Expertise and age effects on knowledge activation in chess

Novice, intermediate, and expert chess players of various ages, playing with two chess pieces on a quarter-section of a chessboard, performed a simple task to detect that the king is in check or is threatened with being in check. Age slowed response for both tasks. An interaction of task and skill revealed differences in diminishing response time between check and threat tasks as skill increased; experts were equally fast on both tasks. Measures of speed and working memory were negatively related to age but unrelated to skill. Skill did not mitigate age-related effects on speed of detection. These results suggest that knowledge-activation processes necessary to assess basic chess relationships slow with age, even in experts.     

Working memory in chess

Three experiments investigated the role of working memory in various aspects of thinking in chess. Experiment 1 examined the immediate memory for briefly presented chess positions from master games in players from a wide range of abilities, following the imposition of various secondary tasks designed to block separate components of working memory. Suppression of the articulatory loop (by preventing subvocal rehearsal) had no effect on measures of recall, whereas blocking the visuospatial sketchpad (by manipulation of a keypad) and blocking the central executive (by random letter generation) had equivalent disruptive effects, in comparison with a control condition. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of similar secondary tasks on the solution (i.e., move selection) of tactical chess positions, and a similar pattern was found, except that blocking the central executive was much more disruptive than in Experiment 1. Experiment 3 compared performance on two types of primary task, one concerned with solving chess positions as in Experiment 2, and the other a sentence-rearrangement task. The secondary tasks in each case were both designed to block the central executive, but one was verbal (vocal generation of random numbers), while the other was spatial in nature (random generation of keypresses). Performance of the spatial secondary task was affected to a greater extent by the chess primary task than by the verbal primary task, whereas there were no differential effects on these secondary tasks by the verbal primary task. In none of the three experiments were there any differential effects between weak and strong players. These results are interpreted in the context of the workingmemory model and previous theories of the nature of cognition in chess.     

Planning abilities and chess: A comparison of chess and non‐chess players on the Tower of London task

Playing chess requires problem‐solving capacities in order to search through the chess problem space in an effective manner. Chess should thus require planning abilities for calculating many moves ahead. Therefore, we asked whether chess players are better problem solvers than non‐chess players in a complex planning task. We compared planning performance between chess (N=25) and non‐chess players (N=25) using a standard psychometric planning task, the Tower of London (ToL) test. We also assessed fluid intelligence (Raven Test), as well as verbal and visuospatial working memory. As expected, chess players showed better planning performance than non‐chess players, an effect most strongly expressed in difficult problems. On the other hand, they showed longer planning and movement execution times, especially for incorrectly solved trials. No differences in fluid intelligence and verbal/visuospatial working memory were found between both groups. These findings indicate that better performance in chess players is associated with disproportionally longer solution times, although it remains to be investigated whether motivational or strategic differences account for this result.     

Perception in chess

This paper develops a technique for isolating and studying the perceptual structures that chess players perceive. Three chess players of varying strength — from master to novice — were confronted with two tasks: (1) A perception task, where the player reproduces a chess position in plain view, and (2) de Groot's (1965) short-term recall task, where the player reproduces a chess position after viewing it for 5 sec. The successive glances at the position in the perceptual task and long pauses in the memory task were used to segment the structures in the reconstruction protocol. The size and nature of these structures were then analyzed as a function of chess skill.     

Visual span in expert chess players: evidence from eye movements

The reported research extends classic findings that after briefly viewing structured, but not random, chess positions, chess masters reproduce these positions much more accurately than less-skilled players. Using a combination of the gaze-contingent window paradigm and the change blindness flicker paradigm, we documented dramatically larger visual spans for experts while processing structured, but not random, chess positions. In addition, in a check-detection task, a minimized 3 × 3 chessboard containing a King and potentially checking pieces was displayed. In this task, experts made fewer fixations per trial than less-skilled players, and had a greater proportion of fixations between individual pieces, rather than on pieces. Our results provide strong evidence for a perceptual encoding advantage for experts attributable to chess experience, rather than to a general perceptual or memory superiority.     

A psychometric analysis of chess expertise

This study introduces the Amsterdam Chess Test (ACT). The ACT measures chess playing proficiency through 5 tasks: a choose-a-move task (comprising two parallel tests), a motivation questionnaire, a predict-a-move task, a verbal knowledge questionnaire, and a recall task. The validity of these tasks was established using external criteria based on the Elo chess rating system. Results from a representative sample of active chess players showed that the ACT is a very reliable test for chess expertise and that ACT has high predictive validity. Several hypotheses about the relationships between chess expertise, chess knowledge, motivation, and memory were tested. Incorporating response latencies in test scores is shown to lead to an increase in criterion validity, particularly for easy items.     

