Is There a Cognitive Basis for Religious Belief?

This paper explores whether the psychological study of cognition can provide insight into how religious beliefs are formed and maintained. A review of illustrative findings from the research literature suggests three themes: First, regularities in our everyday experience are primarily identified through assessment of individual situations rather than through use of all relevant data. Second, preconceptions are highly important in shaping perceptions and interpretations of new experience. Finally, intense emotions often generate an inaccurate sense of certainty regarding beliefs congruent with these emotions. The applicability of these themes to the relationship between religious experience and religious belief is examined. The paper concludes by briefly discussing whether the increasing proportion of the population receiving statistical and scientific training will influence the level of religious belief in Western culture.     

Is There a Problem of Special Angelic Action?

One of the most widely discussed topics in the recent science & theology literature has been divine activity. It is odd that in this literature there has been no discussion of whether and how to accommodate special angelic action (hereafter SAA). Just as the Bible records many instances of apparent SDA, it records many instances of apparent SAA. This neglect may be due to an assumption that there is no distinct problem relating to SAA; the existing suggested solutions to the problem(s) surrounding SDA may be transferable to the angelic context. My aim is to disprove that idea.     

Is Psychology a Cognitive Science?

ABSTRACT Since the 1970s there has been a significant paradigm shift in psychology away from behaviourism and towards cognitive psychology. Indeed a recent survey discovered that by 1983 more than half American psychologists were describing their approaches as cognitive. However, while behaviourism has had an identifiable philosophical 'line' in positivism, reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive model, such a framework has been noticeably lacking from cognitive psychology. A view of cognitive psychology based on functionalism and ideas from systems analysis is put forward.     

Cognitive Performance in Adults’ Daily Lives: Is There a Lab-Life Gap?

This article addresses the “lab-life gap” in cognitive aging research as an important issue of ecological validity in developmental research. Older adults often function competently in complex everyday situations despite age-related deficits on laboratory-based cognitive tasks. Therefore, to what extent do lab-based cognitive tasks predict real-life outcomes in older adults? Our review shows that although they are similar, measures of everyday cognitive competence predict relevant outcomes beyond basic measures. We provide our perspective on critical questions concerning the relevance of everyday cognitive tests in our ever-changing world, new methods of everyday cognitive assessment, and whether everyday cognition can be improved.     

Teaching Theology and Religious Studies Is There A Problem?

This paper discusses a problem which is largely, though not exclusively, peculiar to the older universities in Great Britain where, in recent years, many long-established departments of Christian theology have expanded their area of responsibility to include religious studies. However, the author believes that what he has to say is not without relevance to universities and colleges outside of Great Britain which have inherited and continue to maintain a confessional bias in teaching theology and religion.     

What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory norms. I raise methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition of music, I argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definitions of interest to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.     

IFPS - Is There a Difference?

This paper tries to answer a question about the difference between IFPS and other psychoanalytical institutions. The author states that there is a linkage between the ethics of psychoanalysis and the ethics of the institution. The ethics can not be represented by rules or standards of prerequisites, but by creating a space where the unconscious as desire, singularity and difference takes place. The bureaucratic organization and the hierarchy in the categories of members of IPA institutions goes straight against the transgressor experience of the unconscious. The training analysis under such conditions leads to an identification process with the training analyst, giving as final result standardized, homogeneous, obedient analysts. The author describes a new experience in the training of analysts in his institution without any kind of interference from IFPS. Finally, he concludes that differences exists between the two institutions and that they are mainly due to the identification process typical for IPA and the process of ''choice'' in IFPS.     

Is Global Poverty a Philosophical Problem?

Peter Singer’s groundbreaking call to action in 1972, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” drew philosophical attention to the topic of famine and the associated suffering or preventable death of many throughout the world. Yet despite the volume of philosophical work Singer’s paper inspired, it would still be easy to suppose that global poverty is not a problem for philosophers to take seriously in itself but is rather a particularly stark illustration or instance of a more general problem, whether in ethics or in political philosophy. The aim of this paper is to argue that the philosophical landscape of global poverty is both sui generis and sufficiently complex that the topic should be considered not as an instance of a more general philosophical problem but as a distinct area of normative inquiry.     

Is There a Philosophy of Information?

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.     

Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement?

This essay considers whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement. It is argued that knowledge of God is not only compatible with a more general achievement claim, but is also compatible with a much stronger achievement claim – namely, the strong achievement thesis where achievements are characterized by the overcoming of some obstacle. With respect to reformed epistemology, then, it is argued that the obstacle that is overcome is an environment that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. This essay suggests two ways in which the agent is involved in the process of overcoming this obstacle.     

Is There a Right to Be Forgiven?

Philosophia - Imagine a case of wrongdoing—not something trivial, but nothing so serious that adequate reparations are impossible. Imagine, further, that the wrongdoer makes those reparations...     

Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism?

The “problem of forgotten evidence” is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue that these critics are mistaken.     

Is There a Claim to Deserved Punishment?

In this paper I defend the view that persons have a claim to deserved treatment, including many forms of punishment, against an objection resting on the principle that it is not possible to have a claim to harmful treatment. I do not challenge this principle, but argue, rather, that the harms wrongdoers typically deserve either (a) are not genuine harms at all (for reasons relevant to their being deserved) or (b) are not relevant to the content of these wrongdoers' claims.     

Is There a Double Standard of Aging?1

Elderly and college-aged subjects rated photographs of both sexes at three different ages on 10 adjective rating scales. Evidence for a double standard of aging was obtained. Although both men and women were perceived to diminish in attractiveness as they aged, the decline for women was greater. Moreover, ratings of women's femininity decreased with increasing age, whereas evaluations of men's masculinity were unaffected by age. Unexpectedly, elderly subjects, as compared to college students, discriminated less on the basis of sex and evaluated women more positively. Changes in the gender roles of the elderly were invoked to explain their more favorable conceptions of women.     

Is There Such a Thing as Relative Analyticity?

Fine bases his influential conception of essence on a particular account of definitions. And he complements it with a specific account of analyticity. I will argue that Fine's conception of relative analyticity confuses the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's definition with the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's meaning. His idea that correct definitions specify essential properties of meanings is mistaken. The correctness of definitions can only be assessed by reference to the actual usage of the terms involved. The resulting conception of definitions leads to a deflationary interpretation of claims about essences.