Hegel,the Trinity,and the ‘I’

The main goal of this paper is to argue the relevance of Hegel’s notion of the Trinity with respect to two aspects of Hegel’s idealism: the overcoming of subjectivism and his conception of the ‘I’. I contend that these two aspects are interconnected and that the Trinity is important to Hegel’s strategy for addressing these questions. I first address the problem of subjectivism by considering Hegel’s thought against the background of modern philosophy. I argue that the recognitive structure of Hegel’s idealism led him to give the Trinity a decisive role in his philosophical account. Next, I discuss the Trinity by analysing the three divine persons. This analysis paves the way for the conclusion, where I argue that the Trinity represents a model for re-thinking the ‘I’ in a way that overcomes a ‘naïve realist’ and a ‘subjective’ account of the self. I suggest that Hegel’s absolute idealism can be conceived as an approach to the ‘I’ that considers the role of acts of mutual recognition for the genesis of self-conscious thought, and that the Trinity is the Darstellung of the relational and recognitive structure of the ‘I’.     

“I am the Author and Must Take Full Responsibility”: Abraham Verghese,Physicians as the Storytellers of the Body,and the Renewal of Medicine

Abraham Verghese proposes to renew medicine by training physicians to read the right texts—literary fiction and patients' bodies—with skilled attention. Analyzing Verghese's proposal with reference to Foucault's idea of the "clinical gaze," I find that Verghese conceives of patients as texts that only physicians can read, meaning that physicians become the storytellers of the bodies, lives, and deaths of the people they meet as patients. I conclude that Verghese's project is unsustainable and alternatively propose thinking analogically of physicians as ship captains who maintain therapeutic distance to reopen interpretative spaces for communities outside of medicine.     

First-person thought and the use of ‘I’

The traditional account (TA) of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of ‘I’ conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.     

“I Suck at Everything”: Crime,Arrest, and the Generality of Failure

In this article, we advance the idea that getting arrested amounts to “failing at crime.” And akin to the notion of the generality of deviance—where those who engage in any given form of criminal behavior are also likely to engage in a wide array of other problematic behaviors—we examine whether failing at crime (getting arrested) is associated with other forms of life failure. Using data from multiple waves of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, our results reveal that, independent of one’s level of self-reported criminal behavior and other key potential confounders (IQ and self-control), being arrested is a significant predictor of a host of life failures related to education, employment, relationships, and health. The key implication of our study is that it highlights the need to develop a theory of the “generality of failure.”     

I. Frege and the rise of analytic philosophy∗

Since the beginning of the ‘eighties of the present century, a circle of relatively young American sociologists who are followers of Jeffrey Alexander are making energetic and spectacular efforts to supply sociology with a uniform and comprehensive theoretical framework by continuing Talcott Parsons' lifework. The present article is an appreciation of Alexander's achievements in the justification of a general sociological theory (especially a theory of action and social order) while pointing to objections that can be raised against the character of his theory. A scrutiny of Alexander's metatheoretical deliberations and of his interpretations of sociological classics such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons reveals that Alexander's metatheoretical frame is not flexible enough to actually reconstruct the problem situation of the classics. Pointers are given toward a theory of action that is not subject to the antinomy of utilitarianism and normativism, so that it is more adequate and appropriate to the heritage of the sociological classics, both from a theoretical and an interpretative angle.     

The “concept of time” and the “being of the clock”: Bergson, Einstein, Heidegger, and the interrogation of the temporality of modernism

The topic to be addressed in this paper, that is, the distinction between the “concept” of time and the being of the clock, divides into two parts: first, in the debate between Albert Einstein and Henri Bergson, one discovers the ground for the diverging concepts of time characterized by physics in its opposing itself to philosophy. Bergson’s durée or “duration” in opposition to Einstein’s ‘physicist’s time’ as ‘public time,’ one can argue, sets the terms for Martin Heidegger’s extending, his ontological analysis of Da-sein, as human being-in-the-world. Second, in this the ‘concept of time’ gives way to the analysis of the ‘being of the clock.’ What is this being of the clock that makes evident the fundamental temporality of Da-sein? This question is rehearsed in Division Two of Being and Time. My claim is that the fundamental insight into the nature of time revealed by the encounter between Bergson and Einstein is that time extemporizes itself. Temporality “is” not a being but a process that temporalizes itself, precisely because it “is not.”     