The impact of chess research on cognitive science

Summary Although chess research has not been a mainstream activity in cognitive science, it has had a significant impact on this field because of the experimental and theoretical tools it has provided. The two most-cited references in chess research, de Groot (1965) and Chase and Simon (1973 a), have accumulated over 250 citations each (SSCI andSCI sources summed), with the majority of citations coming a decade or more from their publication dates. Both works are frequently cited in contemporary cognitive-psychology textbooks. Chess playing provides a model task environment for the study of basic cognitive processes, such as perception, memory, and problem solving. It also offers a unique opportunity for the study of individual differences (chess expertise) because of Elo's (1965, 1978) development of a chess-skill rating scale. Chess has also enjoyed a privileged position in Artificial-Intelligence research as a model domain for exploring search and evaluation processes.     

Recall memory for visually presented chess positions

A series of three experiments replicated and extended earlier research reported by Chase and Simon (1973), de Groot (1965), and Charness (Note 1). The first experiment demonstrated that the relationship between memory for chess positions and chess skill varies directly with the amount of chess-specific information in the stimulus display. The second experiment employed tachistoscopic displays to incrementally "build" tournament chess positions by meaningful or nonmeaningful chunks and demonstrated that meaningful piece groupings during presentation markedly enhance subsequent recall performance. The third experiment tested memory for one of two positions presented in immediate sequence and demonstrated that explanations based on a limited-capacity short-term memory (Chase & Simon, 1973) are not adequate for explaining performance on this memory task.     

Expertise and hierarchical knowledge representation in chess

Summary In two experiments the structure of knowledge representation in chess experts and average players was examined. Pattern-recognition theory explains expertise through the existence of many small, unrelated knowledge units. Recent research stresses the structure of knowledge representations. However, the standard paradigm does not allow for the detection of relations between chunks; the theoretical shift has to be accompanied by a methodological shift. In Experiment 1, by means of a partitioning task, evidence was provided for a hierarchical representation of chess positions. Chess masters formed larger and more complex knowledge units than average players. In Experiment 2, the typicality of the positions was varied. The more typical the positions were, the larger and more coherent the constructed knowledge units were. The greatest differences between both groups occurred in more typical positions. This reflects the experts' ability to relate several knowledge units with one another.     

Switch detection in preschoolers' cognitive flexibility

The current study addressed the role of switch detection in cognitive flexibility by testing the effect of transition cues (i.e., cues that directly signal the need to switch or maintain a given task goal) in a cued set-shifting paradigm at 5 years of age. Children performed better, especially on switch trials, when transition cues were combined with traditional task cues (i.e., cues that directly signal the relevant task on a given trial) relative to conditions without transition cues. This effect was not influenced by explicit knowledge of transition cues or transition cue transparency, suggesting that transition cues did not need to be semantically processed to be beneficial. These findings reveal that young children’s difficulties in set-shifting situations stem partially from failures to monitor for the need to switch.     

Stroop-like interference in chess players' imagery: An unexplored possibility to be revealed by the adapted moving-spot task

Summary A group of highly skilled chess players and two control groups of subjects (nonskilled players and nonplayers) participated in a moving-spot task (cf. Attneave & Curlee, 1983). They had to move either a spot or one of several chess pieces within an imaginary grid according to instructions given by the experimenter (the imaginary motion of the imaginary object consisted of a quasirandom sequence of steps in the direction — up, right, left, or down). The general findings were as follows: (1) chess players' error rates were lower than those in the nonplayer group; (2) in a moving-spot condition there were no significant differences in the efficiency of skilled vs. nonskilled player groups; (3) in a moving chess-piece condition, ranges of spatial errors differed for chess-player and nonplayer groups, depending on the symbolic meaning of the chess pieces in the former group; (4) in a moving chess-piece condition we also found tendencies for Stroop-like interference in the group of skilled players (e. g., bishop moving illegally up, right, etc.); (5) all groups benefitted from the use of a checkerboard instead of an 8 × 8 grid as the imaginary spatial framework within which to move a piece; (6) thepost hoc analysis showed that the two small selected subgroups of subjects comprising those who used either pure visual strategy or pure chess-annotation strategy were susceptible to some Stroop-like interference and that the set of pieces with the highest incongruity of moves (bishop, knight) yielded higher error rates than the set of pieces that had congruity of moves (king, rook). Taken together, these results seem to indicate that visuospatial tasks like Attneave and Curlee's (1983) moving-spot task are performed neither on the basis of a static picture-in-the-head type of visual image, for which it is just the same whether one or another type of piece is imaginarily moved, nor on the basis of purely symbolic or propositional operations that bear no relation to the visual-configurational and spatial-localizational representations. Imagery seems to constitute a dynamicprocess of interplay between visuospatial and verbal-propositional codes.     

