on the Critique of Philosophical Theology: The Primacy of Practical Reason

This paper explores the Rousseauian background to Kant’s critique of metaphysics and philosophical theology. The core idea is that the rejection of metaphysics and philosophical theology is part of a turn from theoretical to practical reason influential on European philosophy of religion, a turn we associate with Kant but that is prefigured by Rousseau. Rousseau is not, however, a thinker normally associated with the notion of metaphysical criticism, nor the notion of the primacy of practical reason. The paper draws out this dimension of Rousseau’s thinking and its importance for Kantian thought. It will proceed by discussing the Kant-Rousseau connection; demonstrate the importance of practical philosophy for Kant and the critical project generally; overview Kant’s critique of metaphysics; and turn to a consideration of Rousseau, particularly from the text émile. Given the indisputable influence of Rousseau on Kant, the purpose of this paper is to explore the ways that Rousseau’s own rejection of philosophical theology might be suggestive to those interested in Kant and the way in which it throws new light on Kant’s philosophy of religion. As well as drawing out the Kant-Rousseau connection, it also, implicitly, defends the general orientation of these philosophers as one that is important, perhaps vital, to philosophy of religion.

纯粹实践理性批判与定言命令演绎

普通人类知识在实践运用中出现自然辩证法,引发对定言命令有效性的怀疑,使纯粹实践理性批判成为必要。纯粹实践理性批判通过追问三个问题,防止实践理性的僭越,确立了定言命令演绎的实践的立场。这三个问题分别对应《道德形而上学的奠基》前面三节,说明道德法则除了自由之外,别无根据;自由除了道德法则之外,没有其他基础;追问对道德法则的兴趣,容易把情感当作道德法则的根据。这些观点与《实践理性批判》是一致的。康德从一开始就不是从理论的角度来演绎定言命令,也没有出现主流学界所批判的失败。     

康德关于纯粹实践理性方法论的思想

文章立足于分析康德对“客观的德性法则如何在主观上也成为实践的”这一问题的回答,梳理了康德的纯粹实践理性的方法论思想,提出了两个步骤的理论：判断力的练习与自由的意识;并分析了方法论与实践理性批判的分析论在方法上的统一。康德认为这一方法论思想对道德生活与道德培育具有重要的意义,尤其是自由的意识以及对自己的敬重是道德教育的立足点,因为它们也是人在内心防止心灵的腐败与堕落的惟一守卫者。     

Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Abstract: Philosophers interested in Kant's relevance to contemporary debates over the nature of mental content—notably Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais—have argued that Kant ought to be credited with being the original proponent of the existence of ‘nonconceptual content’. However, I think the ‘nonconceptualist’ interpretations that Hanna and Allais give do not show that Kant allowed for nonconceptual content as they construe it. I argue, on the basis of an analysis of certain sections of the A and B editions of the Transcendental Deduction, for a ‘conceptualist’ reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. My contention is that since Kant's notion of empirical intuition makes essential reference to the categories, it must be true for him that no empirical intuition can be given in sensibility independently of the understanding and its categories.     

《纯粹理性批判》第二版先验演绎读解

范畴的先验演绎是《纯粹理性批判》中最重要、最难懂的部分,也是在第二版中作了最大修改的部分.本文将从三个方面对第二版先验演绎给予解释性的说明,一说明了先验演绎的内涵、必要性及其困难;二阐述了先验演绎的展开,分析了先验统觉是综合的统一性与分析的统一性同一的根据,还有先验统觉如何借助于先验想象力从而使得认识成可能;三提出先验演绎带给我们的启示和留给我们困难.     

再读《纯粹理性批判》第二版序言

《纯粹理性批判》“第二版序言”写于 1 787年 ,它是康德针对该书首版后所引起的诸种批评和讨论的回应 ,与“第一版序言”相比它针对性更强 ,所讨论的问题也更加明确深入。可以说 ,“第二版序言”不仅是整本书的“序言” ,在某种程度上它甚至可以被视为是整个康德哲学的总纲。康德从理性领域中的知识如何能够踏上一条可靠的道路的问题入手 ,借鉴了逻辑学、数学和物理学的发展 ,提出在形而上学领域中进行一场思维方式的变革的重要性。从这篇序言中 ,我们不仅可以了解到康德所反对和批判的形而上学 ,以及他做出如是批判的理由 ,而且还能认识到…     

Substitution by Image: The Very Idea

The aim of this article is to provide a plausible conceptual model of a specific use of images described as substitution in recent art‐historical literature. I bring to light the largely implicit shared commitments of the art historians’ discussion of substitution, each working as they do in a different idiom, and I draw consequences from these commitments for the concept of substitution by image—the major being the distinction between nonportraying substitution and substitution by portrayal. I then develop an argument that substitution by image in the desired, nonportraying sense needs to be thought of in terms of a figurative representation of an image's subject as a generic object, what I will call its figurative instantiation.