Generation of hypotheses in Wason's 2-4-6 task: an information theory approach.

We explored the "context of discovery" in Wason's 2-4-6 task, focusing on how the first hypothesis is generated. According to Oaksford and Chater (1994a) people generate hypotheses extracting "common features", or regularities, from the available triples, but their model does not explain why some regularities contribute to the hypothesis more than do other regularities. Our conjecture is that some regularities contribute to the hypothesis more than do other regularities because people estimate the amount of information in the perceived regularities and try to preserve as much information as possible in their initial hypotheses. Experiment 1, which used two initial triples, showed that the presence of high-information relational regularities in the initial triples affected the information in the initial hypotheses more than did the presence of low-information object regularities. Experiment 2 extended the results to the classic situation in which only one initial triple is given. It also suggested that amount of information is the only aspect of the structure of the triple that affects hypotheses generation. Experiment 3 confirmed the latter finding: Although relations are commonly distinguished between first-order and higher order relations, the latter being most important for generating hypotheses (Gentner, 1983), higher order relations do have an effect on Wason's 2-4-6 task only if their presence incre ases information. In the conclusion we discuss the statistical soundness of human hypotheses generation processes, and we ask an unanswered question: Amount of information explains why some regularities are preferred to others, but only within a set of "nonarbitrary" regularities; there are object regularities that are rich in information content, but are considered "arbitrary", and are not used in generating hypotheses. Which formal property can distinguish between these two sets of regularities?     

Seeing faces as objects: no face inversion effect with geometrical discrimination

Inversion dramatically impairs face perception, recognition, and discrimination. Yet it does not interfere with the ability to make precise estimates of facial feature distances. To investigate this discontinuity between facial feature distance estimation and general perception and recognition, we assessed the effect of inversion on the discrimination of differences in facial compression and elongation or expansion using geometrically distorted faces. The results clearly showed that geometrical face discrimination is not subject to the traditional face inversion effect and did not show a benefit for natural faces. Although discrimination thresholds were not affected by inversion, response times to the distance judgments were faster with inversion, especially when the inverted faces contained natural configurations. Based on these counterintuitive results, we suggest that participants used analytical processing to do the discrimination task. Moreover, we suggest that the depth with which a face is holistically encoded depends on the nature of the task, face orientation, and similarity between a face and the prototypical face template.     

State-Space Analysis of Working Memory in Schizophrenia: An FBIRN Study

The neural correlates of working memory (WM) in schizophrenia (SZ) have been extensively studied using the multisite fMRI data acquired by the Functional Biomedical Informatics Research Network (fBIRN) consortium. Although univariate and multivariate analysis methods have been variously employed to localize brain responses under differing task conditions, important hypotheses regarding the representation of mental processes in the spatio-temporal patterns of neural recruitment and the differential organization of these mental processes in patients versus controls have not been addressed in this context. This paper uses a multivariate state-space model (SSM) to analyze the differential representation and organization of mental processes of controls and patients performing the Sternberg Item Recognition Paradigm (SIRP) WM task. The SSM is able to not only predict the mental state of the subject from the data, but also yield estimates of the spatial distribution and temporal ordering of neural activity, along with estimates of the hemodynamic response. The dynamical Bayesian modeling approach used in this study was able to find significant differences between the predictability and organization of the working memory processes of SZ patients versus healthy subjects. Prediction of some stimulus types from imaging data in the SZ group was significantly lower than controls, reflecting a greater level of disorganization/heterogeneity of their mental processes. Moreover, the changes in accuracy of predicting the mental state of the subject with respect to parametric modulations, such as memory load and task duration, may have important implications on the neurocognitive models for WM processes in both SZ and healthy adults. Additionally, the SSM was used to compare the spatio-temporal patterns of mental activity across subjects, in a holistic fashion and to derive a low-dimensional representation space for the SIRP task, in which subjects were found to cluster according to their diagnosis.     