Am I blue? Depressed mood and the consequences of self-focus for the interpretation and recall of ambiguous words

In two experiments, dysphoric and nondysphoric students first concentrated on either self-focused or other-focused phrases and then performed an ostensibly unrelated task involving the interpretation of homographs with both personal and impersonal meanings. In Experiment 1, they constructed sentences for the homographs; dysphoric students' sentences were more emotionally negative (although not more personal) in the self-focused condition than in the other-focused condition. In Experiment 2, they freely associated to the homographs, and the percentage of personal meanings reflected by the associations revealed an effect of self versus other focus that depended on mood group. Following free associations, they attempted to recall the homographs. Dysphoric students (but not nondysphoric students) recalled a greater percentage of personally interpreted homographs if they had focused on self than if they had focused on other matters. In general, these results suggest that ruminative or self-focused thinking by people in depressed moods transfers to novel ambiguous situations, encouraging more negative interpretations and better recall of personal interpretations.     

“I” and the brain

Many philosophers as well as many biological psychologists think that recent experiments in neuropsychology have definitively discredited any notion of freedom of the will. I argue that the arguments mounted against the concept of freedom of the will in the name of natural causal determinism are valuable but not new, and that they leave intact a concept of freedom of the will that is compatible with causal determinism. After explaining this concept, I argue that it is interestingly related to our use of the first person pronoun “I.” I discuss three examples of our use of “I” in thought and language and submit a few questions I would like neuropsychologists to answer concerning the brain processes that might underlie those uses. I suggest answering these questions would support the compatibilist notion of freedom of the will I have offered in part 1.     

‘I hope that I get old before I die’: ageing and the concept of disease

Ageing is often deemed bad for people and something that ought to be eliminated. An important aspect of this normative aspect of ageing is whether ageing, i.e., senescence, is a disease. In this essay, I defend a theory of disease that concludes that ageing is not a disease, based on an account of natural function. I also criticize other arguments that lead to the same conclusion. It is important to be clear about valid reasons in this debate, since the failure of bad analyses is exploited by proponents of the view that ageing is indeed a disease. Finally, I argue that there could be other reasons for attempting to eradicate senescence, which have to do with an evaluative assessment of ageing in relation to the good life. I touch on some reasons why ageing might be good for people and conclude that we cannot justify generalized statements in this regard.     

The long arm of the state? Transnationalism,Islam, and nation-building: the case of Turkey and Morocco

From the moment the first Turkish and Moroccan workers migrated to Europe in the early 1960s, the Turkish and Moroccan states have been concerned with how to bind emigrated citizens to their country of origin. In this article, we focus on Islam as a multi-dimensional binding mechanism. Religion is a broad register that links emotion, affect, and senses of belonging and binds individuals to political and cultural projects of collective actors and states. As we will demonstrate, it is a field in which both states and migrants have developed a variety of activities and initiatives, but it is difficult to single out what pertains to the state and what not. We argue that although state involvement in these two cases differs markedly, there are some intriguing parallels when we concentrate on religion. In both cases, religious affiliation is a very complex source of binding and of fission. State-monitored transnational networks have been tools of binding, but the same networks have engendered processes of disengagement from the state.     

The Position of Metapsychology in the Formation of Psychoanalytic Knowledge and the Concept of “I” (Ego)