Visuospatial attention in schizophrenia: deficits in broad monitoring

Although selective attention is thought to be impaired in people with schizophrenia (PSZ), prior research has found no deficit in the ability to select one location and withdraw attention from another. PSZ and healthy control subjects (HCS) performed a stimulus detection task in which one, two, or all four peripheral target locations were cued. When one or two locations were cued, both PSZ and HCS responded faster when the target appeared at a cued than uncued location. However, increases in the number of validly cued locations had much more deleterious effects on performance for PSZ than HCS, especially for targets of low contrast whose detection was more dependent on attention. PSZ also responded more slowly in trials with four cued locations relative to trials with one or two invalidly cued locations. Thus, visuospatial attention deficits in schizophrenia arise when broad monitoring is required rather than when attention must be focused narrowly.     

Intentional attention switching in dichotic listening: Exploring the efficiency of nonspatial and spatial selection

Using an auditory variant of task switching, we examined the ability to intentionally switch attention in a dichotic-listening task. In our study, participants responded selectively to one of two simultaneously presented auditory number words (spoken by a female and a male, one for each ear) by categorizing its numerical magnitude. The mapping of gender (female vs. male) and ear (left vs. right) was unpredictable. The to-be-attended feature for gender or ear, respectively, was indicated by a visual selection cue prior to auditory stimulus onset. In Experiment 1, explicitly cued switches of the relevant feature dimension (e.g., from gender to ear) and switches of the relevant feature within a dimension (e.g., from male to female) occurred in an unpredictable manner. We found large performance costs when the relevant feature switched, but switches of the relevant feature dimension incurred only small additional costs. The feature-switch costs were larger in ear-relevant than in gender-relevant trials. In Experiment 2, we replicated these findings using a simplified design (i.e., only within-dimension switches with blocked dimensions). In Experiment 3, we examined preparation effects by manipulating the cueing interval and found a preparation benefit only when ear was cued. Together, our data suggest that the large part of attentional switch costs arises from reconfiguration at the level of relevant auditory features (e.g., left vs. right) rather than feature dimensions (ear vs. gender). Additionally, our findings suggest that ear-based target selection benefits more from preparation time (i.e., time to direct attention to one ear) than gender-based target selection.     

Dimension-based working memory-driven capture of visual selection

We studied attentional capture by dimensional cueing of visual objects. Participants received two dimension cues, one relevant for a memory test and the other relevant for an attention test. Performance in the attention task was impaired on incongruent trials (i.e., when the relevant dimensions for memory and attention did not match) relative to congruent trials. Dimensional cueing effects were enhanced when the cued dimension was held “online” in working memory through the trial, compared to when the cued dimension did not have to be held in memory. The findings demonstrate that dimensional cueing of visual selection can occur in a largely automatic manner, with working memory exerting a strong modulatory influence. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the interaction between memory and attention.     

Are survival processing memory advantages based on ancestral priorities?

Recent research has suggested that our memory systems are especially tuned to process information according to its survival relevance, and that inducing problems of “ancestral priorities” faced by our ancestors should lead to optimal recall performance (Nairne & Pandeirada, Cognitive Psychology, 2010). The present study investigated the specificity of this idea by comparing an ancestor-consistent scenario and a modern survival scenario that involved threats that were encountered by human ancestors (e.g., predators) or threats from fictitious creatures (i.e., zombies). Participants read one of four survival scenarios in which the environment and the explicit threat were either consistent or inconsistent with ancestrally based problems (i.e., grasslands–predators, grasslands–zombies, city–attackers, city–zombies), or they rated words for pleasantness. After rating words based on their survival relevance (or pleasantness), the participants performed a free recall task. All survival scenarios led to better recall than did pleasantness ratings, but recall was greater when zombies were the threat, as compared to predators or attackers. Recall did not differ for the modern (i.e., city) and ancestral (i.e., grasslands) scenarios. These recall differences persisted when valence and arousal ratings for the scenarios were statistically controlled as well. These data challenge the specificity of ancestral priorities in survival-processing advantages in memory.     

