Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states: retrieval,behavior, and experience

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the feeling that accompanies temporary inaccessibility of an item that a person is trying to retrieve. TOTs have been studied experimentally since the seminal work of Brown and McNeill (1966). TOTs are experiences that accompany some failed or slow retrievals, and they can result in changes in retrieval behavior itself, allowing us to study the interplay among experience, retrieval, and behavior. We often attribute the experience of the TOT to the unretrieved target, but TOTs are based on a variety of cues, heuristics, or sources of evidence, such as partial information, related information, and cue familiarity, that predict the likelihood of overcoming retrieval failure. We present a synthesis of the direct-access view, which accounts for retrieval failure, and the heuristic–metacognitive view, which accounts for the experience of the TOT. We offer several avenues for future research and applications of TOT theory and data.     

Individual differences in phenomenological experience: states of consciousness as a function of absorption

State manifestations of the trait of absorption--a trait associated with differential responsivity to hypnosis, meditation, marijuana intoxification, and electromyograph (EMG) biofeedback--were assessed to determine (a) if absorption correlates with various (sub)dimensions of phenomenological experience, and (b) if individuals of differing absorption ability experience different states of consciousness. In two experiments 249 and 304 participants completed Tellegen's absorption scale and experienced several stimulus conditions. Each condition's phenomenological state was assessed by means of a retrospective self-report questionnaire and quantified in terms of intensity and pattern parameters. The results indicated that absorption correlated with increased and more vivid imagery, inward and absorbed attention, and positive affect; decreased self-awareness; and increased alterations in state of consciousness and various aspects of subjective experience. In addition, individuals of high absorption ability, relative to lows, experienced a different state of consciousness during ordinary, waking consciousness that became an altered state with eye closure and an hypnoticlike induction. The usefulness of the results for understanding altered-state induced procedures such as hypnosis is discussed.     

The effect of embodied emotive states on cognitive categorization

Research has uncovered that positive affect broadens cognitive categorization. The motivational dimensional model, however, posits that positive affect is not a unitary construct with only one cognitive consequence. Instead, this model puts forth that there are different positive affects varying in approach motivational intensity. According to this model, only positive affects lower in motivational intensity should broaden cognitive processes, whereas positive affects higher in motivational intensity should narrow cognitive processes. Consistent with these predictions, high approach positive affect has been shown to narrow attention, whereas low approach positive affect has been shown to broaden it (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). High approach positive affect, therefore, might narrow categorization. Two experiments investigated this possibility by having participants respond to cognitive categorization tasks in 3 body postures designed to elicit different levels of approach motivation: reclining backward, which should evoke low approach motivation; sitting upright, which should evoke moderate approach motivation; and leaning forward, which should evoke high approach motivation. Participants smiled while in each posture in order to experience positive affect. Experiment 1 provided initial support for the idea that high approach positive affect narrows categorization and low approach positive affect broadens categorization. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with improved smiling instructions. These results extend previous work by showing that the motivational model's predictions hold for basic attentional processes as well as higher level cognitive processes such as categorization.     

Expressing experience: the promise and perils of the phenomenological interview

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - This paper outlines several of the challenges that are inherent in any attempt to communicate subjective experience to others, particularly in...     

The bizarreness effect: Dissociation between item and source memory

The present study investigated the relationship between memory for particular items (nouns embedded in sentences) varying in bizarreness and the spatial location in which they were learned. Consistent with earlier findings, the items embedded in bizarre sentences were better recalled than those embedded in common sentences. This mnemonic advantage for bizarre sentences did not extend to memory for source (spatial location), which did not reliably vary as a function of bizarreness. This pattern is inconsistent with several existing theoretical formulations of the relation between item and source encoding and related findings. We propose a theoretical possibility for integrating these varied findings. Finally, the expectation-violation explanation of the bizarreness effect was not supported by the absence of a relation between recall of the items and memory for context.     

A developed nature: a phenomenological account of the experience of home

Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home” is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving.     

SARA: a cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.     

A phenomenological survey of auditory verbal hallucinations in the hypnagogic and hypnopompic states

The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) occurring in hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) states has received little attention. In a sample of healthy participants (N = 325), 108 participants reported H&H AVHs and answered subsequent questions on their phenomenology. AVHs in the H&H state were found (1) to be more likely to only feature the occasional clear word than to be clear, (2) to be more likely to be one-off voices than to be recurrent voices, (3) to be more likely to be voices of people known to the individual than unknown persons, (4) to be more likely to talk directly to the person rather than not, and (5) to only rarely give commands, ask questions, or to result in an interactive conversation. Their phenomenology was similar to normative AVHs in wakefulness (as established by previous research) in that the voice-hearer was usually the target of the voice, and the voice was more likely to be of a recognized person. However, H&H AVHs differed from AVHs in wakefulness in that commands and questions were rare, and there was typically no dialogical engagement with the voice. We conclude by proposing that two distinct types of H&H AVHs may exist (which we term “dialogic” and “monologic”), based on an analysis of the phenomenology of the experience, and suggest avenues for future research.     

Dreaming and the brain: toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states

Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states.     