Is it really too far? Overestimating walk time and distance reduces walking

In this paper we use an intercept survey of 1,297 people at seven locations in New Jersey to answer three questions about perceived distances and walk times to nearby destinations. First, we seek to clarify conflicting results from the literature by asking: what factors are associated with perceived distance and walk times? Like other studies, we find that people overestimate both walk times and distances. We find that characteristics of the route matter. People are more likely to overestimate in car-dependent locations, along routes with many turns or barriers, or for destinations that are relatively closer. In terms of personal characteristics, experience walking and familiarity with the area both lead to lower estimates, while concerns about crime, getting lost, or carrying something heavy increase estimates. Next, we explore whether overestimating walk times and distances reduces the likelihood of walking. We find that people who overestimate are less likely to walk, everything else equal. Together, these results suggest that wayfinding campaigns that clarify the travel time to nearby destinations and ease the fear of getting lost are likely to improve perceptions and increase walking. We make an additional contribution by highlighting important differences between our university and town center samples, which raises questions about the reliance on student samples in research.     

Subjects' expectations,individual variability,and the scanning of mental images

The near-perfect correlation between mental imagery scanning times (averaged across subjects) and interobject distances on imaged maps has been cited as evidence for Kosslyn's (1981) analog theory of mental imagery. Present results (1) indicate that individual subjects' scanning-time/distance correlations vary as a function of instructional set (and, hence, a priori expectations), and (2) reveal a large degree of individual variability in scanning-time/distance correlations.     

Solving geometric analogy problems through two-stage analogical mapping

Evans' 1968 ANALOGY system was the first computer model of analogy. This paper demonstrates that the structure mapping model of analogy, when combined with high-level visual processing and qualitative representations, can solve the same kinds of geometric analogy problems as were solved by ANALOGY. Importantly, the bulk of the computations are not particular to the model of this task but are general purpose: We use our existing sketch understanding system, CogSketch, to compute visual structure that is used by our existing analogical matcher, Structure Mapping Engine (SME). We show how SME can be used to facilitate high-level visual matching, proposing a role for structural alignment in mental rotation. We show how second-order analogies over differences computed via analogies between pictures provide a more elegant model of the geometric analogy task. We compare our model against human data on a set of problems, showing that the model aligns well with both the answers chosen by people and the reaction times required to choose the answers.     

False Consensus and False Uniqueness in Estimating the Prevalence of Health-Protective Behaviors

The degree to which people perceive that their health-relevant behaviors are also performed by their peers may influence whether they continue these practices or are susceptible to change. The present paper examined estimates of social consensus for health-relevant behaviors. It was hypothesized that respondents would perceive their own behaviors to be relatively more common than do people not performing them, the so-called False Consensus Effect. However, in terms of the accuracy of consensus estimates, people who behave in undesirable ways will tend to overestimate the actual number of others who behave similarly. In contrast, people who behave in desirable ways will underestimate the actual number of people who behave like themselves (false uniqueness). A group of college-aged males were asked to report about their performance of a series of health-relevant behaviors and to estimate the frequency of each behavior among their peers. The findings strongly supported the first two hypotheses and provided some support for the third. One practical implication of the results is that persons with unhealthy practices may resist public health campaigns and other interventions by overestimating consensus for their own behaviors. Also, individuals who think their undesirable health behaviors are relatively common may believe that they involve few health risks for them. The research suggests the need for further research on social cognitions about health, illness, and health-protective behaviors.     

Spontaneous imagery scanning in mental extrapolation

We report an experiment that suggests a functional application of mental-image scanning. After subjects inspected a simple dot pattern, the pattern was removed, and they were then shown an arrow at an unexpected location. Their task was to judge as quickly as possible whether the arrow pointed at any of the dots in the previously observed pattern. Although the subjects were never instructed to form or scan mental images, most of them reported having done so in order to make their judgments, and their reaction times were directly proportional to the distances separating the dots and the arrows, as typically found in image-scanning experiments. Imagery scanning may therefore serve a useful function when one must judge spatial relations between the positions of remembered objects and newly specified locations.     

Embodied representation of the body contains veridical spatial information

In two experiments, the extent to which mental body representations contain spatial information was examined. Participants were asked to compare distances between various body parts. Similar to what happens when people compare distances on a real visual stimulus, they were faster as the distance differences between body parts became larger (Experiment 1), and this effect could not (only) be explained by the crossing of major bodily categories (umbilicus to knee vs. knee to ankle; Experiment 2). In addition, participants also performed simple animate/inanimate verification on a set of nouns. The nouns describing animate items were names of body parts. A spatial priming effect was found: Verification was faster for body part items preceded by body parts in close spatial proximity. This suggests automatic activation of spatial body information. Taken together, results from the distance comparison task and the property verification task showed that mental body representations contain both categorical and more metric spatial information. These findings are further discussed in terms of recent embodied cognition theories.     

