Visual re-identification of individual objects: a core problem for organisms and AI

Two open questions about the visual re-identification of individual objects over extended time periods are briefly reviewed: (1) How much a priori information about the nature of objects, identity and time is required to support robust individual object re-identification abilities? and (2) how do epistemic feelings, such as the feeling of familiarity, contribute both to object re-identification and to the perception of opportunities and risks associated with individual objects and their affordances? The ongoing interplay between experiments that can be carried out with human subjects and experiments made possible with robotic systems is examined. It is suggested that developmental robotics, including virtual-reality simulations of robot–environment interactions, may provide the best route to understanding both the implementation of epistemic feelings in humans and their functional contribution to the identification of persistent individual objects.     

Visual impressions of force exerted by one object on another when the objects do not come into contact

Simple animations in which one object contacts another give rise to visual impressions that the former object causes the outcome for the latter, and that the former object is exerting force on the latter. How does the impression of force relate to the impression of causality? The main aim of this research was to investigate this issue using stimuli in which there is a gap between the objects at closest approach. Delay between the first object stopping and the second object starting to move had a strong effect on reported force impressions, which is consistent with findings of research on the causal impression. However, the reported force impression was little affected by either the size of the gap or the presence and features of an object in the gap, whereas the causal impression was strongly affected by both. The findings support the conclusion that the force impression and the causal impression are distinct components of the visual interpretation of the stimulus.     

因果信息和提示指导语对大学生贝叶斯推理的影响

基于三重加工心智模型，以大学生为被试，采用经典贝叶斯推理的文本范式，通过操纵自变量：因果信息（有或无）与提示指导语（提供或不提供），试图探讨激发反省心智，消解理性障碍的情况下，因果贝叶斯框架的作用机制。估计正确率和准确性的结果都表明因果信息显著提高了贝叶斯推理成绩，准确性的结果也说明指导语可以提示被试放下既有观念，以无偏见的方式进行推理，从而有效促进了贝叶斯推理表现。而在提示条件下增加因果信息并没有促进作用，表明对于较高元认知的被试因果信息作用是有限的。     

Impressions of force in visual perception of collision events: A test of the causal asymmetry hypothesis

When two objects interact they exert equal and opposite forces on each other. According to the causal asymmetry hypothesis, however, when one object has been identified as causal and the other as that in which the effect occurs, the causal object is perceived as exerting greater force on the effect object than the latter is perceived as exerting on the former. An example of this is a stimulus in which one object moves toward another stationary one, and when contact occurs the former stops and the latter moves away. In this situation the initially moving object is identified as causal, so the causal asymmetry hypothesis predicts that more force will be judged to be exerted by the moving object on the stationary one than by the stationary one on the moving one. Participants’ judgments consistently supported this hypothesis for a variety of stimuli in which kinematic parameters were varied, even when the initially moving object reversed direction after contact.     

The property transmission hypothesis: a possible explanation for visual impressions of pulling and other kinds of phenomenal causality

Under certain circumstances, stimuli involving two moving objects that do not come into contact reliably give rise to the illusory perceptual impression that one of the objects is pulling the other, as if there is an unseen connection between them. It is proposed that the conditions determining the occurrence of this impression can be explained as cases of application of the property-transmission hypothesis. This is a general hypothesis that causal objects operate in part by transmitting some of their own properties to effect objects under conditions where the causal object is active, where there are cues to the occurrence of generative transmission between the causal object and an effect object, and where there is a time-ordered relation of resemblance between properties of the causal object and those of the effect object. This hypothesis predicts that the pulling impression should occur only when the effect object adopts kinematic properties (speed and direction) that resemble those of the causal object. An experiment is reported that supports this prediction.     

Intuitions about gravity and solidity in great apes: the tubes task

We investigated whether great apes, like human infants, monkeys and dogs, are subject to a strong gravity bias when tested with the tubes task, and – in case of mastery – what the source of competence on the tubes task is. We presented 22 apes with three versions of the tubes task, in which an object is dropped down a tube connected to one of three potential hiding places and the subject is required to locate the object. In two versions, apes were confronted with a causal tube that varied in the amount of perceptual information it provided (i.e. presence or absence of acoustic cues). The third version was a non‐causal adaptation of the task in which a painted line ‘connected’ dropping and hiding places. Results indicate that apes neither have a reliable gravity bias when tested with the tubes, nor understand the causal function of the tube. Even though there is evidence that they can integrate tube‐related causal information to localize the object, they seem to depend mainly on non‐causal inferences when searching for an invisibly displaced object.     