Detection costs and contingent attentional capture

Peripheral cues reduce reaction times (RTs) to targets at the cued location with short cue-target SOAs (cueing benefits) but increase RTs at long SOAs (cueing costs or inhibition of return). In detection tasks, cueing costs occur at shorter SOAs and are larger compared with identification tasks. To account for effects of task, detection cost theory claims that the integration of cue and target into an object file makes it more difficult to detect the target as a new event, which is the principal task-requirement in detection tasks. The integration of cue and target is expected to increase when cue and target are similar. We provided evidence for detection cost theory in the modified spatial cueing paradigm. Two types of cues (onset, color) were paired with two types of targets (onset, color) in separate blocks of trials. In the identification task, we found cueing benefits with matching (i.e., similar) cue-target pairs (onset-onset, color-color) and no cueing effects with nonmatching cue-target pairs (onset-color, color-onset), which replicates previous work. In the detection task, cueing effects with matching cues were reduced and even turned into cueing costs for onset cues with onset targets, suggesting that cue-target integration made it more difficult to detect targets at the cued location as new events. In contrast, the results for nonmatching cue-target pairs were not affected by task. Furthermore, the pattern of false alarms in the detection task provides a measure of similarity that may explain the size of cueing benefits and costs.     

A two‐process model of strategic monitoring in event‐based prospective memory: Activation/retrieval mode and checking

Theorists have suggested that individuals may remember to execute event‐based intended actions by deploying executive or attentional resources to monitor for the markers or target events that indicate that it is appropriate to execute the intended actions (e.g., McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; Shallice & Burgess, 1991), but these strategic monitoring views are not specific about the processes that strategic monitoring entails. A more specific idea is outlined here (see also Guynn, 2001) and an experiment with results consistent with this view is reported. According to this two‐process view, strategic monitoring entails maintaining the cognitive system in a prospective memory retrieval mode, which may be mediated by increased activation of the prospective memory representation, plus checking whether the circumstances to execute the intended action are present. In the current experiment, concurrent task impairment on nontarget trials, on which participants were instructed to press a key if they saw a target event (i.e., experimental trials), relative to trials on which participants were not instructed to press a key if they saw a target event (i.e., control trials), provided a footprint of strategic monitoring. An interaction of trial type and whether the experimental and control trials alternated or were blocked revealed greater impairment on experimental trials relative to control trials when the trials were blocked than when the trials alternated. Performance on experimental trials did not vary whether the trials alternated or were blocked, while performance on control trials was significantly worse when the trials alternated than when the trials were blocked. The results are consistent with the two‐process view and the idea that participants maintained a retrieval mode/activation and checked on experimental trials, neither maintained a retrieval mode/activation nor checked on blocked control trials, and maintained a retrieval mode/activation but did not check on alternating control trials.     

Visuospatial and articulatory interference in chess players' information intake

Modularity of the human information processing system has been widely accepted. Research based on this theoretical construction has been successful in many areas of cognitive psychology. Surprisingly little work has, however, been done towards understanding the consequences of modularity in thinking skills. In this paper the functions of visuospatial and articulatory processing will be compared in the context of chess skill to obtain information concerning the cognitive resources needed in this skill. Two experiments on chess players' information intake will be made, in which the effects of visuospatial and an articulatory secondary tasks will be compared. In both experiments a visuospatial secondary task causes strong interference, while an articulatory task has no effect on processing. So chess is a highly visual task but articulation, contrary to some pre-theoretical beliefs, has no real significance.     

Dynamic perception in chess

The present study examines the dynamic aspects of perceptual processes in expert chess players. This topic is approached in terms of the anticipation processes carried out by experienced players during the encoding of chess positions. The aim of the first experiment, which used a short-term comparison task, was to stress the role of anticipation, which allows expert players to focus their attention on the area of the studied position where they expect the likely standard move to occur. The second experiment used a long-term recognition task. The results showed that expert players made many false recognitions on the new positions that could be expected from the positions presented in the preliminary study phase. Taken together, the results of the two experiments highlight the anticipatory component of expert perception.