Embodied representation of the body contains veridical spatial information

In two experiments, the extent to which mental body representations contain spatial information was examined. Participants were asked to compare distances between various body parts. Similar to what happens when people compare distances on a real visual stimulus, they were faster as the distance differences between body parts became larger (Experiment 1), and this effect could not (only) be explained by the crossing of major bodily categories (umbilicus to knee vs. knee to ankle; Experiment 2). In addition, participants also performed simple animate/inanimate verification on a set of nouns. The nouns describing animate items were names of body parts. A spatial priming effect was found: Verification was faster for body part items preceded by body parts in close spatial proximity. This suggests automatic activation of spatial body information. Taken together, results from the distance comparison task and the property verification task showed that mental body representations contain both categorical and more metric spatial information. These findings are further discussed in terms of recent embodied cognition theories.     

口吃者的言语计划缺陷——来自词长效应的证据

口吃者与非口吃者在词长效应上的差异是口吃语音编码缺陷的一个重要的支持证据。本研究在综述词长效应研究的基础上,对这种解释提出了三点置疑,即词频、句法复杂性和发音长度也可能是造成词长效应差异的主要原因,并通过三个实验进行了验证。实验一和实验三在口吃者和非口吃者之间都得到了稳定的词长效应差异,并且排除了词频和发音长度对于这种差异的影响;实验二在控制词长的条件下,发现口吃者对于句法复杂性是敏感的。因此,本研究的结果支持口吃在言语产出中的语音编码和句法编码中都存在缺陷。同时,本研究对于口吃治疗也提供了有价值的参考建议     

Overconfidence in estimation: Testing the anchoring-and-adjustment hypothesis

People are frequently overconfident in the accuracy of their estimates of uncertain quantities. The present study requested 50%- or 90%-confidence ranges. Overconfidence is shown when less than the target percentage of ranges include the true value. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) proposed that people use an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: They begin with a starting value, one supplied to them or generated by them, and insufficiently adjust their estimates around this anchor. The present data support the proposed anchoring process. If subjects receive another person's point estimates, their own implicit point estimates are correlated with these values. However, anchoring- and-adjustment processes do not invariably produce overconfidence. Subjects who receive anchors are no more overconfident than are those who do not receive anchors. If subjects are required to produce a point estimate first, overconfidence decreases; processes involved in explicitly displaying the point estimate are implicated. Overconfidence may occur because people do not realistically assess their estimation ability.     

The effects of feedback format on dynamic decision making

The tendency for people to perform poorly on dynamic decision-making tasks has been attributed to their inability to form adequate mental models of dynamic systems (Sterman, 1994). An alternative explanation is that the tabular feedback formats used in previous studies do not facilitate mental representations of the dynamic task and lead to processing overload. Drawing on research in the human factors area, this study examined the impact of graphical versus tabular feedback formats on performance, response times, and learning on a dynamic inventory control task under differing levels of complexity. The graphical feedback group performed better but the tabular group showed stronger evidence of learning. The two groups did not differ in response times. Records of decision rationales showed that participants were aware of complexity factors but were unable to cope with them effectively under either feedback format. The proximity compatibility principle ( Wickens & Carswell, 1995) from human factors, which argues that feedback must be matched to the processing requirements of the task, provides a useful theoretical framework for the design and testing of feedback formats for organizational tasks and criteria.     

Are people's estimates of what other people know influenced by what they themselves know?

An exploratory experiment was done to investigate how estimates of what other people know are influenced by what one knows oneself. Three hypotheses were of interest: (1) that people are more likely to impute a bit of knowledge to other people if they have it themselves than if they do not, (2) that people are likely to overestimate the commonality of their own knowledge, and (3) that people who are unusually knowledgeable with respect to a particular topic are likely to bias their estimates of what other people know in the direction of their personal knowledge store. Subjects answered questions selected from the set for which Nelson and Narens (1980) have provided norms. They also estimated the percentage of other people who would be likely to know the answers to these questions. The results supported the first two hypotheses, but were inconclusive with respect to the third.     