Psychoanalysis is unique in that competence in the field can be achieved only through applying the method to oneself. Different psychoanalytic schools differ in their understanding of the unconscious, about how to approach it, or how to define the specificity of the psychoanalytic interaction. Consequently, there are differences in the criteria for the definition of the ‘good-enough analysis’. There are many different opinions about how to select candidates, organise the curriculum and length of training. To define psychoanalytic talent is difficult; the uncertainty in the definition of criteria to use for selection is great; the problematic overlap between personal analysis and training is constantly present; to achieve conditions in which learning and creativity can develop is complicated by trainee, supervisor and their relationship to the Institute. Confrontations about training are often heated and divergent, as well as repetitive. Systematic studies about psychoanalytic education are very few. After a short discussion of the different concerns about selection, personal versus training analysis and the ambiguities of the supervisory situation, the author gives a review of three studies on how psychoanalytic education—as viewed by trainers and trainees—is conducted and experienced at the Swedish Psychoanalytic Institute. Training is felt to be well grounded in theory and tradition; nonetheless most do not have a sufficiently clear picture of training as a whole. Both candidates and trainers see the development of a psychoanalytic identity as the goal of training, where the competencies to be acquired are equated with important personality qualities. The candidates have a feeling of “being chosen"; they “wish to belong to a group who share an interest and fascination for psychoanalytic thinking and theory". All praise the warm and open atmosphere, and the mutual and continuous evaluations and the deep involvement of all. The surge to be rooted in an overreaching psychoanalytic ethic, the culture of gratitude within the Institute and the devotion to the task to train psychoanalytic clinicians for the future may preserve an idealised image of psychoanalysis and the fantasy that psychoanalysts are exceptional persons and give a mystifying colour to the psychoanalytic profession. This might also stand in the way of a more radical change in the traditions of training—according to the rather drastically changing climate in which psychoanalysts of the future will have to work.     

Unresolved problems with the “I”, the “A”, and the “T”: A logical and psychometric critique of the Implicit Association Test (IAT)

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) had already gained the status of a prominent assessment procedure before its psychometric properties and underlying task structure were understood. The present critique addresses five major problems that arise when the IAT is used for diagnostic inferences: (1) the asymmetry of causal and diagnostic inferences; (2) the viability of the underlying association model; (3) the lack of a testable model underlying IAT-based inferences; (4) the difficulties of interpreting difference scores; and (5) the susceptibility of the IAT to deliberate faking and strategic processing. Based on a theoretical reflection of these issues, and a comprehensive survey of published IAT studies, it is concluded that a number of uncontrolled factors can produce (or reduce) significant IAT scores independently of the personality attribute that is supposed to be captured by the IAT procedure.     

Children's and Adults’ Judgments of the Certainty of Deductive Inferences,Inductive Inferences,and Guesses

Children and adults rated their own certainty following inductive inferences, deductive inferences, and guesses. Beginning in kindergarten, participants rated deductions as more certain than weak inductions or guesses. Deductions were rated as more certain than strong inductions beginning in Grade 3, and fourth-grade children and adults differentiated strong inductions, weak inductions, and informed guesses from pure guesses. By Grade 3, participants also gave different types of explanations for their deductions and inductions. These results are discussed in relation to children's concepts of cognitive processes, logical reasoning, and epistemological development.     

Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction,forms of theory-ladenness,and the reliability of data

Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claimed that theories predict and explain phenomena, but not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness, which has it that our observations are influenced by the theories we hold, cannot apply. On the basis of two case studies, I want to show that this consequence of Bogen and Woodward’s account is rather unrealistic. More importantly, I also object against Bogen and Woodward’s view that the reliability of data, which constitutes the precondition for data-to-phenomena inferences, can be secured without the theory one seeks to test. The case studies I revisit have figured heavily in the publications of Bogen and Woodward and others: the discovery of weak neutral currents and the discovery of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies. I show that, in the latter case, data can be ignored if they appear to be irrelevant from a particular theoretical perspective (TLI) and that, in the former case, the tested theory can be critical for the assessment of the reliability of the data (TLA). I argue that both TLI and TLA are much stronger senses of theory-ladenness than the classical thesis and that neither TLI nor TLA can be accommodated within Bogen and Woodward’s account.     

I know you're me, but who am I? Perspective taking and seeing the other in the self

Research examining the consequences of perspective-taking on cognition suggests that through perceiver–target overlap, perspective-taking can lead to greater valuing of targets, greater helping of targets, and a reduction in stereotyping of targets and the groups to which they belong. Research has also begun to focus more closely on the ways perceivers come to think and act like targets. This research, however evocative, is not conclusive. The current studies set out to provide firmer support. Reported here, two studies found that perspective-taking influences perceiver–target overlap, which mediates changes in self-concept (ratings of the self on researcher-related attributes and beliefs after taking the perspective of a researcher in Study 1 and attitudes toward African Americans after taking the perspective of a racist in Study 2). In the same studies, overlap simultaneously mediated valuing of the targets (target ratings on positive attributes in Study 1 and liking for the target in Study 2).     

