How an unfamiliar thing should be called

An empirical method is described to derive good names for unfamiliar objects. It is based on three principles: (1) The names should be within users' linguistic capacities; (2) names should be informationally efficient; (3) names should form a classification system. The principles lead to a three-step method: (1) Subjects generate names for the objects; (2) a subset of the names, which fulfills the principles, is selected; (3) how good the names are is tested by matching and recall tasks. Steps 2 and 3 are iterated to improve the nnames. The names that result are natural, short, easily matched with their physical referents, and well recalled. The method is generalizable and ought to be useful in a large variety of situations where names for unfamiliar objects are needed.This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research Contract No. N00014-78-C-0433 to the first author. This report is No. 111 of the Institute of Cognitive Science's Technical Report Series.     

Do the wrong thing: How toddlers tell a joke from a mistake

We investigated whether 19–36-month-olds (1) differentiate mistakes from jokes, and (2) understand humorous intentions. The experimenter demonstrated unambiguous jokes accompanied by laughter, unambiguous mistakes accompanied by the experimenter saying, “Woops!”, and ambiguous actions that could either be a mistake or a joke, accompanied by either laughter or, “Woops!” Toddlers were asked to try. Nineteen- to 36-month-olds differentiated jokes and mistakes by copying unambiguous jokes and correcting unambiguous mistakes. Only 25–36-month-olds differentiated mistakes and humorous intentions by copying ambiguous actions marked by laughter, and correcting those marked by, “Woops!” Understanding humorous intentions precedes understanding intentions behind pretense, lying, and false beliefs, thus may be a first step in understanding that others can intend to do the wrong thing.     

How to be a deontic buck-passer

Philosophical Studies - Deontic, as opposed to evaluative buck-passing theories seem to be easier to accept, since there appears to be an intimate connection between deontic properties, such as...     

How to be a type-C physicalist

This paper advances a version of physicalism which reconciles the “a priori entailment thesis” (APET) with the analytic independence of our phenomenal and physical vocabularies. The APET is the claim that, if physicalism is true, the complete truths of physics imply every other truth a priori. If so, “cosmic hermeneutics” is possible: a demon having only complete knowledge of physics could deduce every truth about the world. Analytic independence is a popular physicalist explanation for the apparent “epistemic gaps” between phenomenal and physical truths. The two are generally seen as incompatible, since the demon’s deductions seem to presuppose analytic connections between physical and phenomenal terms. I begin by arguing, in support of the APET, that implications from the complete truths of physics to phenomenal truths cannot be a posteriori. Such implications are (according to the physicalist) necessarily true. But they cannot be Kripke-style a posteriori necessities, since (according to the physicalist) the complete truths of physics fix any relevant a posteriori facts about the reference of terms. I then show how the physicalist can turn the tables: the demon can exploit the physical fixing of reference to bridge the gap between the vocabularies, by deducing when phenomenal and physical terms co-refer. This opens the way for a “type-C” physicalism, which accepts in-principle deducibility while still appealing to analytic independence to explain why we (who are not demons) find it impossible to see phenomenal-physical connections a priori.     

Strategy variability: How too much of a good thing can hurt performance

Recent research (e.g., Siegler, 1996) has discovered the important and vital role that variability plays among strategy use and development over time. However, as many researchers have pointed out (e.g., Miller, 1993), the majority of the research addressing this issue has focused on the outcomes, rather than on the potentially more informative aspects of variability, strategy development, and the process of adaptation. In this study, we examined the role of variability during strategy development, utilizing a longitudinal method. Thirteen participants were studied over 3 months as they coached a simulated football team. The results suggest that variability plays a major role in adaptive skill acquisition in a dynamic environment--in the direction, however, opposite to that predicted by previous research done with simple static tasks.     

Semantic overlap between scale items may be a good thing: Reply to Smedslund

Smedslund has rediscovered the fact that the items of many scales are to various degrees semantically related. He is critical of this. It is pointed out that there is already an ongoing debate about how much semantic overlap there should be between items and it is claimed that such overlap is important in maximizing reliability. Too much overlap does however limit validity so proposals for formalizing the degree of overlap are briefly explored.     

How to be a Normative Expressivist1

Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief.     

How to be a minimalist about sets

According to the iterative conception of set, sets can be arranged in a cumulative hierarchy divided into levels. But why should we think this to be the case? The standard answer in the philosophical literature is that sets are somehow constituted by their members. In the first part of the paper, I present a number of problems for this answer, paying special attention to the view that sets are metaphysically dependent upon their members. In the second part of the paper, I outline a different approach, which circumvents these problems by dispensing with the priority or dependence relation altogether. Along the way, I show how this approach enables the mathematical structuralist to defuse an objection recently raised against her view.     

这殿后来的荣耀必大过先前的荣耀——杭州基督教崇一堂新堂落成典礼暨《爱的人生》首发式

“万王之王,万主之主,唯有你配得敬拜和赞美……”2005年5月5日9点30分,在熟悉的赞美歌声伴随下,杭州基督教会崇一堂新堂落成典礼暨《爱的人生》首发式正式拉开序幕,丁光训主教,中国基督教两会咨询委员会主任韩文藻同工,中国基督教三自爱国运动委员会主席季剑虹长老,中国基督教三自爱国运     

When scowling may be a good thing: The influence of anger expressions on credibility

Emotion displays do not only signal emotions but also have social signal value. A study was conducted to test the hypothesis that expressing anger when complaining may lead to positive outcomes for the complainant because anger signals goal obstruction and hence the presence of real harm. The results suggest that the social signal value of anger enhances the credibility of the complainant and hence leads to better compensation, but only when the complaint itself presents room for doubt. For highly justified complaints the additional expression of anger does not add information and is discounted. In contrast, showing an affiliative‐smiling demeanor was found to enhance credibility for both types of complaints. Overall, the present research confirmed the important role of emotion expressions as social signals. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.