The Blicket Within: Preschoolers' Inferences About Insides and Causes

Four experiments examined children's inferences about the relation between objects' internal parts and their causal properties. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds recognized that objects with different internal parts had different causal properties, and those causal properties transferred if the internal part moved to another object. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds made inferences from an object's internal parts to its causal properties without being given verbal labels for objects or being shown that insides and causal properties covaried. Experiment 3 found that 4-year-olds chose an object with the same internal part over one with the same external property when asked which object had the same causal property as the target (which had both the internal part and external property). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that 4-year-olds made similar inferences from causal properties to internal parts, but 3-year-olds relied more on objects' external perceptual appearance. These results suggest that by the age of 4, children have developed an understanding of a relation between an artifact's internal parts and its causal properties.     

Perception, Causation, and Supervenience

What relation between an experience and a physical object makes the experience a perception of the object?¹ One common answer is that it is a certain kind of causal relation. The idea is that to perceive an object is just to undergo an experience appropriately caused by the object. This answer is incorrect. The reason is that perceiving an object does not supervene on the causal connection the object bears to the perceiver's experience. Whether or not a person perceives an object depends, in part, on conditions that could obtain or fail to obtain without variation in the causal processes (if any) by which the object causes the person's experience. In what follows, I explain and defend these claims.     

Perceived causality and perceived force: Same or different?

Visually perceived interactions between objects, such as animated versions of billiard ball collisions, give rise to causal impressions, impressions that one object produces some effect in another, and force impressions, impressions that one object exerts a certain amount of force on another. In four experiments, evidence for strong divergence between these two impressions is reported. Manipulations of relative direction of motion and point of contact between the objects had different effects on the causal and force impressions (Experiment 1); delay between one object contacting another and the latter starting to move had a stronger effect on the causal impression than on the force impression (Experiment 2); a context of other moving objects significantly weakened the causal impression but not the force impression (Experiment 3); and there was an inverse relation between an impression of one object penetrating another and the amount of force the former was perceived as exerting on the latter (Experiment 4). These findings are explained in terms of differential effects of instructions on attention, and also in terms of differences in meaning between force and causality.     

Konzepte der Identifizierung

The authors investigate primary, hysterical, narcissistic identification, and introjection as conceptualised by Freud, Melanie Klein’s projective identification, and Anna Freud’s identification with the aggressor and altruistic surrender. It is pointed out that hysterical identification, narcissistic identification, and introjection are unconscious processes leading into a state of primary identification, and that they can be distinguished on a clinical level as regards the emotional meaning the object has for the subject. In hysterical identification the aspects of an object with which one identifies and all its other aspects retain their emotional meaning, in narcissistic identification these other aspects also keep their emotional meaning, but in this case the aspects with which one identifies lose their emotional meaning, and in introjection all aspects of an object lose their emotional meaning. Furthermore, it is shown that hysterical or narcissistic identifications are the mechanisms underlying the identification with the aggressor, and that—along with projections—hysterical re-identification also plays a decisive role in projective identification and altruistic surrender, whereby in these latter processes the object identifies himself unconsciously with the contents projected onto him in a hysterical or narcissistic manner.     

Causal learning from probabilistic events in 24‐month‐olds: an action measure

How do young children learn about causal structure in an uncertain and variable world? We tested whether they can use observed probabilistic information to solve causal learning problems. In two experiments, 24‐month‐olds observed an adult produce a probabilistic pattern of causal evidence. The toddlers then were given an opportunity to design their own intervention. In Experiment 1, toddlers saw one object bring about an effect with a higher probability than a second object. In Experiment 2, the frequency of the effect was held constant, though its probability differed. After observing the probabilistic evidence, toddlers in both experiments chose to act on the object that was more likely to produce the effect. The results demonstrate that toddlers can learn about cause and effect without trial‐and‐error or linguistic instruction on the task, simply by observing the probabilistic patterns of evidence resulting from the imperfect actions of other social agents. Such observational causal learning from probabilistic displays supports human children's rapid cultural learning.     

记叙文中因果连贯对空间情境模型回溯建构的促进

采用移动窗口阅读技术探讨记叙文理解中因果关系对于空间信息加工的作用。实验1和2的自变量是故事中空间信息与故事结果的因果关系,采用相关样本t检验对不同条件下探测词的反应时进行统计分析,结果表明因果关系不仅会影响文本明确提及的空间信息的加工而且能够促进隐含的空间关系建构情境模型。实验3的自变量是故事中物体与位置词的空间关系,采用相关样本t检验对不同条件下位置探测词的反应时进行统计分析,结果进一步表明空间情境模型是读者为保持故事因果连贯回溯建构的而不是在阅读进程中的实时建构。实验4中空间关系的复杂程度增大,结果发现当故事中空间信息的文本距离较远时即使有保持因果连贯的需要,读者仍无法回溯建构空间模型。     

The role of preschoolers' social understanding in evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions

Preschoolers use information from interventions, namely intentional actions, to make causal inferences. We asked whether children consider some interventions to be more informative than others based on two components of an actor’s knowledge state: whether an actor possesses causal knowledge, and whether an actor is allowed to use their knowledge in a given situation. Three- and four-year-olds saw a novel toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Two actors, one knowledgeable about the toy and one ignorant, each tried to activate the toy with an object. In Experiment 1, either the actors chose objects or the child chose for them. In Experiment 2, the actors chose objects blindfolded. Objects were always placed on the toy simultaneously, and thus were equally associated with the effect. Preschoolers’ causal inferences favored the knowledgeable actor’s object only when he was allowed to choose it (Experiment 1). Thus, children consider both personal and situational constraints on knowledge when evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions.     