True Overconfidence in Interval Estimates: Evidence Based on a New Measure of Miscalibration

Overconfidence is often regarded as one of the most prevalent judgment biases. Several studies show that overconfidence can lead to suboptimal decisions of investors, managers, or politicians. Recent research, however, questions whether overconfidence should be regarded as a bias and shows that standard “overconfidence” findings can easily be explained by different degrees of knowledge of agents plus a random error in predictions. We contribute to the current literature and ongoing research by extensively analyzing interval estimates for knowledge questions, for real financial time series, and for artificially generated charts. We thereby suggest a new method to measure overconfidence in interval estimates, which is based on the implied probability mass behind a stated prediction interval. We document overconfidence patterns, which are difficult to reconcile with rationality of agents and which cannot be explained by differences in knowledge as differences in knowledge do not exist in our task. Furthermore, we show that overconfidence measures are reliable in the sense that there exist stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence in interval estimates, thereby testing an important assumption of behavioral economics and behavioral finance models: stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence across people. We do this in a “field experiment,” for different levels of expertise of subjects (students on the one hand and professional traders and investment bankers on the other hand), over time, by using different miscalibration metrics, and for tasks that avoid common weaknesses such as a non‐representative selection of trick questions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

1s范围视听时距认知的分段性研究

时距认知分段性指不同长度时距加工机制和表征方式不同。以往研究对1s范围时距认知分段性仍存在分歧,为此在规避以往研究局限基础上设计实验1和实验2。实验1和实验2分别采用双任务范式探讨心算任务对100ms和1000ms听、视时距比较的选择性干扰,结果表明,心算任务影响了1000ms听、视时距比较的75%差别阈限,心算加工负荷越大,75%差别阈限越大,但对100ms听、视时距比较的75%差别阈限没有影响。两项实验支持了1s范围视、听时距认知均具有分段性。     

Dual processes,evolution and rationality

In three experiments we tested hypotheses derived from the goal specificity literature using a real-world physics task. In the balance-scale paradigm participants predict the state of the apparatus based on a configuration of weights at various distances from the fulcrum. Non-specific goals (NSG) have been shown to encourage hypothesis testing, which facilitates rule discovery, whereas specific goals (SG) do not. We showed that this goal specificity effect depends on task difficulty. The NSG strategy led to rule induction among some participants. Among non-discoverers, SG participants were faster and more accurate on difficult problems than NSG participants. The use of misleading exemplars (scale configurations that obscured the rule governing outcomes) led to fixation on inappropriate hypotheses for NSG but not SG participants. When more diagnostic learning exemplars were used, NSG non-discoverers still performed worse than SG participants on difficult problems. SG participants also outperformed NSG participants on a post-test of difficult problems. These findings qualify the generality of goal specificity effects.     

Directional scanning of remembered visual patterns

We report a set of experiments that helps to define the conditions under which mental image scanning may be used spontaneously for specific, practical purposes. Subjects were shown a dot pattern, followed by an arrow, and their task was to say whether the arrow was pointing at any of the previously seen dots. When no advance information was provided about the arrow's location, reaction time for correctly verifying that an arrow was pointing at a dot increased linearly with increasing arrow-dot distance, and the subjects almost always reported scanning a mental image in order to make their judgments. However, when a cue for the arrow's location was presented 2 sec beforehand, reaction time was uncorrelated with distance, and most of the subjects reported using an alternative strategy based on the determination in advance of correct directions from that location to the dots. When given only 1 sec of advance information about arrow location, most subjects reported using a combined image-scanning and advanced determination strategy, resulting in a reaction time function that increased only for the farthest distances. Because in each of these experiments instructions to form or to scan mental images were never given, these findings address the most common criticisms of the image-scanning paradigm.     

Number versus continuous quantity in numerosity judgments by fish

A fundamental question in human cognition is how people reason about space. We use a computational model to explore cross-cultural commonalities and differences in spatial cognition. Our model is based upon two hypotheses: (1) the structure-mapping model of analogy can explain the visual comparisons used in spatial reasoning; and (2) qualitative, structural representations are computed by people’s visual systems and used in these comparisons. We apply our model to a visual oddity task, in which individuals are shown an array of two-dimensional images and asked to the pick the one that does not belong. This task was previously used to evaluate understanding of geometric concepts in two disparate populations: North Americans, and the Mundurukú, a South American indigenous group. Our model automatically generates representations of each hand-segmented image and compares them to solve the task. The model achieves human-level performance on this task, and problems that are hard for the model are also difficult for people in both cultures. Furthermore, ablation studies on the model suggest explanations for cross-cultural differences in terms of differences in spatial representations.