Dissociation of the distance effect and size effect in one-digit numbers

Magnitude comparison of single digits is robustly characterized by a distance effect (close numbers are more difficult to compare than numbers further apart) and a size effect (for a given distance, comparison difficulty increases with increasing size). The distance effect indicates access to the mental number line (Dehaene, 1997), and the size effect is usually interpreted as indicating that the mental number line represents larger numbers more vaguely than smaller ones. In contrast, we have argued earlier (Verguts, Fias, & Stevens, 2005) that for symbolic numbers (Arabic or verbal notation), the size effect does not originate from the mental number line but, instead, originates from mappings to relevant output components that are specific for magnitude comparison. If the latter is true, it should be possible to dissociate the distance effect from the size effect in tasks other than magnitude comparison. In two experiments, we observed a robust distance effect insame/different judgments, which implies access to the mental number line. Yet the size effect was absent. Consistent with our prediction, this finding establishes a dissociation between the size effect and the distance effect.     

Relationships between trait impulsivity and cognitive control: the effect of attention switching on response inhibition and conflict resolution

This study examined the relationship between trait impulsivity and cognitive control, as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) and a focused attention dichotic listening to words task, respectively. In the task, attention was manipulated in two attention conditions differing in their cognitive control demands: one in which attention was directed to one ear at a time for a whole block of trials (blocked condition) and another in which attention was switched pseudo-randomly between the two ears from trial to trial (mixed condition). Results showed that high impulsivity participants exhibited more false alarm and intrusion errors as well as a lesser ability to distinguish between stimuli in the mixed condition, as compared to low impulsivity participants. In the blocked condition, the performance levels of the two groups were comparable with respect to these measures. In addition, total BIS scores were correlated with intrusions and laterality index in the mixed but not the blocked condition. The findings suggest that high impulsivity individuals may be less prone to attentional difficulties when cognitive load is relatively low. In contrast, when attention switching is involved, high impulsivity is associated with greater difficulty in inhibiting responses and resolving cognitive conflict than is low impulsivity, as reflected in error-prone information processing. The conclusion is that trait impulsivity in a non-clinical population is manifested more strongly when attention switching is required than during maintained attention. This may have important implications for the conceptualization and treatment of impulsivity in both non-clinical and clinical populations.     

Contributions of cognitive science to the Rorschach Technique: cognitive and neuropsychological correlates of the response process

This article presents an understanding of the Rorschach Technique in terms of emergent models from cognitive science. We propose a linkage between cognitive psychology and neuropsychology in understanding the operations that underlie the Rorschach response process. Contemporary information processing models are described. The Rorschach Technique is conceived of as a complex process involving all areas of the cerebral hemispheres, encompassing various aspects of visual attention and perception, object recognition, associative memory, language production, and executive functioning. Exner's model of the response process is delineated, including both Association and Inquiry phases, in terms of requisite underlying neuropsychological abilities and anatomical substrates. The question of the Rorschach Technique's status, utility, and potential as a neuropsychological assessment, tool is discussed. Understanding the Rorschach in terms of contemporary cognitive psychological and neuropsychological models heightens appreciation of the technique's complexity and provides a heuristic and conceptual foundation for empirical research.     

Relation of game location and experience on mood states

The study investigated relationships between game location, performers' experience, and mood states. 31 experienced collegiate soccer players completed the Brunel Mood Scale to assess anger, calmness, confusion, depression, fatigue, happiness, tension, and vigor before eight competitive games (four home and four away). Participants were categorized into Experienced and Less Experienced groups, based on the level of performance at which they played. Repeated-measures multivariate analyses of variance compared mean mood scores across location and experience, and follow-up univariate analyses suggested the increase in mood scores on Tension and decrease in scores on Calmness, Happiness, and Vigor between playing away and at home were significantly greater for Less experienced soccer players than Experienced players. Implications of these findings for the applied practitioner are discussed.     

Dissociation of bimanual responses with the Simon effect: on the nonunitization of bimanual responses

The authors examined whether responses of the 2 hands were completely unitized when participants (N=36) produced bimanual responses to lateralized targets in a Simon-type paradigm. Their primary aim was to investigate whether lateralized stimuli differentially influence the response dynamics of the 2 hands. Simon effects were obtained in reaction time and force components of the bimanual response by the hand on the same side as the lateralized stimulus were more forceful than were those of the other hand. Also, Simon effects were larger when the lateralized target appeared alone than when it was accompanied by a distractor on the other side of the display. Finally, responses of the 2 hands were correlated most strongly when stimulus displays were symmetrical. The authors conclude that bimanual responses are strongly coupled, but not perfectly so.     

Emotional states and memory biases: effects of cognitive priming and mood

Recent studies have shown that naturally occurring and experimentally induced affect states enhance the accessibility to retrieval of memories of life experiences that are congruent in valence with the affect state. Previous studies have suggested that this memory bias results from the influence of affective processes on memory retrieval. In our study we manipulated mood state by having subjects read statements expressing positive or negative self-evaluative ideas or describing somatic states that often accompany positive or negative mood states. The somatic and self-evaluative statements had, in general, equally strong effects on mood state. In spite of this, however, the self-evaluative statements had a stronger impact on recall latencies for life experiences than did the somatic statements. Moreover, the impact of the self-evaluative, but not the somatic, statements on recall was found to be independent of the statements' effects on mood state. This suggests that the cognitions accompanying a mood-altering experience may have a substantial effect on the capacity of the mood state to influence memory retrieval.