The causal asymmetry

It is hypothesized that there is a pervasive and fundamental bias in humans' understanding of physical causation: Once the roles of cause and effect are assigned to objects in interactions, people tend to overestimate the strength and importance of the causal object and underestimate that of the effect object in bringing about the outcome. This bias is termed the causal asymmetry. Evidence for this bias is reviewed in several domains, including visual impressions of causal relations, reasoning about Newton's third law in naive physics problems, concepts underlying linguistic expressions of causality, and research in causal judgment from contingency information. Although there might be an equivalent to the causal asymmetry in the domain of social causality, there are too many uncertainties in the evidence for conclusions to be drawn.     

Visual impressions of generative transmission

ABSTRACT

Previous research has shown that stimuli in which a moving object (A) contacts a stationary one (B) and stops, and object B then moves off in the same direction, give rise to a causal impression: object A is perceived as producing the motion of object B. This impression is weakened or does not occur if there is a delay between A contacting B and B moving, or if there is a spatial gap between B and the location at which A stops. It is shown that a strong causal impression can occur despite the presence of both gap and delay if there are cues to generative transmission of causal influence from A to B. The cues investigated were successive colour change of a series of objects filling the gap between A and B. Reported causal impressions were stronger with the colour change stimuli than with stimuli in which the objects were present but did not change colour, and stronger if the colour change proceeded from A to B than if it proceeded in the opposite direction. Reported causal impressions increased in strength as the number of objects involved in the colour change increased, consistent with the hypothesis that the colour change is a cue to a process of transmission, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that it is perceived or inferred as involving a chain of causal relations. Other kinds of changes to object properties—a small upward motion, shrinkage without moving, and disappearance—yielded similar results. It appears that any rapid sequential change in object properties in the direction of causal influence can function to give rise to the visual impression of generative transmission. The possible role of apparent motion is discussed.     

Causal coherence and the availability of locations and objects during narrative comprehension

The aim of this study was to examine whether locations of objects are encoded and available to the reader at different points in a narrative, depending on their causal relevance. Participants in five experiments read narratives in which the spatial relation between an object and its location either did or did not provide a causal explanation for a later critical event. Object and location target words were presented to the participants immediately before or after the critical event. Speeded recognition response times to target words demonstrated that both locations and objects were reactivated, but only after they became causally relevant. The results suggest that the causal structure of a text can influence the availability of spatial information and that at least some spatial relations are encoded during reading and are available to the reader when they are needed to build coherence.     

Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past

When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past-perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interesting cases of hallucination. Hallucinations generated by misleading cues (e.g. ‘seeing’ Kanizsa triangles), hallucinations of Charles Bonnet Syndrome patients, and dreams are experiences of past-perceived objects.     

Toward a causal realist account of causal understanding

Within a limited domain, humans can perceive causal relations directly. The term causal realism is used to denote this psychological hypothesis. The domain of causal realism is in actions upon objects and haptic perception of the effects of those actions: When we act upon an object we cannot be mistaken about the fact that we are acting upon it and perceive the causal relation directly through mechanoreceptors. Experiences of actions upon objects give rise to causal knowledge that can be used in the interpretation of perceptual input. Phenomenal causality, the occurrence of causal impressions in visual perception, is a product of the application of acquired causal knowledge in the automatic perceptual interpretation of appropriate stimuli. Causal realism could constitute the foundation on which all causal perception, judgment, inference, attribution, and knowledge develop.     

Inferring Causal History froms Shape

The shape of an object often seems to tell us something about the object's history; that is, the processes of growth, pushing, stretching, resistance, indentation, and so on, that formed the object. A theory is offered here of how people are able to infer the causal history of natural objects such as clouds, tumors, embryos, leaves, geological formations, and the like. Two inference problems are examined: the first is the inference of causal history from a single shape. It is claimed that this inference consists of two simple and yet powerful rules, based upon the symmetry and curvature structure of the shapes. When these two rules are applied to a large collection of shapes, it is found that the resulting causal histories accord remarkably well with intuition. The second inference problem is the recovery of intervening causal history between two successive shapes that are known to be two stages in the development of the same object. This type of inference is manifested, for example, when a doctor compares two X-rays, taken a month apart, of the same tumor, and is able to conjecture the intervening growth. It is found that a grammar of only six operations is sufficient to generate the later shape from the earlier one via psychologically meaningful process-extrapolations. Finally, a basic heuristic by which human beings seem to infer complex temporal relations between different processes in the past is proposed, and investigated in detail.