“As soon as the bat met the ball,I knew it was gone”: Outcome prediction,hindsight bias,and the representation and control of action in expert and novice baseball players

A virtual-reality batting task compared novice and expert baseball players’ ability to predict the outcomes of their swings as well as the susceptibility of these outcome predictions to hindsight bias-a measure of strength and resistance to distortion of memory for predicted action outcomes. During each swing the simulation stopped when the bat met the ball. Batters marked where on the field they thought the ball would land. Correct feedback was then displayed, after which batters attempted to remark the location they had indicated prior to feedback. Expert batters were more accurate than less-skilled individuals in the initial marking and showed less hindsight bias in the postfeedback marking. Furthermore, experts’ number of hits in the previous block of trials was positively correlated with prediction accuracy and negatively correlated with hindsight bias. The reverse was true for novices. Thus the ability to predict the outcome of one’s performance before such information is available in the environment is not only based on one’s overall skill level, but how one is performing at a given moment.     

Art history, the problem of style, and Arnold Hauser’s contribution to the history and sociology of knowledge

Much of Arnold Hauser??s work on the social history of art and the philosophy of art history is informed by a concern for the cognitive dimension of art. The present paper offers a reconstruction of this aspect of Hauser??s project and identifies areas of overlap with the sociology of knowledge??where the latter is to be understood as both a separate discipline and a going intellectual concern. Following a discussion of Hauser??s personal and intellectual background, as well as of the shifting political and academic setting of his work, the paper addresses one of Hauser??s central questions, viz. how best to square a thoroughgoing commitment to the social nature of art with the reality of successive artistic styles, given that the latter seem to be characterizable on purely formal grounds. This is followed by a discussion of Hauser??s conflicted views on the relation between art, science, and technology. This injects a tension into Hauser??s work, due to his initial reluctance to explain just how the aesthetic and the cognitive realms relate. The final part of the paper, through a closer examination of the analogies and disanalogies that Hauser sees between art history and the history of science, attempts to give a positive answer????on Hauser??s behalf??, as it were??to the question of whether art may be credited with a specific cognitive dimension of its own, and if so, what its contribution to our cognitive enterprise may consist in.     

A postcolonial Pannenberg? Mimicry,the law,and the cross of love

This paper employs the postcolonial concepts of mimicry and hybridity to interpret Wolfhart Pannenberg's understanding of the violence done to Jesus on the cross and the subversive reconciliatory love that it engenders. According to Pannenberg, although the man Jesus was crucified as blasphemer of the Jewish law, the resurrection vindicated Jesus so that the ones accusing Jesus were retroactively deemed to be the actual blasphemers. As a result, Jesus ended up dying not for his own alleged breaking of the law, but as an inclusive substitute for all blasphemers of God (through amour propre) deserving death. Thus, the resurrection confirmed Jesus’ divine identity and his earthly teaching that love supersedes and transforms the law. Applying the concept of mimicry to Pannenberg, on the cross the symbolic and semiotic are held together in tension for in mimicry the “not-quite sameness” menaces the colonizer. The cross, ostensibly a symbolic sign of abjection, is mimicked by the suffering of Jesus and subverted through a practice of inclusive semiotic love which recapitulates sinful human life toward a life of transformed autonomy. Pannenberg displays a pseudo postcolonial understanding of subverting oppressive law into love. However, on account of his futurist ontology, the eschatological totality is underscored relative to formative experiences, leaving him vulnerable to postcolonial critiques of essentialism, which can reinscribe colonialism. I contend that Pannenberg employs a strategy of “strategic particularism” in which concepts such as mimicry and hybridity are helpful as hermeneutical tools but ultimately provisional and temporary relative to the whole.     

I’m merciful,am I not? Facets of narcissism and forgiveness revisited

Narcissists are said to be particularly unforgiving, yet previous research remains inconclusive. This is likely because most previous studies focused on narcissism as a unitary construct, thereby neglecting its multiple facets. The present study (N = 1101) thus aimed to clarify the nuanced associations between different facets of narcissism and forgiveness, the latter being assessed via self-report and non-self-report measures. The results of a structural equation model (SEM) showed that antagonistic aspects of narcissism were negatively correlated with explicit forgiveness. Importantly, agentic as well as communal aspects of narcissism were positively correlated with explicit forgiveness. Aspects of narcissistic personality were not correlated with implicit forgiveness. Results suggest that not all facets of narcissism are associated with an unforgiving stance.